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hauk made hy Dominge> Souza, Mr. Vl\nsittart, and lIlr. Villiel'll-
1.<lrd Wellington ridiculea it---Ue pllrmitll a contrnballd trade w ha
carried OIl with Lisbon by Soult, fur tho sako of too re8UUrcee it
furnishea , • _ _ • • • • • • • • p. 207
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NOTICE.
IN addition to the manuscript authorities used for the fonnel'
volumes, several memoirs, joumals, and notes of offi~l'S
cmll!oycd in the different operations have been consulted for
this volume. Amongst others, the Journal of general Harvey,
of tlle Portuguese service, and some original papers suptllied
by sir Howan! DougllUl.
IN my controversy with marshal Beresford, for which see the
sixth volume, I expressed a belief that the French army at
Albuera WllS less numerous than I had represented it. 'fhe
following letter, since procured, decides the questiou;-
E:arait d''U:M kttre ecrite de Seville le 4 Mai, 1811, par M. k-
m"' due de lJalnudie, yfmha/...en..clwJ de l'armle du midi,
as. A. S. le prince de IYcuJTum et de Nev.jclllJ.tel, major.
gemral.
Le g6nhal lAtonr Maubourg a 6t6 oblig6 de 8C replier !!Ut
CODstantina et Alamis, Cordovo est mCDacee par un corps
Anglnis, Portugais, et F..spagnol, bMucoup de troupes Il6
ooncentrent en Estremauure; Badajoz est investie. La
g&n~ml Blake a r~uni sur l'Odiet une arm6e de quinze a seize
mille hOllUlles, et paroit se pr6parer a. marcher sur Seville.
Le restant dn quatricme CQrps est en opfrlltions contre les
troupes qui out d6!.lnuch6 de Murcie. Si j'cnumere !.lien, je
6uis ell cet instant attaqu6 Bur divert! points par Jllus de
soixnnte !niHe hommes indlil>elldllmmeut de troupes qui BOut
reaWes a Cadiz et 1:1. l'isle de Uon, et de eelles qu'il y a 1:1.
'fnrrifa, 0. Algesirns. et a Gibraltar, que je dois coutcnir, le
danger est pre~nt, je dois fl\ire face de tous ctltes assurer de
uouveaux triomphes nux armees de S. M. l'empereur, et eviter
NOTICES.
les facheux h~nemensJ que 1'on prepare contre l'arm6e dn
midi. J'esp&e riiussir, mais le suC(,-es sera complet ~i lea
secours que j'll.ttenus arriv~J1t apropos j void mea dispositions.
Je pars duns quatre jours ave<: vinge mille lunwrne8, erois mille
cJwvaux, et trente pWlWJ de canon, pour rcjetter nu delA de la.
GUndiillla. les corps eunemis qui se sont r6pundus en Estrc-
mndure, d6gagcr &dnjos et fuciliter I'llrriv60 du g6n6ro.l comto
d'Erlon. Si les troupes que 00 g6ncrDI Dmcnc pcuvent so
l'C\llIir avee celles que je coniluirai et si lea tl'onpes qui sont
parties des armcea du nord et dn centre, dont j'ai en partie
di'lposC, arrivcnt A wrns, j'aurai en Estrcmadute trente-einq
mille hommes, cinq mille chevaux, et quarant-e pieces de canon
de campagne; alors je livre bataille nux ennemis Il.uaud hien
meme toute l'arnlce Angloise qui est sur le continen.t y seroit
rcunie, et ils seront vaincus.
Si une pnrtie des rcnforts que j'attends manquent je few
avcc ce que j'll.urai, tout ce IIUC pourrai vera le but propose.
Le geueral-l.lll-chef de l'anll6e illlphiale du midi,
(Signce) Mo' Due DE DALMATlE.
Pour ex.traits conformes.
LeUers to ale .Aut/wr received since the publication of tJu
First EdiJ.ion.
Moonsd-house, 'Ileal' Bridgewater,
16th October, 1831.
SIR,-The well.merited reputation which YOilr work on the
Peninsula. 'j\'nr a.lrcndy possesses, and the probability there is
that from its general correctncss, and the deep research dis-
played in its production, it will be referred to in aft.el' times
as the most faithful r~rd. of the operations of the British
army iu the Peuinsula, induces me to refer you to a passage
wherein my llame is mentioned ail commauding lhe cavalry
on the 8th of October, 1810, when Masscna.'s ad\'auccu guard
drove the envalry piquets out of Rio Maior.
The account which you give of tbat an:air is subat.antinlly
correct with the exception of my baving the command. I
commanded n brigndo only; sir S. Cotton was present in
A1eocntre, and comulllUdcd tho wholo force upon tho occasion,
as you ll:lay aati.sfy yourself by referring to the London Gazette,
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wllerein appears a letter from that officer to lord Wellingtoll
of the 9th of October detailing the whole proceedillg.
As correctness must ever he tho aim of the impartial
historian, I tnJst you will do me the justice of inserting this
letter in thn forthcoming volume.
I have the honour to he,
&:e. ke. &le.
JOHN SLADE, Le.·GclleToJ.
Note by cO/OMl Napier.-'!tIy account of the all1i.ir of Rio Maior Wtll
chiefly Uken from the manuscript joum.~l of tho late major Som~'I1I
Coek&, who had a diatioguiMed 8,"~ in the skirmish; in tlmt o\ocoUllt
Jteoeral8lade W:IlI mentioned aa commanding the rear-guard for the day.
Hence my error.
Woolwicli, September 7, 1833.
DEAR SrR,-In perusing the third volume of your History
of the Peninsula War, I observe in the account of the battle
of Albuera, that you ascribe to me exertions on the right of
our position, which in reality are due to air Jnliua Hartmall,
who commanded the British and German artillery, as I did
that of the Portuguese iu the battle; the two COlllmaum
bein~independellt of each other, and bot11 were thanked by
lord lleresford in the orders Bnd despatches.
11111.\'0 to oxplain that my guIill, by lord Beresford'a orders,
were postOO, for ll. great part of the battle, on favourable
ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and about
700 yards from the village. Their fire bore ejfedtuJJJy upon
the bridge, and the road from it to Albuera, and I was not
ordered to the right till towards the close of the bllttle.
In cone1usion, I can only add that yOll will oblige me by
giving publicity to thia statement in a note to your ncxt
vo1umc. I remain, uear sir,
kc. &c. &C.
A. DlCKSQY.
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CHAPTER I.
STATE OF"THE WARlN SPAIN.
DORSENNE'S invasion of Gnllicia was happily prevented when
it could not have been resisted, but that province remaiued 9Jl
inert as before. Overtures had been made from England to
takcSpnnish troops into British pay, but the Spanish regency,
remembering Canuing's prodigality, demanded three millions
sterling yearly besides arms Md clothing, without which the
Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! And the intro-
duction of Euglish officers Oil uny other terms was impo!ll>ible,
because t}IO Spanish military mon were indignant at the
degrading proposal! The Perceval faction finding it t1mB, anel
wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington on Q, scale
commensurate with his capacity, theu sought to encourage the
partidas as less expensive, aud more excmplary for the conti.
nental natious in respeet to Fl'llnoo; wherefore sir Howard
Douglas, successor to gelleral Walker as the Gallieian military
agent, was directed to increase the sUPlllies to tllOse bodies, and
to combine their movcmcnl.g with eaeh other and
with the EIlgli~h Biscay SqulLdroll. Wellington
also, at the desire of the ministers, sellt tlle
chiefs military presents, with letters acknowledging their
service&, ond justly, for he had derived great advon·
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tages from tlldr efforts, and thought he haa dcrived more,
because he only knew of their exploit!! by hCllrflfLY. Wllen he
afterwards Bll.W them closoly lle acknowledged, tlltl.~ however
willing to aet aud however harassiug their warfare had been,
none of them could fight the French without very sU11el"ior
numbers: if the latter occupied it, house or church and only
baned the rl('"rs, ndtllCr fCglllars nor particins could force
tllem. In like manllcr Nnlloleon, rebuking hls generols for
suffering the parlidas to gather head, observed, thut when cut
off from the English ships tlley were nullities.
Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne's retreat enabled Abadia.
to resume his poi\ition on the frontier; but the wet senson WIIS
setting in upon men destitute of the nCl:Cssnries of life in a
province abounding with cu.ttle and goods easily to be pro-
cured; for money, although plentiful, was generaUy llOarded,
and hence commodities were cheap and to be obtained in lieu
of taxes at the market-price. An extraordinary increase of
the customs, nrising from the trade of &lltilnder nnd Bilbao
being trausferred to Coruilll by the war, alilQ offered a vnJuable
resource. That harbour Wl!S filled with colonial goods, and"1lS
tlle appetiw8 of men genera"lly stifle patriotism and haffle
power, a licensed commerce wns carried on with the enemy's
podS in Biscay j }'et without judgment as related to the war;
for the return was iron to re.el]Jorl to the celonies, whereas by
an internal traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the
troops might llave been had from Castille and Leon. But
couflUlion and corruption everY"·hcrc prevailed, the military
exigencies were the last thin/:,'1I cured for, and the starving
soldiers commitwd a thousand excesses with impunity. The
people were oppressed witll imposts legal and illegal, and yet
the defalcation in the revenue was great) and tlle monopoly of
tobacco the principal finaucial resource, W(lS injured by the
smuggling arising from tue uuseUled lUl.ture of the times.
The annual charge Oil the pro\·ince was 1,300,000l., the
actual re<:l:ipts less than 500,OOOl. The jUllta met the defi-
ciency by an CJ;;trnordinnry contribution from all property,
Ilave that of day~labo\lrer6, whieh they e.~pecteu to produce
150,OOOl., but a corrupt and ,·exatioIlS collection tormented
the people witllOut filling tbe trellsury : the clergy and the
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richer classes wcre favoured Wl in Portllgo.l, and in six months
not. oven a seventh part was ohtained.
}'rom this state of affairs two inferences mar be drawn:_
I". Thnt England not Ollllicia supported tile war here as in
other parts of the Peninsula. 2°. That /lS England had in
1808-9 paid to Gallicia three milliolls of hard dollars, and
gi"en other sU]lplies for double the number of troops employed,
the deficiency of revenue had been amply compensated, and
the eauscs of distress must be sought for in the ]lroecedings of
the tl.uthoritie~, aud the unomuloUl:! nature of the war, 'rIm
successive juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were
inert in civil administrl1.tion, ~rnlptJ and incapable of using
the English succours justly or wisely. The junt-a of this
period WlI.!I factious, iutriguing; hostile to that of Leoa,
unfriendly to that of the Asturias, jealous and contemp-
tuous of the militnrJ leadeN, who abhoITcd the junta and
were tonuented with factions of their own. The regular
officers hating the partida.s endeavoured to get control of tlle
8uppliea sent for tliC latter; and as they necessarily lived by
plullderillg their own eouutrymen, they strenuously opposed
the arming of the pensants j partly from fear lest the latter
should resist this licence, partly hecause the republican and
anti-English spirit now influencing the Cortes had also reached
this quarter.
All the dergy dung to the peasantry, with whom tlu~y llad
great influence, but the anny, wllieh had imbibed liberal words
rnthflr thun principles, WlIS iuimical to them. A preS8 W!I.l:l
established at ilead-quarters, from whence issued political
papers, original or repeated from tlle libels at Cadill, in which
the Portuguese were called slaves for submitting to Brilish
influence j and it was openly avowed thnt the French yoke ":as
preferoble to that of England. The guerilla system and the
arming of the people were also attacked, and these wl-itillg9
were met by other political pllpers from t11e civil press at
CorUllll and St. Jllgo. Frequent change of commanders ren·
dered these evils more prominent j for the local government
luw legal power to meddle with the milittlry aITllngements, and
ever)" new commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the
jUllta refused to acknowledge Abadia as their llrililideut duriug:
B'
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the absence of Castlli'ios; and he, eomplllining alike of their
negligence IUld of their interference, when they proposed to
establish a general dep6t at Lugo marched & part of hiB arm1
there to pre\'ent it.
But the occult source of most of these difficulties is ro be
round in the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet to
uphold n.o.tiOlltU independence with internal slavery, against
foreign 8g'o'Tcssion willl an ameliorated government. TLe
clergy, powerful with the mass, clung to the English because
they supported aristocracy and church domination; llnd they
were also for tile partidas, beCll.usc commanded by men
springing direclly from the ehurch it-aelf, or from poople
attlWhed tu the chureh; while the regular armies ofllcered by
the friends of the Cortes disliked the partidas lIS interlopel1
and political enemies. The English ministers, hating Napo-
Icon, not as the enemy or England but lIB the C'hampion of
equality, cared not for Spain unless ber people wero ensland.
They were willing to use a liberal Cortes to defeat Napoleor~
but also desired to put down that Cortes by the aid of the
clergy aud bigoted people; nevertheless 1\9 liberty will alway&
have more ebnrms than alanry, they would have miss&! of
both objects, if the exigencies of the continental system had
not indueed tIle emperor to go to Moscow where the snow
destroyed llim; and if the very advocates of liberty in Spain
had not in their mndness oppressed the South Americans.
The Cortes by discovering a rabid love of power in practice
rendered tlleir democratic doctrines suspected; hut Wellington,
in support of aristocracy, used the greatest prudence in policy
and in his actions wa.~ considera.te and just.
In the first conference held at Corui'la after Douglas's arriYllJ,
the junta as matter of routine demanded more money from
Englaud; he advised instead, a. better management of their
<)wn resources, snd pointed out tl1e military measures requisite
to render the army efficient. He recommended Gronse as the
li.ue of retreat rather than Lugo and Coruiia; and be endea-
voured to establish a permanent depot in the island of Aros<>
on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat;
be also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great coats, the
hospitals with lolanket.s, and completed the urelock& of the
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army to twenty.five thousand. 'fhere were however abuses
which he oould not remedy, and which would Item rather to
belong to the army of an Asiatic despot thAn • European force
6gbting for independcnce. Innumerable baggage anima1s
devoured all the forage, and the personal &ervanl.a
and cooks, ",ho from custom never ~d duty, :~~ti:
were al)(l\"e fh'e l.honsaud I When the alc&: mcn
were deducted. IIClIt'Oely sixteen thousand infantry and three
squadrons of Cll.''alry remained for service. And so little .-as
there of organization that the lroope, although young, robust,
patient and docile to the greatest degree, could scaroely be
moved even £rom one quarter to another aa a military bod)' ; the
generals, unable to feed them on the frontier, more than once
Illenaced and in December did actually retire to Lugo, leaving
the province open to ill\·asiun.
Abadill. al first appeared to enter loyally into the &melioJ'1l..
tions proposed. He gave the command of the troops 10 Por-
tllSgO, repAired to Coroiia himsc1£, and orgflllizcd the provinoo
in SCV(lll militllry govcrnments, oue for euclt division of the
army; each govenUllcnt was to raise a lClICrvc, and supply and
clothe tJle oorrellIHmding dh'ision on the frontier. Soon how.
ever he displayed jealousy of the peasantry and of the English,
and oonfined ilia exertions to the organimtion of an expedition
against South America, which the Cadiz I'C'gClley had onlered
him to equip from the Euglish stores at the moment when
Doneuue was menacing a uew iD\'asiou of GWlicia I Douglas
vehementl,. opposed tba, the junta were rally ave~ to it.,
and Abadia pretended to be 110; but he bad a perill:mal inte-
re..-t in the colonies and secretly pushed on the armamcnt..
To evade Mr. Wdletl.ey's reproaches the regency promised to
8U8pend the embarkations; yet the expedition sailed from Vigo,
and the oq,"B.niuUon of another thrioo as strong, including all
the best artillery in the kingdom, 'It'U immediately cummeneed,
and would also have sailed a fcw mouths later but for the
vigorous interference of Douglas ou the ilpot I\ud Wellesleyat
Cadiz.
Gallieia in the latter cnd of 1811 Wll8 without maga1.ines
hospitals or 8)'Stcm j 8he was wrn by fllCtiou, ber people were
oppressed, her goveruors foolish, her gencJl\la bad; and though
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the province supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal, her
infantry were famished and too undisciplined to descend into
the plains of Leon. Sir Howard Dougll\.'l had therefore
nothing to work upon save the gucrilln lenders, wllOse activity
he very considcrnbly increased. Au;mcllting the number of
l.:hiers, lie endeavoured to keep the force of each low, lest
growing proud of their command they should consider them.
selves generals »od become useless, as had already happened to
CfIlnpillo Longa and POTlier when their bnnds were incorporated
with {.he seventh army: this policy may .however he qua.
tioned, for of all the numerous bands in the north seven only
were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina,
Pastor, Sala1.f~r, Pinto, AmoT, /lnd the curate,
whose united fOrl~t'S did not' exceed ten thousand
men, were sustll.ined by reb'tl.!ur taxCll, customs, convent
revenues, and donations j Longa supported his from the
produce of the salt-mines of Pamj but all the rest were
bandits, whose extinction was onc of thc ndvnntnges expceted
from the formntion of the sl'lVenth army. They wcre however
stimulated for a time by sir Roward's exertions. In the
Asturias, while Bonnet was on the Orbijo, Porlicr snrprised
Santanderj and though general CauCAult, a very active officer,
soon drove him again to the LicbaUfl, tho Englisll eruizers
noting in concert destroyed several eoast batteries, aud the
Sir f1oward. Iris frigate bringing a supply of anus sought to
Dooglaa', establish a pennllnent intercourse with the chiefs.
lISS. Rcille lInd CaffarelJi being then in clIMe of Mina
and Longs, the mission of thc Iris was marred; :ret Mina
contrived to receive arms from that vessel, and being joined
by the Valencians and CatalOllian deserters and fugitivC!l
from Campo Verde, soon returned to Navarrc with greater
strength than ever.
While CillfnreUi and Roille thus scoured the line of com-
munication, DOl'8ellne hnving the invasion of G.lllicia still in
view, relieved Bonnet on the Esla and sent him with eigbt
thonsand men to re-occupy the Astnrias. The Gallicians
anticipating this mctl8Ure had detached Mo~so ""ith threll
thousand five hundred men to roinforce SlIn Pol, who from
Pag-arcs watched the passes leading from LeOll. bleudi.l.abel·
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also ooncentrnted five thollSllIld of the bands to the eastward
Oil the Xalon, so that eleven thousand mCIL 0Pllosed the
entrtluce of Bonnet; but the passes of Cubillas and Yentana
westward of Pagares were left unguarded, and by those roads
Bonnet, an excellent offi~r, turned l[oseoso and dro\'c him
down the Lena with 103B and disgrace: then falling Oil
Mendizabel, he chased him also in disorder from u.nes into
the Liebana. All the civil authorities fled to Castropol, the
Spanish magazines were ta.ken, and Bonnet rc-occupying
Oviedo, Gihon, and Gmdo, fortified the pusses leading to
!.eOll and effectnally ruined the military resources of the
Asturias: the organization of the seventh army was thus for
the time crushed. The retnrn of Moscoso's division, and the
want of provisions in the Biel"lo, which hOO compelled Abadia.
t-o rctire to Lugo while Dol'8enlle was menacing the frontier,
bad thrown Gallieia also into a. fennent, which was increased
by the imposition of the new contributions. The people
openly dedared thnt the exactions of a Freuch Sir Howard
army were a relief compared to the deprcdatiollS Dou.g1lul'8
of the Spanish troops. MSS.
During these transactions in the lJorth, Drouet had joined
Girord at Merida and menaC<ld tllC allies in the Alemtejo,
llOping tbus to draw Wellington frolll the Coo; but the de-
monstration WfIS too feeble, and the English geneml thou{:'bt it'
snffieicnt to rcinror~ Hill with his own brigade from Castcllo
Brollco. These movements were undoubtedly pl>rl of a grand
lllan for invading Portugal, if the emlleror could have
arrauged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move
onoo more ft,,<>ninst Lisbon by MllSScno.'s route was not promis-
ing, nnless the northern provinces of Portul,ral were likewise
invaded, which required tlle preliminary occupation of Gallicia,
at lellllt of the interior; and as it was advisable to invade
the Alemwjo simultaneously with Bcim, the occupation of
Valencia and Murcio. WfIS necessary to Ilrotect Andalusia
during the operation. The plan was vast, menacing, and
ready for execution; for though the wet season bad set in, all
athl.ck ou the northern parts of Portugal and tbe iUVW:lion of
Gullicia were openly talked of in Dorsenne's army; CaffareUi
was to join in the expedition, and Monthion'a reserve, de-
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signed to replace Caffarelli, was already six thousand strong.
Neyor Oudillot were spoken of to command the wllOle, and a
strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of
the south, arrangements which could have reference only to
Napolcon's arrival. But the RUS<lian war Boon balked the
project; and Wellington's operations, to be hereafter noticed,
compelled Dorsenne aglliu to relinquish the iuvasion of
Gll.llicia, and caused Bonnet once more to abandon the Astu-
rias. Thus with various turns of fortune the war was managtd
in the northern provinces, and no great success aMended the
French arms, oocouse the English general always remedied
the Spanish errors. It was not so 011 the eastern line of
invasion. There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable
of resisting him, had continued his career of vicoory, and tbe
insufficiency of the Spanilll'ds to save their own country w&s
mado lllIUlifest.

SIEGE J,.: BATTl.F. OF
SAG'L~:NTU:d.
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CHAPTER n.
OQXQVEST OF VAL~ClA.
9
IN August and the beginning of September, Suehet while
preparing for tllis great enterprise once moro dispersed the
bands of ViJlo. Campa snd the other chiefs infesting the borders
of Aragon, and having received conscripts in return for the
weakly soldiers be sent to France, formed large magazines in
Morella and TOrOOla. Dcducting eight thousand men left in
Catalouia undcr general Frere, and a like number under Mus-
mer, destined to protect Aragon, he had twenty-four thousand
disposable for the invasion. Deeming this number inadequate,
be demanded a reinforcement from the srmy of reserve then
in Navarre; but Napoleon whose system of warfare was emi·
nently methodical refused. He liked better a bold push at a
distant point with a few men than to use many, if by 80
doiug he rendered his communications weak; for he judged
courage and enterprise fittest in att-ack, prudence and force for
the support. And yet he designed to aid Suchet vigorously
when the time for a decisive blow arrived; then, not the divi-
sions of tl\e reserve only were to marcll, but combined move.-
ments from nearly all the annies in the Peninsula were to tako
place, and it will Le seen, that if Wellington, by menacing
Ciudad Rodrigo saved Gallicia, the French army of the north,
by mCllllcing Gallicill, kept the allies on the Agueda and so
protected Suehet'l iuvasion of Valencia,
Three roads led to tile Glladlllaviar: one from TOrOOza by
the sen.-oollSt, one by Teruelllnd Scgorbc, one by Morolla and
San Mateo. 'l'lle two fonner wel'e carriage-roads, but only
tile first was fit for heavy artillery; and it wall blocked, par·
tially by the fortress of Penisoola, entirely by the fort of
Oropesa. Wherefore, though ilie infantry and cavalry could
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move OD 0. bye-rond to tlu} right, the convoys Bud the gum
from 'l'ortom could not JlllSS uutil Oropes!! was reduced.
SU<lhet, knowing what audacity will effect in waT, resolved to
mask Peniseolo., avoid Oropesa, sClld Ms field artillery by
Teruel, and ncaT Saguntum offer battle to Blake: if the latrer
declined he designed to turn upon Oropesa find Saguntum,
and trost for subsistence to the' !Iuer/(J,' or gnrden of Valencia,
so called for its fertility, until the arrival of his convoys. His
system of supply was however well organized. From Morella
and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in
the British army, were to caTry provisions, and sheep and
ClIttle were delivered to eaell regiment for its subsistence in
advance. This plan, which sir John Moore had nlso projoctcd
in his campaign, Suchet fonnd advllDtagoouB j and surely all
tbiugs requisite for the subsistence and fig-Ming of troops
should be organized regimentally, and the functionaries em·
ployed should wear the uniform of their different corps.
Jealousies between different branches of the service would
then be unknown; and the cllll.ractcr of all subordinates being
under regimental guartliauslLip would be equally praiseworthy,
whieh cannot now be said.
Valencia was a prey to disorder. During the siege of Tarn-
gollll, PaJacios, notwithstanding Ule lligh moullrchic prin-
ciples which eAused his dismissal from the regency, had been
appointed captain-general of Valellcill, Mureia and Arngoa.
He imlllediately raised a strong party amongst the frian and
oUler opponents of the Cortes i and when make, llavillg rallied
the :Murclans after the Tout of Baza, assumed, Ill!
CriAPtllln ~s,- rogcnt, command in Valencia, hc WR.'! immediately
ngton,... •
opposed by Palacios' faction. To drow the popu·
lace and the sotUierll to thcir side tlley proposed to inundate
the plain around Murviedro, and 'lcfcnd the strong country
beyond; hut Blake, disregarding this, resolved to harass the
Frenh flanks b~' detachments. He sent C. O'Donncl with tho
divisions of OLispo and Villa Campa to Albaracin, aIld sup-
ported him with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria;
he gave Mahy fiye tbOUBll.nd infantry and seven hundred Mur·
cian cavalry, Md charged Mm to surprise a detRchment of
Joseph's army stationed at Cuenea; Bassooour he pooted at
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Suchet..
Rectuena with two thousand men, llnd directed Dumn and the
EmpecillOOo to invade Arllgoll iu couctrt with Alillll.
Exclusive of "Mahy's and Bassccour's Murcial1Jl, Blake had
twenty thousand infantry and two thousnnd Cllvalry for the
field, Saguntum 1100 a. garrison of three tllOusand five lmn.
dred, Peniscola fifteen hundred, nud the wany noenc. MSS.
partidas mOOe the whole country seem in amls; TuPP'!T. )[8S.
hut these last were capricious or mood, and Blll.ke MT. W.lle.
could not reckon OIl more than eight thousand. l~y. )ISS.
His regular [!.I'm}', composed or tllC Albuera troops, Do}'le, liS$.
tlle veterans of St. Juan, Mirandll, and Villa Cllmpa was the
most numerous, and far the best Spain had ynt lJroduceJ; 1l1ld
Valencia was riell in all things necessary to supply it;
tlle building was filir enough to look llt, bnt the dl'y rot
woos within; tho French hOO lmlllerous seeret parti3llUs, fllC-
tiou was busy, Blake, who had collected rather than orgs..
ni:l:ed his forces, was incapable of commanding, anu was lllike
unpopular in Vnlcllein /lnd at Cndiz where tllC regency of
whieb he was a member was tottering. 'l'he CoI'h:S iudeed
qU!l.shed Mahy's "Murcian command, and recalled Blake; but
the order arrived after Suehet hOO COOle "1J and was dis-
regarded; IDetluwhile the reserve of the Mureiau army fell iuto
disorder, eight thousand deserted and the remnant became
despondent. Thus all interest concentrated in the city of
Valencia, which was ill truth the key of the eusteI'l\ coast,
because Carthagena, requiring an anny to defend it, could only
be feel from Valencia, and Alicnnt was naked.
Suehe1's OOIUlllllS moved simultaneously by tlle three roads,
The one wlliell marched by Teruel, where a field
magtl7.ine was catablishoo, turned to it.3Jcft lJeforc
reaching Segoroo llud passed over the Sierrn de Gudar to
Castellon de la Plana, where all three were uuited
the 20th of Septembcr. Penisooln had been
masked tue 15th, lIud Oropcsu. invCl;ted the 19th, but the fire
of the last IJlaee had compelled the column to IJf\SS by the
rugged bye-rond of Caooncs to Villa Franca. Bluke Roe"". lIse.
theu seemed disposed to fight, for he broughtZayas
up beyond Murviedro, called in Obispo from Albaraein, and
Mah)' from Cucnca. But these generals moved slowly and in
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disorder, and IlOme French dragoons IHwmg put a great body
of infantry to flight at Almnllzol'll. on the Mingul"CJl, the
Spo.ni..sh general bccume doubtful if his UTIlIY would stand, and
T lISS retired behind the Guadalaviar, leaving O'Dounel
upper, . with a division on the side of Segorbe. Valencia
was in consternation, but, BassecOllr being at hund, Suchet
feared to nttack BO large a force in nn entrenched camp while
his direct communication with 'l'ortozlI was intercepted by
Gropesa: wherefore dispersing the anucd llcnsanb on his
, flank he turned against Murviedro.
SIEGE OF SAQUNTtlM.
This mountain-rock, four leagues from Valencia, was co,'cred
with the ruins of the ancient city and remains of Moorish
towers and wnlle, forming fouf distinct posts col'cring the
whole summit; but, with the usual Spanish !lroerastinlltioD,
the heavy gUllS prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, lUld
only seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for
defence. The modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot
of the rock, was coverer! by the river Plllanein, and by a canal,
lUld OCCUllied by some Spanish piquetsj but the 23rt! Hubert,
having passed the water, invested the rock on the cast while
Harispe invested it on the west and south, and a third
division drove the Spanish posts from Murviedro and ell-
trcnehcd itself in the houses. The re:,-t of the army Wa'! die-
posed in villages on the hills to the north-west, aud patroles
were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntulll
was: invested, hut it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on
the went, wllcre the ascent although prOoeticablc was very
rough and ilillicult. It would Mve been impregnOoble if the
Spaniards had mounted tlleir large guns, for the French had
to bring earth from a distancc to form parallels and batteries
which were not proof against heavy shot.
An ancient tower called San Pedro was first to be attacked,
and' above it was the fort of San }'crnll.ndo, unassailable while
San Pedro stood, and, from its heigllt, then only by the miner.
But near the eastern extremity of the rock two ancient
brcachca hlld only been stopped with timber, and as a large
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tauk offcred cover for troops cloRe to these breaches Suchct
ordered an eSCllladc. Three columna assembled before day-
break on the 28th iu the tank, a strong reserve Wll8 in
sUllport, and a false attack was directed agaillBt San Pcdro
to distract the attention of the besieg-ed. But in the pre-
vious part of the night the Spaniards sallied, and the action
baving excited ll. French soldier he fired from the tank before
the appointed time, whereupon the oolulUllB rushing forward
in disorder planted their ladders, but the garrison thrust
tllem from the walls and drove the storrners back with the
loss of three hundred mcn. After this check Suehct used a
purt of his Ilrmy to a.ttack. Oropesa, while the rest mude a road
for the guns to reach the battery raised against the tower of
San Pedro. This being done, he turned his attention towards
Blake, who, following his first plan of action against the
Frendl fluukJl, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent
O'Dolll1e1 with Villa Campa's division and St. Juan's cavalry
to Betera alld Beneguaxil, Obispo to Segorbe, thus fonn-
ing a half circle round the French, and cutting their com-
munication witli Teruel, near which place Mahy also arrived:
Suchet, however, caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose
whole division dispcrsed after a. skirmish with the advanced
guard, £Ind the ltaliallB theu returued to the siege. 'l'he next
night Harispc warched again.st O'Dollnel, who was well posted
at Bcnegul>zil behind a canal, baying his oontre protected by a
ehapel £Ind some houses j neverthcleas he was beatcn with loss
at the first ahock, and Red ill disorder over the Guadlllaviar.
Blake calmly witnessed these defeats, although he had a large
body of troops in hand and was within a few miles of the
field of battle.
Sucllet's battery-train now advanced from 'fortoza, and four
pieces were placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th
he took the dirootion of t.he attaek in IleTSOll. '1'he fort,
crowning an isolated rock, Wl\8 breached in a few hours and
surrendered j but the garrison of the King's Tower, a separate
work on a small promontory commanding the hnrbour, was
carried off under the French fire by the MIlo"Uifieent. Suchet
having thus with a loss of bnly thirty men opened the road
for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the lIicge
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of that place. It was difficult. To lIlake tIle road to the
batteries was a work of pain; amI altllOugh the indefatigable
troops had forme<! a breaching-battery on the 12th, while
sevcn small mortars and howitroerJ:l, )llaced on the right anll
left) hnd nearly silenced the Spnnisll fire, the muskets of the
besiegers alone brought down from tifteen to twenty mcn.
On the 17th the breaching-battery opened its fire against
San Pedro, wllell the !lew masonry crumbled away, but the
ancient work resisted tlu,: guns like Il rock. Next day the
fire recommenced, the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns
aud the aSSlIun was ordered; but the tower overlooked the
works at a short distance, tile preparations were early dis-
covered, tIle Spaniords repfl,irefl the breach with sand-bags,
and regardless of the French fire with loud crics provoked the
attack. At five o'clock four hundred men rushed Ull as swiftly
as tlJC sleepness of the asoout would llemlit; but the head W!lS
eheekeil, the rear began to firc, the whole got into confusion,
snd when one·half had fallen without making the slightest
impression on the defenders the attemJlt was abandoned.
Mter this signal failure a seoond battery of six pieces W!lS
erected onc llundrcd and forty yards frOIll the towcr, but
an attempt made to approach close to the foot of th~ breilcb,
VIM hy the plunging fire of the besieged baffled. Andriani, tlle
govcrnor, having communiCfltion by aignlll with the shil)S in
the Grno, was enoourogcd in his gnllant defence, and infonned
he was already promoted j but to undcrstand Suchet's em-
barrassments from the protracted resistance of Sagulltnm,
Lacy's eontemJlomry operations in Catalonia, and those of
the pilrtidlls in ArtIgon, must be noticed.
CATALO~·u..
,\Vhen this principality WllS relieved from Suehet's wnrfare
the sickness iu Mm:uollald's unny nearly oxtin-
guished the active French power in, the field;
becanse Frere's division, which ocellJlie<l Montscrrllt, being
designed finally to join in tIle Valcncilln expooition, conld not
be employed in any harassing cxeursious. Laey was therefore
enabled to re·organize eight thou.sand men in two divisions
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under Eroles and &rsfield, the junta called fortll the tercios
of reserve, nnd arms and stores were supplied for all by the
Englillh navy: wherefore the taking of MontS€rl'at was inju-
rious to I·he French, for if Frere's division had kept the field
this reliction could not have taken place. Lacy's first effort
was in concert with the EngliEh ships against the Mcdas
Ismnds, which were retaken in the end of August by the
Und!lUlltcd, the Lavinia and Blossom, aided by a small Spanish
detachment, the whole under captain Thomas. Tho Spanish
auxiliaries did little, and the SUCCe6ll, obtained moro by labour
than lighting, WIiS cntil'lll}" due to Lhe naval men,
who were justly indignant that colonel Green ~:.pe\~:li.~lSi.
depreciated their exertions to raise his own repu- .
tation with the Catalans.
Lacy thcu proposed fortifying Palamos as a marine depOt
and stronghold in common with the English navy; and with
a wondrous folly expected that sir E. Pellow, who lmd no
troops in his fleet, would defend the people while employed ill
the work. This scheme being coldly received he nud tile
junta turned tlleir attention inland, and lixed on Buaa as a
plnee of refuge. This rcmarkable rock, rising be-
tween the Cal'doner and Bind~es rivers, twenty
milcs from Cardona, could only be reached by one
rllggcd road; and thus cut off from tIle relt of the
world it eould uot be foree<l or starved, being
fourteen miles ill circumference, hellJt;h)', full of springs, and
fertile of forage and fuel; and when it and Cardona, Sohona
and Seu d'Urgcl, wcre glllTisoned by tho tereios of relcrvc,
Lacy re<:ommenced ollllllsive excursions with the regular
srmy. In September IlC plundered the French Ceroafia, and
on llis rcturn uniting Sarsficld and Eroles' troops stormed
19ualada and killed two hundred l'rench; theu without nttack·
ing tIle fortified convent· tllere returned to Calsf, from whence
he detached Ero!es to intcrcept a convoy coming to Ig1lllladu.
l'hi!; being efleeted tae l;'reLlch quitled the convent nmI joiucd
the garrison of Montserrat, but fearful of being invested and
stsrved they abandoncd that strong point also and retired to
'l'arngona. Moutserro.t wus immooiately re-occupied by the
Cat.aluns, who recovered a large store of clothing and CiWIlll't
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equipments which had been hidden in a vault and ull(liscOo
verell by tlm French.
Eroles failed in nn attack on MOllCllda, but shortly after·
wards compelled five hundred men forming the g....rri~on9 of
BelpuiS and Cervera to surrender, which placed the whole liue
of communication between Lends. and Barcelona in the power
of the Catalllus. Then the whole province WIIS in commotion.
Sarstlcld seized the passes leading to Vich j ;\JrIlJSO llnd Rovim
menaced the Ampurdolll; and Erolcs, entering the French
Cerdlliia, defeated some national guurU!l scut there after Lacy's
expedition. The Ciltalau ellid raised contributions, burned a.
town in France, llnd returned to the Garriga pass while M&lIso
occupied Mutafo, both lying in wait for l\ eonvoy 1facdoDsld
WfIIl preparing to Bend to Barcetone.. Sa.rsfield aho embarked
llis division for the Ampurdam to menace Macdonnld, nnd
though tl16 weather did not permit him to laud, the demon-
IMation sufllccd and the COllvOy did not move. LlWY then
recalled Sarsfield to aid in a surprise of Barcelona itself, but
after putting the troops in motion, lIe shrunk from the attempt.
Meanwhile one swarm of the minor parlidas menaced the
F~neh communications between Mcquinenza. and TOrtOza,IlOd
llllother swarm settled on the plains of Lerida.
Aragon was equally disturbed. Duran and the Empeci.
nado had received Blake's orders to unite for the invasion of
that kingdom, but the seeret junta of the district were a\'ergs
to tbe plan; tbe Empecinndo's men would not move, the}' even
enme to blows with the junta's poople, aud in this confusion
general d'Armanac, who lllld retired from CUlmen, roturllW
and dispersed the whole. The Empeeinlldo however collecwl
them again, and havi~g joined Duran, their united foree, being
six thousand infantry and two thousand five lmudred horse,
moved against Cnlatayud; Mina acting ill eoncert with them,
came from the Liebana to Navilrre with five thousand mcn,
the minor bands were active, and the whole mass was suP"'
plied from Vnlencia with clothing and ammunition b.r the
English consul Tupper. General :\Iusnier's force was at
thi8 time so scattered he could not figM tile large partidas
withgut eXllOsing some important point. The Empceinado
therefore got possession of the pasll at Frasno, which \lullbled
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JJurnn to reduce the fortified convent of CQlatayud, wbere
tbe French and Italian soldiers disputed upon the defence and
agrecd only to IlUrrcndcr. Musnicr bnd collected somo troopg
ro succour it but was unable to force the PllS~ of }'rasno; and
when he was reinforced with troops from Navarre by Rcille
HIe Sl'lllliar<ls disappelU"ed, but re-occnpied CnlattLYlld when he
retired. This opened a free communication with Mina llnd a
general plan was discussed, yet Mina and Duran could uot agree
and all acted sepamtely.
At thig time however Scvcroli returned from Italy with
eigllt thousnnd men, and soon drove the Spaniards in fiigllt
from Calatayud ro Molino, Daroca, and Medillacelli. But, Oil tile
other side of the Ebro, Mina invested Exca, and when tIle
garrison broke throngh his line llC pursued thcm to the walls
of Zarago:c:u, after which, assailing Ayerbe, he meunced the
Frencb communication by Juca. Meantime an Italian bat·
talion detached from Zarngol'JL to succour Exca met the gar-
rison nt Zuera, and the whole force, amounting to eleven
huudred infantry and sixty cavalry, followed Mina to Ayerbc,
but he turned and killed or took the wl101e. lkille and
Musnier immediately spread their columns in nil directions to
iutereejlt Mina, yet Le evaded them, and though sharply
ellased and several times ellguged, reached Motrioo Oil the
Biscay COlI8t with his prisoners. The Iris frigate rook somc
off his hunds, and the renminder, tllfet.\ hundred in numOer,
were sent ro Cornua by the Asturian mountains; only thirty-
six arrived, all tllC rest heing shot by the escort under pretence
that they made a noise uear a Freneh post!
Mazzllehelli's brigflde followed the E1l1peeinfldo, defeated
him and brought off the gurri30n of Molino, but the smaller
bands still infested Suchet's communiClltiolls between Tortolla
and Oropcsa, aud reports were fife that an English forte was
ro land a.t Peniscola.. Bl/lke also Beut Obispo ngainst Temcl,
which was mennCl..'l1 on all sides, for Mnhy still remained in
those parts. Thus the partisan Wllf seemed interminable. and
Suehet would have been in grcat danger if a mall of aLiJity
had been opposed to llim; for, with inferior numbers, he was
cooped up between the enemy's fortresses >lnd the mountains,
Ilis communications were interrupted, he had twice failed in
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his assaults at &guntum, aud had a. formidable army in his
front. Blake soon relieved llim from llis difJkulties. hlacios
and the junta had retired to Aleim and in couCt':rt witll the
frial'll of lIis fllction issued 0. manifesto to raise 0. commotion
lle,<'I'Qinst Blule, but the latter was now popular and the Valen-
eiuns dated U)' the resistance ofS:lguntulll called for an action,
wlLieh the Spllnisll general, urged partly by his courage, the
only military qualification lle possessed, partly tllut he found
llis 0lleratioull on the French I'ear h1ll\ not disturbed nle siege,
W,k'I willing to undertake. Mahy and Bassccour's divisioIlll
bad arrived, lIud OlJiBpo boing called in tu l3etera, eight thou-
saud irregulars were thrown upon the French colllUlunications,
and the whole Sll8nish army, amounting to twenty-two thou·
san\l infantry, two thousllud good cavillry, and thirty-six gum,
maJc ready for ltattle. SUc11et, although expecting this OOD-
crlltrntion, hud detllchc(l Palombini to nttnck Obispo, but the
lattcr Ilfter a shRl'p skirmish marched so rapidly upon Lirill,
HUlt J3I11ke miglJt lmve falhm upon ~he :Frcuch anny with
Lill wllole force while Palombiui wns abseu~: he lIeglectcd this
favourable O)lportunity, and the Itnliau general rejoined the
nrmy in time to light.
The ground between Murviedro and Valencia. is generally
low ano lint, yet witll BOrne isolated hills lIml much inter-
sected by ravines, torrents, :Uld water.euLa; i~ is also thickly
studded with olive-trees, and near Saguntum is narrowed by
the mountains and t11e sea. to three miles, though it afterwards
spreads oot again. III tllis narrow part Suchct rewlvcd to fight
without relinquishing the siege of Snguutum, where he left a
strong dcwehmcnt ill the trenches with orders to open the
Jira of a new uattery the mOment the Spanisu army appeared
in sight.
His left under Raben was refused, to avoid the fire of
some vCBscls of Will' and gun-boom wiJich flanked Blnke'a
rrweh. The centre under Rarispe was exteude(l to the foot
of the Liloullwins, ~o as to UIlCI' all obli\!uc front ero1>8illg the
Olllin road from Valeudo. to Murviedro. Palombini's division
llnu the dragoons wcre placed in second line behind the
centre, IInd bellind tllem the euirassiers were lleld in rescrt(\,
'fhis narrow front was fllvouroble for Ull action in Iho plniu,
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but tllC right of the Freuch, and the troops in the trenches,
oould be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which the
roads from Betera led to Gilet directly upon the line of retreat.
To prevent that, Suehet pcsted CWopiski with a. strong
oetflChment of infantry and the Italian drngoons in the pass,
aud plMlCd thc Nellpolitan brigade of reserve nt Gild.' In
this situution, although his lighting troops did not exceed
seventeen thousand men, cooped up between two fortresses
and hemmed ill by tllc lllountain on one aide the sea. on
the other, with only onc nnrrow line of rctrCllt, the French
generol did not hesitute to enh'TIge a very numerous anny: he
trusted to his supcrior moral resources, and what woulil have
been madness in other circumstances was llCrc skilful dal'iJJg.
"Blake issuing n fine addrc:ss to hi~ soldiers 011 the 25th o~
October advanced to fight. His right wing under Zn.)'llS, COJli-
posed of UU~ Albuera divisions, IllardlOO by a rood leading
upon the village of Puzzol; Blake followed. in person, with a
weak reserve commanded by Velasco; thc ecntre under
Lordizabal, snpported by the CtIvolry of Loy and Caro, moved
by the main road; the left consisting of lIiranda's and Villa
Campll.'s infantry and St. Juan's cavalry, was supported by
Mohy's division and moved ngainst the de~le of Espiritus.
Obispo, acting as 3. flanking corps, entered the mountains by
Nll.(juera to menace the right of Chl0l'iski, but he was met by
a brigade under general Hobert..
Advancing rapidly and in good order the Spaniards drove
the Freneh outposts over u uvine, called the Piecador, whieh
covered Suc1u~t'8 front; Zayas, Lnrdil:abal, Onro, and Lay,
immediately passed this obstl\Cle, the first taking' possession of
PU7.zol, where tIle eOllStingflotilla's fire protected his right flank.
Blake IULlted with Vclusco't; reservo at El Puig, an isolllted
hill Oil the sea-ooast behind the PieCMlor, wllile Lardi7.ubulllll([
the cavalry, forming an oblique line to face tllc Frendl front,
occupied the ground between Puzzolllnd the }JiccaJol'. 'rhus
the Spanisb order of battle was eut in two by tlle ravine, for
St. Juan, lIIiranda, and Villa. Carnpn. did not P/lSS it, llod
Mtlhy took possc:ssion of a heigut Clllleu the Germanels, whieh
'VlIS opposite the mouth of St. Espiritus. This front of battle,
CJ:tcnding from Puzzol to the. Germancls, waa. not less than six
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miles, and the division of Obispo was scpnmted from the left
by the same dllitancc. The whole was weak lIud there 11'&9 no
efficient reserve. for Velasco was distant and 1IIuhy actually iu
the line. The French order of battle, covering less than t1li~(J
miles, was strong, the reserves well.placed, and Chlopiski's
division, although a league distant from the ml.lin body, was
firmly posted Md nble to tnkc pllrt in tho bnttle, while
the interval between him and Suchet was closed by irnpasaable
heights.
BA'I"lU: O}' SAOU;'iTUlI.
Villa Cfimpa begun the bnttle by lIdvnncing against the pIl5S
of ESlliritns, but tbe Italian drugoolls gulloping out ovcrtlu'\?w
his advanced guard and put hi~ division in disorder; wbereupoll
ChJopiski descended into the lllain with his infantry, droyc
Mah)' from the Germands, and d<'tached a regiment to succour
the centre. 'fltere the:French wcre hard !lresaed, for until the
Spanill.fds crossed tllC Pic.:ador, Suchct llUd not perceived that
all ISolated height in front of Hllrispe would command all the
field. 'fo remedy this error he made hill infantryadvlluce,snd
rode forward witll an escort of hussars to seize tile hill; ba~
the enemy was already in possession, IInd it was only gained
by Harispe after a sllarp action, in wllieb general Pari~ and
several superior officers were wounded. At this time also
Obispo's guns were heard flit 011 the right in tIle hills, and
Zap.!;, }lussing Puzzol, endcuvoureu to tUn! the French lelb.
The day was fine, the field of battle distinctly seen by the
soldiers in Sagulltum, who crowded thc rflll1llllr(S regardless of
the besiegers' fire, and uttering loud cries of victory! victory!
by their gestures scemed to encouragc tllcir countrymen to
)lress forward.
Suchet seeing the dcdsivc moment Wall apIlI'oaching, ordered
Palo1,l'lbini's infantry and l,he French dragoons to SUllpor;
Harispc, and though wounded himself galloped to the euirns-
siers an(1 brought tllem al~o iutu I\()tion, there Wll! no time
to lose, for the Spllniards, although driven from tho height by
Harispe, turned at the Piccador on the pursuing French hus-
Mrs, and, supported by lheir setoud line, were a.gain advancing.
The French artillery poured grape-shot into their rnub, but
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their march was unchecked, and their horsemen with onc
charge overthrew the hussars and captured the French bat-
ter)'. Tile battle would have been lost if Harispe's infantry
bad not stood firm until Palombini, stealing forward under
cover of a slight rise of ground, suddenly opened a fire on
the flank of the Spanish c/l.valry. and at tlle same time the
French hussars rallied and turned. The Spauish horsemen,
thus placed between two fires, thought the flight of the hus-
sars had been feigned j they hesitated and the uext moment a
tremendous ch1\Tge of the euirns3iers overthrew cvcryt,hing.
Caro was wounded and tOoken, Loy fled with his sumving
cavalry over the Piccador, tlle :l!'reneh guus were recovered, tile
Spanish artillery taken, and Lardizahal's infantry laid down
their arms, or tllTowing them /I.war saved themselves as they
could: Harispe's division immediately joined Chlepiski'B, and
both together pursued the beaten troops.
1'his nearly simultaneous success on the centre and right
having cut tlte Spanish linc in two, plaectl ZllY,UI in a
uangerous position. Suehet wa'i on his flank, Habort advanced
a.,.-.ainst his front, and Dlake llad no reserve to restore the
battle, for the few troops IInd guns unde!' Velnsco remained
inactive at El Puig. However, such had been the vigour of
the lwtiou :JUU 80 iuferior were Suehet'a l.LUlUbcrs, that it
required two hours to secure his prisoners and rally
Palombini's division for another effort Zllyas, whosc left
flank was covered in some measure by the water-cuts,
stoutly maintained the village of Puzzol for II time, llnd when
finally driven out, although he was charged several time;; by
some squlldrona attached to Hllbcrt's division, effected his
retreat across tile Pict'lldor and gained El J'uig; frOlU thcnee
he fled o.loVg tlle sea coast to the Grea de Valcneia, leaving
his artillery and eight hunured prisoners behind. Chlopiski
and Harispo had mcantime pursued Mahy, MiranJa, Villa
Cumpa and Lardizabal to tbe torrent of Carnixet, where
many prisoners were taken; yet Obispo, ooming in there from
the hills, rallied the fugitives, amI the li'reueh cavalry having
outstrippeu the infantry were unable to pre\'ent the Sparuard3
reaching the Guadalaviar. 'rhc victors had about a. thousand
killed and wounded, the Spaniards had not more j but two
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generals, five thousand prisoners, anti twelve guus were taken,
IIoUtl Blnke's iuability to cope with Sucllct being made mauifest,
his troops were totally dispirited and Saguntulll surreuderoo
that night,
ORSlmvATIONS,
I Q, Valencia was the objcct of tllis campaign, It could not
ll0 invested until &guntum WIl.'! taken, and tho Spanish army
defeated; bence to protect SaguntullI without endnngering his
UrJllY was the problem for Blake to solve, He had twent)'.
five thousand troops belides the garrisous of Peuiscola, Ora·
llcsa and Segorbe j llC could commaud or iufluence nehrly
twenty tllollsand irJ'('gulars, whose chiefs were active and inreJ-
lib"Cntj his line of operations W"lllI direct and 8Ccure, hc had a
tlect and scvernl secure harbours, Suchet could not bring
twenty thousand men into action, and his lino of 0l1eration,
long lInd difficult, was intercepted by the Spauish fortresses;
Blake therefore could c1100se whether to fight or protract the
war,
2°, If to fight, he shoultl have taken post at Cast-ellon de
lA. Pilmll., kept A. oo'l}5 of obscrvation at Scgorbe lint! strong
detachments t-owards Villa. Franoo Ilnd Cabancs, llolding his
Ilnny in reawncs,s to fnll 011 the heads of Suchet's columns IIii
they camc out of the mountains. But experience had, or
should ha..-e taught lllake, tllat a battle in the open field
between tllC French and Spanish troops, wlllltevcr miglit be
thft apparent l\(lvantage, \I'aS uncertnin, and this last and best
army of the country ought uot to have been risked. He
should therefore have merely held that position to check the
heads of the Fl'ellch coluUlns without cngaging in a pitched
battle. I
3Q• From Castcl10n de la Plana hnd Segorbc tllC troops
might lUl.ve been withdrawn and eoncentratc<l nCllr }'Iurviedro
in oue march, and Blake should have llrepnred nu intrcnched
camp ill the hills elooo to Saguntum, plllciug n corps of o1J6er-
vation iu the plain behind that fortress. These hills were
rugged, very difficult of aceess, and tIle lIumerons water-euM
and power of fonning inundations ill the plain were so
fa\'ourable for defence that it would have been nearly impos-
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sible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could thQ)'
.have i1wested Saguntum while he remained in this <:amp. In
thiB strong position, witlJ llis ret,rcat SCl::UT'C upon the GUll.(lJ\-
laviar, tho Spanish geueml would have oovered the ferLile JlIIT1s
from the French forogcrs, and held their Rnny llt L,\y while
the irregulars operoted upon the communication. JJc might
then have safely detached a division to his left to 1I~~i~t the
partidM, or by sea to land at Ptlui~oolo.,lIndaa his furce3 wOll1l1
soon have been increased the invasion must have b~n
frustrated.
4°. Instco.d of fonowing thi~ simple principle of defensivo
warfare, consecrated since the dnya of l~abius, Bhlkc abnn-
doned Saguntu.u, and from behind the Guauu!aviar scnt
uuconnected dct.a.cllloents on n half eircle rouud the I<'rcnch
ann)', which, being concentratetl and nearer to Cfll;h Ill'taeh-
ment than the latter was to its own bnse at Valcncia, could
and did defeat them in detai1.
5". Blake, like all the SpnniBh generals, indnlged vru,t mili_
tary cOU~lltions beyond bis means, and generally in violation
of strategic prineipl~s. Thus his llrojcct of cutting the corn:
munication with )hdrid, invading AragQll, and Cl>llllectillg
Mina's operotiolls with Laey's ill Cutalonia, WlIS gigautic in
design hut without any chance of SIlCCCsa. For Scvcroli's
division added to »Iusnier's secured Arugon; and if it had not
bcell so, tILe reillforcemculs, then marching' tbrough Na.vnrre
to differcnt parts of Spaiu, rendercd the time chosen for these
attempts peculiarly nnf,wollrablc. The chief ohjection WilS,
however, that BJ"ke had lost the favourable occusion of
protracting the war about Saguntum, and the operations
Ilg"llinst VIIlencla. were sure to be broug1Jt to II crisis before
t11e llfl:i:Iirs of Amgon could !l/),Ve been sufficiently elllllurrass-
ing to reCllL tIle Frcnch general Thc true wny of usiug the
guerilla forccs, was to bring thcm dowll closc Illl0U thc rcar
of Suchct, espeeio.lly on the side of 'reruel wh~re hi~ lllHgm:ille
was; a safe thing to do, because those partidas Imd un open
retreat if. attacked, and if followed would still have effected
thcir object of weakeuing and distressing the army before
Valencia. This would ha\'e becn quite a dillcreut opcmtion
from that which Blake !ldopted when lIe posted Obispo IUld
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. O'Donnel at Eenagunzil and Scgorbc; their lines of 0l~rations,
springing from the Ouadalavinr, were then entirely within the,
power of the French, and this error alonc p::ovcs tlltl,t Bla.ke
was nn ignorant commander.
(iO, Urged by the cries of the Valeuciau popu\ntiou, the
Spanish general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was
another great error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of
execution. He who luu:I so much experience, who had now
commanded in four or five pitched battles, knew 80 little of
his art, that with twice as IDany men as his ndvcr~rYI and
wilh the choice of time and pillec, he made tILl'CC llilllul{allOOUS
attacks on lUl extended front without ally COnuniOIl or sup-
port; aud he had no reserves to restore tile fig-lit or to cover
his retreat. A wide sweep of the net without regllrd to the
strcngtl\ or fierceness of his prey was Blnke's only notion, IInd
the result was his own destruction.
7". Suehet's operations, especially llis IIdvance against
Sa..,"1lntum leaving Oropesa behind him were aLle and rapid;
he saw the errors of his adversary, and made thcm fahl!.
To fight in front of Sagnlltnm was no fanlt; he aeted. witll a
just confidence in his genius and the valour of his troops.
He gained that fortress by the battle, yet acknowledged that
it could not have been. taken by siege and tlmt a 1Ilockade
would ha.ve required two mouths: but eould he ila.ve blockaded
Saguntum if Bhlke bad. bec.u with twenty thousand men on
the neighbouring hillsi
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WilES SagunluOl fell, Suchet boldly decided- to enclose t!Je
whole of Blake's force together with the city of Valencia, round
which it WAA encamped j nor WAA he deterred by the desul~
tor)' opcrfltions of the pnrtidllll in A.rngou, nor by thc state of
CutalQllia. make, revertilJg lo his fonner system, ealllld up
to Valencia all the garrisons and dep8ts of llurcia, and
directed the conde de Montijo, who lmd been expelled by Sonlt
from Grenada, to join Durnn. Re likewise ordered Freirc to
move upon Cueuf:l\ with the Murcian army to support the
MonLijo and the other jlartida chief3 who remained nenr
Aragon after the defeat of tlte Empecinado. The many smalL
bands and finned peasants immediately abont VlIlcncia llC
made no use of, neithu hll.\'I\SSing t11e French nor in auy
lllanuer accustoming these peapl\! lo action, ull1l in ArugOll his
affairs tnrned out ill. lIazzuehelli entirely dcfe:Lted Durau
near Almlluin. on tIle 7th of November; [he 23nl CampiLlo
was defeated at Ai'uH]on j lInd a ptIrtidll huving appeared at
Peiiarova-, lIear Morel1l., the people rolltl lIgn.inst it. ~'ilJlIlIy
Napoleon, seeing tlle contest in V1I1elleia was coming to a
crisis, ordered Reille to reinforce Suchet, 1I0t only with
Scvcroli's Itlllirills but with his own French division, iD 1I1l
fifteen thOUSlinu good trool)S'
:.ueanwhile Lacy's activity had greatly diminished in Cuta-
lonia. He hnd, inelurling the tercios, sixteen thOUSlilld
troops, twelve thousand being anned; aud ill f:olljunctioll
with the junta he had clUllSeu the whole VOJlUllltion in re·
OOf<.'es. But he W/lll jealolls of the people, who wero gellernlly
of the church plU·ty, nnd, IIlI he hlld before done in the lwndu.
deprived them of arms which they llau purchased ill obedi-
ence to his own proclamlltion. He also diSconntenlUlced the
pO}lular insurrection, not without plansiblc reasous but in act
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faithlessly and 0PJlrcssiv~ly. He said they always los~ their
arms and ammunition, were turbulent cxpcnsi\'c and bad
soldiers, and llis object WfIS' to iucorpomte them gradually
with the lI,MllY where they could be of service; but he made
no gQOO use of the lntoor nud thus impeded the irregular
witbuut helping the regular warfare. 'fho Cubl/lIls had
always possessed a certain freedom and lon~d it; they had
boon treated despotically and unjustly by all the commallden
placed over them since the commenccment of the war; and
now linding J..acy worse even than his predecessors tlICir
ardour sensibly diminished: many went over to the :FrclIch,
and tho discouragement was illcrCllSeu by some unfortuuate
events,
Henriod, governor of Lerida, had on the 25th of October
surprised and destroyed in Bnlaguer a swamI of partidus
settled on the fertile plain of Urgel j those ou the left
·bank of the Ebro had l)een defcated by the eseort of one of the
convoys, and an entrenched :Freneh post, opposite the Medwl
i~lnllds, had llullifioo others by hindering COllUlluuiclltlon with
the land; Mnurice Mathieu surprised Ml>tturo, aud the war
had how fatigued so many persons that several towns were
ready to receive the enem}' as friends. Villa,
Appendix 7, Nueva de Sitjes and other places held constantf8. Yol. ill,
communication with ]~lLfcclollll; the peollle of
Cudaques refused to j)ay their contributiolls to Lacy, suying
thoy had paid the French and lIleallcJ to side with the
strongest. One Quinart, a member of the junta, was
detected corresponding with the encmy; counter guerillll.s, or
mther frecbooting bands, made, their appearance Ileal' Bergn;
privateer!! of oU nations infcstcd thc coast, and t110sc 11iratC3,
the disgrace of civilized warfare, gcllemlly agreed not to
molest each othcr, but roblJed all defenceless flags without
distiill~tioll, Kow also tlm disputes betwccn Snrslield, Ero1es,
and ::\Iilans, and of all three with Lacy, who WM besides on
blld krms witll captain COdl'illgton, nflected the patriotic
ardonr of t,he people Ilnd relielled the }~rench fl'om the alarm
whieh the first operntionJl had created.
111 Cat.ntollia the gencruls-in-ehief were )ICVer nativcs, nor
identified in feeling with the natives, Lacy, unfitted for
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open warfarc, had recoUl'lle to ns~inatiOD. ClllllPO Verue
had countenanced this horrible system. Lwy unu his coad-
jutors have been nccnsed of instigating the murder of French
officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, tIle drugging
of wines and flour, and the firing of powder mlloO'fizillcs,
rcgardless of tlUI SClfet)' even of the Spaniards who might be
within reaeh of the explosion: aud jf any nllLll shall doubt
the truth of this, let him read 'TI/6 History of 0/6 CO'IJ..
epil'aei.!.3 against tlli1 French Armies in Catawnia.' Printed
in 1813 at llilrcclollB, it contains the military police reports
upon dilfcnmt attempts, many succcssful, to destroy the
French troops j and wben allowance for nu enemy's tale and
the habitual flllsificatioDs of police agents is made, ample proof
remains that Lacy's warfare was one of assassination. Indeed
the facility which the great sizc of Barcelona offered for t.hosc
attempts, together with its continual cravings and large gar~
rison, induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of
the city, preserving only the forts. This has be<!n noted as
indiC>iting secret despair of final success in the Peninsula,
but tllC argument is weak in opposition to fnets. He had just
Itugmellted hill immense forces, wllieh were invading Valencia
lind menacing Gallicia after ha\'ing relieved Badajos and
Cilldad Rodrigo j he was himself preparing to lead fom llUD~
dre<i thousand men to the most distant extremity of Europe;
and A1l1llrieo Mathieu continued to hold Barcelona and evCll
to take au important part in thc field OIJerations.
Such was the state of affairs when Suehet advanced to the
Guadalaviar. His IOBSCS Rud the escorts for bis numerous
prisollcflI hoo diminished his force to eighteen thouSll.nd Inen,
while Blake's army inellldillg Freire's division W!18 abo"6
twenty-five thousand, of whieh near thrce thousand were
cavalry. Having llUmmoued the city to uscertain the public
spirit, he was ll.Ilswered in lofty terms; but secret communi.
cations taugllt him that tIle cnthusilU:im was not fervcnt, and
he seized the Grao and the suburb of SermllOll on the left
bank of the Guadalaviar. There were five stone bridges over
that river, and BIllkc, having protected three with regular
works, broke down the two in tho Serronos und occupied
some houses and CQuvents on the enem)"s side to cover them.
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Sucbct immediately carried these irregular defences fllld for-
tified his position there and at the Crao; he thus blockc<l
the Spaniards on that side wit], a small force and prepared to
pll.SS the river higher tip.
The Spnnish defences comprised three distinct post.!'.
1°, The city, which had n wet ditch, earthen works in fToutU!
the gates, and Ilo circular wall thirty fed high and ten thick;
but the areas of the bastions were only upheld by tilllber-wor~{
within the wall. 2°, An entrenched camp fixe miles ill
extent, enclosing the city and the three suburbs of Qunrlu,
San Villcente, alld HUZllfllj the profile of this camp was so
steep as to require scaling-laddtrs for an assault, and there
WItS n ditch twelve fect deep. 3°. Entfondled lines along the
bank of the river reaching to the sea below and to the v!llley~
of Quarto and 'Manisses above the city: wherefore, including
the circuits of the Cilmp aud walls there were eight miles of
works to uefelld. The ground. behind. WM intersl'<lted with
deep canals for irrigation, wllieh brallebed off from the river
just above the village of Quarte. The Spanish Cilvalry was
posted at Aldaya in roar of the len wing to observe the open
cOImtr)', and Sucllct, who couM not force the pnssnge of the
river until Reille joined him, mcrel)' sent parties over to
skirmish, while he increused. his secret communications in the
city, and employed detachments to sconr the country in hi~
rear. In this manncr, nearly two months passed; the French
waiting for reillfor~ments, Blake hoping for a general insur-
nction to Sllve Vnlencia; yet he neither harassed the enemy's
rear and flunks uor exercised his own Illell.
In DC(.'{lllluer, Heille, leaving Navarre and Arngon to Cllffa-
relli, marched to Terucl, wlll:re Severoli with his ltaliall8 had
already arrived; but the vicinity (){ Freiro and Montijo, who
now appeared near Cuenca, compelled him to halt at 'l'enlel
until d'Arlllllnnc, leading a. dctflchmcnt from the arm)' of the
centre, drove the Spanish generals away. 'l'heu he advllnceu
to Segorbe, lIUU as Fl'eirc did not rejoin Blake, and tile latter
was ignorant of neille's arrival, Suehet res()lved to force the
passage of the Gnadalaviar instant.ly. In this view the
Ncapolitan division was placed at the Serranos to hold tho
Spaniards in check; Habcr~ took post at the Grao, Palow-
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bini oppcsite the village of Mislata, whieh was nbout half way
between Yalencia and the yilluge of Quarte. lkille made a
forced march by Liria and Denagullzil, llnd three bridges
being thrown in the night, above t11e sources of the canals
opposite Uibaroya, the rest of the army cro:sc<1 the Guada.
laviar with all diligence on the 26th, and formed in order of
battle 011 the other side. It was then eight o'clock and
Reille had not alTived, but Suchet, designing to drive all tlle
Spaniards within t11e entrenched camp, feared they would
evade the danger if they saw the French divisions in march,
and therefore pushed Harispc's infantry and tlio cavalry to
the Albufcra salt-lake, beyond Valencia, to cut off Blake'ij
retreat to the Xucar. Robcrt's brigade baited to secure the
bridges until Reille should come up, and the troops on the
left bank of the Guadalll.viar attacked all the river lino of
entrenchments.
Suchet Inllrc1loo towards tllC lake as rapidly M the thiek
woods would permit.. His hUilsars fell in with the Spanish
c&valrJ at Aldaya and were defeated, but the latter's charge was
stopped by the infantry until the remainder of tllC French
horsemen ellme up and overthrew them. Blake instead of falling
on Suehet wilh his reser\'c was occupied wit.h the defence of
the river, especially at the village of MisJata, where a false
attack to cover thp, pAASuge at Ribll,roya had first given him
the alarm. Ptl.lombini pflSsed over some skirmishers at t11is
point, rrnd then throwing two bridges. att.a<:ked t.he entrench·
ments j his troops were driven by Zayas back to the river
wllerethey rnllied, alld even effected the passage of the canals,
but a Spanish reservo re3tored the fight and finally drove
them qui!.c over thc river. At that momcnt fuille'g divisioll,
wanting one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at
Ribaroyll, and in conjunction with Rohert fell upon MallY and
OL>ispo, who were in the villllges of Manisses and Quarto.
Those places though fortified with Cllrc to the front, were open
to the renr ano on the side of A1dara, and made little resist-
auce, whereupon Suchet, who lUl.d been dela}'cd hy the aspect
of alt'lirs at Mislata, continued his march for the Albufera.
Pnlombini having ll.o"tltin crossed the riyer without opposition
above Mislat.a now joined Reille, and their united for~es fol·
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Jowed Blake HDd Zayas. Those gencl'a!s retlre<l ill good order
townrds the city, but lIfahy unci Obispo fled outright; the
latter passed betweel< Suchet's COlUIllll and Blake's camp
towards the lake; tJ1C former took the Tond to Alciril, behind
Suchet., llnd WIl8 thmJ entirely cut off from Valcncifl.
All the Spanish army 011 the upper Glladulaviar WlllI thus
!leakll with the loss of its artillery !\lld buggage, and below
tIle city Habett WIIS equally victorious. lie had first opened
a cannonade against the Spanish gun-boat.'! near the Cmo; lIud
~his flotilla, although in sight of 11Il English sevent}'-foul' aud
~Il frigntc and doacly supported by the l)upillon slo(1), lied
without returning El shot i the French then IJl\.Ssed tlHl water
and carried the entrenchment, a feeble breast-work defeuded
by tbe irregulars. The )mssage being thus effeeted Habert
Iixed his right on the rh'er, nud sweeping rouud with his lefu
drove the Spaniards towards a saliellt Jlart of the e.1mp called
the Oli\'ct, which wag occupied by Mirandlloi but bcforo he
could connect his flank with HlIrispe's troops, who were now
on the lake, Obispo's division, flying from Suehet's cavalry,
passed over the rice grounds between the lake nnd the sea. and
so escaped to Cullem: the remainder of Biake's army, eigllteen
thollBand of all kinds, retired to t]le camp and was closely
iuycstcd during the night.
'£hroo dctaeluuents of French dragoons, each man having
an iufantry soltlier behind him, were then sent by the dillerellt
roads of Alcim, Cullera, and Cueuca, the two first in pursuit.
of Mah}' and Obispo, the latter to observe Freire. Mahy was
found in a position at Alcira, and Blake had already sent him
orders to ll1aintl~in the line of the Xnear i but he had lost his
artillery, llis troops werc disheartened, and at the first shot he
fled although the ground was strong llnd he bad three thou-
saud men, while the French wcre not above a thousand.
Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera llnd endellvourcd to rejoin
Uahy, wllCu a very heavy and unusuul fall of snow prevented
their junction, but offere<lo. finc advantngc to the French. For
the :British eollSu], thinking tho Xucv.r would be defendctl Imd
lllnded large stores of provisions llnd llIllmunition at Dcnia
aDd was endeavouring to re·embark thcm, out the, storm
drove tllC ships of war off the coast and for thr<:e da)'s fifty
cavalr)' coulU have captured Denio. and all the storcs.
DE<:. 1811.] BOOK xV.-CnAP. 3. 31
In this bnttlc, which cost Suchct less than five hundre<l men,
ZayllS a.lone displuJed a proper vigour nnd spirit, und while
retiring upon the city repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat
by the road Mah}' had followed, which would have sav~l the
army; yet the other WIIS silent, for .he WlL'! in every way
incnpll.ble as an officer. With twenty-three thousancl infantry,
a powcrful ClJ,valry, Ilnd /l, widQ rivC!' in his frout-with the
command of severnl bridges by which he eonld have opemted
on cithcr side ;-with strong entrenchments and a seeure
eallll)---with a. fortified city in the centre, whence his rCilervcs
could have reached the most distant point. Qf thc scene of
operation ill less than tWQ hours-with aU these advantages
he had permitted Suchet, whose foroo, seeing that one Qf Reille'a
brigades had 1I0t arrived, scarcely exceeded Jlis own, to foroe
the passage of the river, to beat him at all points, and to
enclose him by a marcll which spread the }.'rench troops on a
circuit of more than fiftocn miles: and he now rejected the
only menus of llaving his army. .Hut Suchet's operations,
whieh were of the nature of a. surjlrise, prove that he mu~t
have Ilad a supreme contempt for Ilia: adverSllry's talents, IInd
the peasantry partook of the sentiment j the French parties,
spread over the country for jlrovisions as far as Xutiva, were
everywhere well received, and Blake complained that Valencia
contained a bad llcollle! They might have retorted,
On the 2nd of Decemher, the Spanish general nttemllted at
the head of ton thousand men to break out by tIle left bll.nk of
the GUlldalaviar; bnt IUs arrangemeuts were unskilful, and
when his advanced guard of five thousand men had made way
it Wl\i! abandoned IInd the main OOhllllll returned tQ the city.
Next day many dcserters went over to the :E'rench, and Heille's
absent urigadtl haviug arrived reinforced the posts 011 the left
bank of the river. Suchet fortified his camp on the right
bank, and having in the night of the 30th repulsed two thou-
~nd Spaniurda who made 11 sally, commenced regula\' ap··
llrOllches agaillSt the camp and cit.y.
SIEGE OF \'ALE~CIA.
It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp;
th", city contained one hundred and lifty thouSIlnu souls
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besides the troops, and there was no means of provisioning
them, because Suchet's investment was complete. Sixty
bea-v}' guns with their parks of lImmunitiOIl woJre transported
neross the Cuadalaviar to batter the work~; and Nl the suburb
of San Vinccntc aud the Olivct offered two projecting point",
which possellBcd but feeble means of defence, the trenches
were opened against tuem in the night of tho 1st of JaUWlf)'.
The fire killed colonel HCllri the chief French engineer, but in
the night of the 5th the Spaniards abaudoned the camp and
took refuge in the city; the Frcllch perceiving the mm'€'-
ment then escaladed the works, and seized two of the suburbs
80 suddenly t1mt they captured eighty pieces of artillery and
estllblisllcd themselves within twenty }'llrds of the town wall.
Mortar batteries now opened upon the place, and in the even-
ing, Suchet sent a summOllS 1.0 BJake, who replied, that he
would have uccellted certain tenns the day before, but the
bombardment convinced him be might now depend upon botb
the citizens and tlle trOO)ls.
This answer satisfied Suehct. He judged the placc would
not make an)" defencc, and continued to tllfOW shells until the
8th; ufter whieh he made an utUlck upon the suburb of
Quarte, but the Spaniards still held out and be was defeated.
However, the bombardment killed mauy persons and set fire
to the honses in several quarters; and as there were no cellars
or eaves, lIS at Zaragoza, the c11ief citizens begged Blake to
capitulate. While debating with them 1\ friar, hearing a flag
whieh he caned the Standard of the Faith, eame up with I
mob and insisted upon fighting to the lust; a )liqnet of
soldiers was seut against him, but he rouled it and shot the
OffiCCf, yet his mob soon disr.ersed. Finally, a convent ')f
Dominicans close to the wllliH being taken and five batteries
ready to open, Blake demanded leave to retire to Alieant with
nnns, kggage, and four guns. Tliesc terms were refused, }'et
8 capitulation, guaranteeing property und oblivion of the past
and providing that the unfortunate prisoners in the island of
Cnbrcra should be exclHlUgcd against an equal number of
Blake's army. was negotiated and ratified on the 9th. Then
make, complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the city.
Above eighteen tliousand regular troops with eighty stand of
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colou;!!,. two thOlLqllllO hor3cs, three hundred and ninety guns.
forty thousand muskets, and enormous storcs of powder were
takeu; autl it is not OIle of the lellll~ remarkable features of
this extraordinary war, that intelligence of the fall of so great
a city took a week to reach Madrid, and it was not known in
Cadi\'; Ilntil one month aftcr!
Ou the Htll of Janullry Suellet made his triumphal entry
into Vulcneill, lmving completed 1I. series of campaigns ill
whieh the incapacity of bis adversaries somewhat diminished
llis glory, but in wbich his own activity and skill were not the
less conspicuous. NaflOleon created him duke of Albufera,
and his civil administration was strictly in unison with his
conduct in the Jidd, that is to aay, vigorous aud prudent. He
arrested all dangerous penolls, especially the friars, and sent
them to FraTlee, and he rigorously deprived the poople of
their military resourCC6; but he prollorlioned his demands to
their rOllI ability, kept llis troops in pcrfecl discipline, was
eareful not to olfend the citizeus by violating their CUl:ltoms or
shocking thdr religiolls feelings, and endeavoured as much
as possible to govern tllTough t.he native authorities. The
archhisllop and many of the clergy aided him, and thc suI>-
mission of the peollle was socllTCd.
Spanish faction aided Lhe prudent vigilance of Suchet. The
eity was lost, but the kingdom of Valencia might have re-
covered under the guidance of able men. The
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convents and cllUrehes were full of riches, the
towUll alld vilbges ahounuCl1 in resonrces, the line of the
Xucnr was vcry strollg, and severnl fortified places m::d
good harbours remained unsubdued; tllc partidas in the
llills were still numerous, the people were willing ~o figllt,
and t.he British ageuts llUU the British fleets were ready
to aid and suppl)" arms and stores. The junta llOwever
diswlved itfIClf, the magistrates fled from their posts, the
pollu!llee were left without ehiefs; amI whell the consul
TU(lpcr proposed to establisll a commission of govern-
ment, lwving fit its head the padre Rico, Valencia's first
defender against Moneey and the most able Bnd energetic
man in those parts, lIahy evaded the proposition; be won].1
not give Rico power and .allowed ever}" disposition to impede
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useful exertion, Then the leadillg people either open!)· su~.
mitted or secretly entered into conncxiOll with the French,
who were thus enabled tranquilly to S('CUl'{l the resources of
the country i and as the regency at Cadiz refused tlJC stipu_
lated exehl.ngc of prisoners, the Spanish nrmy wns scnt to
:E'nmce, lInd the horrors of Cuurem were prolonged,
Duriug the siege of Vulencia, F,'eire nud his ::Murcians,
illeludiug a body of cm'alry', had abandoned the Ilas8es of the
Contreras district and retired across the Xuear to AlmallZ&,
Mahy occupied Alooy, and Villa Campn. marched to Cartha,
geM, Snehot wished to leave them undisturbed until he '"·as
re:o.dy to attack Alicnnt itself, But to ensure the fllll of
Vlllelleiu, Napoleon hud dinx:ted Soult to hold tell thOll~and
men in the Despeiias Peros, to march if necessary to Suehot's
assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordcred to
detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of
cavalry, from the valley of the T'lgus, to oo-operate witll the
army of Arogon, These last-Ilamefl troolls sbould llavc inter-
posed between Valencia and Alicaut before the battle of the
26th, but they only rem,:lleJ Almanza on the Dth, the "cry JIIY
Valencia surrendered: }'reire retreated before them, and MaL)',
who was preparing to advance ngllin to Alcira, took shelter in
Alicaut, Montbruu knew that Villeneia had fallen and was
ndvised by Suchet to rcturn immediately, but wishing to share
in the glory of the hOllr he marclled f1f,'il.inst Alieant threw
somo shells and summoned it to surrender, The municipal
lIuihorities, the govemor, Dnd wUIlY of the ICllding lloople,
were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did uot press them, and
when he retired the place was, as Suehet had foreseen, put
into a. state of defence. The consul Tupper, aud Hoehe the
military agent, then distrihut!lrl clothes and food to the naked
furnishing soldiers, restored tl\Cir oourage, drew many more W
Alieant, and stop!}Cd the doseli.ioll, which was se grent that ill
one month Freirc's division alone lost two tliouSlIud mell,
:lloutbrun's attemjlt Ulcreforc hurt the FI'Clldl interests, llnd
his troops on their return to Toledo wasted aud pillaged the
country through which they passed in lI. shameful manner.
Villa Camllfl now nb'llldoncd C'lrth'lgcnn alld returned to
the lllountains of Albnruzin' und Suchet, ellllJc.rrassed by tbe
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failure at Alicant and ureading the fever atCartlmgena, posted
Harispe's division on the Xucar to guard against the pesti-
lence rather than to watch the enemy. Yet he seized Onndia
and Denia, wllich lll.'lt Wll8 strangely neglected both by the
Spaniards and by the British S<]ulIdron after the stores were
removed; for the castle had sixty gUllS mountoo, many \'es-
sels were in tlle port, alld as \l. post it was important, and
might easily hll.ve been IlCld unt.il 8 Spll.nish garrison could be
thrown in. When these points were secured 11 brigade was
dew.ehed ou the side uC Cabrillas to preserve the eOlllmuui(:tL-
tion with Cuenca, and Uusuier was OrUered to form the siege
of Peniseola: bllt at the moment of investing that place,
intelligence arrived tlult Tarag<ma, tIle garrison of which, COil-
trory to orders, had consumed the reserve-provisions, was
menaced by Lacy, wherefore Sevetoli lllQved Crom VulelJeia to
replace Musnier, liud the latter marched to TortoJ:a in aid of
Taragona. Prel'ious to hill arrival, Lnfollse, governor oC Tor-
toro, had advllnced with some eavolry and n battalien of
infantry to the fort of Belaguer to obllCrve Lacy, and being
falsely told the Spaniards were in retreat, cntered Cambril on
the 19th, and from therlcc pusIled on with his cavlllry to
1'amgono.: the Spaniard was nearer than he imllg"ined.
It will 00 remembered tlllLt Erules and Satllficld were posted
in the valley of the Congusta and at Mattaro, to intercept the
French convoy to Barcelona; but in December Maurice
Mathieu seized Mllttaro, while Decaen, who had received some
reinforeeUlents, brougllt dowll the IOllg e.xpeellX1 convoy, and
the Spaniards tllllS placed between two fires, after a slight
action opened tIle rOM!. When Dceacn returned to aerollt~
they rellumed their position, but wey after proposing several
new projects, wllieh he generally relinquished lit tlie momcnt
of executiou, at last decided to fall on Tarngona IInd after_
wnros invade Arllgon. With this view, ho drew off Erotes'
division auol some cavalry, in all aoout six thousand men, from
the Congosta., and took post about the 18th of January at
Reus; stores from CadiT. were then landed from the English
vcseels at Cape Salou, and Codrillgton repaired to the Spanish
quarters to cOlleert a. combined opernlion with the fleet; it
was at that moment the scouts hrought word that Wosse had
n2
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entered Tarngona with the Cflvalry; and that the French infan_
try, eight hundred in number, were at Villn Seea, ignorant of
the vicinit,y of the Spanish army.
Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and Codrington
,vould have returned to his s]lip, but a pal role of }'rench ut;L-
goons chased him back, and another patrole llushing to Salon
made two ClIlltains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners
and brought them to Villa Seea. Ey tbis time, howe"cr,
Lacy IllW fallen 111,011 the French infantry in front, and Eroles
turning boUl their flanks nnd closing upon their rear killed and
wounded two hundred, whereupon the remainder surrendered.
Wholl this well managed auu !Ulppy exploit; had wrminuted
the released naval officers immediately regained their ships,
and the B<J.unclron was tllat night before Taragona ; but a gale of
wind off shore impeded it-s fire, the Spaniards did not appear
on Ihe land-side, ilnd next day the inerelllling gale com·
pelled the ships to anchor to the enstwll.ro. Lney had however
aoalldolled the proje<:t agail18t Taragona, and after 6ellding his
prisoners to Dusa, went off llimself towards Montserrat, leaving
Eroles' division, reinforced oy a eOllsiderable body of armed
pessantry, at Altafulla behind the Gaya. A bridge in front
WM broken, the position was strong, nud Eroles, who had
heen also promised the aid of 8.usfie1d's division, awaited the
IIUaek of three thousand mcn who wcre coming from Burce-
lOllS. He was lwwever ignorant UJat Decaen, finding the wars
from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the side of
Vieh, had sent gcneral Lamarque with five thousand men to
Barcelona, and Manricc Mnthicu had thus eigllt thousand good
troops.
DA'ITLE all ALTAFULLA.
Being an.xious to surprise Eroles, the French generals tool,
pains to eon~al their llumllCfil and marched all nigllt; but lit
dflybrcak, having fouled the river, they defeated the Spaniards
with a loss of n tllOusand killed alld wounded. Tlle pursuit
was bamed by the to{.al dispersion of the Ciitnlrms, and the
Freneh in returning suffered from t,he fire of the naval S<J.uadron.
Eroles then complained that Sarsfield had kept away with ..
design to sacrifice him. If so he gained nothing, for Dceaen
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huving scoured the higher country about Olot descended into
the valley of Vich and defeated him also; he was at onc time
even ll. pri~oner but was rescued by ll. 8oldier. }'rom Centclla
Decaell lnarched by Caldas and Sabadcl upon DarcelQlla, and
Musnier re-victualled Taragona..
In this manner the CntaIans were again reduced to great
straits, and the :E'rench, expecting reinforccmcuts, occupied all
tlu; coast, made uew roads beyond the reach of the ships' fire,
find Clltabli8hed fresll posts at. Moneado, Mattftro, Palnmos, and
Cadnqucs; they n.Iso )lIaecd dctael1mellts in the higher valleys
and compelled the Sllfluiards once more to resort to tlle irre-
gular warfare, now a very feeble resource, because Lacy 1111d
distlnned tile somatenes and they wcre very uiseontcnted.
Milans, Manso, Eroles, S/lrsficld, and Rovira were continually
disputing, yet beiug 8till slIjlplied with arms alltl stores from
the British n!lvy, SUSbl.illed themselves until new combinations
were produced hy the English efforts. But Lacy's intrigues
ond unpopularity iucreased, to geneml gloom prevailed, lind the
founuations of streugth were shaken; for tbough the jJU.tl·jOts!
still pos~essed the mountains anu even violnted the )'rencb
frontier, their enemies held all tIle towns, al1 the portil, find
most of the lines of communicntion, and their moveable
columns gathered the harvests! of the valleys and chased the
most daring of the partisans. Wherefore Suehct, seeing
Taragona was secure, renewed his operations by the siege of
Peniooola.
This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the
sea, WAA nClIrly impregnable; the communication with the
shore was hy 0. ueck of land sixty yards wide amI two hun_
dred and fifty long. In the middle of the town WlIs a strong
castle well furnished with guns liud provisions, Dritish ships of
wnr were at hand to aiu the defence, the rock yielded copious
springs of water, and deep mllr6hes covered the approach
to the neck of laud, which beiug covered by the waves iu
heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by batteries
and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia :r-,Tavarro, who hlid been
takeu Juring the siege of l'ortoza und had escnped, was the
governor, nnd his garr,ison was sufficientl)' numerous.
On the 20th ground was broken, and morLar-ba.tteries,
T'EXrl'SULA WAit
c.~tab]isllcd twelve hundred yards from the fOrl, opelled their
lire on the 28th. 'J'li~e nigllts after, (I, parallel of live IHlIldred
yards was built of fII.<>eincs and gahinns, nnt! hatteriCfl wel'O
collllllenced on either flank. In the night of the 2nd tlle
brcllclliug Imltcries beiug finished aud t\rllleU were going to
0POll, when a privuteer captured a despatch from the governor,
WllO eomjl1ained in it that the English wished to take the
command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to
llurrelHler thall stiffer t.hem to do so. On this hint Suehet
(Ipencll negotiations which terminated in tlle ellpitulation of
the fortress, the troops being alloweU to go where they pleased.
'l'hc .Freneh found six!.)· gUllS mouuted, 1l111lthe ellsy reduction
of such a strong place, whidl secured their line of communi.
ClItion, produced a geucral dispositioll in tIle Valcneians to
submit to fortune. Sueh is Suehet'.~ lIecount of this alf,lir, but
the colour wllieh lie tllought it neeeMJlry to give to l\ transac-
tion full of shame find di~honollr to NaVlll'rO, ean only be
considered as lmrt of the price paid for Pcuiseola. 'l'he true
causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison
were from the first despondingund dividc(l in opiniou, and the
Britisll llaval officers did hut stimulate the troops and general
to do tlleir dut)' to thcir conntry.
Six thOUSillld Poles were IlOW recallcd from Suellet by
Nn]loleou, who required all the troops of tlmt nalion for his
Russiau expedition; tllcy IlIIll'Ched by Jaca, taking willl them
the prisoners of Blakc's army. llcille's two French divisions
were then ordered to fonn a sepamte corps of observation on
thc lower Ebro, Ilml Pl1lombini's Italian division WI\5 sent
tOWflrtls Sorin. ami Cnllltllyud to oppo~c Montijo, Villa Campa
nud Bnssecour, who wcre lignin in joint operntioll on thllt side.
But Reille soon marched tOIl'MUI:l Arllgoll, :\ud Sevcroli's divi-
sIon took his place on thc lower. Ebro j fur the pnrtidas of
Durllll, Empeciuado, IInd those numerous bands from thc
AsturillS and La 1.[ontnfia. composing the seventh army,
hllrllSsed Nal'arre and 1\ ragon ami were too powerful for o.ffll-
Telli. Miu!! !.llso surprised Hu(}Sca in January, and when
attacked during his rdrc:lt at LUlllbiar repulsed the CJ\ewy
!lllllrorried off Lis prisoners.
Surhet's field force ill Valcneia was thus reduced by twenty
thousand men, he had only lifteen thouSilnd left, and COllS('
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quently could not !lush tue invasion on the siue of Uurcia.
'l'ue approaching departure of Napolcon front Paris also altcl'cU
the situation of the French armies in the Pellinsuh. The
king was again appointed the clllllcror's lieutenant, and he
cxtended the right wing of Suchct's ar/llY to QuenCH, swl
concentrllkd the army of the centre at Madrid. Thus Vslencia
was made 11 mere llead of CAntonments, in front of whieh fn'Sh
Spanish annies soon assembled, and Alicant bcCllme lID objcct
of interest to tho English government. Suchet, who hud
neglected llis wound, received at the battle of SagllutulIl, fell
iuto a dnllgerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which
seemed destiJlcd to lick np all the remains of the Spanish
power Wll8 sudJcnly cxtinguislled.
OBSERVATIONS,
}O, 'l'he events which led to tllO ClljlitllllltiOU of Valencia
wcre but a continuation of those faults which had before
ruined the Spanish CAuse in every part of the Peninsula,
IUl.mely, the neglcet of all good military uwgcs, and the mania
fol' lightillg great Lattles with bad troops.
~. Blake needed not to have fought" scrious action during
flny pArt of tIle campaign. He might hflve succoured Sagun-
tUIll without a dangerous battle, aud might have rctrroteJ in
gafety behind the Guadahwiur; he might have defcuued that
river without risking his whole army, aud then have retreated
behind the XUC.1f. He should never llfl\'e shut IIp his Ilrmy in
Valenciu., but having done so he should nevcr lmvc ropitulnted.
Eighteen thOUl:ll\nl! llloo well COlluueteu, could always have
broken through the thin circle of iuvestmeut drawn bJ Sucllet,
especially AA thc Spnnillrds had the power of operllting Oil both
banks of the river. The cuIDpfiigl.l. was one llUge error
througllOut, and Wll8 pithily suwmed up in oue sentence by
Wellington. Being accused bJ the regeucy atCadiz of haring
cilused tlle catastrophe, by pcnnitting the army of the Ilorth
mu.! thllot of Portnb"lll to S\lUU ruinforeelllcut~ to Suchct, he
replied thus-' The misfortunes of Valencia are to be attri-
buted to Blnke's ignorallce of Ms profes.siou, and to Mall)".
cowardice lInu trenchcry I'
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CHAPTER IV.
OPERATIOXS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTRF.MADURA.
[1811.
THE affairs of ~hcse provinces caunot be treated separately.
Wherefore, taking Soult's position lit Seville as the centre or
a Vl\St system, it shall be shown how from thence he dealt his
powerful blows around, aneI struggled even as a consuming
firo which 110110 could smother though many tried. Seville
the bMe of his movements, the storehouso of bib anny, wa~
fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being
genemlly submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks.
From thence he maintained a line of communication with
the army of Portugal through Estromadura, and Witll Madrill
through La lIancho. i from thence 1l.1I0 he sustained the most
diversified operations 011 all parts of a circle which embraced
the COlldado de Niebla, Cadiz, Grenada, Cordoba, and Eslre-
maclura. The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the
most vulnerable point, 1Jecause from thence the allies might
intercept the navigation of the river GUfl<1alquivir, and so
roi6C the blockade of Cadiz; and the frontier of Portugal
would cover tILe assembly of the troops until the moment of
attack. Moreover, cxpeditious from Ca<1iz to the mouth of
the Guadiana were as we ha,·e seen frequent. Nevertheless,
when Blake and Ballesteros had been driven from Ayamonte
in July and Angust, the French were masters of the Condado
with the exception of the castle of Paymago, and Soult, dread-
ing the autumnal pestilence, did Dot keep more than twelve
hundred Illen on tiult side.
Victor always maintained the blockade of the Isla. His
position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San
Lucar de Harameda on the right to Coni! on the left, running
through Xerel\ Arcos, Medina·Sidonia, and Chielana. But
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while thu.s pested he Wll8 in 0. manner blockaded himself; for
in the Isla, includillg the Anglo-Portuguese division, tllere
were never less thun sixteen thousand troops, having the com·
mand of the sea IInd able at any moment to land on his
flanks. The partidus, although neither numerous nor pownrful,
often impeded the intercourse with Seville; the serranos of
Ronda and the regular forces of .AJgesiras, supported by Gib-
ralmr, cut the communication with Grenada; nnd ns Tnrifa
WUil still held by the allies, for general Campbell would never
relinquish that important point, the fresh supplies of cattle
drawn from the great plain called the Campiiia de Tarifa were
straitened. The expeditions to Estrcmndura nnd Murcia, the
battles of furosa and Alhut'a, and the rout of Dam, had
emploJed all the disposable part of the army of tile south;
hence Victor's corps, scarcely strong enough to preserve its
own fortified position, could ffill.ke no progress in the attack
of the Isla. l'his wcakness of the }'rcnch army insured the
safety of Cadiz, wherefore part of the British garrison joined
Wellington, and Blllke, as we have seen, carried off the .Albuera
clivbions to lose tllCffi at Valencia.
In Grenada the fourth corps, now commanded by Laval,
11ad two uistinet tasks to fulfil. 1°. To defend the eastern
frontier from the Murcian army; 2°. to maintain the CORst
line beyond the Alpuxaras against the efforts of the pnrtidn8
of thoso mountains, ag"dinst the scrranos of the Hond!>, ami
ngainst the expeditionary armies from Cll.di~ and from Alge.
sims. However, the defeat at &za, and the calling off of
:Mnhy, Frciro and Montijo, to aid the Valencinn operatiolls
secured the Greulldan frontier; and Mttrtin CUrerll, who WIIS
left there with 0. small force, having pushed his partisan
excursions rashly was killed in a skirmish at Lorca about
the period wllen Valencill. surrendered. Cordoba was generally
occupied by n. division of five or six thousand men, ready to
operate on the side of :Estremadura. and .Mureia, or to chnse
the partidas, more numerous thero than in other partg Ilud
also connected with those of La. :Maneha.
Estremadurll was the most difficult field of operation.
Thnre Dndlljos was to be supplied and defended from the most
formidable Ilrmy in the Peuinsulo.,-there the oommulliClltiollS
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with Madrid and the army of Portugal were to be maintainod
by the way or 'J'ruxillo,-thcre the fifi!J French corps, uuuer
Drouct, ha.d to collcct its subsistence from a ravaged country,
-to Ilrcserve its communications ovcr the Sicrra Morcna with
Sc\-i1\c,-to protect the march of mOllt1Jly convoys to Badnjos,
to observe Hill, /lUll to oppose Morillo's troops, now bClloming
numerous uud bold. Neither the Spanish Ilor British divisioll~
could prevent Drouet from sending cOllvoys to Badlljos, becaus~
of the wllnt of bridges on the Guadiana below the fortress;
but J'lforillo incommoded his forilging ]lflrties; for being posted
at Valencill de Alcalltarll, aud lllwing his retreat upon
Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about Cacerc3,
aud even pus!wd his illcursiollil to'l'ruxillo. Drouet, there-
fore, was compelled to keep a strong ddachmcnt beyond
the GUlldiana, wllich exposed his troops to Hill's entu-
)lrises j lllul that bold :md vigilant commander, well in-
structed and having ten thousand excellent troops, Wll3
II very dangcroll8 neighbour. Marmont's position ill the
valley of the 'l'ugn~, und the construction of the forts and
bridge at Almaruz, Wlli..:h enalllcd him to keep a division at
'fruxillo and connected him with the army of the south, tended
indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French
)lMition in E~tremlldllrfl; nevertlLcles9 Drouet generally
rcmnincd ncnr Zafrn with hig main body, beeo.use from thence
he could more easily mnke his retreat good to the Morena, or
advance to Mt:ridu. and Bndajos as occaaion required.
Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts
of the drde round Seville at the period when Suehet invaded
Valencia, und Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo. Soult,
if hig share of the rcillforcemcnts which entered
Spain ill July and August hall joined him, would
have had about u huudrcd thousand troops, of
which ninety thousand lllen a.nd fourteen thousand horses
were Frendl: but the reinforcements were detained in the
different governments, and the actnal number of French pre-
Bent with the eagles WII.~ not morc than sixty-seven tholl.'lilud.
Victor had twenty thousand; Laval and Drouet eleven thou·
SlInd each; the 1,'arrison of Badajos was five thousand,; twenty
thousand formed a dispo-sable reserve, and the rest of the
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force consisted of 'esoopd.eros' and civic gunrda, chiefly cm·
played in the garrisons am] police. UpOll pnssing occasious
SOlllt conld llO'wever take the field at any point with twenty-
four or twenty-five thousand men, IlIld in Estnmadura with
.wen 0 greater number of excdlellt troops well and powerfully
organized; but the manner in which his gnat force was para-
l.vsed in the latter pnrt of 1811, shall now be shown.
In October, Drnuet being then in tl1c Morcnfl. and Girard's
division at Jlerid~l watching Morillo, who Wl\8 at Caceres, the
duke of Dalmatia, coming fl'om his Mureinn e:'<pedition, sent
thrce thousand men to Fregelll\\ seemingly to menoce the
Alcmtejo: whereupon Hill recalled his brigades from the Ponful,
and eonccntrnted his wllOle OOI'j.lS uehind Campo Maior the
9th. The 11th Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish
cavalry retired from Caeens, the French drove "MorilIo to
Cam de Cnlltella.ila, and everything indicated a serious attack;
but at this moment Soult's attention was attracted by the
appearance of Ballesooros in the 110mb and he recalled the
force from Fregcllnl. Drouct, who 11lId reached Meridn,. then
retired to Zafro, leaving Girard wit·h a division and some
cavalry Ilear Caceres.
Ballesteros had disembarked at Algesiras on the 11 th of
September, and immediately marehed with his own nnd
Beguine's troops, ill all four thousand men, to XimellB, raising
fresh levies and collecting the sen-allOs of the Ronda as he
advanced. On the 18th he endeavoured to succour the castle
of Alcalo. de Gazulcs, but a French aetachment from Chiclanll.
had already reduced that post, and nfter SOIllIl skirmishing
both sides fell back, the one to Chiclana the other to
Ximcna. At this time ab: thollSilnd Freucll were collected at
Ubrique, in furtherance of 1I project Soult was then meditating
to effect the entire subjectiolt of Andalusia and the destruction
of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design, which
shall be hereafter explained, required preliminllr,)' operations,
the most importllllt beiug the capture of TlIrifa; for that
place, situated in the narrowest vart of the strnits, furnished
either " protection or a dangerous point of offence to the
Meditermncan trade, following the relatiOlls of its possessor
with Englaml. It affected the supplies of the French before
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the I~la,-itwas from its nearness and the run of the current
the customary point for trading with Morocoo,-it menaced
the security of Ccuta: and it !}()Sllcsscd, from ancient recollec-
tions, 0. species of feudal superiority over tllll smaller towns
and port!> along the coast., which would give. M!e French a
moral in/iucn~ of some oonsequenee.
.A. confidential officer sent from Conil had secretly nego-
tiated with the barbaric emperor a convention by which he
engaged to exclude British agents (rom his court j and to
permit vessels of all IUltions to use the Moorish itlg' to corer
tllcir cargoes while carrying to the French supplies hitherw
sent to the allies, provided Soult would occupy Tarifa as a
depot. This impomnt convention WIIS on the point of being
ratified when the opportune arrival of some U1lUsuallr mag_
nificent presents from England turned the scale llgniust the
Frellcl\ and their agent was dismissed; tile English supplies
were increascd, and Mr. Btuaet cntered into a treaty for the
purchase of horses to remount the allied cavalry. Calculating
on the capricious nature of barbarians the duke resoh·ed how.
ever to fulfil his part by the capture of Tllrifll; hcnce it Wag,
that he had, when Ballestcro9 appeared at Ximellll, arrested
the movement of Drouet ng.linst the Alemtejo, and seut
troops frolll Seville by Ubrique to dislodge him from a posi-
tioll extremely inconvenient to the first and fourth corps, and
likel)" to affcct the taking of Tarifa. Ballcsteros, if reinforced,
might also have menaced the blockade of Cadiz by inter-
cepting the supplies from. the Cllmpiiia de Tarifa, and still
more by menacing Victor's oomrnullientiollS with Seville along
the Guadalquivir. A demonstrntion by the allies in the hili
de Leon arrested the march of thcse French troops for a
moment, but on t·he 14th, eight thousllnd men under gencrals
Godinot and Sem616 advanced upon St. Roqne and Algesiras.
The inhabitant,g of those p[accs fled to the green island, and
Ballesteros tool, refuge Ullder Gibraltar, where his flunks wcre
covcred by the gun-bonts of thc lllucc. The garrisou WIl!l too
wwk to assist him with mcn, aud tllUS cooped up he per-
force lived upon the resources of the pla.ce. Efforts were
therefore madll to dmw off the French lly hUrlliBing their
flanks; and thoutih the naval IllCilllS did not suffice to rellloye
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llis whole army seven llUudred were transported to Manilba,
where the 8err8n08 and some jlartirlas had 1ll\i>Cmblcd on the
left of the enemy. At the same time twelve hundred British
troops witll four guns under colonel Skcrrett, llnd two thou-
sand Spllniards under Copons, sailed fl'Om Clldi? to Tilrifa to
act upon the French right. Copons was driven back by 11
gale of wind, Skerriltt al'ri ved the 17th, and the next day
G<Jdinot sent a detachment ~<?fl.inst him, but the sea-road by
which it marched was so swept hy thc guns of the Tuscall
frigate, lIided hy tIle bonts of the Stately, that after losing
some men it returned. Then Godiuot and SemeJ6, disputing
and witllout provisions, retreated and were followed by Balles-
teros' cavalry lIS fur as Ximcna wl\cre tlley separnted in grellt
anger, and Godinot aRer reaching Seville shot himself: this
failure in the south unsettled Soult's plans and was followed
by a heavier disaster in Estremadum.
SURPRISE OF A1lQYO MOLINQ.
When Dronet retired to Zafra Hill was directed to drive
Girard from Caceres that Morillo might forage that country.
For this purpose he assembled his troops at Albuqucrque the
23rd, and Morillo came to Alisooa on the Salor. Gimrd had
an advanced guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th Hill
occupied Aliseda Rnd ORsa de O:llltillana, and the Spanish
Cllvalry droY(: the French from Aroyo de Pucrco. The 26th
at dnybreak Hill entered Mo.lpartidn do Cnceres and Ms
(lllvlllry pushed back that of the enemy: Gil:ard lhen aban-
doned Cacercs, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill,
hll.ving no certain knowledge of the enemy'a movement-s,
halted for the night at Malpartida.
On the morning of the 27th Morillo entered Caceres, thc
encmy Wag tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Menda,
and Hill, hoping to intercept their march, pursued by Cl cross
road through Aldes de Cano and Casa de Don AuWuio.
During thia movement intelligence came that Girard had
halted at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala on
the main road to Cncercs, thus indiC/lting that be knew not
of the new direction taken by tIle allies alld ouly looke!l to a
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pursuit from Caceres; wllcrefore Hill instantl}' made a forced
march to Alcuesca within a league of AI'oyo de Molinos.
This last village was in a I,lain, and behind it 1I. ridge of rocks
rose in the form of II crescent (,bout two miles wide on the
chord. Oue rOiu.! led directly from Alcucscu. UpOll Aroyo,
another entered it from tllc left, und three led from it to the
right j the most distant of the last was the Truxillo road,
whicl, rounded the extremity of the sierra, the nearest WIIS the
Mcridll. road, and between them was that of l[c(]c!ill.
During the nigM the weather was dreadful, but no fires
wet'tl permitted ill the allied camp, :\uJ at l.wo o'clock in the
morning of the 28th the troops moved to 1I. Iow ridge hlllf. fl
mile from Aroyo, under CQvcr of wllich they fomlOO three
bodies, the infantry on the wings, the cavalry in the centre.
'rhe left oolumn marched stroigllt upon the village, the riglit
towards the extreme point of the sierr3, where the foaU to
Tnlxillo turned the horn of the crescent, the cavalry ke!lt its
due place between both. One brigade of Girard's division
lllwing marched at four o'clock by the rond of Medellill WlUI
nlready safe, but Domhrouski's brigade and tllC cavalry of
Briebc were still in the place, the horses of tbe rear-gullrJ,
unbridled find tied to olive-trees, while the infantry were
gathering to form on tJlC Metlellill roa.U outside the villllge.
Girllrd was in a house waiting for his llOrse when tlVO British
officers galloped down the street and ill an instant all wlUl
confusion; the envalry bridled up hfl.Stily, the infantry run
to their alarm posts, but a tempcst raged, a thick mist rolled
down thl! eraggy mountain, a terrific SllOut was heard llmidst
tIle clatter of tlle elements, and with the drivi.ng storm came
the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments cbarging down
the strect.
Thc French renr-gllurd of horsemen, lighting nnd struggling
llnrd, were driven to tlle cnd of the village, while the inflUltry,
llUrriedly forming' squares, clIdeavol.red to cover the main body
of the cavalry which was gathered on the left. 'I'hen the
seventy-first, lining the garden-wails, opened a galling fire on
the nearest squllre, the ninety-sccolld filed out upon the
French right, the fiftieth regimcnt secured the prisoners in the
vill~<>e, and the rest of the column, headed by the .spanish
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camlry, skirted the outside of the hOllsClland endeavoure(l to
intercept the retreat. Soon the guns opened on the French
square3, and the thirteenth dragoons captured their artillery
while the ninth drngoons and German hussars charged anu
dispersed their cavalry.
Gifllrd, an intrepid officer, although wounded still kept his
inf,mtry together and oontinued hill retrf.l\t by the 'l'ruxiJlo
road; but the right column of tho allies WlIS in possession of
that line, tlJCir cavalry find artillery were close upon the
French flank, and the left column, was again coming up fast.
lu this desperate situation, llis lllen falling by fifties, Girard
would not surrender, bnt songht to escape in disllersion by
scaling the almost inaceessihle rocks of the sierra. His pur-
suers not less obstinate also divided. The Spaniards u8Ceudl:d
the hills at an easier Illlrt beyond his left, the thirty-uinlli
regiment and Ashworth's Portuguese turned the mountain by
the Truxillo road, and the twenty-eighth and thirty_fourth,
led by genel"81 Howard, followed tlle Frcnch step by step up
the rocks, taking prisoners every moment, untiL the pursuers,
heavily loaded, were uuable to eontiuue this trial of speed
with men who had throwu away their arms and packs. Girard,
Dombronski, and Briche escaped at first to San Hernando
and Zoritn in tbc Guudll.lupc mountains, after which, crossing
the GUlIdillna at Orellano, on the 9th of Novcmber they
rejoined Drouet with about el.l: hundred men, the relllllius of
three thousand. They were said to be the 'finest troops
then in Spain, and indeed their resolution llot to surrender
in such all appalling situation was no wCiln proof of their
excellence.
Twelve or thirteen hundred prisoners, including genernl
Bron amI tlle prinec of 1\remberg, all thc French lIrtilkry
baggage and colllllli£sarillt, together with ll. eontributiou just
raised feU to the victors; and during the fight, ll. Portuguese
brigade united to Penne Vi1IaIDur's cavlllry W[Cl sent to Meridll,
where Borne stores wero found. The loss of the lI.11ies was
seventy killed and wounded, Md lieutenant Strenowitz WllS
taken. He was distinguislled by llis courage and successful
enterprises, but he was un Austrian who Imd abandoned the
}'rcnch arlllY ill ::ipaiu to join Juliull Sallchez' partida and W!U
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liable to death by the laws of war, Originally forced into
the French service he was in reality no deserter, and HiJl,
anxious to slIve him, applied frankly to Dronet, who WM 80
gmtle of temper thut while sma.rting uJI(lcr this disa~ter he
released his prisoner. Girartl was Duly dCllrivcd of his divi-
sion, which Wlls given to geneml furois, although in a military
point of view his offence was unpardonable. He knew two
or three da.ys before that Hill was nellr him; he knew t110re
Wll~ fl. good rOftd from Malpartida. to Alcucsca becnuse he had
himself passed it t.'oming from Cuccres; llnd yet he halted at
Aroyo de :Molino without necessit.r, tlud without sendiug out
even a patrole upon his flank, thus sacrificing two thousand
brave men. Napo!eQu's clemency was great but not mis.
placed, for Girard afterwards repaid it by his de\'otion at the
battle of J.I\lt?:en when the emperor's SUlr WIIS on the wane.
Hill neglected no preCtlut.ioll, let no advllntage escape, llnd ro
good ammgemcntB added celerity of movement firmncu
Bnd vigour, His t.roops scconded him as he merited; and
here was manifested the advantage of possessing the friend-
ship of a people so strongl.r influenced by the instinct of
revenge as the PeninsulaJ'l!. For during the night of the
27th every Spaniard in Aroyo, liS well as in Alcuesca, knew
that the allies were at hand, and not one was found 80 base or
imlisercet as to betray the fad.
This blow struck, Bill returned to his old qUllrten;, the
Sllauisll troops fell back behind the Salor, and
the report of Girar<!'1l disnster Bet all the French
corps in motion. Drouet fC<oceupied Caccres with a tlJOusand
mon,-}'oy ]lllSSed tilo Tagus at Almaruz on the 15th, and
woved on Truxillo,-a eOllvoy entered Balhti0s from ZlI.fra 011
the 12th, a second on the 20th; and Soult, while collecting
troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the ground
under thc guns at Badajos with potatoes and corn. Every-
thing seemed to indicate a powerful attack on Hill, when II
serious di.sturunnce nmongst the Polish troops ut HonquilIo
compelled SoulL to dell.lCh men from .Seville ro
quell it. That effected, n division of four thou-
sand men entered Estrclllndura, and Drouet, whose
corl19 was thus ~sed to fourteen tllOUSlmd infant!)'
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and three thousand cavalry, OD the 5th of December a(lvanecd
to Almendralcjos, and the 18th hi~ advanced guard occupied
Merida. At the same time MarnlOnt concentrated pl!rt of Ius
army at Toledo, from whence Montbrull, as we have seen, was
directed to aid Sucllet at Vll.leneia, and Soult with the same
,iew sent ten thousand men to tho Dcspciios Peros.
Drouet's movements were however again stopped by some
insubordination in the fifth corps. And as it was now well
known that Sou]t's chief object was to destroy Bnllesteros and
take Tarifa, Rill again advanced, partly to jlrOte<lt Morillo from
Drouct, partl)' to save the resources of Estrcmadura, partly to
make u. diversion in favour of Bllllesteros and 'farifll, aud ill
some sort also for Vlllellcia. Re entered Estrcmadura hy
Alhuquerque the 27th, and having received information that
the French untaugltt by their former misfortunes were not
vigilant, made a forced march in 110pes to surprise tllem. On
the 28th he passed Vil1nr del fuy and SilO Vineente and
reached Na,\'a de Membrillo!l, where he fell in with three
hundred Frene11 infantry and a few hussars, part of a foraging
part)' the remainder of which was at a village two lea.gues
distant. A patrolc grwe an o.lann, tho French retreated
towa.rds Merida and were closely followed by four hundred of
the allied cavalry, who had orders to make every effort to stop
their march; but to use the words of general Hill, 'the intrepid
and admirable manner in which the enemy retreated, the
infantry fomled in square, and favoured fLfI he was by the
Mture of the eouutry of which he knew how to take the
fullest advantage, llre,'ented the cavalry alone from effecting
anything Ilgainst him.' Captain Neveux, the able ofiiC(:r who
eOlwnandoo. on this occasion, reached Merido. with a loss of
only forty men, all killed or wounded by the fire of the
artillery; but t-he French at Merida immediately abandoned
their unfinished works and evacuated that town in the night,
leaving' behind some bread and lI. quantity of wheat.
From Merida, Hill, intending to fight Drouet, marched on
the 1st to Almendralejos where he captured
auothel" field store; but the French general fell
back towards Zafra, and the weather was so bad
and the roads so deep that Hill halted the main body while
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colonel Abercrombie with a detachment of Portuguese and
Oennan cavalry fClllowed the enemy's rear-guiml. Meanwhile,
Phillipon, who never lost flll advlIlltage, sent either the detach-
ment which had escorted tho convoy to Badajos or somo
Polish troops, with whom llQ was disoontented, down tho
Portuguese frontier on the right of the GUllllillna by Mourn,
l.fourao and Serpe, witll orders to drive the herds of cattle
from those places into the Sierra Moroua. Aoorcrombie
reached Fuente (le! Maestro the evening of the 3rd, where
he met a stout squUllron of the enemy and 11 stiff charge took
]lla.cc, but the French, out-numbered fiud llanked 011 both sides,
wefO overthrown with 0. loss of thirty mon. Dronet was lIOW
in full retreat for ::Mouasterio, Morillo, moving UpOIl 1Ifedellill,
took post at San Benito, and I,he allies remained llIasters of
Estremadurn until the 13th of January. Marmont's di\1.
sions from the valley of the Tagus then menaced tIle eas~m
frontier of Portngfll, whereupon Hill returned to Portalegre
und sent a division over the Tagus to Castcllo Bralloo.
Drouet immctlilllely retunwd wLlereun, .:md hill cavalry snp-
ported by a detachment of infantry marelled against Morillo;
for that general, instead of falling buck when Hill did,
made a sudden ineursioll to La Mancha and was attacking the
castle of Allllag-w, where he was completely defeated by genel'lll
Trcillnrd aud fled to HorCiljo in the GuaJalupe mountains
reaching it the 18th; yet his fngitivCtl were still coming in
Oll the 21st, and his army remained for a luug time in the
greatest disorder.
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CHAPTER V.
WmLE Hill wag engaged in Estremadurn, impnrtant event9
pasgcd in the south of Andalusia. Soult, rClSolute to ttlkc
'l'arifa, orgauized a batwring~tr'J,ill and direl.:ted Laval upon
San Roque with a strong division. Skerrett was then on the
side of Vejer de Froutera menncing Scmel6, but findin3
Coponll, who had promised an aid of four thousand men, only
brought up Beven llUndred, he returned to Tarifa on the
approach of some l!~rench [TOm Conil. ScmelG then drove
Ballesteros under tIle guns of Gibraltar, where he arrived just
in time to escape IAval's columns. As SemeIe did not folloW'
close, Il. combined attuck was IlrOjected by Ballesteroll, COPOIlS
and Skerrett nguinst Laval, and it was in progress of exccu-
tion when SelueUi came in sight, whereupon COpOns awl Sker· •
rett instnntly returned to Tarifn.
Ballesteros remained at Gibraltar, a beavy hurthen npon
that fortress, and as his troops were without shelter from the
rain general Csmpllell proposcU to scud them in Britisll
vessels to renew that attempt ltgaillst Malaga which had before
failed under lord Blayney. 'l'hey were embarking
O JanullrY.when the French retired by tho Puerto de jell,
a graud pass, <:onnC<..1wg the pluinil of Gibraltar and the
valleys of the Ouadaranque with the gTcat and rieh plain
coiled the Campiiis de Tarifa, and with the gorge of L08
Pedragosos, which is the eastern eutranCl:I to the pastures
called the Vega de Tarifa. This mo,'cmcllt WM prepara-
tory to the siege of Tarifs; and as the bnttering-trsin was
nlready Witllill fiYe Icague8 of that place, Skerrett proposed
to seiM it by a combined operation from Cadiz, 'l'arifa,
Oibmltar, and Los BnrioR, where BnllC!looros had now
taken post. The combination was too wiue. Ballelltero~
indeed feU on the encmy by surprise at thc pass of 0Jcu,
1::2
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llnd Skerrctt and Copons received orders from geneml Camp.
bell to tnke advantage of this diversion; but the former,
~eeing his own plan wus 1I0t adopted to its full extent, would
not stir, lInd the Spaniards after a skirmish of six hours
retired. Laval then left fifteen hundred men to observe
Bnllcsteros, and Illneing 0. detoobment at Vejer to cover hia
right flank th.reuded LoB POOl"'de"'OBOS llnd advauood agai1l8t
'ftlfifll..
The French expected little opposition. The town was
encircled with towers connected by an archery wall irregular
in form, witllOut a diteh, and too thin to resist even field artil·
lery. To the cast and north some high ridges flanked and
seemed entirely to command the weak rampart; but the Eng-
lish engineer had observed, that the nearest ridges formed at
balf jlistol.sbot a natura] glacis, the plane of which, one point
excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with great nicety;
Dnd on that side were more towers, better flanks, llud more
powerful resources for nu iuterior defence. Judging then that
the seemingly favourable nature of the ridges, combined with
other circumstances, would tempt the enemy to commence
their trenches on that sidc, to rcnder the «elusion unavoidable
he strengthened the westtlrn frou~ of tho place, an« rendered
tlie at'Cess to it uneasy by demolishing tile main walls aDd
removing the flooring of nil isolated suburb on the north west.
He also made an out-work of a convent whicli was situated
aoout a llUndroo yards from the place, /lnd eastward of t110
suburb prepared an internal d(lfence which rendered the storm-
iug of the breadl the smaUest difficulty to be enconntered.
But to appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be
described.
Tll.rifa Wll.S cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent
which eut-enng at the east PIlJlSCS out at the opposite point.
This stream was barred at its entrance by a tower willl II
Jlortcullis, in tivut of which Jlalisades were )llanted llcross the
bed of the water. The houses within the walls were strongly
bnilt and occupied incliued Il]anes rising from Cllch side of
the torrent; but at the exit of tbe latter there were two
Inassive structures forming parl of the walls called the toWtf
and ca.stle of the OusmllllS, both of which looked up tbe
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hoUow fOfmed by the tneetillg of the inclined planes at the
·stream. From these structures, first a saudy LLcck of land
and then a. causeway, the whole about eight hundred yards
long, joine<l the town to an island or rather promolltory two
thousand yards in eircumferencc nnd with pllrpendieulilr sides,
whieh forb&le entrance save by the cameway, at the island
end of wl.ieh there Wa.<.! an unfillished entrenchment and
ba.ttery. On the connecting neck of land wcre some Sllnd
hills, the llighcst called the Catalina being scarped amI crowned
with a slight field work containillg llo twelve-pounder; it
covered lhe causeway and jn oonjunction with the tOWtlr of
the Gusmans, which was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder,
flanked the western front and commanded all the groullcl
between the walls Md the island. The gun in the tower of
the Gusmans shot clear over tho town on to the slope where
the Frenc.:h batteries were expected to be raised; and the
Stately ship of the line, the Druid frigate and several gun
and mortar-boats, wcre llue1lOred in thc most favourable situ-
ation for flanking the enemy'iI ajlproacllcs.
Reverting then to the head vi the defence, the ridges on the
eastern fronts and tlle hollow bed of the torrent, which olTered
cover f!lr troops moving to the assault, deceitfully tempted
the ellemy to that side, while the flanking fire of the collvent,
the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalilla, and the
appearance of the shillpillg deterred them even from examin_
ing the western side, and forcibly urged them to"''1\rds the
enst.erll ridgo where tho English engineer wished to find them.
There he Lad marked their ground Aud indicated the situation
of the breach; that is to say, close t-o the cntrance of the
torrent, where the llOllow meeting of the inclined phmes ren-
dered tlle inner depth of the walls far gte(lter than the outer
depth, where he bud loop-holed the houses, opened cummuni~
cations to the rear, barricadC(1 the streets and accumulated
obstacles. The enemy after forcing tlle breach wonld thus
have beeu confined between the houses on the inclined planes,
exposed on each side to musketry from loop-holes and windows,
and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmnns, which
raked the bed of the torrent; the garrison could at worst
have reached thll castle and tower of the Ousmllns, which
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bt:ing high and mas~ive were fitwd for a Tear·guard, llnd l'ro-
\-ided with ladders for the troops to descend and retreat to the
jgland undo1' cover of the Cat111ina.
Bcsidcg tlle ships of wnr and the Cntlllinn guns, there were
in the island four twenty-four poundcfl>, two ten-iuch mortnrs,
and six sllluller pioces j in the town six field-pieces and fonr
coehorns 011 the cast front; an eighteen-pounder ou the
Gnsmans, a howitzer on the portcullis tower, and two field-
pieces kept in reserve for sallies. But most of the artillery
in the island was mounted after the investment, so that two
twenty-four pounders and two mortars only could ttoke part in
the defeuce of the tOWIl; llJlU llS the walls amI towers of tbe
latter could not sustain honvy guns, only tbree field-pieces and
the cochorns did in fact reply to the enemy's fire.
srF,QE OF TARIF.A.
Including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred
horse of that nation the garrison was two thousand five
hundred strong, posted in the following manner. Seyen
hundred in the island, one hundred in ~he Catalina, two
hundred in the cODvent, fifteen hundred in the town.
On the 19th the enemy drove in tIle advanced posts, but
during a 1l11ll.rp skim\ish was designedly led towards the eastern
front. The 20th t·he plllOO was invested, and on the 21st a
piquet having incautiously advanced tuwlLrds the western
frollt, captain W~en of the cleventh suddenly desccnding
from the Catalina carried it clear off. In the night the enemy
approac1\Cd close to the walls, but the next morning Wren
again cnmo down from i·he Catnlina, and the troops from
the rom-ent sallied to reeogni.Be the llosition of the French
advanced posts. So dariug was this sally lhat lieutenant
Welstead of the eighty-second captured a field-piece in their
camp; he was unable to bring it off in face of the Frenel\
rC5erves, but the latter being dmwn nncler the fire of the ships .
the island and the town suffered 8Cvcrcly, Md could scarcely
recover tlle captured pieee from uuder the gUllS of the north-
east tower.
Tn the night of the 22nd tlle anticipations of the British
engineer were realized. The enemy broke ground in two
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places five hundred yards from tlle eastern front, and the
approaches were assicuously worked until the 26th under a
destructive fire, to which tho French replied principally with
Wo.U-Ilicces, and would have done much mischief if the garrison
had not hoon amply sUPlllicd with salld-bag~.
On the 23rd the ships were driven off in a gale. The 27tb
~'ae French hattering-train arrived, and the 2nth their sixteen
pounders opened a.,"iLinst the town, and their howitzers against
the ishuuJ.. 'fhe pieee on the tower of the Gusmlllls Wlll:!
quickly dismounted by this fire, but it Wlll:! as quickl)' re·
established; yet the heavy guns brought the old wall down
in flakes, and a wide breach WllS shortly made a
little to the French left of the portcullis tower.
Skerrett then held a council of war and proposed
to abandon the place. He was strenuously opposed by major
King who commanded the troops which came from Gibraltar,
and by the chief enginecr captain Smith; but he would have
uone it jf general Camphell, hearing of his design from King,
had not caned the transporl;s away. '1'he llla(:e was indeed
open to assault and escalade, but behind the breach the deptb
to the street was above fourteen feet, IInd Smith had covercd
the ground below with iron grlltings hllving e\'ery second bar
turned up; the houses there anu behind all the poiuts liable
to escalade were also pre-prepared and garrisoned, lll\d each
:regiment had its own quarter of defence assigned. ,!,he
hreach W>13 in charge of the eighty.seventh under colonel
Gough; on his left were tlle rifle!llen, aud on his right some
Spaniards ought to have been, but were not, and still further
on the rigllt were two C()mpll.nics of tllC forty-seventh.
In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape on
the breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it OOtll'ooII
the discbarges. The 30th the brellChing fire was renewed,
the wall WllS broken for sixty feet and the whole offered IlII
easy llScent; yet the besieged again cleared away tile rubbish,
and in tlle night they were a.ugmenting the defences behind,
when 11. heavy min augmented the river to a torrent" which,
bringing down from the li'reneh camp a mass of lllanks
fascines gabions and dead bodies broke the lllllisacles with a
shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of
the waters even injured the defences behiud the breach: a
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new passage wns thus opened in tho wall, yet witll great
vigour the besieged repaired the damage before the morning,
IInd calmly and confidently awaited the attack.
ASSAULT OF TAIUFA.
In the night the waters subsided f.lS quickly Il9 they bad
rison, but at dll)'light El. living stream of French grcl1lulicrll
gliding awifUy down the bed of the river reached without
shout or tumult the foot of tbe walls, but there, instead of
quitting the hollow to as9ail the breach, they dashed like the
torrent of the night against the portcullis. The eighty-seventh
regiment, hitherto silent and observant ns if ut a Bllcctacle, then
arose.and with aloud shout and crashing volley slUote the head
of the French column 1 The leading oflicer co\'efj,!d with wounds
fell against the portcullis grate and gave up his sword through
the bars to Gough; the :b'reneh drummer, a gallant boy,
dropped lifeless while beating the charge at his officer's side,
und the dead aud wouuded filled the 1\011011'. '1'he survi\'ors
breaking out to the right and left spread along the slopes of
ground under the rampart8 and opened a quick irregular
musketry, and at the same time a number of men leaped from
the trenches into pit<! digged in front aud shot fast at the
glU'rison j but no escalade or diversion at the other points
was made. The storming column was terribly shattered,
the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from tIle north-eastem
tower a. Iield-piec<:, held in reserve expressly for the occasion,
sent a tempest of gf3ptl whistling through tho l!'reneh ffiusses,
which were swept away until llley could no longer endure the
destruction, and plunging once more into t-he hollow returned
to their camp, while a shout of victory mingled with the
sound of musical instnlments passed round t1\e wall of the
town,
In this combat five officeI'll and thirty-onc men fell on the
side of the allies: the French dead covered all the slopes, and
choked the bed of the river, Ten wounded officers were
tllkell in by the breach, only onc survived, and Skerrctt, com-
passionatillg tbe suffering'S of tbe remainder, permitted Laval
to fekh them off. 'l'he Biege \I'M then suspellucd by Lad
weather, For the rain IlllrtiaUy ruined the French batterieB,
•
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and stopped their supplies, the tornnt, again swelling, broko
tue stockade llnd injured the allies' retrenchments, and solUe
vessels coming from Gibraltar with ammunition were wrecked.
Skerrett was however cxpeeting another nSSflnlt until the
night of t,he 4th, when the Bound of cannon in the cump
without 8ny bullets coming indicated that the encmy was
destroying his guns previous to retreating. At daylight
troops from the convent drove the French out of their batte-
ries, yet a heavy storm impeded the attack and tlle retreat
\\118 skilfully conducted. Sickness followed the hardships of
the trenches, many men dcscrted and the expcdi-
.tiOll did uot cost the French lel;il thun a thousaud
men. The allies lost only onc hundred and fifty
men and one officer, lieutenant Longley of the engineers. who
was killed.
Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true llistory of its
defence cannot tllere be fonnd. To hide the errors of tbe
dead is not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to
the living becomes a crime. Skerrett has obtained the eredit
yet he was not the author of the success at Tarifa; he, and
lord Proby the sccond in command, thought the plaoo could not
be defended nnd ought to be abandoned; all their llroceedingll
tended to that end, and they would eveD. have
given up the island. At Skerrett's express desire Appendil: 8.
".gcneral Cooke had reealled him on the ]8th, thnt
is to say thll day before the siege commellced; aud during
its progress he evinced no hope of final success, flOr made
exertions to obtain it; in somc in8tancC3 he took mC:l\Sures
tending direclly towards failure. To whom then was England
indebted for tbis splendid achievement1 'rhe merit of the
conception is due to general Campbell, lieutenant-governor
of Oibrnltar. He first occupied Tllrifn, and engaged the
Sprmio.rds to admit an English gttrriS<lD into Ceuta to llCCUtb
the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade; and he
waa the only autllOrity in the south of the Peninsula w!lo
appeared to understand tho true value of those points.
Finally, it WllS llis imperious aud even menacing orders which
prevented Skerrett from a.bandoning Ta.rifa before the siege
commenced.
General Cnlllpbell's resolution is the worll to be admired,
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because Tarifa was not within his command, which did not
extend beyond t.hc walls of bis own fortreSll; and he IUlu also
to contend against gcneral Cooke 11'110 claimed tIll! conl~ol of
a garrison chictty composed of troops from Cadiz: He acted
also contrnry to the opinion of lord Wcllington, who, alwars
averse to Illly scrions co-operatiou with the Spanifmls wdl
kllOwing thc latter would inevitllbly fail and throw the
bnrthen Oil the British in the hour of need, was hero more
strongly illfluellcoo, beclJ.use the reports of Cooke, founded
on Skerrett's AmI lord Proby's representations,
reprobated the defence of Tarifn. Thus mis-
informed of tlle real resonrees and having no
local knowledge of the plaetl, lord Wdlillgton judged that
the island only could be lleld-thnt Skerrett's uctnebment was
not wanting for that purpose-ami that without the island the
enemy could not keep possession of Tarifll. Were they even
to take both he thought they could not retain them while
Ballesteros WIIS in strength and succoured from Gibraltar,
nnle8S they also kept n strong force in those parts: the
defeneo of the island was also, he snid, the least costly and
most certain. However, witll that prudence whicll always
Inlu'ked his proceedings, allhough he gave his opinion he
would not interfere from a distllllce in a matter which could
only be accurately judged of on the spot.
But the island had not a single house amI ,vas defenceless,
the rain alone WOllld hnvc gone nenr to force the troops away j
Hnd ilS tho shippiI:g could not always remain in the road-
stead, the building of casclllales and barnlcks and store-
houses for provisions and ammunition would have been more
expensivc thlln the defence of tlle town. Tarifa was an
outwork to the islrmd, and so strong tllnt n much more
powerfnl attnck had heen expected and a mONl
powerful rcsistanetl preplltcd by the English engi-
neer: a defence not restiug on the vll.lour or the
troops alone but on a skilful calculation of all th~
real rcsomces and all the chances.
That the object was wortl} tllC risk may be gathered from
this, tllllt Soult three months nftcr the siege thus expressed
himself, 'The taking or 'l'arifo. will be more hurtful to the
Euglisb aud to the defenders of Ca.diz than tLe taking of
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Alicant or even &dajos, where I cannot go without first
securing my left and laking 'l'arifu..' And he~iJes the advan-
tages already noticed, this place Wll8 close to Ceutll where
there were a few British soldiers and many Freneh llrisoneril.,
and above two thousand discontented Spanish troops and
galley-slaves: Ceuta, which was so neglected by G~neral
the Spanish regency that the Frencll general, C,amJlb<ll
!lBB.D'Alvimllr, tllCll a llrisoner, netullll.r urged the
governor to give it up to Soul" a.I the ollly means of avoid-
ing starvation. Neither would the marshal have f<\il(:(l to
strengthen himself nt 'fllrifa in despite of Ballesl£ros. It
would have given him the supplies of the Campiilll, AppemllJ: 8.
aud those from Daroory, which eould only be
brought to that port or to Coni!; but the latter wns seldom
frequent<ld by the Moors because the nm WfW long and pro-
carious wherelUl u. favourable current always brought their
craft well to Tarifa: swarms of Frellcll gun-boats would thell
llfwc commanded the coasting trade if not the entire straits.
Tnrifo. WIIS wortll the efforts made for its defence, and,
settiug asiJe the courage tluJ devotioli of the troops without
wllieh uotlling could have ~n effected, the merit chiefly
appertains to sir Charles Smith the eaptain of engineers.
That offiecr's vigour and CIIpaeity overmatcbcd the enemy's
strengtll without and th~ weulrncsa llnd cajolcment of those
who did not wish to defend it within. Skcrrett could not
mCf\Sure n talent above his own mark, and though he )'ieldcd
to Smith's energy he did 60 with avowed reluctance, and
dashed hig acquiescence with some wild actions for whieh it is
difiicult to assign a motive, because he was llot a dull illall,
llnd he WM a brnve llllIU lIS his death at Bcrgen-op-Zoom
provl,'<.I; but his lwlitury capacity wan naught, and his mint!
did not easily eal£h another's enthusiasm: Tarifa was the
commentary upon Tnragollfl. During the siege the enginccr'8
works were constuntly impeded by him; he would call 011' the
labourers to prepare posts of retreat, and Smitll's desire to
open the north-gate, which had been built up that the troops
might have egress in ease of csCI.Illlde, was 0IlPosed by him,
although there was no other point for the garrison to sally,
save by the sea-gate which was near the castle. Again, a
shell from the Cusmaus tower, having bursted too soon,
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killed or wounded one of the inhabitants; a deputation of
citir.cns came to complain, and Skcrrctt, although dIe
brench was then open, immediately ordered that gun llnd
a thirty-two pound carronade which at four hundred )'ard8
looked into the French batteries, to be dis-
tfPCndi:r. 3. mounted and spiked! and it was done. He
also oosigncd the charge of tIle brench entirely
to the Spaniards, and if Smith had not iusisted upon posting
British troops alongside of them this alone would have ruined
tile defence; because bunger nakedness and neglect had so
broken the spirit of those poor men that few appeared during
the combat nod Capons alone displayed the qualities of El
gullant soldier.
To the British engineer therefore belongs the praise of tbis
splendid action. He perceived aH tIle resources of the place
and with equal firmness and talent developed them notwith·
standing the opposition of his superiors; be induced the
enemy, whose attack should have embraced tlle suburbs and
tbe north-west salicnt angle of the IIIace, to open his trenches
on the east, wllcre under the appearance of weakness was con·
eentrilted all strength; finally he rcprCSllCd dc;qxlDdcnc}' where
he failed to infusc {.'()nfidence. Next in merit WllS cnptain
Miehell of UJe artillery. III the management of thst arm
his talent and enterprise were {.'()nspicuous, especially during
the assault, when his gUlls swept away the Frcncll stormers.
Nor can the rcault of tlmt attAck be taken ll.9 the measure of
eitber officer's merits. A prolonged siege and a more skilful
and powerful attack was expcetcd by them; and ill the enemy's
camp was found an engineer's sketch for an extensive system
of mines and breaches, yet nothing WllS tllere laid down that
hud not been anticipated and provided ~<>ninst by hia British
opponents. If then the defence of 'l'arifu was a greut and
splendid exllloit, alld none can doubt that it WllS, those who
conceived planned and executed it should have all the glory.
Alllongst tllOse persons Skerrett h118 no right to be placed:
),et, sueh is the caprice of power, that he 'I'M highly applauded
for what he did 1l0~ do, and general Cumpbell Wllll severely
rebuked by lord Liverpool for having risked his majesty's
troops!
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On the Frcnch part there was OOUNlge but no skill. For
two days their heavy howitzers boo been dircct<'d vaguely
aginst the interior of the toWIl and the distant islund, wiJitliOr
the unfortunate people had gone from their shattered and
burning houses. A portion of tile 8llells thus thrown nw"y
in cruelty would ha.ve levelled the north·e88t tower, tIle
importance of whieh the French knew; but throughont the
siege their operations were mastered by the superior allility of
the engineer and artillery officcrs opposed to tllem. Gencrol
Campbell, expecting a more Jlowerful attack in the spring,
directed casemates and splinter proofs to be made in the
island, but Skerrett's troops were recalled to Cndiz whieh now
contained nearly eight thousand British, exelusi\'c of fifteen
hundred destined for Carthagentl and AJicant. 1'his aITtlnge-
ment was soon changed, the events of the war put Cartbagcua
out of the French line of open>tioJls, and the pestilence there
caused the removal of the British troops. Neither was Tarifa.
~"lJ,in attacked. Wellington had predicted that it would not,
and on sure grounds, for he was t11en contemplating a. series
(If opcrations cal.culated to change the whole direction of the
war.
6. PENINSULA WAR.
BOOK THE SIXTEENTH.
CHAPTER I,
Llbll.
Up to this period the hlYlISioD, although diversified by oeea.
sional disnsters vU the part of tile ifi\'lldcrs, had been pro-
gressive. 'l'h~ tide, sometimes flowiug sometimes eubiug, sUll
gained upon the land, and if tlte Spaniards partially arrested
its progress it was because England urged tllcir Inbour !lnd
renoynted their strength; but no firm barrier 110 solid dike had
been opposed GllVO by the British general in P()rtugul; IIUO
even there the foundation of his work, SlIpped by the t.riokling
wal·era of folly llnd intrigue, wall sliding- lIWllY. By what ~ur·
prising efforts of courage aud judgment he secured it shall
now be shown; but Wl the field operations were always more
influenced by )lolitical considerations than military principlr.a
it is necessary aguin to show the state of all parties to the
war.
Political Bituation of l..:ing J08eph..-France, abounding in
riches and power, waa absolute mist.ress of Europe from the
Pyrenees to tIle Vistula; but Napoleon, pursuing his eyst<:m
of cominental exclusion was hurrying on to tl. Dew war 80
vast that evell his power was strained. to meet it. The Penin-
sula already felt relief from this cause. The dread of his
arrival ceased to influence the operatioDJlof the allied army in
Portugal, and mllny able Frencl} offieers were recalled; it was
known that the PolCl' and imperial guards were to be with-
drawn, uwl heuce tlle scale of offensive projeds was necessarily
eontl'"eted. Conscripts and young soldicrB instcad of veterans,
and in diminished numbers, were now to he expcctedi and in
tlie French anny there was an oppressive sense of the (mor-
mOllS exertions required to bring two such mighty wars to a
happy conclusion. l'he Peninsulars were cheered by seeing SO
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powerful (I, monarch M the czar risc in oppositiou to Napolco!l;
Ilnd the Euglisu gClieral'lIl1uticipatiollil of Il uortheru war, whicu
was the great basis of his calculations, were realized. He had
not indeed been strong enough hitherto to meet eighty thou.
8lmd Freueh ill battle and there were more than three hundred
tiJouSlllld iu Spaiu; but hope rose wiJen he saw the great
warrior of the age turn personally from the contest iu the
Peninsula, to carry to another point four hundred thousllnd
\'eterans whow mig:iJt seemed sufficient to subdue tilo
world.
Onc immediate beneficial effect of this impending war was to
restore J08eph's 'l.Uthority over the French armies in Spain; for
wheu the emperor was distant the supreme coutrol t'Ould ouly
be given to the king, though it revived, and with. greater viru·
lence, former jealousies and bickering. And as Joseph was
obstinate in his policy, Ilnd the pride of tho French generals
\I'M not lessened, pretexts for disputes were ucver wanting,
and their mischievous nature may be gathered from onc
t,'l:ample. In November tiJe king, pressed for money, sold the
Ulagazines of corn collected nCtlr Toledo for the army of Por-
tugal and without wllieh t.iJe latter could not cxist; Marmont,
regardtess of the political scandal, immediately scut troops to
recover the mllguzincs by force and desired the pureiltlser8 to
reclaim tlleir money from the monarch!
Politi.<Xd Btale ofSpain._All the intrigues and colTuptions
and conflicting interests before described had incrensed in
violence. Negotio.tions for England's mediation with the
CQlonies were not over; Carlotla still JlTcssed her claims j the
di\'"is.iOll between thc liberals llnd serviles as they were called
beCDmc daily wider and Cadiz WIl9 in 1811 tIle focus of nil
disorder. 'I'he governillent, wcnk ilnd dishonest, nsoo llIany
pitiful arts t.o extract mone)" from England: no subterfuge
was too moan. \Vhen Bluke was going to Estremlldum, Jlre·
vions to tho battle of Albucrn, BaNln..'li entreuted the Britisll
envoy to gmnt a loan or a girt, without which Dlake he said
CQuld not move; Mr. Wellesley refused because a large debt
was already duo to tho legation, aud the nnxt IMming llo
Spanish ship of W3r from AmeriOil lauded llo million und a hlllf
of dollarsl In Jul)' the regency nnd the Cortes werc with.out
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influence, HIe former was held in universal merited contempt j
and notwitllstanding tlie vast Il11mS rteeived every ser"ice was
famishe(l while the treasury was declared empty, and there
was no probability of allY furtller remittances from AmcriCll.
'l'he temper of the llUblic Wll8 sounld towards Englund, the
l,ress openl)" assailed the British character, nod nil things
tended so evidently towards nnarcll}' that Mr. Wcllesley de-
clared 'Spanish afi'airs to be then worse than tlle)' had been
at any previous period of tllC war.'
At first the Cortes had been swayed by priests and lawyers
WIlD eherislHxl the inquisition and opposed all free illstitu-
tions; now it Wll8 cllielly led by a liberal or rather democrat-ic
party averse to the British inlluence, and in Augu.qt a. new
constitution opposed to the aristocratic principle was pro-
mulgated. Witli the excellences and defects of that instru-
ment the present History has indeed little concern, but· the
resnlh were not in accord with the spirit of the C(mtriYlmee,
find the e,-ils affecting the war were rather ine1'CllSoo by it; the
democratic basis of the ncw constitution excited many and
bitter encmies, and the time and atteution which should have
been ~towed upon the amelioration of the soldiers' CQndition
were occupied in factious disputes and corrupt intrigues. That
many sound abstrnct principles of governn\IJnt were clearly find
vigorously laid down in the sellcmc of the constitution Cllnnot
be denied, the oomplicated oppressions of the feudal s~tem
were swept away with a bold and just hflud j but of what
a.vail, as regarded the war, was the euunciation of principles
which were neyer attempted to be reduced to practice'
What cncourngelllcnt was it to tllC soldier to be told he
was a free mall lighting for Il. constitutioll as well lIS for
national independence, when he saw the authors of that con-
stitution corruptly revelling in wealth whiclt should have
Appendix 1. clothed and armed and fed himt What WM
Vol. Ill. nominal equality to him when he saw incapacity
rewarded, crimes and tronehery ullllunished in the rich, the
poor and patriotic oppressed1 He laughed to scorn those who
could liud time to form the constitution of a great empire but
could not find time or hOlicst)· to cherish the men who were
to defend it J
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Many grievous reports of misfortune and treaebery,some true
some false, were soon sjlread by the en()mics of democl1\cy; and
at tile most critical period of the war in Valencia they c;\"cired a
popular commotion to swccp away the Cortes. There was
withal 11 strong di~positioll in the great to ~ulunit to the
invader, becau&'. the romaining estates of tbe 110bility being
chiefly in Valencia they were willing to save their lASt
resources at the cost of llationul iudepeudllllcc. The monks
aud friars, furious at tile sUIJIlression of the inquisition, were
the chief plouers everJ·where; and the proceedings of Palaci08
in concert with them wcre only purt of a general. chureh
leag-ue to re~ist the lIew doctrines. In October, Lardizabal,
n1so a deposed regent, published at Alicaut a manifesto, in
which he aCCllsed the Cortcs and the Clldiz writers of jacob-
inism, maintnincd the doctrine of passive obedicnce, and snid
the regeuts took the oath to the Cortcs because they could not
connt on the army or the people at Oadiz; othcrwise they
would have caused tllC king's authority to be rcspccred ill thcir
persons U8 his only legitimate representatives. This mani-
festo being declared treasonable a vessel was desparehed to
. bring the offender to Cadiz; bllt the following day it was dis-
covered that the old council of Cw;tille had also drawlI up e.
manifesto similar in principle, and t11e persons sent by the
Cortes to seize the paper were told that it WlI8 destroyed. The
protest of thrcc members against it was however found, and
five lawyers were selected from the Cortes to try the guilty
councillors and Lnrdizabal.
III Novcmber the public cry for a new regency became
general, and it wus Lacked U)' the English plenipotentiary.
Nevertheless the matter was deferre(l upon divers pretexts,
the democratic party gained strcngth in the Cortes, and the
anli-Briti~h feeling a]J]Jwred lllore widely dill'used thau it
really waa, because some time elupsed before the ehureh and
aristocratic party discovered that the sccret policy of England
was the same as their OWIl. It was so hOIl'~ever, evell to the
11pholdiag of the inquisition whieh it was ridiculously asserted
had bGCome objectiollflble only in name; AA if the frame-work
of tyrallllY existing tl\Cre could ever be wanting tho will to
fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put
VOL. n', P
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011 R smooth countenance towards the Cortes; and the negotia-
tion for mediation was uilCd by the Spaniards merelr as a
ground for demanding loans subsidies find succours in kind,
which they used ill fitting out new expeditious ugllillst the
revolted colonists, the <''Olfiplaillts of the British legation being
quite disregarded. At this time also Lapcll(l was acquitted of
misconduct at Barosll., llud would kl.VC been immediately re-
employe<l if the }:nglish minister Imd 110t threatened to quit
Cadiz and advised genoml Cook to do the Sl'llllC.
Mr. Wcllcsley seeing fatal consequences to the war must
ellSue if a stop was not put to the miscouduet of the regency,
sent Mr. Vaughau, ~etll.ry of lega.tion, to acquaint the British
cabinet with the facts and solicit a more firm and decided
course of policy. He desired to have the subsidies settled by
treaty tllllt the people of Spain might really know what Eng-
lam] had done and WllS still doing' for them; for OD every
occasion, arms clothing ammunition loans p~ovisious guns
storc.;, aud even workmen and funds to form founderies, were
obtained wasted and embezzled; the people knew )lothing of
this extravagant generosity, and the receivers and waswrs were
hooping calullluies ou the donors. When the regeucy qu~tiol1
was at. last seriously discussed in the Cortes, ilio de]lUty
Callmany, said by the partisans of JosCJlh to be anti-English
in his heart, argued the necessity of this change
~~f J~h, on tlle ground of pleasing the British. 'l'bis
excited great disconwnt flS he ]lrobably inwnded,
llnd many deputies dedared at first they would uot bo dietated
to by ll.tl)' foreign power; but the departure of Mr. Vaughan
alarmed them, and a commission, formed to improve the mode
of governing, was hflStening the decision of tIle question when
Rlake'fI disaster at Valencia completed the work, CarloUa's
ilgent wns active in her helltllf, but the cloqueut aud houl>St
Augnstino Arguelles wus opposoo to him; aud the CortC3,
recognising llCr claim lo the succession, denied her tl16 rcgeucy
because of a ]lreviollS dccrce which excluded all roJal person-
ugC3 from that office.
On the 21st of January, 1812, after n secret discussion of
twent)·-four llOUrs a new regency of fivo members, two being
AmcriClills, was J.lrodaimcd. They werc thc duke of Illliul·
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tado the» ill England, Henry Q'Douucl, admiral Villal'viceucio,
Joachim de Alosquera, and Ignacio~ de Ribll.S. Eueh was to
llave the presidency by rotation for six months, and they
commenced bcllelicinIly. O'Donllel being friendly to tho
Brili:>h alli:UlCe proposed a military feast to restore harmony
between the English and Spanish oftit'Cl'i!; he made lllillly
changes in the dcpartmcnt of war nnd finauces, cOllSulted the
British gCllemts, disoouded scvernl ood regimcutll lIud incor-
porated the men with other battaJiolls; he also reduced many
inefficient alld malignant colonels, and striking on' from the
pay lists nIl unemployed. and absent officers tl1ey were
found to be five thOUSllUd ill number I Ballesteroll, llppoillteu
captain-general of Andalusia, received command of the fourth
army, head-quarters heing prudently removed to Algcllirllll and
thc troops increased hy drafudrom Cadiz to ten or twelve
thousand ruen. A new army was set on foot in Murein, and
to check trading with the French /l. gellcrul blockade of all
the coost in their IloSBcssion from Rosns to St. Sebastian 'I'M
declare<!.
But all this activity was simply to obtain an English loon!
Failing of that the old disllUtcs brokc out, the democratic spirit
gailled strength in the Cortes, the allLi-Euglish party (lug
mented, the press abounded in libels impugllillg the good faith
of the British nation, especially with respCjlt to Cents, for
whieh however there WllS somo plausible ground of suspicion,
because the acquisition of Hlat fortress had lletually been pro-
posed to lord Liverpool. 'l'he new regency, as violent as their
predecessors with respect to Amcric>~, disregardcd the mcJin-
tion, and having scel'cUy organized iu Gallicia Illl expedition
against the colonies SUllplied it Witll llrtillery furnished from
England for the French war, and thell, under anothcr pretence,
demalulcd mOlley of the British minister to forwlll'd this
iniquitous folly.
PoliticallltaJ.c of Porl.ugal.-Tn October, 1811, nil evils wcre
aggravated. 'fhe returu of the royal family was put 011; llud
the military reform whieh Ben:sford was at Lisuull to elf(:ct
thwartcd or retarded by the regency, :Mr. Stuurt indeed
fOl'<le<! a repair of the bridges aud roads in Bcirn, and the
partial suppl)' of the forl.resscs; auu t.hough owoscd oy
"
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Rcdondo, for t116 firs~ time, he made the l'cgeney substitute
8. military chest flocl oommissllrint instead of the old 'Junta
de ViYCfCtl.' Forjua and llidolldo then disputed for the
custoJyof the lIew chest; ILlld wbcll :Mr. StUlIl't explained to
the one, that the iIlren~ being to sepurotc the mouey of the
army from that of the ci\'il departments his claims were in.
compatible with such an object; and to the other that the
conduct of llis own i1epartmcnt was already more than he
could manage, both were offended. 'l'his MW source of dis-
order was only partially closed by withholding the suo3idy
until they yicldcJ.
Great malvcrslltions in the revenue were also discovered j
and l\ Illan to enforce an impartial exaction of the ' dceima,'·
which W!IS drown up by Nogueira fit tbe Ilesire of Wellington,
was so ill-received by those whose illegal exemptions it
attacked, that the SoUZllS immediately IJla.ced thclllsclves at
the head of the objectors out of doors. Nogueim then modi-
•fied it, but the Souzas still opposed, and as Wellington, judging
the modification to be IIll evasion of tile Jlriuciplc, would not
ree<lde from the firat plan a permanent dispute Imd a perma-
nent evil were thus established by that pernicious faction. In
fiue, uot the Souzas only but the whole regency, thinking the
war was virtually decided ill their favour, were intent to dri\"c
the British away by disgusting the gencml A new quantI
Also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wel1ington had been ereated
condc dc Vimicro, Beresford conde de 'frallcoso, Silveim cande
d'Alllllffiute j :md other minor honours had boon conferred on
subordinate officers. They hud however boon dclnyed in a
marked manner, and lord Strll.ngford, who appears to have
been mled entirc.ly by the Sou;~a faction /lnd was therefore
opposed to Forjfl3, charged, or as he tcnnoo it, reported a
charge lIw,de agll.iust the latter at the Unlzils, for lLll.villg cul-
pably delayed the ol11eial returns of the officers wbo were tuus
to be rewarded. Against this Illlfoundcd accusation, for the
report llad been malIc and }'Oljns was not the person to whose
department i\ belonged, lord IYellington lInd Mr. Stuilrt pro-
tested, uCCI\use of the injustice and of its being designed to
eause t,he removal of Forj:ls. The English gencrnl wus how-
e"er placed in a strll.nge position, for while his letters to Forjas
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were menacing rebukes to him alllI his eoadjutoTS for their
neglect of public affairs, and his formal complaints of tIle
regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was thus compelled
to SClId other letters ill support of the peri;(lIIS whom he was
charging with misconduct.
In the midst of thelle embarrassments an accidcntal c\'cnt
was like to have brought the question of the British remaining
in Portugal to a very sudden decision. While :M.35Ilena was
before the lines, one d'Amblemont had appcared in North
America, and given to Quis the Spanish minister there a !l!an
for buruing the British lleet in the Tagus, which he pretemled
to have received onIcn from the French government to
e::r.:e<lutc. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils mrlny
llersons naliled by d'Amblemont as imIllicated were arrested
at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuflrt had
a.sccrtailled the whole affair to be Il. forgery. The attcntion
paid to this man by Qni!! and the court of Rio Janeiro
induced him to make further trial of their credulity, and he
then brought fonl'ard l\ correspondence between tIle principal
authorities of Mexico and the :b'rench government; he even
produced letters from the Frcndl ministers, directing intrigues
to be commenced at Lisbon and tIle Freneh illtcrcst thel'll to
be ]llaced in the hrmds of the Portuguese intcndunt of police.
Mr. S~lIart" lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons
whom this forging villain was thus dooming, prn}'ed lord
Wellesley to interfere; but tIle court of Rio Janeiro, falling
headlong iuto the suare, sent orders to arrest more viCtiUUl,
and amongst others, without assigning CllUse aud without
communication with thc English general, the rcgenc}' seized
oue Borel a. clerk to the British paYlIlllster-generol. Thu act,
contrary to treat}', hostile to the alliance and insulting, misell
Wellin~on's indigtllltion, Hc notificd to tho Portugue.~
government his resolution, unless good rClUlOllS were assigned
and satisfaction made for the olltrage, to order all persons
attached to tho British to place themselvCi! in security under
tile protection (lf the army until the fUl'tber ple35ure of the
Britisll prince regent should be made known. Then tlle long_
gathering politiral storm seemed ready to break but suddenly
the horiwn cleared.
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Lord Wclling....on's letter to the prince, backed by lord
Wellesley's vigorous Jil!iolllllCy, had at last, alar1Jl\.'tl the court
of Rio Janeiro, and iu the very crisis of Borel's case came
letters from the prince fcgrllt approving all the changes pro-.
posed by the English general. 'l'he oontrnuiction given by
'Mr. Sluar! to the calumnies of the SoUZIl faction WIIS taken
as the grollnd for retracting Linhllre's insulting note relative
to that geutleuUUl's. conduct. Principal SoUZll W!lS not dis-
missed, nor was Forjas' resignation noticcu, but the prince
declared he would overlook that minister's disobedience and
retain him in office; 11mB proving that fear, not com'iction or
justice, (or ForjUll had not been disobedient, was the true
cause of this 6ccming return to fritmdly relations with the
British. Mr. Stuart, considering the submission of the prince
to be a mere nominal concession of power wllich was yet to
be ripened into renl autllOrity, looked for further difficultiCll
and he was not lllistaken. Re however made it a point of
Ilonour to defent! Forjns and Nogueim from the secret "en-
gean(.'e of the oJlllosite faction. 'l'his submission of tlle court
however, ga\'C the British an imposing' influence which ren-
dered the Sollzns' opposition nugatory for the moment. Borel
WMI released and exenses were made for his arrcst,-the
formntion of " military chest WM pushed with vigour,-the
paper money was mised in value,-tho revenne WM somewhat
increased and Beresford was ellabled to make progress in the
restoration of the army. But tlle prince directed the regency
to revive his claim to Olivcnr.a. immediately, and it was with
(liffieulty Wellillgton eeuld stifle this abmrd pTOooc<lingj
mither did the forced hnrmony IlISt, for tho old abuses
Hffecting the civil administration of the ann}' rather increased.
as will be shown in tile narration of military operations which
IHe now to be treated of.
After tlle combats about Guinsldo the allied army was
extensively cantoned on both sides of the Con. Ciudad
Hodrigo was distan!.!y observed by the Briti~hJ and so clO6ely
by Julian Sllllchez, that on the 15th he curried ofI' more t·ban
two lllmdred oxen from under the guns of the place llnd cap-
tured Rcnnnd the governor who had imprurlcntly ventured
out with a wcak escort. At this time Marmollt hud a division
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in Placcllsill, and thc rest of his infantry between tbat place
Md MMlrid; but his ell.Vlllry was at l)eucrllnda on thc Sala-
manca. ~id(l 01' the wountaillS, aud his line of collllnulliClllioll
was organi:red on the road of the Pucrto de Pico. Dorscnne's
ann)' stretched from the TormC3 to Astorga, the walls or
which lUll! those of ZUlllora und otber towns in Leon were
being restored that the flat country might be 11dd with a
few troops against the Gallieian anny. Tt was this scattering
of the enemy whiclt hlO enaLled Wellington to send Hill
against Girard at Aroyo de Molino; but when the reinforce-
ment.'! from France reached the army of Portugnl the anny of
the north was again concentrated, anu wouLd have invaded
Gallicia while Bonnet attacked the Asturias if Julian
Sanchez's exploit had not rendered it necessary first to re-
victual Ciudn.d Hodrigo.
In tbis view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca by
general Thiebau1t, who sprend a report that a force was to
assemble rowards Tnmamcs and t11e convoy WM for its snp-
lJOrt. 'l'llls TUmour did not deceive Wellington; I,ut he
belie"ed the whole army of the nortll and olle di"isioll of the
army of Portugo.l would be employed in the operation, and
therefore made arrallgelllellts to !il\8S the A/,'11eda alld attack
them on tIlC march. Heavy rains rendered the fords of that
river impracticable, Thieooult seized the occasion to intro-
duoo his oollYoy, lllld leaving a new governor returned on
the 2nd of November before the WAters hnd subsided. One
brigade of the light division was at this time on the Va-
dillo, yet it wns too weAk to meddle with the French, and
it was imj)Qssible to reiufol'cc it while the Agueda was over-
flowed; scarcely can an army ever pBSS it in winter, because of
the narrow roads the depth of the fords aud ruggednC69 of
thc banksj it will suddenl)' rise from rain in the hills with.
out any previous indication in the plains, and t11e violence
and depth of its stream will sweep awny allY temporary bridge
and render it impossihle to pASs except by the stone bridge
of Ciudad Rodrigo, whieh was at this time in the enemy's
possession.
Early in November Dorsenue marched 0. body of troops
towlll'ds the Illlls above Cindad as if to conduct another
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convoy; but the allied troops passed t!lo Agueda ut the ford
of Zauwrn, whereupon Um French retired, and their nar
was harassed by Carlos d'Esprma aud J uliun Sanchez, who
captured some provisions and money contributions they
bad raised. But llOW the couutry between the Coil. and
the Agucdll. WIIS exhausted; and a.s the Portuguese gOVCfll-
mont still neglected to supply tr;Ulsport it wus impo8Sible
to bring up the field ~upply from the points of water car-
riage to the army. Wclliugton was therefore, contrary to all
military rules, oompclled to SCIlllTl::tc his divisions in the face
of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry,
evon to the lIIondcgo IIond the valley of the Douro or soo them
starvcd.
'1'0 cover this (hug-erolls procccJing he kept a considerable
body of llIell beyond the Coo, aud the slale of all the rivel'1l
and roads coupled with the distance of the enClllY in some
lIleasure protected him. Hill's second expedition into Estre-
madllm was thcn nlso dmwing the attention of the French
towards that quarter; and Mllrmollt being abont to dctnch
MOlltbrun towurda Valencia, 11lId withdrawn Foy's division
from Placensia and concentrated tllC greatest part of his
army at Toledo; all this rendered the scattering of the
allies less dangerous, and in fact no evil consequences ensued.
The war of positions had thereforc turned cntiroly to the
advantago of the allies, Wclliugton by taking post near
Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill movcd round Ba.dnjos had in
a manner paralyscd three powcrful armics. For Soult,
harassed by Hill in Estrcmadui'l\ and by Ballesteros and
Skerrett in. Andalusia, failed in both quarters; Rnd altJlough
Marmont in conjunction with DOrsClllIC had succoured CiudaJ
HoJrigo, the iuvssioll of GlItlicia Iwd boon again stopped
short and his entcf}lrises confined to the re-occupation of the
AsturitlS.
AlmeidB 'I'll:'! now repaired so far as to resist a sudden
attack, aud whilc the recent movement lleross the Agueda
occupied tile cncmy's uttontion, the lmttcriug-train tlnd siege
stores were iutroduced wiihout notice us an annumcnt for the
.new works. A treslle-bridgc to throw over the A.gueda ~'as
also secretly prepal'ed in the arscnal of Almcida by major
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Sturgeon of the staf}· corps, nu officer whose brilliaut talent..
scientific resources, and unmitigated aet.h·ity continually
attracted the attention of the whole lll'1l1y. Thus the prel~_
ration for the attack of Ciudad adv&l\ecd while the English
geneJ".1l ijceUl.\lU to llu only intent upon defending his own
positioll&.
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fiSH.
HAVTl'O now brought tlm story of the war to tlla~ period,
when, after lUaIlY ch:UJges of fortune, tile chances had beeome
1lI0re equal and the fate of the Peninsula thrown between the
contending powers, a prize for tlle readiest and boldest
warrior, I would, ere it is shoWTl 110W WelliTlgton seized it,
recal to the render's recollection the previolls vicissitudes of
the contest. How, when the first or illsurrectlonal epoch of
the war had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napo-
leon vehemently broke and dispersed their armies and drove
the British Iluxiliaries to embark at Coruiitl. How the war with
Austria and the ina.ctivity of JOSCpll rendered tlle emperor's
victories unavailing and revived the confidence of the Spaniards.
How sir A. Wellesley, victorious on the Douro, marched into
Spain, and 'though compelled by tlle great foroe of the enemy
combined with Spanish bad faith to retreat, liS :Mooro from
the same causes had retreated, his advanee !loo freed Gallieia,
as :Moore's advUI:Ce had previously saved Andalusia. How
the Peninsulars, owing to tlle e:<ertions of their allies, still
possessed the Astllrias, OaIHeill, Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia,
Valencia, nnd Catalonia, and every important harbour nnd
fortress except Santauder, Sautona, Barcelona, and St.
Sebastian.
How Wellington, appreciating the lUlvantagc3 which an
invaded people pOSSCS5 in their numerous lines of operation,
counselled the Spaniarus and forceu tile Portuguese to adopt
fI, defensive Wllr; and witli the more reason that England,
abounding beyond all nations in military resources and invin-
cible Il8 1\ naval power, could foml with her ships 0. sceure
exterior floating base or line of depOh round the PenillSula,
and was ready to employ her armies as well as her squadrons
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in the struggle. How the Spaniards, unheeding these ndmo-
nitions, sought great battles and in n few months lost the
Asturias, Andalusia, Estrellludura, ArugOll, llnd the best for-
tresses of Catillonia, and were again laid prostrate and hclplcS9
before the enemy. How the vietoriolls French armies moving
onwllrds in swelling pride dll.Shed against the rocks of Lisbon,
aUlI then receded, brokell and rcAu611t, until the Ellglish gene-
ral once more stooJ a conqueror on the frontier of Spain.
Had he then retaken Bada-joB find Rodrigo he would hava
gioriously finished the fourth or defensive cpoch of the war;
but being buflleJ purtly by skill partly by fortune, fadiously
opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish
government, only half supporteJ by his own cabinet, and
pestered by tlle follies of all three, he was reduced to seeming
inactivity while the Frcncll added Tamgonn and the rich king-
dom of Valellcia to their conquests.
On these things the reader should reflect. They are the
proofs that English steel, English gold, English genius,
English influence, fought and won the battle of Spanish inde-
pendence; and this is not said as a. matte!" of boast, although
it was very glorious I but as a. usefullcsson of experience. On
the other llund tIle prodigious strength of France undcr Napo-
leon, that strength whieh could at oncc fight Englcllld and
Austria and llim at the conquest of the Peuinsula and the
reduction of llussia. at the same moment of time, llnd all with
good hope of success, crcatcg nmfll':cment! Let it not be
Mid the emperor's efforts in the Wilr of Spain were feeble, for
if Lhe insurrectional epoch whieh WM une.'tpccted and IIcci-
dentul be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts ",ill be found
llnswemble to his gigantic reputation. ID 1809 the French
army WIIS gradually \Iccrcased by IOS!:lcl> and drufts for the
Austrian war from three hundred and thirty-five thousand to
two hundred and twenty_six thousand. But in 1810 it was
agu.iu rllised to tbree hundred o.nd sixty-nine thousand, aud
fluduflted between that number and three hundred and thirty
thousand until August, 1811, when it was 8gf1iu
raised to three llUudred find seventy-two thousand
men with lifty-two thousand horses! And yet
there are writers who £lSSut that Napoleon neglected the war
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in Spain1 Dut so great is the natural strength of that country,
that llnd the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom
in council heen commensurate with its constancy in resistance,
(lvon this power, backed by tho four hundred thousand mon
who marebed to Hussiu., would scarcely have sufficed to subdue
it. But woak in light and steeped in folly the Spaniards
would 113ve been trnmpled in the dust but for the man whose
grent combinatiolls are now to be related.
The nicety, quickness, llrudeneo and audacity of Wellington's
operations caUllot however be justly esLimated without an
exact knowledge of his political, local, Rud mornl position.
His political difficulties have been described, his moral situll-
tion was simply that of 0. mall who felt that all depended
upon llimsclf, and that he must by rapid and unexpeewd
st.rokes effect ill the field what his urother ooultl not elle,:t
in the cabinet while the power of the Pcrceval faction was
prevalent in England.
To uuderstand his 10Cft1 or military position the confonna..
tion of the country and the lines of communication must be
ca.rofully considered.
Dorscnne's llrincipal magazine was at Valladolid, llis ad-
vanced posts were on tlle Tonnes, from whence to Cindad
Rodrigo was four long marchca through a wild forcst country.
Wellington's line WM supplied from Lisbon to R:iivu. on the
Moudego by wawr, nft.er which the land carriage Wllll more
than a hundred miles through wild mountains and devastated
valleys: it required fift.een da.ys to bring a convoy from
Lisooll to the Aguedn. His flank communication with
Oporto TUn through eighty miles of rugged country before
the first point of water carriage on the Douro could be
reaclled. His communication with Hill was likewise through
a. country of strong pfl8SCS, offering no resources for supllly,
nnd his field magllZines there were filled from AImlntes, the
llighest navigaule jloint 011 the '1'agus; Vilhll Velha on this
line 11as been before noticed as furnishing the only sure
military passage over the 'ragus between AIlllaral; and
Abmutes. In tllese relativo positions the advantages were
with respect to the siege ami succour of Ciudad ltodrigo
balanced; for the country on both sides of the Agueda beiug
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exllll.usted, and beyond that capricious river no covering posi-
tion, the greater distance of the French from the fortress wns
thus eompCltsatcd to them. This consiuerntioll had pre-
vented the lIttllck of Rudrigo ill Mny and turned Welling-
ton's attentiou towards B.....dajos. Bnt the aspect of afh.irs
soon cJmnged. The skill of Phillipon, the diligence of "MAr-
mont, the generalship of Sou]t in stopping at Llercna after
Albuem. rescued &dajos; and tlJOUgll Wellington's still
greater genertllship in stopping on the Cays prevented fUl'tller
mischief, the misconduct of the Portuguese govllrnment
combined with Marmont's new position in the valley of the
Tngus precluded n renewal of the siege. The fallacious hoJlO
of finding Ciudau Hodrigo unprovided brought the English
general hastily back to the Coa, but lllOugh he thereby
stoPI)ed the invasion of Gallicia. he could undertake no offen-
sive operations, being bridled 1>y the positions of DorsenllO
and Mnrmon~ For if llC advanced against Salamanca his
eOllllllunicatiolls with Hill ami evcn with Lisboll would be
exposed to Marmont; and if he turned against that marshal
Dorsenne and Soult would 11ayC closed OD his flunks. Theso
things being overlooked, some able officers at the period of
the Elbollou COlnlmt censured the line of retreat to Sabugal,
becausll it uncovered the \in\: of Celorico and exposed the
battering-train then at Villa Ponte; but waf is always a.
choice of difficulties, and to risk guus, of WhOBO vicinity the
encmy was not aware, was ktwr than giving up the comlllU-
nicatiC/lI with nill wwch was threatened by Foy's adv:lllce to
Zal'7.fL Maior.
.AfWr the allies camo to Bcira, DorscllD(l nnd Mllnnont
being reinforced became separalclyequal to Wellingtoll, and
together too strong. Soult, master of Andalusia, lmd a
mo~·cablo reserve of twenty thousund men, Sllchct gained
grolluu in Valencia, the Asturias were ro-oceupied by Bonnet,
and the arlll)' of the centre was re-organized. To besiege
Ciutlad or Badajos ill form was llopeless; and the rumonr of
Napoleon's arrival made the English generullook once more to
the lines of 'forres Vedras; but wllcn the certaiut}, of a Russian
war renlOve·d this fear the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo becnma
possible. There WIlS then a good buttering-train in Almllida,
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and the works of that 11[[100 were restored, the line of eOIllIlIU·
llication with Oporto was completely organized and shortened
by illl)lrovillg the navigl\tion of the DonTo; Rodrigo itself
. was weakly garrisoned and the French ignorance as to the
state of the allies' prcp.lratiolls gave hope of a surprise. It
was however only from surprioo success CQuld Le cxpccwJ,
and it wns not the least of WCllill!:;'1.0l\'l:l morits that Le so
well CQuceah:u his )lreparatiolls for so long a Jlcriod. No
<>ther operation was open, and yet he could 1Iot remain
inactive because nround him the whole bbric of the WUT was
falling to piCCC3 from the folly of the governments he WM
serving. If be could not cllect a blow against the l<'rcnch
while Napoleon was Cllg!LbtCu ill the Russiull Will' the Peuin·
sula would be lost.
To surprise a third-raw fortress with ll. weak garrison seems
a small matter ill such grave circumstances, but in reality it
was the finlt stop in l\ plan whieh saved the Peninsula, whell
llothing else could have saved it. IYellingtoll kncw the
valley of the 'l'llgUS coulll not long support tlle army of
Portugal and the anny of the centre,-he knew by inter-
cepted letters that Marmont and the. king were at open war
upon the subjeot, ami he judge<l, if he could surprise Ciudad
Rodrigo, the anny of IJortugnl would for the sakc of provi-
sions and to protect Leon, uncovered by the departure of the
imperial guards, concentruk in that province. 'l'his first step
would therefore break the bar Napoleon had raised to offen-
sive operations. For to keeJ) Ill'\gtlzines in reserve for sudden
expeditions, feeding meanwhile AA they could uI}I)n the country,
was the French llliInner, Illid hence want of provisions nover
obstructed thcir IlLOvlllg upou importallt occasions; yet
Wellington thought the tempestuous season would render it
difficult for Marmont when thus forced into Loon to move
with grout mas3CS; wherefore he ]lroposCiI if Hodrigo fell to
mllrch by Vilhu Vclha to Estromaduru. und suddenly besiege
Badujos 1Ilso, tlw prcl'Urutil.'llll to bll secretly made in Eh',lS.
undcr protection of Jlill's corps. This was the seoolld a((lp,
and oue of promise, because of the jcalousies of the marshals
the wet lICil.80n find his own cOHlbilllltions, wJlich would
impcUc tl10 COllccntr:llioll of the French linuies aud 1)1"0\"011'
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them from keeping together if they did unite. He had hopcg
liKe.wlSe (ha~ Ballesteros' corps, now augmented, would vex
s.:,ult's )losts 01\ the coast while IIill and Morillo harassed
Mm on the GuadiMll.; and if Bwlajos fell, he de8iglH~d 10
leave a force to eo~'er i~' against the anllY of the centre amI
fight Soult in AmIu.lusia. For he judgcJ that )lurmont couhl
not in default of provisions pass heyoud the Guadiana, lIor
follow him before the harvest was ripe j neither did he fear
him in Beirn, because. tl1e torrents would be full, the country
8 desert, IInd the militia, aided by a small regulur corps amI
covered by AhllCida. ulId Ciudad Rodrigo, would be sullicient
to prevent any serious impression on Portugal during the
invasion of Andalusia.
This plan, subtle Md vigorous, Wils the more daring becnuse
his OWll troolJs were llot ill gOOtl plight. He Ilud iudeed
received reinforcements, but the infautry had served at Wal-
c1lCren and exposure to night air or even slight hardships
thrcw them by hundreds into the hospital, while the new
regiments of cavalry, inexperienced and not acelimated, were
fouud, 1ll()1) and horses, so unfit for duty thut he seut thelll to
the rear. The pay of the IIrmy was three months in arrear,
the supplics, brought up with difficulty, wcre vcry flClInty,-
half Ilnd quarter rations were often l>Crveu, sometimcs the
troops were without My bread for three days consecutively,
and their clothing was 80 patched that scnrccly a regiment
could be known by its uniform. CboPl>Cd straw, the only
forage, WllS vcry scarce, the regimcntal auimals were dying of
hunger, corn was rarely distributed save to the generals IInd
staff, IInd c\'en tlle horses of the artillery and the old cavalry
suffered ;-the very mules of the commissariat were pinclicd
and the muleteers eigh~ months ill arJ'Cllrs of pay. The call_
wnlllent!l about the COR and Agncda were unhealthy from the
rains, twenty thouSllnd men were in hospital, and, deduction
made for other druius, ouly fifty·four tuouslIlld of [,oth nations,
iacluding garrisons and posts of commuuication, were ulltler
aMns. To finish the picture, a sulky apathy in t11c Portuguese
regency, produced by the prince's letter, was becoming more
hurtful than the former aoth'C oPI>osition. Yet these dis-
trwC8 Wellington with sUfllrisiug subtlety tumed to the
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advantage of bis present designs; for the enemy were Ilwareof
the miser)' in the army and their imnginution magnified it;
and as the nJliccl troops \VCI'O scattered for relief from the
Guta mOllutuins to the Douro, from tIle Agucdll to the Mon~
dego immediatelY after the battering-train entered Almcida,
both armies concluded that the gUlls were to arm that
fortress us ll. cover to the exteuded country quurters which
necessity had forced upon Lhe Dritish general. Not even
the engineers employed in the preparations knew more
than tlIat So siege or the simul:ltion of So siege was in con-
tcmpluLion; but when it was to be nttcmptcd, or that it would
be attempted at aU, none knew j-c\'cn the quarter-master
b"euel'.ll MUTI':l.)' WlIS sulTeroo to go home 011 leave with the
full persuasion that 1.\0 0Ileralion would take plaee befo:e
spring.
In t·he Dew cantonments abundance of ]lrovisions and dry
wCtlther, for in Ecira the first n\ins genernlly subside during
December, stopped tho sickness and restored three thousand
men to the ranks j and the !lrivations had in no lIl/mller weak-
ened the moral courage of the troops. 'I'he old regiluents
weTe incredibly bardy and experienced in all things neces~ry
to sustain tlwir strellgtll and efficacy; t11c swff was well prac-
tised; and lord Fit7.roy Somerset, military secretary, had
cstablished sueh all intercourse bet·wcel} the llcud-quartcrs and
the battaliou chiefll, Umt the latter lmd, so 10 'speuk, dired
rommunication with the genernl-in-ehief UPOIl aU the business
of their regiments, a privilege wllich stimulated the euthusiasm
and 7:CI\I of all. For the regimental commanders being gene-
rally vcry young men, the distinctions of TlIllk were not rigidly
enfurced, aud the merit of each ollicer was consequently hetter
known and more earnestly SUI)portclI when promotion and
honours were to be obtained. By tills mcthod lord Fitzro}'
acquired an ~Mct knowledge of the moral stat-c of each regi-
meut, rendered his own office important lInd gracious witl! the
urmy, and with 9\,0;1 discretion lllllI jmJgment that tlle military
hierarchy was iu 110 Jnauller weakened: all the dariug young
men were excited, and being uuucqullinted with tl,e Ilolitical
difficultiog of their general anticipated noble triumll!ls which
'Were bapllily r,cll.lized.
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'fhe favourable moment for r.ction so long watched for by
Wellington co.me at last. An imperial decree had agnin
remodelled the French armies. That of Arngon WIIS directed
to give up f<luT divisions to form 0. new corps under Rcillc,
"..IIlIed the' army of the EbrQ,' its head~uarterll to be at krida.
'l'he army of the south was recolllpoS<'.d in six; divisions of
infantry and three of cavalry, exclusive of the garrison of
Bad~jos. :M~rslml Victor returned to Franco discontented,
for he was onc of those whose reputation had been abated by
this war, llnd his divisions were gi,-en to Conronx, Barrois,
Viilatte, JAval, Dronet, Darico.u, Peyremont, Dig-oou, IInd tlle
younger Soult. The rcserve of Monthion WIIS broken up, and
t·he army of the north, destined to maintain the great com-
muniClltions with Frllnee aud to reduce the partidas Oil that
line, was ordered to occupy tbe districts round 8t.. Ander,
SebMtian, Btlrgos, IInd PampeluDa, and to communicato by
the left with the now army of tbe Eoro j it was also ex~cd·
ingly reduced in numbers, for the imperial gtlards, seventeen
thousand strong, being required for the Hnssian war marclled
in December to France. All tlle l)olish battalious, the
skeletons of the Ctlovalry regiments, and several thousand ehoice
IlIell destined to fill the ranks of the old guard were drafted;
flO that not lells than forty thousand of tile best soldiers were
withdrawn, all~l the maimed and worn-out men being sent to
}'rance at the same time, the force in the Peninsula was dimi-
nished by sixty thousand men.
The head-quarters of the army of the north llrrived lit
Burgo8 in Jalluary, and 0. division was immediately sent to
drive Mendizabel from the Montalia de St. Ander. But as
this arrangement weakened the grand line of communication
with Fmnce Marmont was ordered to abandon the valley o[
the Tagus IInd fix !lis head-quarters at Valladolid or SalallUlllCll.
Ciudad Rodrigo, the siJ:tll Slid seventh governments, and the
AsturiM, were also plueed under his authority, by which Sou.
imm and Bonnet's division, fonning togetber about eiglltel'1l
thousand men, were added to Ilia army, but the former general
returned to France. These two divisions were however
ext-ended for the wko of supplies from tho Asturias to Toledo,
and as :MonU)l'UIl was then near Valencia aud Soult's altentiou
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distracted between Tarull. and Hill's pumuit of JJroue~ the
French were emploJed over an immCl19Cl tract of ODuntry.
Mannant also. deceived by the seemingly careless winter atti.
tudo of the allies left Rodriga unprotected and Wellington
inst.'WUy jumped with both feet u~u the devoted fort.resll.
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CHAPTER 1lI.
STEGE OF ClUDAD RODIUOO.
88
THfRTY-FlVE thousand men, cavalry included, were disposable
for this enterprise. The materials for the siege were lllacOO
at Gallegos, Villa del Cicrvo, and Espejll, on the left of the
Aguedn, aua the ammunition was at Almeida. }l'rom thoso
places the hired. carts and mules were to bring up the stores
to the pare; seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected,
bnt ,from tlle scarcity of transports only thirt,y.cight gUM
could be brought to the trenches, Qnd these would hilYo
wanted their due sUIJPly of ammunitiolJ, if eight thou~tUIl.L
shot had not been fonnd amidst the filius of Almeida. A
hridge was commenced the 1st of January at Mllorialva near
the confluence of the A.zava with the Agueda, six milt:S below
Ciudlld, and to secure it piles were drjven into the bed of the
river above and below, to which tbe trestles were tie<l The
fortrcas was to have been invested thc 6th, but the nllt,ive
carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excel-
lent road with empty carts, and it was daugerous to find fault
because they deserted on the slightest offence.
When the placc was closely examined, it was found thnt
two convent!; which flanked and strengthened the bad Spanish
entrenchments round the suburbs had been fortifiedj Md on
the grcakr Teson an enclosed IInd 1l8li5ll.doed rOOouht, called
Francisco, Wall constructed and sUPllorted "'.r two guns and Q
llOwitzer placed on tlu~ flAt I"oof of A convent Jlaving the
BlIme name. All the ground wus rocky eXccllt on the Tcsons,
altd though the ramparts were there better covered by ou~
works Md could fire mpre heavily ou the trenches, it was,
following the English general's views, most assailo.blc, becnuse
elsewhere the batteries must have been placed Oil the edge of
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the countcrscarp before the)' could scc low cnougll to 111-encll:
this would have been 11 tedious process, whereas the swaller
Tesoll furnished the means of striking over the crest of the
glacis at once, fmd n deep gll11ey offered cover for the miners.
It WIlS therefore resolved to srorm fort FrlU\cisco, form a
lodgmeut tbero, open tile first; parallel along tile grellwr
l'e8011, place lllirty-tllree llieces in CQUlltcr-batterics to ruin
the defences, and drive the besieged trom the convent of Fran-
cisco. Mtcrwards. working fonvlIrd by thfl sap, it was pl'O_
]losed to construct Imlaching-bntterics 011 the lC~8cr Tcson
and blow in tJu~ countcrscnrp, while seven guns, battering a
we.'\k turret 011 tIle left, opened n. second hrench with a viow
W turu any retrenchment behind tile jJriucipl\1 In'Cllch,
Carlos d'Espllna and Julian Sanchez were pushed to the
Tormes in observation while four Btitish divisions llnd Pack's
Portuguese laboured in the siege; but on the rigllt bank of
t11e Agueda there was neither fuel nor cover and the troopa
tllerefore kept their quarters on th~ hither bank, 11Ilving,
although a severe frost and falt of snow had set in, to ford
the river each day by di"isions in suceession, carrying their
provisions cooked, To obviate the difficulty of obtaining
country trim~port the English general had pre\'iollSly eou-
structed eight hundred Cll.rts drown by horses, which were
now his ll"urest {Iepeudeuce for brillbring up awmuuitioll; lIud
so many dela)"s were anticipated (rOlD the irregularity of the
native CfIrters and muleteers and the chances of weatller, that
he calculated upon an operation of tW!Jnt)o.four days. Yet he
hoped to steal this time from his a.dversaries, sure, even jf he
failed, that the c1asll of his arms would again draw their
scattered troops to that quarter as tinkling bells draw swarm-
ing bees to an empty hive.
On the 8th the ligllt divisioll and "Pack's Portuguese forde<!
HIe AbTliedu three miles above the fortress, tlml making 1I
eirCllit took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained
quiet during the day, and lIS there was no regular investment
the enemy did not think tho siege WM commenee<1. Blit in
the evenillg the troops stood to their arms, and colonel Col-
borue, !lOW oomnlanding the fifty-second, having assembled
two compauiea from each of the British regimcnUl of the light
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division stormed the redoubt of Francisco; tllis he did with
so much fury that the as.sailfints appellred to be fit one lllld
thc same time, in the ditch, mounting the pnrapets, fighting
Oil the top of the rnmpart, ami forcing the gorge of tlla
redoubt, where t11e explosion of one of the French shells had
burst the gate open. Of the defenders a few were killed, not
mfln)', and the remainder, forty in numbcr, wcre made pri.
soners. When the post was thus taken with the loss of
only tll'cuty-four well uud ofiicers, Elder's Cllfsdores were set
to Ia.bour on tlle right of it bcCtluse the fort itself was
instantly covered with shot and shells from the rown i
this tempest continued through the night, but nt dll.ybrclIk
the plllullel, six hundred yards in length, wna suuk three
fl'€t deep. the comlllunication over the TeSOl1 was completed,
lInd' the siege advanced several days by this welI-managcll
lISSlIult.
The 9th the first division took the trenches ill hand, the
place was encircled by posts to prevent any cxternal commu-
nication, and at night twelve hundred workmen commenced
three counter-batteries for clc\'lm gullS encll, under a heavy
fire of shells and grape. Before daylight the labonrers were
under cover, and a ditch was also sunk in the front to provide
mrth for the batteries, which were made eighteen feet thick
at top to resist tIle very powerfulnrtillery of the p1:lce.
On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches and
(\ thousand men laboured, but in grtm.t peril, for the besieged
had 1'1 BlIpcrobundancc of ammunition llnd did not Bpure it.
In the night the COilllllllIlitm.tioll from tl1e puralle! to the
batteries was opened, and ou the 11tll the third division
undertook the Biegc. That day the mo.gnzines in tllC batteries
were excavated uud UJC approaches wideuedj but tlle euemy's
fire was destructive, and the shelL'! came so fast into tl1e ditch
in front of the battcries tho.t the troops wcro withdrawn llnd
the mrth rnised from the inside. Great damage was also
sustained from salvos of shens with long fu?Ccs, whose aimul.
Ulilcous explosion cut away the parapets in a strange manner;
and in the night the French brought II howitzer to the gnrden
of the convent of Francisco with which they killed manl
Illen tlud wouudeu otherll.
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On the 12th the ligllt division resumed work, the riflemen,
profiting from a thick fag, oovered them!IClvCi! in pits which
they digged in front of the trenches and from thence picked
off the enemy's gunners; yet the weather was 80 cold nnd the
besieged shot so briskly that little progresll was made. The
13th the same causes impeded the labourers of the first
division. Scarcity of transport also balked the operatioDIl.
OnfJ.third only of the native carts had arrived and the drivers
of those present were very indolent j much of the twenty-four
pound ammunition was sLill ~,t Villa de Poute, autl intelligence
arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to succour the
place. In tbis difficulty it was rcsoh'cd to hasten the siege
by opening a. lmmcll with the counter-batteries, which were
not quire six hundred yards from tllC curtAin, ILnd then to
storm the Il[aoo without blowing in the ooullteracarp: in other
words to overstep the rules of ,science and ~tlcrifice life rather
than time, for the capricious Agueda might in one night flood
aud enable a small :French force to relieve the place. The
whole army was therefore broug11t up frolll the distant quarters
and posted in the villages on the Coo. ready to cr088 the
Aguedo. and give battle.
Hill also, in returning from Merida, sent a division across
the Tagus, lest Marmont, despniring to unite his foroos time
enough to relieve the place, s1\Ould move against Castello
Braneo and Vilha Velha.
In the night of the 13th the batteries weIe armed with
twenty-eight guns, the sccond parallel and the approaches were
continued by the flying sap, and the Santa Crnz convent WIIS
surprised by the Germans of the first division, which secured
the right flank of the trenches. The l~th the enemy, who
had observed that the mell in the trenches always went on' in
a disorderly manner on tIle approach of the relief, made a
sail)' llnd overturned the gahions of the sap; they even pene-
trated to thc parallel, llnd were upon the point of entering the
batteries when a few of the workmen getting together
checked them until a support arrived and the guns were
saved. This sffair, coupled with the death of the engiMer
on duty and the heavy fire from the town, dela)'ed the open-
ing of the breaching. batteries; yet at half-pllSt four ill tile
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evening twent)'-five heavy gumJ battered tlle 'jausBe bra~'
alld rampart, and two IJieces were directed against the convent
of Francisco. Then was beheld a. spectacle at once fearful
and sublime. 'l'he enem.r replied to the ll8Sailants' fire with
more than fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns
~hook the ground far and wide, the smoke rested ill heav),
volumes upon the battlements of the place or curled in ligllt
wreaths about the numerous spires, tIle shells, llissing through
tho air, scorned fiery serpents leaping from the dllrkncss, the
walls crashed to the stroke of t1le bullet, and the di~tallt
mouutains faintly returning the sound appeared to mourn
over the falling city. And when night put an cnd. to this
turmoil tbe quick clntter of musketry was heard like the
pattering of hail after 1I. peal of thunder, for the fortieth regiment
then earried the convent of Francisco Il}' storm and established
it.self in the suburb.
Next day the rtImparts were again battercd and fell BO fast
it was judged expedient to COllllllence the small hreaeh at the
turret, wherefore in the night five more ~UIlS wcre mounted.
At daylight the hcsiegcl"9' batteries rccommeneed, but at eigl1t
o'elock a thick fog eompelled them to deslilt; nevertheless tbo
/JIII8ll breach had bcen opened and the IJ]ll.ce was summoned
hut without effect. At night the parallel on the lower 'resoll
was exteuded and a sharp musketry was directed from thenoo
against the great brcach; the breacllillg-battery aSOl'iginally pro-
jectedwas also commenced, and the riflemen of the light division
continued from their pits to piek off the enemy's gunners.
On the 17th the fire 011 both sides was very heavy, amI
though the wnll of the place was beaten down in large
cantles sc\'ernl of the besiegers' guns wero dismounted, their
butteries injured,.mauy men killed, f:.'elleral Borthwick COlli-
mandant of artillery wounded, the sap entirely ruined, all(1
the riflemcn ill the pits overpowered with grape; yet towards
eveniug the latter r(lC{lveroo lhe upper Imnd and the Frcnch
could only fire from the more distant embrasures. In the
night the bnttcry intended for the lesser brcaeh WI'lB armed
and that 011 the lower Teson raised 80 as to afford cover in
the day_time.
On the 18th the besiegers' fire was resumed with great
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violeuce, the turret; WllS shaken at the sl!'!all breach, the large
breach became pru.cticable in the middle, and the enemy oom_
menced retrenching if,. 'fhe 5.'l.p made no pl'ogrc8S, the !Illper.
intending engineer was badly wouwlcd, fmd u. twent~'-fot1r
pounder having hursted ill the butteries killed Bcycrul mell.
III the night the battery DU the Ivwcr 'l'c;;ou WAS improved,
and l\ field-piece and howitzer being place(l there kept up a
constant fire DU the great breach to destroy the }'rench
retrenchments. Qn tllC 1nth bot.ll bl"Cllchf:S hCCllme jlTactiCllhle,
mojor Sturgoon closely examined the plnce anti l\ plllll of
aUack was formed 011 his report; lh(.l lIi;l;(lult \\'lLS theu oruereJ
/lud the battering-guns were turned against the artillery of the
rnmparts.
ASSAULT O~· CIUDAD RODRIGO.
This operation, confided to the third llnd ligllt divisions and
Pack's Portuguese, WIl.'! orgonil'.crl ill four parts.
1". Right auack. A company of the eighty-third and the
second cu~adores, posteJ in some houses near the bl'idgtl, were
to cross the river and escalade an outwork ill front of the
castle, where there was no ditch but whcre two gnns com-
manded the junction of the eonntersearp with the body of the
place. The fifth and ninety-folllth regiments, posted behind
the (.'{Inveut of Santa Cruz lInd having' the seventy-seveutlJ in
roseI've, were to enter the ditch at tlle extremity of the counter.
~carp, to escalade the 'jaU$se brave,' Il.ud scour it on their left
'lS far ail the great breach.
2". A8suult of the great fmmh. One llUlIdreJ and eighty
men, protected b}' the fire of the eightY-lhird regiment and
carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out
of the second parallel alld be followed by a storming pariy,
whieh was ngoiu to be supportod by Mookinnon's brigade of
the third divisioll.
3". Lift rUtack. The ligM division, posted behind tlle con-
.ent of Francisco, was to send three rifle compllnies to sconr
the filuS.'le brnye to the right, Md so connect the left and
centre attacks. At the SlIme time 11 stonning ptIfty, prcecdoo.
by the third calfadore~ with hay-sflcks alld followed by Vande-
tcur's allll Andrcw Bllrnard's brigades, was to make for the
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small brcaell, and when tIle f{\llsse bra.ye WM carried to detach.
to their right ill nid of thc main ll38ault, to t]lOO left to force
a pUs>age at the Salamanca gate.
4". 1o'al&e aUaik. This was nn escalade to be made by
Prn:k's Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side
of the town.
Colonel O'Toole of the e::u;adores commaudeJ the riglit
attllck. Five hundred volull~eers under major JIanners of
the seventy-fourth, the forlorn hope under lieutenant Mackie
(If the eighty-eightll, composed the storming party of the
third di\'isioll. Three hundred volunteeril led by major Georgo
Nupier of lhQ Iirty-second, with a forlorn hope of twenty.five
llIen under lieutenant Gurwood of the same regiment, formed
the storming party of the ligllt division.
Al! the troops reached their posts without seeming to
attract the attention of the euellly, Lut bclore the
sigun! wns given, and while Wellington, who in
persOll had been pointing out the Icsser breach to
ninjor NIlllier, was still at the convcnt of Froncisco, the attack
011 the right commenced and was instantly taken up along the
whole line. Then the space between the troops and the ditch
was at once covered with soldiers and rovllgcd by 11 tempcst of
grape from the ramparts. The storming parties of the third
divisiou jumped out of the parallel when the first shout arose,
but so rapid had been the movements on t11eir right, that
IlCforc they coule1 rench the ditch, Ridge, Dunkill, and Camp-
bell. witll the fifth, sevcllty-seventh, am! ninety-fourth regi-
ments, had already scoured the fllusse brnye, and were pushing
up t1\c great brcach amidst the bursting of shells the
whistling of grape anel muskets and the shrill cries of the
Freudl, who wcre driven fighting bchind. the retrenehmcnts.
'fhcre they rallied, and sided by the musketry from tho houses
made hard butt!e for their po~t; nono would go back on either
side; and yet the British could not get forward, and men and
ufliccrs falling in llenps choked np tho pllSSIlge, which fronl
Illinute to minute Wall raked with grape from two gnus flank.
ing the top of the breach at the distance of a few YlU'ds: thus
stl'iving, find trampling alike upon the dead and the wounded
these brave mell maintained the combat,
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On tIle left the stormers of the light di\·jsioll, who had
three hundred yards of ground to clear, would not wait for
the hay-bags, but with extraordinary swiftness running to the
crest of the glncis jumped down the scarp, l\ depth of cloveD
feet, and ruslloo up the faussc bruyc under a smashing dis-
charge of grnpe and musketry. The ditch was dark and
intricate, tbe forlum hope inclined towards tile left, the
stormers went straight to the breach which was so narrow at
the top that a gun placecl across nearly burred the opening;
there they were rejoined by the forlorn hope and the whole
body ruslled up, but the head of the mass, crushed together
as the ascent narrowed, staggered under the fire, nod with the
instinct of self-prescrvlItiou snapped their owu muskets
though they llad not been allowed to load. :Major Napier
struck by a gmpe-shot fell at this moment with a shattered
firm, but he calle<1 aloud on his men to use their bayonets,
llnd all tIle unwoundcd officers simultaneously sprunS' to the
frout, thus the required impuLse was g-h'cn and with II furious
shout the breach was'earried. Then the supporting regiments
coming up in sections abreast gained the rampal1., the fifty-
seeond wheeled to tIle left, the forty-third to the right, and
the place was won.
During this contest, whieh lasted only a few minutes on the
breach, the fighting at tIle great breach had continued 1\ith
unabated violence: but when the stormers and the forty-third
Clime pouring along tllC rampart towards th<"lt quarter the
French wavered, tllree of their expense maga7.ines exploded
at tlLe same mOllleflt, llud then the third di\'ision with a mighty
effort broke through the retrenchments. The garrison fought
indeed for a moment in the streets, yet finally fled to the castle,
where lieutenrmt Gurwood, who tllough se\'erely wounded in
the head had entered amongst the foremost at the lessor
breach, nceivcd the governor'~ sword.
Now into the streets }llunged the assailants from all
quarters, for O'Toolc's attack was also successful, and at tl16
other side of the town Pack's Portuguese und the reserves
meeting no resistanco had ontered. Throwillg off the
restrnints of discipliuc tlle troops committed frightful ex-
cesses; the town was fired in three or f(,ul" places, the soldiers
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menaced their officers and shot eaeh other; rollny wcre killed
in the market.. plllee, intoxication soon increased the tumult,
and at I&-t, the fury rising to absolute llladness, a fire was wil-
fully lighted in the middle of tlle greet mllgur.ine, by whieh
the town would have been blown to atoms but for t-IIe ener~
getic courago of 1I0me offieers and u. few soldiers who still
preserved their seuses. Three hundred French had filHen,
fifteen hundred were made prisoners, Rnd the immellile stores of
ammunition, with one hundred nnd lifty pieces of artillery,
including the bnttering·train of Marmont's firmy, were cap-
tured. The allies lost twelve hundred wen and ninety officers
in the siege, of which six hundred and fifty aud sixty officers
were slain or hurt at the breaches. Generals Craufurd and
Mackinnon, the fomlCr a person of grent ability, were killed,
and with them died many gallant men; nmongst Coob', ,
others, a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it bas I!ell'l(l;l'!,
been felicitously said, that' three generals and Vol. I.
seventy other officers bad fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the
strife only talked of HlIrdyman.' General Yandllleur, leading
the light divisiou after Craufurd fell, was badly wounded, so
was colonel Colborne and a crowd of inferior rank; and
unhappily tlle slaughter did not end with t11e hatUe, for the
next day as the prisoners lInd their escort were marching out
by the breach lion accidental explosion took place and uumoors
of both were blown into air.
To recompense an exploit so boldly ul).dertllken find so
gloriously finished lord Wellington was created duke of
Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the
English, marquis of TOIT<lS Yedras by the Portuguese; but it
it to be rcmarked, t11at the princc regent of Portugal had
previous to that period dispbyed grllat ingratitude iu the con-
ferring of honours upon the British officcl1J.
OllSJo:I,V.\TWNS.
1°, ThiB siege lasted only twelve days, lialf the time origi-
nally CIllculated upon by the English general, and yet the
incxperience of tllC engineer and soldier, and thc heuvy lire of
the place, hlld caused the worlUl to be more slowly cli.(.'Culed
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than might ]lavc been expected i the cold also llnd impeded
the lllUourors, but with 11 less severe frost the trenches would
have beon overflowed, bee.'l.uSC in open weather the water rises
everywhere to within six inches of the surface. The worst
obstacle WtlS the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools fur_
lIished from the storckccpcr-gcncml's office in England, the
profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing respecteJ:
the engineers clIgcrly sought for }'reuch implements becau~e
the English tools woro useless!
2°. Welliugtoll'g audacity in storming the roooubt of Frail_
MO and breaking ground on the first night of the invest-
ment; hi~ greater audacity in storming before the firo of the
defence had been even nbntcd or the countcrscnrp blowed in,
were the true causes of the sudden fall of the }llace. Military
and 1101itienl reasons alike warranted this neglect of rules.
Suec*ss depended more upon the courage of the troops than
the skill of the engineer; a.nd wllen the general terminated
his order for the assault with this sentence, 'Cimlad Rodrigo
must be stormed t·bis evening,' he knew well that it would be
nobly unuen;tooU. Yet the :Freneh fought bravely on the
breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate
Illell, were bayonetted.
3°. A perpendicular dc:scent of sixteen feet ent off' the
grCllot hrClloCh from the t.own, (lnd the bottom was planted with
sllarp spikes aud sl;rewcd with live shells. 'l'he houses behind
werc loop-holed a.nd gnrnislled with muskcteexs, and on the
flanks there \I'ere cuts, not very deep or wide, and the French
had left the temporary bridges over them; but they had para.-
pets so powerfully uefentled it WllS Mid the third division could
never have carried them hOO not the light division taken the
enemy in flank: an assertion perhaps easier made than proved.
4°. This rapid siege has been contrasted with the slow
attack of Mnssenll. in 1810, ant! the defellee of Hermsti oom·
pared with that of Bllrri6. But Ma.ssena WllS not !If{!ssed for
time, and would have been blallleable to spare labour at the
expense of blood; IIerrasti had a garrison of si:x; thousand
mell, whereas Barri6 had less than two thousand, of which
only seventeen hundred were Ilble to bear arms, nnd with
auditional works to guard. Nevertheless lllil neglect of the
JAN. 18121 BOOK XVI.-CHAP, 3.
lesser breach was a great crror. !\(\\TOW nnel high, a slight
addition lo its defences would have rellucl'cu it impro.<:tiCQ.ble;
and as the deserters told him in the morning of the 19th the
light division was come up out of its turn lle must lll\ve
expected the (I.'Himlt and hOO time to prepare for it. Morco\'er
the small breach was flanked ut a short distonoo by a demi·
bastioll with a pal'ape~ whieh though liltle injured was aban-
doned the moment the llcad of the storming part)" forced its
way on to the rfolllpart. Rllt the real clefell("e of Ciudlld was
out"ide; wlleu It fell, MarIllont's errors at Elbodon became
manifest. Neither can that m:mhal be justiiied for baving
left so few lllen in Ciudud Rodl'igo; with a garrison of five
thousand the place could not lla\'e been taken.
~o. Disgmceful worc tl10 eXCC8ses of the allied troops: tho
Spani;;l.: peoplll were allies lInd friends, unarmoo, helplells, aUlI
all these claims were disres'mlcd. 'The soldiers were not to be
controlled.' That excuse will not suflioo. Colonel Macleod, of
the forty-third, l\ young man of a most cD<:rgetie spirit, placed
b'Uards at the breach nnu constraincd his rcgimcnt to koop its
milks for a long time aftcr thc dil>orders commenced; bnt as
no prc\'ions general meflBures had llcen taken, and no organized
efforts milde by higllcr authorities, the men were fillAlly curried
away in the iucrcn.sing tU1l1uit.
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CHAPTER IV.
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IN Ciudad Rodrigo papers were found showing that maT,y
inhabit-ant.s were emissaries of the enemy. All these people
Carlos d'Espll.iia slew witllOut mercy, but of the English
deserters who were taken some were llurdonoo, and the rigour
of the Spanish general was though~ ovcrstrailled. When
order had heen restored, workmen were set to repair the
breaches and level the trenches, and arrangements made to
provision the town quickly; for hlarmOllt was gathering his
forces at Vallmlolid, being still ignorant the place Illl(l fallen.
In the latter cnd of December, rumour, anticipating fact, had
spoken of an English bridge on the Agucda, and Montbrun's
expedition to AliClmt WM countermanded; yet the report
died way and Monthrun recommenced his lllarc]l. But though
tho bridb"e was really cast on the 1st and the sicge ,commenced
on the 8th nothing was kuowll on the 1:&th at Salamanca.
On the 11th Marmollt lIrri\"ed at Valladolid, and on the 15th
llC first heard of the sicge. His anny was immediately ordered
to concentrate at Sulmnullca. BOllllct quitted tIle A~turiClS,
Moutbrun hu:stcued back from Valtmcia, Dorsenne litut a
detachment in nid, and on the 25th six. divisions of infantry
ami one of cavalry, forty-five tllOusand iu all, were assembled
at Salnmflllea, from wl1Cllec to Ciurlnd WfUl only four ffiarch6B.
On the 23rd Soultam ndvo.nced to llIatilln to ascertain the
fate of the fortress, but jive thouslUld of Hill's troops had
thcn reachcd Castdlo Branco und the allies wcrc therefore
strong enough to fight berolld the Ak,'Ileda; hence if the siege
had lasted the twcnty-fom dll.Ys eXI}(lCtcd the place might still
have been taken. Marmont knew on tbe 26th that the for-
tress wss lost, uut!, unable to tJomprehend his ad\"ersary's
SUCCC3S, retired to Vall.adolid. His troops were thus harassed
by ruinous marches in winter; for ::Montbrnu had o.lrcady
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reached Avila on his return from Valencia. Bonnet in repass-
ing the Asturian nlOunmins suffered from cold and fatigue,
and more from the attacks of Porlier, and sir Roward Douglas
immediately sent money and arms to the Asturians. Morillo,
who hOO rcmainud at HorclI.jo, south of the 'l'agus, in great
peril after hi~ llight from Allllagro, took t·lIc opportunity to
escape by 'l'I1.IXillo, and Saornil's band uut off a Frcnch detach·
mellt at :Medina del Campo; other losses were sustained from
the partidlls on thc Tictar, lInd thc operations of those in the
Rioja, Nll\'lIlTe, and New ClIstille were renewed. 'l'he regular
SJ!<lnish troops were likewise put in movement. Abadia and
Cllbrem advancing from Gallieia. menaced Alltorga and La
Dllne1~ bnt the arrival of DOllnet at Denevcnte soon compelled
them to retire lIgain to Puebla de Sellilbrill. and Villa Francs.:
lbell Silveirn WllO had IU6rehed across the froutier of 'l'rus OS
Montes to aid them also fell back to Portugal.
Mannont's operations weTe here again ill-judged. Had he
takcn post at To.mamcs, or St. Martin dc Rio, lInd placed
strong advanced guards at Tenebron lInd St. EspiritusJ in the
hills immediately l'lbol'e Rodrigo, he would have rccovered the
place. His troops might 11Bve been concentrated at that point
tllO 28th, on whieh day rain set in 80 hC/l.\'ily tbnt the trestle-
bridge would not stand, Bnd the waters rose two feet over tile
stone bridge; the allied army on the left bank could not com-
muuicate with the fortress, which was thus isolated for several
days with the trenches not quite repaired. But tl\C grco.test
wltrriOI1l are lhe very slaves of fortuue I
Wellingtou's cJcs were now turned towards Eadujos. lIe
dCfligned to im'est it during the second week of March, beClluse
the flooding of the Beirn rivers would not only permit a COll-
centration of troops in the Alemtejo without risk to Portugal
in the north, but impede a junction of the 'French forces in
EstremaJuTII. Green foroge WllS. to be had earlier in Estre-
Illluluru than on the Agueda, and his subsequent operations
against Andalusia would depend uJlOn forerunnillg the lUll.
vest, whieh ripening sooner there t!\im in Lwn would be the
enelllY's resource. Prelimiuary measures were already in
prof,'Tess. In Decemher a pontoon bridge escorted by lIlilit'lr)'
urtilicer" and Borne Portuguese $CameD had been ordered from
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Lisbon to Abrnntes, where uraft bullocks were collected to
draw it to ElvliS. After the fall of Hodrigo stores !lUU tOO{d
were sent from Lisbon to Sctuvul, :lnu thence in boats to
.Alca~er do Sal: and a company of the military artificers, thcu
nt Cfldi7.. were disembarked nt AYl1ffiontc for Elvas where Illl
engineer officer secretly supcl'intcnJcd the llrcllllrntions for the
siege. UcuIlwhile the repairs of Ciudad Wtlllt Oil, two llew
redoubts were traced out upon tIle 'l'csons, the old onc was
enlarged, the suburbs were strengthened, but heavy storms
impeded these WOrks Md stopping nIl communication with
the south c.lcll1)'oo the ulterior operations j wheIl the wentber
cleared other o1J5trn.:les were not wuutiug.
Sinking from want the draft. bullocks were unable to drag
the whole battering-train by Vilha Vclh", and only sixt~n
twenty-four pounders and tWClIty spare enmllgcg could be
moved on that line j wherefore sixteen twenty-four pounders,
then in vessels 011 tile 'fagus, were ordered up to ALflllltes,
ll.Dd the admiral was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had
none of that calibre aud offered eighteen pounders; but tlle
artillery major Dieksoll found these were Russian pieces whose
bore was too large for English sll()t, ILnd the Ildmirlll rrfuscd
to give gullS from his own shil), the Barlleur, in their place:
this capricious proceeding produced difficulty and delay, and
the artillerymen had to eull the Portuguese shot ill the
uT$Cnal to obtain a sufficient snpply. Dickson's energy over-
Cllme every obstacle, and in the beginning of March fifty-two
battering-guns, the pontoons from ALronws and most of the
stores frouI Aleat;er do Sal were parked at Elvas, where
gabions and faseines were piled i..u great numbers,
:Marmont" who had lost his emissaries at Ciurlad Rodrigo,
and was unable to measure his adversary's talent and energy.
lmd llo"1lill spread his troop!> tlHl more easily to feetl them.
Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry returned
to Talavera aud Toledo,-SoulI<U1l oceupied the countT)' from
Zamom and Toro to the hanks of the Tunnes,-Bonnet after
driving the Gallieians back to Scnnbria and Villa FranCl\
remained (lbout Benevellte and ASlorga. The army of Portu-
gal seemed to expect no further' operations on the part of the
allies; yet from some secret misgiving, Mannont caused Foy to
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march through the Gundalupe by the pass of St. Vincente,
to ascertain whether nn a.rmy could march by that line from
the 'l'agus to the GuaJi:Llm. This BC:l.tterillg of the :French
relieved Wellington from a. serious embarrnsslOent. The want
of laud-transport had delayed tIle arrival of clothing for the
army, nnd to receive it the regiments were necessarily Bcnt to
the IUwigablo points on the Mondego, Douro and 'l'agll6;
hence the march to the Alemtejo was long and U111nilit<lry;
and it would have been too d~llgerous if Marmont had kept
bis troops togetllcr on the ']'ormC3, with advanccd posts pushed
towards Ciudad Hodrigo. The weather proved extremely
favourable, aud the new Portuguese COlllmissariat supplied the
troops well without those exactions and oppressions which
hlld liitherto attended tho native movements: the scarcity
was however. still so great that rations of CllSSlI.va root were
served to them instead of bread.
Wellington's character always rose with his difficulties, but
the want of specie crippled every operlltion. The intended
earnpaign in Andalusia could not, when there was no harvest
on the ground, be conducted unless by paying ready money·
for supplies, seeing that the Spaniards would ne\'er diminish
their socret resources on promises. The English g(meml and
Mr. Stuart, therefore endeavoured to get British bank notes
accepted as cas~ by the great merchants of Lisbon and
Oporto. Wellington also, reflecting on the enormous sums
spent in Portugal and judging many llersons had secret hoards
which they would invest if they could do it safely, asked for
English Exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner,
intending to pay the interest lltllletulllly and faithfully how·
ever inconvenient it llIight prove at the moment. This plan
could not be adopted with Portuguese pllper been.use the
finances were faithlessly IDlluagcd by the regcncy, but some
futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by
lord Liverpool, llnd money became so SCllI'ce that in the
midst of victory the wllr was more than once like to stop
altogether.
Du the 5th of March, t11l~ lI1'my being ,'/"Cl! on the way to
the Alemtejo, Wellington, who had maintaincd his head-
quarters on the Con. to the last momeat to blind the cnemy
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as to his real designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo 10 Casroii.Oll.
He also personally explained to tlle governor Vivos the plan
and intention of tlle Dew works, supplied him with mone}',
furnished him with six weeks' provision remaining from the
field stores of the Britillh troops, and gave him the resen'cd
atores at St. Joo. de Pcsqueiru on th6 Douro, from wIJence
Carlos d'EsJllliia undertook to tnwsport them to the fortress.
MarmOllt was then at SalaLDllDca and ignorant of the allies'
march, wherefore Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry Wail posted
on the Ycites to screen the movement lIB long Il5 possible, llnd
he wns instructed to retire on Beiro. if Marmout adnlllccd, hut
to cover the lIIt1gllziucs at Cll.stcllo J3raooo by disputing the
rivers and defiles with the enemy's parties. Silveirn was
directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Ollorto,-the
militia unclcr Trant Ilond J. Wilson were to concentrate about
Guarda,-those of Bcirn to unite about Cilstello Braneo undet
eoloDel Le<:or. 'fhe orders of all were the same, namely, to
dispute the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to
defend those of the Estrelln, Leeor those of Castello Branco,
on whieh town Victor Alten's cavalry was finally to retire if
pressed. With thC3e forces, amI thc Spaniards under Sanchcz
and Espana, /lnd with the two fortresses, for Almeida lH1S
DOW cullUble of d~fence, Marmont's efforts were Ilot much to
be dreaded in that season, seeing that 4e had lost his
battering-train in Ciudad.
Wellingtoll reached Eh'as the 11th, and resolved to invest
Badajos immediately though the troops and stores had not
alL arrived; for he WlIs then ten days lmhind the time he had
contemplated, and the delay had thrown him into the equi-
noctial raiM by which bis difficulties were augmented. The
cause of tllis was lIgain the cver-recurring vexatious conduct
or tile Portuguese regency. There waa no want of t,ronsport
iu the couutry, hut lIS the govCrJllllent would not compel the
magistrates to do their duty, the latter either refused to pro.
cure carts for the army or forced the poorer classes to supply
them, which oppl'CasioD the Jlcasant.s naturolly avoided by
fligh~. Thus, l3utlajos would ll:l.\'e heen invested the 6th if
the rich tOWD of Evom, wllich had not seen the face of an
cum)' for more than three years, had not refused to Bupply
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any carriages, which necessarily postponed it to the 17th. It
was in vain Wcllingtoll tllrentcncd and rcmonstrated,-in vain
he wasted time anti mental llower in tlevbing new laws or
remedies for bad oUl)s,-iu vain Mr. Stnart worked with equal
vigour to give energy to this extraordinary government,-
whether in matters of sJnnll or vital importance, insolent
angcr and falsehood, disgmeefol subterfuges aud stolid indif-
ference on the part of all the civil fUllel;iolll1rics met them at
every turn. The responsibility e\'en in small matters became
too grCllt for subordinate oflioors,-the English general WjUl
forced to arrange the most trilling details of the service him-
self, and his iron strenglh of body and mind were straiueU,
until all mco wondered how they held, and in truth he did
fall sick but recovered after a few days. The eritical nature
of the war ma.y be Iwre judged of, for no mall could llave
supplied his place at such a moment, no man, however daring
or skilful, would have voluntarily plungeU into diflicultit!6
which were like to drh'C Wellington from the contest.
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ON the 15th pontoons were laid over the Guaditlnn four milee
from ElVll.'>, at a lllace where the current was dull, and two
large Spanish boats were arranged IlS flying bridges. The
16th Beresford, who llad again joined the anny, crossed I-he
river, drove in tho enemy's posts and invested Badajos v..ith
the third, fourth, and light divisions, and a brigade of Hamil-
ton's Portuguese, in all fifteen thousand men. Soult was then
before the 18la, but Drouct's division, five thousand strong,
was at Vilh Franc:n and Daricau with a like force was at
Zalamca de ScrCDo. near lIfcdcllin i wherefore Graham passing
the Gundilllll\ with the first, sixth, and seventh divisiollil of
iufll.utry and two brigades of cavalry, moved by Valveroe and
Santa Martha upon Llcrcnn, while Bill moved from Albu.
querquc hy ::\Jcrida upon Almcndrolcjo!l. Tllcse covering
corps were together thirty thouSlInd strong, five thousand,
including the heavy Germans who were at Estremos, being
cavalry; aud n.s the fifth division WlIS on the
march from Beirn, t11c whole army presented fifty_
one thousand sabrcs and bayonets, of whieh twenty
thousand were Portnguese: Cnstaiios went to Gallicia, but the
fifth SIJaui;;h anllY uuder Morilto and Penne Villelllur, four
thousand strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the
lower Gundiana, intending to fall on Seville when Soult should
advance to the succour of Badajos.
As t!.lC allies advanced Drouet marched by his right to
Horllachcs in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a
view to keep open the collulllllljention with Marmont by
TruxiUo; Bill then halted at Almendrnlejos, and Grahnm
took post at Znfro, placing SlaMs cavlllry at Villa FrnnC3.
Manno~t had meanwhile dmwD Ilia sixth division from TaJa-
vera. wwards Castille through the Puerto de Pico, and tho
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four divisions aud cavalry quartered at Toledo had rccrossed
the Tagus aud marclled over the Guadarama, the whole point-
ing Cor Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the
army of Portugal would not act in conjunction with that of
the south.
THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.
This fortress was garrisoned by a miKM force of Frcnch, Ilea-
shm, and Spanish troops, five thousand in 0.\1 inc1udillg sick.
PLilIipon making himself felt in every direction, had scoured
the vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried
off cattle almost from under the gllllS of Elv1\S Bnd ealllllO
Mayor, and llis spies were abroad from Cindoo Rodrigo to
Lisbon, from Lisbon to Ayamonte. He had made an interior
retrenc1llllcnt ill the castle and augmented the number of its
guns; tIll:' rear of fort Christoval was also better sceured, and a
coverw collllUuuication from the fort itself to the work at the
bridge-head was Dearly completed. Two rM'clins were con-
structed on tlle south si(le of the town, n third was com-
menced, (lnd likewise counter-gullnls for the bastions; but the
eastern front ncxt the castle, whicu WIIS in other l'esIJccts the
weakest point, was without any outward protection save the
. strCllm of the Rh·mns. A 'cundYl or second ditclt had been
dug at the bottom of the great ditch, which was also in some
parts filled with water; the gorge of the Pllrda!erM \I'M
enclosed, and the work connected with the body of the plllce
from whence powerful butteries tooked into it. 'fho three
western fronts were mined, and on the CMt the Sail Roque
bridge was built up to fonn an innndation two hundred yards
wide, whieh greatly eontmct-ed tbo space by which the plnce
eouloJ be approached. All the inhabitants had been ordered
on pain of expulsion to In)' lip food for three months, and two
convoys witlt provisions and ammunition had entered the IJlace
on the lO~h and 16th of l?ebruary: tlie stores of powder and
supply of shells were howcvcr inadequate.
Wellington finding' tbe old attack l\o<rtlillst Christovul and the
ensUe now impracticable, desired to assail one of tile western
fronts whieh would have been scicntific; but the engineer Sllid
he 1.ul.oJ not morturs miners or guns, nor the ml:aUS of bringiug
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up sufficient stores for such an attack. Indeed the want of
transport had again forced the allies to draw stores from Elvas
to the maniftlt hazard of that fortress, and hence, here as at
Ciudnd Rodrigo time was neccBSfIril}' paid for by the loss of
life; or mther tIle crimes of politicians were atoned for by the
blood of the soldiers.
It was finally resoiv"ed to attack the bastion of Trinidad,
bwmsc"thc counter-guard there being unfinished that bastion
(1)uld be hnttered from the hill 011 which the Picurina stood.
The lint parallel was to embrace the Picurina, the San HoquE;
and the eastern front, in such ~ mallllCf that counter hattericl
migllt destroy all the armament of the southern fronts which
hore RW'inst the Picurina hil1. The PicuriM itself was to be
battered llnd stormed, and from t1l1~nce the Trinidad and &nta
Maria bfUltions were to be breached. All the gung were then
to be turned to open a third breach in tile connecting cur-
tain which was known to be of weak masonry, and thus a
storming party could tnrn any retrenchment bellind thc great
breaches. In thig way the inundation oould be avoided, amI
although 11 }l~rench deserter declared, and truly, Ihat the ditch
WlIS there eighteen feet deep, such Wag the general's confidence
in his troops and in his own resources for aiding their efforts,
that he resolved to soonn thl} place without. blowing in I-he
oounterscarp.
Dickson's battering-train of fifty-I,wo pieres include(l sixteen
twenty.four_pound howitzers for throwing shrapnel shells j but
this missile, much talked of in the army at the time, was little
prized by Wellingten, WllO had Cilrly detected its insufficiency
save as a COlllmon shell or when used with very heavy metal;
and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to injure
the inhabitants, neither in this nor iri any siege did he use
mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them tlp,
for l>esidcs tho neglect of t110 Portuguese gO\'crnment, the
pC1lSantry and evell the {lrdellan~n employed to move tlle
lmt.terillg.traill from Aleacer do Sal, although well paid,
deserted.
Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British,
the rest Portuguese, and there were one llUmlred and fift,- sap-
pers, volunteers fr(JlU the third division, not skilful but of signal
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bravery. The engineer's parc was behind the heights of St.
:MichaeJ. Picton had direction of the siege,-Colvillc, Kempt,
aud Bowes alternately commanded in the trenchea,-the
engineer ollicers, Burgoyne and Squire, conducted the attack,
and in the night of the 17th eighteen hundred men, prott'Cted
by a guard of two tllousand, hroke gronnd onc hundred and
sixty yards from the Pieurina.. A tempest stifled the sound of
the pickaxes, and though the work was commeuced late a
communication four thousand fect in length was fonned, and
0. JMrnllcl six 'hundred yards long, three feet deep and three
foot six inches wide, was opened. When day broke the Picu-
rins. was reinforeed, and a sharp musketry interspersed with
dischargea from some field-pieces, aided by heR\')' gUM from
the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.
In the uight of the 18th two batteries were traood out, the
parallel was prolonged right and left, and the pre,"'ious works
were improved. The garrison raised the parapets of the
Picurina, lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags, and
planted musketeers to gaU the men in the trenches, who
replied in a like manner.
The 19th Wollingtou having flCcret intelligence tllllt a Slllly
was intended ordered the guards to IJc reinforced. Neverthe-
less, at one o'clock some C!>\Oalry came out by the Talavera
gate, and thirteen hundred infAntry nnder gcncI'1ll Vielland,
second in command, filed unoh3erved into the coulmunication
between the Picurilla and the San Roquel,--one huudred men
were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself, and all these
troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before them
lllld Oeb"ltll to dellloli~h the parallel. Previous to this outbreak
the French cavalry had divided and commenced a sham fight
on the right of tIle parallel, the smaller party, prctcnding to
fly and answering Portuguese to tho challenge of the piquets,
were allowed to pll8S, and, elated by the success of this strata.-
gem, galloped to the engineer's pare, a thOllsnnd yards behind
the trenches, where they cnt down some men, not mauy, (or
succour soon cameo Meanwhile the troops at the parallel
having rallied upon the relief which had just arrived beat the
cncm)"s infautry back even to the castle, In this hot fight
iJJe besieged lost above three hundred wen and officers, the
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besiegers only ono hundred and fifty j but colonel Flctcllcr,
chief engineer, was badly wounded, and severnl hundred
entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillillon bad promised
a high price for each; yet this turned out ill, as the soldiers
. neglected the fight to glLtlu~r tools. Afr.cr the action 8
reserved squadron of drogoons lloud six ficld·pieccs were nlwa)'s
stationed behind St. MiclJ3cl, and a signal post was esta-
blished on the Sicm. de Venta to give notice of the enemy's
motions.
Wet and boisterous weather harnssed the workmen, flooded
the trenches, and retnrdcd progress, but on the 10th the
parallel was entirely opened ODd on the 20th enlarged; OC1t
night it Wall extended across the Seville rood :lIlt!. three
counter-batteries were commenced j but they were traced in
cear of the parallel because the ground was too soft in front
to bear moving guns: moreover, the trench being l\ mile long
with only n guard of fourteen hundred men, a rush from San
Roque, which was scarcely three hundred yards distant, would
have carried the batreries.
On the 20th EL slight sally had been repulsed, and the 21st
Phillipon plnced two field· pieces on the right bank of tho
Guadiana to rake the trenches, but EL slloulder of earth raised
the night before bamed this design and the riflemen's fire sent
the guns away. Indications of repeating this operation against
the left from the Pamaleras being observed, three hundred men
with two guns were posted on somo broken ground in 0Ppo-
sitiolL
In the night anotller battery against the San Roqu!l wtI3
commenced, and the battery agninst the Picurina was finished;
yet heavy rain ngnin retarded the works, and the besiegers
lUl.Viug ftliled in all attempt to draiu the lower purts of the
parallel by cuts made an artificial bottom of sand-bngs. The
besieged thinking the curtain adjoining the castle was the true
object of attack threw up an earthen entrenchment in front, nnd
commcncod clearing away the houses behiud it;. A covered
communication from the 'l'rillidad gate to the San Uoque,
intended to take this supposed attnek in revel'lle,
was also commenced; and flS the labour of digging
WIlS great it was completed by hnnging up brown.
UARCH, 1812.] nOOK XVI._CllAP. :0;. 105
cloth wllieh appeared to be earth, an ingenious expedient
enabling the garrison to puss ulIsocn between those points.
Vaubau's maxim, thilt a. perfect investment is the first
requisioo in Q siege, had been neglected at Badiljos to spare
labour. The great master's art wl\.9 however soon vindieated
by his countrymsn. l'llillipon findiug the right bank o! the
Guadiana free, made a batrery in the night for three field-
pieces and at da}·light raked the trellcl1~: tIle shots pitclling
into the parallel swept it ill the most destructive lll:l.Uner for
the whole day, there was 110 remedy, and the loss would ha,·c
been terrible if tIle soft nature of tIle ground had not pre-
vented the' touch and bOllnd of the bullets. Orders werc
immediately sent to the fifth division, theu at CalnI'0 :Ullyor,
to invest the place on that side, but these troops were distant
an(l misfortunes accumulated. In tllC evenillg raill filled the
trenches, the flood of the Guudianll run the fixed bridge under
water sunk twelve of the llontoons aud broke the tackle of the
fiying bridges; the provisions of the army could not then be
brought o,·er, the gUllS and ammuuitioll were on the right
bank and the siege was on the point of beiug raised. III ll.
few days however the ri,·er subsided, some rortuguese craft
were brought up to form a flying bridge, the pontoolls ElIWed
weTC employed as row· boats, and the communication was thus
secured for the rest of the siege without accident.
On the 23rd the besieged were working on their in.
trenehment covering the front next the castle, aud the
besiegers were fixing platfonns, when at three o'clock sudden
rain filled the trencJles, the sntumted earth fellnwny, the works
crumbled, and the Il.ttock was entirely suspended, Next day
the place \VIIS invested beyond tbe GllwillUlI by the fifth
division, llnd the weather being fine the butteries werc llrmed
with ten twenty-four pounders, cleven eighteen !louuders, IInd
seven five-Il.ud-a-half inch howitzers. all of which opeueU 011 the
25th; they were vigorously a.nswered, and II howitzer WIlS dis-
mounted and severel flttiIlery Ilnd engineer offieers were killed.
Nevertheless t1l0 San Hoque was silenceU, and the Picnrina
garrison so galled by the marksmen that none darC(\ look
over the parapet; nud as the extcfunl nppellrlUlee of that fort
did 1l0t indicate great streugth general Kempt was ordered to
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llSSllult. The Olltwam seeming WI\8 however vcry fallacious,
the fronts were well covered by the gloois, the fln.nkB deep, the
llIIllpart at fourteen feet from the bottom of the ditch was
protected with thick slanting palings, and above them there
was an earthen slope of sixteen feet. A few palings had been
knocked off the covered way and the parapet was slightly
damaged, but it WllS re]mired with sand-bags am] the ditch was
profound, lUlrrow at tile bottom, and lIullkeu by four splillter-
}lroof casemates. Seven guns were mounted, the entrance by
the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, and the
garrison was two hundred strong, el"Cry man having two
muskets. The top of the rampurt was garnished with loaded
shells to push over, a retrenched guard-house formed a second
internal defence, and small mines and a loopllOled gallery under
the counterscarp, intended to take the assailants in rear, wcre
begun but not finished.
Five hundred Illen of the third clivi~ion assembled for the
attack. Kempt ordered two hundred under major Rudd of
the sevent}'-seventh to turn the fort on the left,-an equal
force under major ShAW of tIle seventy.follrth to turn the fort
by the right,-ond onc hundred from caeh of these bodies were
to enter the communication with San Hoque and intercept
succours coming from the town. The flanking columns were
to make a joint attack on the fort, and the hundred men
remaining formed a 'reserve under captain Powis of the eighty-
third. The engineers, Rolloway, StanwllY, nnd Gips, having
twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, guided these
columns, and fifty of the light division provided with axes were
to move out of the trenches at the moment of attack.
ASSAULT OF PIcunmA.
At nine o'clock, the night being fine and the arrangements
skilfully made, the two Jlanking bodies moved forward. The
distance was sllOrt and the troops quick, bnt the fort black
and silent before now seemed a mass of fire. The assailants
running to the palisades in the rear with undaunted courage
endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive
musketry and the thick pales rendered their efforts nugatory,
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they strove to get ill by the fflces of the work, yet the depth
(If the ditch and the slanting stakes again hatJIed them. The
enemy also shot fast find flltall}', and the crisis being imminent
Kempt sent the resorve headlong ngainst the front; theu the
fight and the carnuge ~ame terrible, and a battalion coming
ont from the town to the succour of the fort WllS encountered
and beaten by the Jmrty on thc communication. Tho guus of
Badaj06 Bud of the CIIstle now opened, tIle gunrd of the treuehes
replied witll musketry, rockets were thrown up by the besieged,
and the shrill sound of alarm bells mixed with the shouts of
the combatants inercased the tumult. Still the Pieurina sent
out streams of fire by the light of whieh durk figures were
seen fUl'iously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis had
escaladed where the artillery had beaten down tile pales, and
th(l other ossailullts tllroWing ladd(lrs in the lIlanner of bridges
from the brink of the dit<:h to the slanting stakes also lIlounted,
and all were fightiug band to haud. The ax;e-men of the
light division, compassing the fort like prowling wolves, soon
discovered the gate Md hewing it down broke in by the rear,
yet the struggle coutinued. Powis, RollowllY, GillS, and
Oat<:s of the eightl'..eighth, fell wounded 011 or beyond the
rampart,-Kixon of the fift.y-secoud W/l.S shot two yards
within the gaw,-Shll.w, Rudd, nnd nellrly ul! thc other
ol1ieers llilu fallen outsiue,-lUiu it was not until half the
garrison were killed that Gaspar Thiery, the commandant,
surrendered with eighty_six men: the others rushing out of
the gate endeavoured to cross the inundation and wero
drowned.
Phillipon thought the Picurina. wonld huve delayed the siege
five or six dIlJ'8, and had tlle as:ault been 11 dill' later thig
would have ha)lpened; for the loop-holed gallery in the
counter-scarp and the mines would then have been completed,
llnd the body of the work was too well covered by the glaeis
to Le (luickly ruiucd by lire. He was ballle<l bl' this heroie
assault, whieh IllSwl an hour and cost four officers and fift.y
men killed, fifteen offi~er8 and two hundred and fifty wonnded;
llnd so vehement was the lighting the garrison forgot
or had not time to roll over the shells and combustiblC8
arrnnged on the mmpnrt.<J. Phillipon did uot colleen.! tho
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danger accruing from the loss of tllC Picurinn, but he recnlled
to hi.s soldiers' ret'Qltedioll, how worse than death it was tu be
the inmate of an English hulk I nn appeal deeply felt, for the
annals of civilized nations furnish nothing more inhuman
towards captives of war than the prison-ships of England.
When the Picuriua Wll.S tuken tlJrcc battalions advanced to
8Cl::Uro itl and though I) great turmoil :wd lirillg from the
town continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works and
communication with the first )larallel were established, and the
second parallel was commenced; set at daylight the redoubt
was so overwhelmed with fire from the town DO troops couM
remain aud the lodgment was entirely destroyed. III the
e,"cuing the S3llpers cfl'eckd another lodgment 011 the flanks,
the seoond parallel was then opencd in its wllOle lcngtb, and
next day the counter-batteries on the right of the Picurinll
exchanged" vigorous fire with the town, by which one of tbe
besiegers' b'UllS was dismounted aud the iuexperieli('1:d Portu-
guese guuners did liot damage the defences mudl,
In the night of the 27th a llew communication from the
first parallel to the Picurina WlIS madc, and three brcaching-
batteries were traced out; Olle for twelve twenty-four pounders
occupied the space betweeu the Picuriull. and the wumlatioll, to
breach the right face of the '£rinida.d bastion,-a seoollu for eight
eighteen pounders was on tlle site of the Picurinll, to breach
the Icft flank of the Santa Maria bastion,-a tllil'd, on the
prolonged line of the front to be attacked, eontllinoo three
shrapnel howitzers to scour the ditcll and 11rC\'cul HIe garrison
working in it-for Phillipon Ila\'1ng 1I0W discovered the true
line of attack, set strong partiC!! in tlle night to roise the
counter-guard of the Trinidnd and an imperfect mvelin covering
the menaced front.
At daybreak these works, furnished with gabiou's and SlInd-
bags, were lined with lUusketeers who galled the workmen
employed on the brcaclling batteries, and the cannonade WM
brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegera' gnns were die-
mounted, t.he gabions placed in front of the blltteries to protect
the workmetl were knocked over, and the musketry became
80 destructive tlmt the men were withdrawn from the front
and threw up earth from the inside,
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In the nigllt of the 27th the second parallel was e:<:ter:ded
to the right, with the view of raising batteries to ruin Son
Roque, destroy the dam 1hat held up the inundation, and
breach the curtain behind j but the Talavern road proved llard,
and the moon flhone so brightly tllat the labourers were quitc
exposed and the work was relinquished. On the 28th the
screen of gabions before the batteries was res1?red, and the
workmen resumed their labours outside, the parallel was then
improved, and the bcsieged ",-ithdrcw their gun!! from San
lloque; )'et their m~rksmell still shot from thence with great
exactness, and the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two
howitzers in one of the counter-batteries which was therefore
dismantled. The cnemy had also during the night observed
the tracing string which marked the direction of the sap ill
front of San Roque, and a daring fellow, creeping out just
before tbc workmen arrived, brought it in the line of the
cusUe lire whereby some loss was sustained ere the false diree--
tion was discovered.
In the night the dismantled howit7.er battery Wag re-armed
with twenty-four pounders to play Oil the San Roque, and a
new breaching-battery was traeed out on the site of the
Picurina against the flank of the Santa Mnria bastion. The
I!eeond parallel was also earried by the sap across the Talflvera
road, and a treneh was digged for riflemen in front of the
batteries. Tuc 29th fI slight sally made on tlle right bank of
the river was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at San
Roque Wag mined by the enemy's fire, and the hesieged con-
tinued to mise the counter-guard and ravelill of the Trinidad
and strengthen tlJe frout attacked, The besiegers anned two
brea.ching_bfltteriea with eighteen pounders wllieh the next
dny opened against the flank of Santa MuriQ, yet Witll little
effect, and the explosion of sn expense magazine killed lInd
hurt Illsny men.
During the siege Soult, having little fear for the town yet
expecting a great battle, was cnrefuJly organizing a powerful
force to unit.c with Droud nnd Daricau. Tho!'\C gcnemls hAd
occupied the dis1rict of La Serena to keep opeu the commuui-
cation with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; but GrJham
and Hill forced them into the MOfCna, while Morillo and
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Penne Villemur, lying close on the lowerGuadiallR, waited tlwir
opportunit}, to fall DU Seville wben 8ou1t should advance: and
t11cre were other oombinlltions to embarrass the French mar-
shal. In February, gcncrol Montes, detached by Ballcstcros
from San Hoque, hud defeuted Marnnsin on the Gund:\jore
river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga, and tbe whole
of the Spanish army then assembled in tbe Rooda hills, with a.
view to fall on Seville by the left of the Gundiana while
:A!oril!o nssailcd it on tllC right of that river: this compelled
Soult to send troops tOWliNS Malaga and fatally ul'layed hi!;
march to Estremmlura.
Marmont was oouceut-ratillg hia anny in the Salamancl\
country, and it was rumoured ]16 meant to attack Ciudad
Rodrigo. Wellingtou WM disturbed by this infonnntion. The
flooding of tIle ri\'crs would prevent a blockade and he knew
Marmont lmd not obtained a. battering-train i but the Spanish
generals and engineers had neglected the new works and
repairs of Oiurlad Rodrigo i even tllC provisions at St. J08. de
Pesqniern. had not been brought up and tile fortress had only
thirty days' supply: Almoida was in as bad a state, and the
project of invnding Andalusia was likely to be stoPIJed by
these embarrllssments.
On thc 30th it bccnlllC known that Soult wns coming from
Cordova. Then the fifth division wns brought ovcr the Gua-
diaulI, Power's Portuguese brigade and some cavalry 0111)' being
left to maintain the investment on the right bank, and the
siege WilS urged ve1lemcntly, l'orty-eight pieces were in con-
stant play and the snp against San Roquc advanced; yet the
enem)" was equlllly diligent, his Iiro was destructive and his
mvelin and oolmter-gullrd on the menaced front visibly ad-
vanced. The lot of Alwil the sap was close to San lloque,
the Trinidad crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the
flank of the Santa Maria, which was cascmatcd and lllld hi~hcr­
to resisted the hatt-cries, also began to yield, 'l'he 2nd the
face of Ule Trinidad Wll8 very muclL brokell, but at the Santa
1ilaria the cascmates being laid open the bullets were lost in
the cnvitics, and the garrison commenced a retrenchment to
cut oft'the whole of the attacked front from the town.
In the night a new battery against the San Roque being
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armed, two officers and some SlIppers glided behind that out-
work, gagged tIle sentinel, placed powder btlrrels and a lllatch
fto<>'ainst tlle rh.m of the inundation, and retired undiscovered;
yet the explosion did not destroy the dam and t~e inundation
Temll.illed. Nor did tile 83p make !Jrogress, because of the
French musketeers; for thougl. the marksmen set llgainst
them slew muny, they were reinforced by means of Cl raft with
parapets whidl eros~eJ the inundation, lIud JUell also 1l3ssed
by the cloth conunUllication from the Trinidad gatc.
On the 3rd gUllS wore turned agninst the curtain behind
thll Sau Roque, but the rnllSollry llroved hard, ammunition
was scarce, a breM!h tllere would have been useless while the
inundation remained und the fire was soon discontinued. The
brooches in tho ~astion wero now greatly enlllrgcd and tho
besieged assiduously laboured at t.he T1.!trellchments behiud
them, and converted the nearest houses llnd garden walls into
a. third line of defence. All the houses behind the front next
the ctl8tle were also thrown down, aud a battery of five guus,
intended lo flauk the diteh aud breach of the 'l'rilliilitd,
was commenced on the castle hill outside the wall; the
ooeiegers tIlcrefore traced a eounter~battery of fourteen shrop-
nel ho\\'itz~rs to ph~y upon that point during the assault, and
the erisis was fast approM!hing. The breaches were nearly
practicable, but Soult l\f1.\"ing joined Drouet and Darica.u, was
advancing, nnd lIS thc allies werc not in sufficient force to llSSlIult
the place lIud give hllttle at the same time, it was TCsoh'ed to
loo\·e two divisions in the trenches and fight at Albuet1l.:
Grllhnm therefore fell bllck towards that place, and Hill, dcstro~'­
ing the hriuge at MCI'iua, lllRrellcJ frolll the upper GUlluiuUll to
Ta1avera Reat.
Gaiu of time being now, liS ill war it gcneTlllly is, the
essential iugredicft of success the anxiety Oil buth siJcs
redoubled, yet Soult was still at Llerena on the morning of
the 5th when the breaches were declared practicable. l'ho
assault was therefore ordcT1.!d j but though Lllilh ';; divisioll
was brought up to assist, a very careful personal examination
caused such douhtB in Wellington's mind that he delayed
until a third breach should, as he originally desif,'lIed, be opeueJ
between the Trinidad and Mw bastions: this could not be
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commenced before morning, and in the nigllt the ellcOlY
laboured assiduously behind the openings, regardless of the
showers of grape with which tlle bntterics scoured' the ditch
and hreaches. Next morning the guns were turned against
tlle'l'riuidad curtain, and the bad masonry CTumblClt so fast
that in two hours a yawning break was seen, and Wellington
having again recognised t-he points of attack renewed his
orders for the assault Then the soldiers eagerly made ready
lor l\ combat, $0 fiercely fought so terribly won, so dreadful
in all its circumstances that posterity roll s~rcely be expeded
to credit the tale: but many arc still alive who know that it
is true.
So sllllsibJe was the English general of Phillipon's firmness
and the courage of bis garrison that he spared them the
affront of a summons, )'et, seeing the breach strongly entrenched
and t·hc enemy's flank fire stilI powerful, he would not in this
drend crisis trust his fortune to a singlll cffort. Eighteen
thousand elaring soldillrs burned for tIle signal, and he, unwilling
to loso tho service of one, gave to each di"ision a tllSk such liS
few generals would have the hardihood even to contemplate.
For on the rig1lt Picton was to file out of the trenches,
cross the Rivillaa river, IInd scale the castle walls, eighteen to
twenty-four feet in height, furnislled with all means of
destruction -and so narrow at top the defenders could easily
reaqh and overturn tlle ladders. On the left Leith was to
make a false attack on the Parda]erllS, but a realllSSllult on the
distant b!l5tion of San Vinccnte, where the glads wns mined,
the ditch deep, the scarp thirty feet high, llnd the parapet
garnished with bold troops pro,·ided each with three loaded
muskets that tbe first fire might be quick and deadly.
In the centrc, tlle fourth and light divisions under Colville
and Anurew llarnarll were to march against the breaches.
1'hey were furnished like t11e third and fifth divisions with
ladders and axes, and preceded by storming parties of five
hundred men elleh with their respective forlorn hopes: the
light division was to assanlt the bastion of &nta Maria.,-the
fourth division to assault the 'friuidad anll the curtaiu,-and
the columns were divided into stonuiug and firing parties,
t·he former to enter the diteh the latter to keep the crest of
the glacis.
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At first only one brigade of the third division was destiued
to attaek the castle, but just before the hour of assault a.
sergeant of· sapI~rs deserted from the French and reported
that there W:l~ but one eOllllllunication from tue toastle into the
town, wherefore the wl10le division was directed to assail in
mltSs. Tu aid thC3C great attaeks gencrol Power's Portuf,,'Ueso
were to make a feint from the other side of the Guadill.ll&,
and Illajor Wilson of the forty-eighth was to srorm t·he San
Roque with the guards of the trencllCs; this general outliue was
tilled Illl with lliany nice arraugements, SOllle of which were
followed, others disregarded, for it is seldom all things Arc
attended to iD ~ desperate fight. Nor was the enemy idle.
While it was yet twilight some l:'ronch cavalry issued from
the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who endeavoured to look
inro the trenches with a. view to flscertain if an assault was
intended; hut the piquet on tlmt side jumped up, and firing 11S
it run drove him and his escort back into the works: theu
dllrkne!!s fell and silently the troops awaited the sigual.
ASSAULT OF BADA.JOS,
Dry but clouded was the night, the ail' thick with \vatery
exblllations from the riven, tho ram}larts and the trenches
unusually still; Jet a low murmur pen·adcd the latter, and in
the former light.s were seen to flit here and there while tllo
deep voices of the sentinels ut times proclaimed that all WM
well in DaJajos, The Frencll, confiding in Phillipon's direful
skill, watched from tllCir lofty stAtion the approacll of enemies
whom they lmd twice before bullied, and lIOW hoped to drivo
a third time blasted and ruined from the walls. 'l'he British,
f;tAnding in deell columns, \\:ere as eager to meet that fiery
destruction lIS the others were to pour it down, nnd both were
alike terrible for tbeir strength, their discipline, and the passions
awakened in their resolute hearts. Former failures there wel'Cl
te avenge, und on both sides leaders who furnished no excuse
tor wenkncss in the hour of trial. The possession of Badajos
had become 0. point of pcnonnl honour with the soldiers of
each llation, but the desire for glory with tIle Briti3h was
dashed by a lmtred of the citizens on an old grudge; and
recent toil and hardship with much spilling of blood had II1t\de
V01.. 1\'. I
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InllDy incredibly savage; for these things render the noble-
minded indeed averse to cruelty but harden the vulgar spirit:
numbers also, like Cresar's ccnturion who could not forget the
plunder of Avarieum, were heated with the recollection of
Ciudfld Rodrigo and thirsted for spoil. Thus every spirit
found 1I. cause of excitement, the wondrous power of discipline
bound the whole together ss with a baud of iron, find in the
pride of arms none doubted their migllt to bear down every
obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.
At ten o'clock, the castle, the s.·m Roqllc, the l)1'eacbes, the
Pnrdn1erns, the distant bastion of San Vinccnte, and the hridge-
1H':au Oll the other side of the Guadiaull. were to luwe been
simultaneol1sly assailed, Rnd it was hoped tlle strength of the
enemy would shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many Rre
the disappointments of wsr. An unforesef:n accident de1a}'f:d
th attack of the fifth division, Md 0. lighted carcass thrown
from the castle, falling close to the third division discovered
their array and COm}lel1ed them to anticipate the signal by
half M hour. Then, everything being suddenly disturbed,
the double columns of the fourth and light divisions n1so moved
silently and swiftly against the breaches, and the guard of the
trenches rushing forward with a. shout encompassed the San
Roque with fire and broke ill so violently tllllt scarcely any
resistance wns made. But a. sudden blaze of light and the
rattling of musketry indicated the commencement of a more
vehement combat at the castle. '!'here general Kempt, for
Picton hurt by a. fall in the ClIlllp and e~pecting- no change in
the hour was not llresent, there Kempt, I say, led the third
division. Having passed the Rivillag in single files by !to
unrrow bridge under n. terrible musketry he had re-formed nnd
running up a rugged hill reached the foot of the castle where
he fell severely wounded, and as he was carried back to the
trenches met Pioton WllO was hastening to take the command.
Meanwhile the troops, spreading along the front, had reared
their heovy lo.dden, some ngaiust tllc lofty castle some against
the adjoining front on the left, and with im-redibJe courage
ascended amidst sllOwers of heavy stones, logs of wood, and
bursting shells rolled off the parapet, while from the flanks the
eDemy plied his musketry with fearful rapidity, and in frout
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with llik'es RlLd bayonets stabbed the lea.tling assailants or
pushed the ladders from the walls: and all this was attentled.
with deafening shouts and the erash of breaking lndders, and
the shrieks of erushoo soldiers answering to the sullen stroku
of the falling weights.
S~ill swarming round thCl reml,ining ]addClr!l those un-
daunted veter,ms strove who should flNt dimu, uutil all being
overturned t1le Freneh shouted victory, and the Briti~h, baAlCt!
but untamed, fell back a few I)(\CCS and took shelter under the
rugged edge of the hill. Thel'e the broken ranks were some-
what rc-formed, and the ]\eroic Ridge springing forward sei7.ed
a ladder and calling with stentorian voice on his mell to follow
once more raised it agaillst the caatle, yet to the right of the
fonner attack where the wall W:lS lower and an embrllSure
offered some facility, A second ladder was aoon placed alollg-
side of the first by tllC grenudier officer Canch, and the next
instant he and Ridge were ou the fllompart, the shouting
troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed find in a man-
ner surprised were driven fighting through the double gnte into
the !.own, and the castle was won. A. reiuforcemcnt from thc
French resen'e then came up, a shnl'p actioll followed, both sides
fired through the gote fllld the enemy retired, but Hidge fell,
aodno mllll died that night wilh lllo're glory-yet wallY c.li~'Ii,
and there WIIS mudl glory.
All this time tho tumult ot the breacllcs was such fLS if
the very earth had been rent lIllUnder and its eeutral fires
bursting upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached
the gllleLS just as the firing ot t]\C castle commenced, and the
flash of a single musket dischArged from the covered way as
a signal showed them that the French were ready: yet no
etir WI\lI 11card Ilnd darkness oovered the brenehes, Some 1111)'-
packs were thrown, some ladder.. pll.ced, and the forlorn hOIJCS
and storming parties of the light dlvisioll, five hundred in nil,
deSCllnded into the ditch wit110ut oPllosition ; but then a. bright
flame shooting upwards displayed all the terrol'll of tll(l scene,
The ramparts crowded with dark figures and glittering arms
were on one side, on the other the red columns of the Britigh,
deep and broad, were eomiug on like streflms of burning lavl\;
it was the touch of the mlJgiciau's wand, Ior a crash "f thunJer
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followed and with incredible violence tIle storming pllrt,ics
were dllBhed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds of shells
and fIOwdcr-bsITeIs.
For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the
ditch nn\U7.ed at the terrific sight, hut then with a. shout that
mntcllcd even the sound of the explosion the men Hew down
the ladders, or disdaining their aid leaped reckless of the
ucptb iuto the gulf below,-and at the same mOffillut, amidst
a blaze of musketry that dazzled the eyes, the
(ourth division came muuing in snd descende(l
with a like fury. There werc only five Io.ddcrs
for tllC two columns which were close together, and a deep cut
IUaUC in the bottom of the ditch as- far as the counter-guurd of
the Trinidad WlIS fil1(!(1 with water from t116 inundation; into
that watery allare the head of the fourtll diviaion fell, and it is
said above Do hundred of the fuzileers, the men of Albuerll, were
tllcre slnot·hered. Tho~e who followed checked not, but as if
HUch a disaster had been expected turned to the left and tllUS
came npon the face of the unfinished mvelin, which being
rough and broken was mistaken for the breach and instantly
covered with men: yet B. wide and deep ehasm was still
between them llnd the rnmjlarts, from )"henoo came a. deadly
fire wasting their ranks, Thns bamed they aho commenced
a rapid discbarge of musketry and disorder ensued; for the
men of the light division, whose conducting engineer had been
disablod early and whose flunk WM confined by an unfinished
ditch int,ended to cut oft' the bastion of Santa Maria, rushed
towards the breaches of the curtain and tIle Trinidad, which
were indeed before tIlem, bllt whieh the fourth division bad
been destined to storm. Great was the confusion, for the
Tavclin was quite crowded with mcn of OOtl1 divisions, and
while some eontillued to fire otlJCrs jumped down and ruu
towards the breadl, many also passed between the rll.velin aud
the counter-guard of tIle Trinidad, the two divisions got
mixed, the reservcs, which should have remained a~ tile quarries,
also Cll.me pouring in until the diteh WII.$ quite filled, the rCflr
still crowding fonvard and all cheering vehemently, The
enemy's shouts also were loud and terrible, and the bursting
of shells and of grenades, the roaring of guns from the flanks,
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answered by the if011 howi!;zcfs from the llattery of the parnllt"I,
th~ heavy foil and honid explosion of the powder-banels, the
whizzing flight of the bll\zing splintera. the loud ellhortlllion~
of the Of}iOOfd alid the continual c1attef of the muskets miOUe
a maddening din.
Now a multitude bounded up the great brench fLS if drivCJ\
by 0. whirlwind, but across the top glittered a runge of 5wOrd-
blades, sharp-pointed, keclI-edged ou both sidl.is, amI finnly
fixed in pOndefO\lS beams chained together and se!; deel) ill
the ruins j llud fOf kn fcct in front tllC lUlCCllt WOB co'\erod
with loose planks studded with shllrp iron points, on whicll
feet being set the Illanks moved aud the unhappy soldiers
fl\11ing forward on the spikes rolled down upon the mnks
behind. Then the FfCllchmen, shouting at the success of
their stratagem aud leapiug forward, plied their shot with
terrible rnpidity, for every mall hlld 8cveral muskets, and Md)
musket in addition to its ordinary charge contained n small
cylinder of wood stuck full of woooell slugs, wliich scattered
like hail when they were discharged. Once and Ilg:l.in the
ll.SSI\ilant.<; rushed up the brcn.cllC8, but always the sword-
blades, immoveable and impassable, stoppeJ theif charge, IllLd
the llissing' shell! and thundering' powdcr.barreis explodC<l
unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, hundred! more
were dl'oplling, still the hefoie officers called aloud for new
trials, and sometimes followed by many sometimes by a few,
ascended the ruins j and 90 furions were the men themselves
that in onc of these charges tile rCll.f strove to llUsh the fore-
most on to the sword-blades, willing cven to make a bridge
of their writhing bodies, but the othern frustrllted tllC attelllpt
by dfopping down; and men fell so fllf from the shot, it was
hard to know who went down voluntarily who were stricken,
and mnny stooped unhurt that never rOllo again, Vain also
would it have been to break thfough the sword-bladCll, for
the trendl and parapet behind the breach were finished, /lnd
the assailants crowded into even n nnrrOwer space thall the
ditclJ was, would stilllJave been separated from their euemiCll
and the slaughter would have continued.
At. the beginning of this dreadful conflict, Andrew :&mard
, had wit.h prodigious efforts separated his division from the
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other and preserved some dcgroo of milito.ry army; hilt now
the tUlllUlt was such 110 COllllU3Ud could be llellrd distinctly
except by those close at hand, and t11C mutilated carcases
Ileapea on each other and the wounded struggling to avoid
being trampled upon broke the fornmtions: order WllS imp0i>-
6ible! Officers of all ranks, followed morc or less numerously
by the men, wore seen to slart out as if struck by sudden
madness Rud rush into the breach, which yawning and glitter-
ing with steel Beemed like the mouth of ll. 11Uge dragon
belching forth smoke lInd flame. In one of thcse attempts
CQloncl :bhcleod of the fort.r-third, a young man whose feeble
body would have been quite unfit for war if it had not booll
sustained by an unconquerable spirit, was killed; wherever
his voice WIIS heard his soldiers had gathered, und with Rueh a
Iltrong resolution did he lead t!\I;lIll up the fatal ruinll, that
when one behind him in falling plunged a hayolld into his
back, he complained not but continuing his course was shot
dead witllin a yard of the sword-blades. Yet there was no
want of gallant leaders 01' desperate followers until two hourn
jJassed in these vlIin efl:orts hlll.l convinced the troops the breach
of the Trinidad was impregnable j aud as tlll: opening in the
curtain, although less strong, was retired and the approach
to it impeded by deep holes and cuts mMle in the ditch, the
soldicrs did not much notice it after the partial failure of one
attack which had bwn made early. Gathering in dark
groups and leaning on their musket-s tlley looked up with
sullen despemtion at tlle Trinidad, while the enemy stA::pping
out on the ramparts and aiming their shots by the light of
tlie fire-tllllls which they threw o,·er, I18ked us their vietims
feU, ' W71Y they did'll()/, come mto Br.ulaju81'
In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in
llcaps and others continually f'llling, the wounded crnwling
about to get some shelter from the merciless shower above,
find withal a sickcning stench from the burnt flesh of the
~. 'A slaiu, Cllpt.aill Nicholas of the en!.<illeers, was
,,"'" ma""l'- ~ll~ll~f'lll $baw observed by lieutenant Shaw of the fort}·-third,
Kennooy. making incredible efforts to force hia way with
8 few men into the Santa Mana bastion. Shaw immediutely
collected fifty soldiers of all regilllenb and joined him, ilnd
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although there was 0. deep eut along the foot of that breach
also, it wus instantly passed and tlle5C two young officers
led their gallant band with a rush up the ruins; but when they
had gained two-thirds of the ascent a conoontrated lire of
Illusketry and grape dashed nearly the whole dead to the
cartll: Nicholus was mortally wounded and the intrepid
SUMI' stood alone I With iuexpressible cooluess he looked at
his watch, and saying it was too late to carry the breaches
rejoined the llill8SCS at thc otbcr attack. After this no further
ellort WII.S made at ally point, aud the troolls remained passive
but unflinching beneath the cnemy's shot which streamed
without intermission; (or of the riflemen on tho glacis, many
leaping early illOO tho ditch had joined in the assault, nnd the
rest, raked by a cross fire of grape from the distant bastions,
bamed in their aim by the smoke and flames from tlle ex-
plosions, and too (ew in number, entirely failed to quell the
FrcncIJ musketry.
About midnigl,t, when two thousand brave men llad (lIllen,
Wellington, who WlIS on a height olose to the quarries,
ordered the remainder to retire and re-form for a second
fISSllult; he lltld heard the castle was taken, but thinking the
encmy would still resist in tllC wwn was resolved to assail
tlle breaches llgain. This retreat from tbe ditch was not
effected without further carnage lIud confusion, the French
firo never slackened, II cry arose that tbe enemy Wll9 making
a sally from the distltllt flunks, and there WQll a rush toward,
the ladders. Then the groans and lamentations of the
wounded who could not move and expected to be slain
increased, aud many officers who had Ilot heard of the order,
endea,'oured to stop the soldieN from going back: some
would even Im,'e removed t·bo laddcra but were unable to
break tlle crowd.
All this time Picton WI\lI Iring close in the castle, and
eithor from (ear of risking' the loss of 0. point which ensured
the captnre of the place, or that the egress was too difficul~
made no attempt to drive away tlle enemy from the breaches.
On the other sido however the fifth division bad oommenood
the f"lse IIttlick on the PardalenlS, and on the right of the
Guallialla the Portuguese were Sharllly engaged at the bridge:
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thus the town was ginlll'd with fire, for Wnlker's brigaue,
having passed on during t\le feint on tlu~ Pnrdaleras, was
escalading the disbmt bastion of SAil Vincente. His troops
lmd advanced along the banks of the river and reached the
Frcuch gulird-hou.;;e at the barrier-gate undiscovered, the
riJlp\e of the waters smothering the sound of their footsteps;
but jllst tlleu the explosion at the hreaches took place, the
mOOll sllOne wt, the French sentinels discovering the columns
lircd and the British soldiers springing forward under n slmp
musketry began to hew down the wooden barrier at the
co\'cred W8)". The Portuguese, panic-stricken, tllrew down
the scaling.ladders, the others sllntcl\cd them up ngain IInd
forcing the barrier jumped into the ditch; but the guilJillg
engineer oBieer WlIS kiUed, there WlIS a. cumlle which embar-
rassed the column, and the laddcrs proved too short for the
walls were gellertlllyahove thirty feet hig1l. The fire ofthe cnemy
was deadly, a small minewllS sprung beneath the soldiers'
feet, lielunll of wood alld live shells were rolled over on their
hews, showers of grope from the flank swept the ditch, ,md
man after man drollped dead from tIle ladders.
FortulIlltcly some of the defenders hOO been cnlled away to
aid in recovering the castle, tho mmparts were not entirely
manued, lIud the assailants discoveriug a corncr of the bastion
where the scarp was only tweuty feet Iligh Illuced three
ladders there under an embrasure wllich had no
gUll and was only stoplled with 11 gllbion. Some
lJleu got up with difficulty, for th(l ludders were
still too short, and the first man who gained t-he top was
pushed up by his comrades and drew others aftt'r Ilim until
mUlIy lllul won the summit; anlJ though the Frcnch shot
heavily against them from both flanks ond from ll. house ill
front, their numbers llugmClltcd rapidly aud half the fourth
regiment cntered the town itself to dislodge the French frolll
the houses, while the others pushed Mong the rampart t<Jwards
tIle bl'()ach and by dint of hard lighting Sllcccs.'livcly won
three bastions.
In the last of these combats Walker, leaping forward sword
in hand at the moment when one of the enemy's eallllonccrs
was dischargillg a gun, was covered with so mllny wounds it
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was wonderful that he could survive, and some of the soldiers
immediately after, perceiving a ligllted match on tile ground,
cried out a mine! At that word, such is tlu:: power uf imngi.
tion, those troops who had not been stopped by the strong
barrier, tIle deep diteh, t1l0 high walls and the deadly fire of
the euemy, staggered baek BPlJalled by a chimera of their own
raising; and in this disorder a French reserve nnder general
Veillande drove on them with a firm and rapid charge, pitch-
ing some men over the walls, killing others outriglit, and
cleansing the ramparts even to the San 'Vineente_ There
however Leith had Illnced colonel Nugent with a battalion of
the thirty-eigllth as a reservo, and when the FrcncIl came up,
shouting and slaying all hefore them, this l.>attalion, two hun.
dred strong, arose and with one dose volley destroyed them;
then the panic eCilSCd, tl)O soldiers rallied, lInd in compact
order once more cllllrged alollg the walls towards the hreaches;
but the French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned
by fortune, did not yet yield. Meanwhile the portion of t1)O
fourth regiment which !loo entered the town WIIS strungcly
situated. For the atreets were emptyaud brilliautly illumi-
natcd and no person was seen, yet a low buzz and whispers
were beard around, lattiees were now lInd then gently opened,
and from time to time shots were fired from underneath the
doors of the houses by the Spaniards, wIlile the trooP'! with
bugles sounding advanced towards the great square of the town.
In their llrogress they captured several mules going witll amUlU-
nition to tile breachea; yet the square itself was as empty and
silent IlS the streets, llnd the houses as bright with lamps;
11 terrible enchantment seemed to be in opemtioll, tllCy saw
only an illumination and henrd only low whispering around
them w]lilo the tumult at the breaches WIlS like the crashing
thuuder. Plaiuly however the fight was there raging, and
llence, quitting the square, tlle1 attempted to take the garrison
in reverse by attacking the n'llllpllrts from the town-side, but
they were received with a rolling-musketry, lIriven bllek with
loss, and resumed their movement through tlle streets. At
last the breaches were abandoned by the French, other parties
enterell, desultory combats took place, Viellanrle, and Phillipon
who was wounded, seeiuti all ruined, passed the bridge with a
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few hundred soldiers and entered San Christoval, which was
surrendered next morning upon summons to lord }"ihroy
Somerset: for that officer Imd with glent readiness pushed
through tho town to tIle drawhriJgc ere tho Ji'rcnch had time
to or<,;anize furlher resistance. But eYon ill the moment of
ruin the night before this noble governor had sent some
horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult, and
they reached him in time to prevent a grC£ltcr misfortune.
Now commenced tUll.t wild llnd UCS!lCrllte wickeuucss which
tarnished the lustre of the soldier's heroism. All indeed were
not alike, hundreds risked and many lost their lives in s~riving
to stop the violence, but madness generally prevfLiled, !lnd as
the worst men wore leaders here aU the dreadful passions of
human nature were displayed. Sho.meless rapacity, brutal
intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and
pitoous lo.menlations, groans, ShOll!:.'!, imprecations, the hissing
of fires bursting from the hOIlSes, the ernslling of doors ami
windows, and the reports of muskets used in "iolenee,
resounued for two uays and uigllts ill the streets of Badajos!
On the third, wllen the eity was sacked, wheu the soldiers
were exhausted by their own exeesses, the tumult rather sub..
sided thal\ WIIS quelled: tile wounded meD were tllCll looked
to the dead disposed of! .
}'ive thousallu Illell uml officers fell in tbis siege, and of
tllese, ine1uding seven llUndred l'ortuguese, three thousand five
huudred had been stricken in the IlSmult, ai;'tty" officers and
more than seven hundred men being slain on the spot. The
five generals, Kempt, Harvey, 13owes, Colville, and PictOll
were wounded, tlle first four severel)'; six hundred men aud
officers fell in the escalade of Sun Vineente, as many at the
castle, and more than two tllollsand at the breaches, each divi- '
sion there losing twelve hundred! And how deadly the hreach
strife WIIS may be gathered from this: the forty-third and fifty~
second regiments of the light division lost more men than
the seven regiments of the third division engaged at the
eustle!
Let it he eonsidere<l tllUt this friglitfnl C1lTllflgC took place
in a space of less thun a hundred yards squllre;-tliR~ the slll.in
died not a.ll suddenly nor by one manner of death-that some
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perished by stool, some: by shot., Bomo by water, that somo
were e:rushed tmd mangled by heavy weights, some trnmpled
upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery explosions ;-that for
hours this destruction wns endured without shrinking and the
town was won at last.. Let these things be considered and it
must be admitted a British army bears with it an awful po.....er.
And falso would it be to say tho French wore fceble mon, the
garrison stood and fought manfully and with good diseipliue,
helmving worthily: shame there was none on flny side, Yet
who sholl do justice to tho bmvery of tho British soldiers!
the noble emulation of the ollieers I 'Who slmll measure out
the glory of Ridge, of ?![ac1eod, of Nieholas, of O'Hare of
the ninety· fifth, who pcrislled on thc brench at the head of the
storlllers, and with him nearly all the volunteers for that
de;pemte serviee! Who shall describe tho
springing vnlour of that Portuguese grenadier
who was killed the foremost lllnll at the Santa.
Maria i or the martial fury of that desperate rifleman,
Wl10, in his resolution to win thnlst llimself beoenth the
chained sword.bhldes, and tllere sulTered the enem)' to dash
his head to Ilieces with the ends of their muakets! Who C/ln
sufficiently honour the intrepidity or Walker, of Shaw, of
Caneh, or tIle hardiuess of Ferguson of the forty-thirtl, who
11aving in former assflults received two deep w01l11ds was hero,
hill former hurts still open, leuding the stormerll' of his regi-
ment, the third time a volunteer the third time wounded I
:Nor would I be understood to select these lUl pre-eminent,
mlmy and sigoal wero the otllcr examples of unbounded devo-
tion, somc known, some thst will never be known; for iD sueh
n tumult much passes unobserved, nnd often the observers fell
tllemsch'CS ere they eould bear testimony to what they saw:
but 110 age no nation ever sent forth brnver troops to battle
tllnn tl108e who stormed Bndnjos.
Whel\ tIle 6xteut or the night's havoc was made known to
lord Wellington the firmness of his nature gave way for a
moment, and the pride of conquest yiel(led to a passionQte
burst of grief for the loss of his f,'Il.Uaut soldiers. •
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HAynw now achieved the second step in his projeet~ the
Englislj general looked to crown this extTilordinll.Ty winter
rompuign by fighting n. great hattle in Andalusia, but the
misl.'Qllunct of others delllU'rcu him of tltat glory. Ciuduu
Uodrigo and its repairs 11ad been entirely neglected, !lnd Carlos
d'Espauo.'s tymnnieal conduct had rendered the garri.son dan-
gerously discontented; Almcido. also was insecure, Rnd Mar-
mont lmd passeu the Agueda. The projected. mu:reh on
Andalusia could not 00 llttcmpled until UlQse fodresses were
snccoured; yet Wellington, knowing Bcira could not be imme-
diately hurt by Mannont, lingered awhile in hopes that Sonlt,
stung by the 108s of Badajos, would risk n. blow in Estremu.-
dura before the secondary operations then in activity drew
him again over the Morena; SoulL was indeed deeply afl'edoo
by the loss, hut the circumst-fmees were too gra,-e to let his
anger ovcrbear his jmlgment: he was surrounded by cnemies
and refrained from an unequal baltlc. Quitting Sc,·me tho
ht he bad marched by Constautino upou Llerona with purl of
llis army, while Oazan, to imposcon t}le allies, ha(l moved at
first by llIonasterio with the remainder and the baggage, bnt
from Santa Guillenll by cross road~ gained Constllutiuo 1I1so,
alld thus nil were cOlleentmted t1le 6t1l at Llercnn. 'l'his cir-
cuitous movemeut was determiued v)' the positions of Dronet
and Dnricnu, who llnving been driveu back by the CordoVl~
roads could not mlly on the JIonasterio side; but now all
Rllvanced to Fuentcs (le Ovcrjuiin, llIul the allies fell lm.ck to
Albuera and Tallovera Real.
Du the 7th Sonlt reached Villa Frllncn and his cavalry
ent~red Villlllba and Fuente del JIucstro. Tile 8th he was in
IDllrc11 to fight, when the horsemen sent hy FhiJlipon met him,
and at the sume time his spies uppris~'(). him that :MllMUOllt
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was in the north. Then he fell back to Llcrcna, for the allies
could brillS forty-five thousnnd meu iuto liue, allll his army
though strongly constituted of the bc.~t troops in Spain <lid
not Cltcccd twenty-four thousond. Ho IlIld however little
time to ucliberale, for Pcuue Villemur !lnd Morill0, issuing out
of Portugal with four thousand men, had cros.,eJ the lower
Guadinna and ou the 4th seized &m Luear de Mayor, 0. place
ouly teu mile~ from Seville, which was thcn garrisoncd by a
Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph's service and by , escopder04 t
aud convalescent mell, wherefore the commandant Hignoux,
after 0. skirmish, shut himself up in tho fortified posts. 'l'be
Gth the Spaniards occupied the heights in front of the Trillno.
bridge, and the ith att<'lcked the French entrenclunents 1iOping
to rWoo 0. popular commotion; but a worso danger wu., gather-
ing ou the other side; for Ballesteros, after the defeat· of
Marallsin lit Cartama, hnd advanced with eleven thousand men
intendiug to fall on &.wille from the 10ft of the Gundalquivir.
To distract the attention of the Freuch, llnd to keep Laval
from detaching troops to Seville, Ballcstcros had sent CoPOllS
with four thousand men by ltar to Junquera. on tho Mo.lngu.
side of the Rouda, while he enttJreol Los Rarios himself nuu
thu8 threatened at once Grenada and the lines of Chic111Ull.
An the smaller pnrtidfl.'l of the Rondll were also lct loose in
different dirCtitious to tiut the tiolIlmunicdiollS, adze slDnll
magazinC8, lllld collect Spanish soldiel1l who at differellt
periods 111ld qllittcd tllCir colours. COPOIIS relllnined at Jlln-
quora. BllllestorOll Illlvillg three divisions uuder Cruz Mur-
geon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince of AlI~lonll,
marche(l to Utrerllas soon as Soult had ilepllrted from Seville.
Thus the communication of thnt city with Cadiz on onc side, and
with :lllllngn. and Grenada on tllC other, was cut off: alld the
French wanted ammunition,because 1l1nrge convoy, coming from
Mlldrid with aD escort of twelve huudred men, was stopped
in the Moreua by the Illlrtidas from the Ronda and frolll
Mureill.
On the 6th the Spanish Cllvnlry was within fl. fcw miles of
Seville, whcll false inforlllatiou adroitly given by II Spaniard
in the French interest led R'lllestefl.ts to believe $nult was
closo at hand, whereupon he returned to the Ro~da, lUld nu,
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day Penne VilIemur, 11:lVing received notice froUl Wellingtoll
tliat the French would soon return, also retired to Gibraleon.
When B.·l.llcstcros discovered tIle deceit, insklld of returning
to Sc\1IlC he 115SQultcd the smnll CIl.stle of Znhura in the hills,
and being repulBCd with collsiderilble loss maUe a circuit north
of ROllua, by AICt\la de Pruna to Casarbonela, where he was
rejoined by COpollS. The marquis of Cuevas then marched
against OilSUnIl, which being Duly garri.~oned by 'esropeterOl,'
WM expected to filII at once; but after two days' combat nnd
the loss of two hundred killC<! und wounded the three thou~
sand patriots retired, bafited by a hundred and finyof their
own countrymen figllting for the invaders!
When Cuevas returned, B,llIeswros marched in three
columns by roads looding from ClISflrbonela find Antcquera,
to attack general Rey, who was (losted with eiglJteell hundred
men near Allora on the GUfldaljore river. The centre column
engaged without advll.ntn,.""C, but when Rey saw the flank
columns coming on he retired behind the Guadalmediila river
close to Malaga, having lost t\ colonel and two hundred men
in )lltssing the GUll.daljorc. After this action Ballesteros
returned to the &nda, for Soult was now trul}' at hand
find his horsemen were already in tlle plains. He had sent
Digcon's cavnlry on thc 9th to Cordoba to chfl$c the pmtidas,
find had ordered Drouet's division to take jlost at .Fnentes
Ovcrjuiiaj now dircetiug PeyreJlllont's cavalry upon Usagre,
he came l1imself by forced marches to Seville, which lie
reaehed the 11 th hoping to surprise the Spanillrds. Thus
the stmtae"Cffi wh~eh saved Seville on the 6th alBa saveJ
Ballesteros, for Conroull: was comillg up upon the other side
from the Guadalete and the Spaniards would have been
enclosed hut for their timely retreat. And S<lllreely IllLd Scult
quitted Llerena when the Frondl met with n. disaster nent
Usagre, which though a strong pOilitiou had always provcd a
very clangeroWl advanced post OD both sides.
Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the
enemy, received intelligence that Peyreymollt's ca\'lIlry was
between Villa Gareia. a.nd Usngre, llnd conceivc<l hopes oC
cutting it off. Allllon's brignde, commanded by Frederie
Ponsollb)', moved therefore during the night from Villa.
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Franca upon Us.'l.gre, llnd Le Marchant'a brignde mnrcheJ
from Los Suntos UpOll Benvcnidn to intercept tllc retrcnt
011 Llercnll. Poosonby's advllllCed guard commenced the
action too soon and the French fell back before Le Mnrcllnnt
oould inwre<:pt them; but as some lleights skirting" the LlcreM
road prevented them from seeing that gellenll, they again
drew up in order of battle behind tile junction of tile Ben-
venida road. The numhers were about nineteen lmlldrcd
sabres on each side, sud Cotton, ably seizing an accidentnl
advantage of ground, kept the enelllJ's attention engilged
with Ponsonby's sqnadrons whilo Le Marchant, sceretly
p>lSsing at the back of the heights, ~ellt the fifth dragoon
guards ll",'"'ilinst their Rank, Ilud the next moment POllsonhy
charged their front. 'They gave way and being pursued lost
8C"eral officers and a llUndred and twenty-eight lllell prisoners,
and many were killed in the field; the l03S of the British Wl\.!l
fifty-six mell and officers, forty-live being of the fifth dragoon
'guards. The French found refuge with Drouet's infantry,
which had not then left Llerena but now fell back hehind the
Guadalquivir.
Soult WIIS preparing to fight the allies at Seville, for be
knew of Wellington's intention to invude Andalusia. Ho
knew also the aIllount and disposition of his forces, alld
purposed to Illeet him oomiJlg out of the Morenn with all
tbe French army united; nor did he doubt of finnl success,
although the failure of the IllSt harvest f.nd the non-arrival
of OOIlVO:rS since Fcbnlllry had lessened llis resollrces. "iYcl-
liugton's plan WIlS, howev~r, of necessit;r deferred. He had
levelled his trenches, and brought two Portuguese regiments
of infantry from Ahrflntes find Elvns to form a temporary
gurriSOIl of Budujos until some Spallinrds, who had heell
lauded at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then confidillg
the repairs to Hill, who remained with two divisions of
infantry and three brigades of cnvalry in Estremadurn, ho
mArched llimself upon Bcira, which Marlllollt Wl\.!l now
ravaging with great cruelty.
That maTsllal had desired to net with Soult in Estrcmadum,
but the elupcror's orders were imperative that he should uluke
a diversion for Badajos h)' an irruption into Portugal. On the
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14th of Mllrcll he ascertained that none of Wellington's clivi-
sioll8 were on the Agueda, and on the 27th he wt\S ready w
move. Bonnet, reinforced by Carier's ]lrigade, was then on
the Orbijo in observation of the Gallidans, Ferrier's division
wall at Vfllladolid, Fo),'s in the valley of the Tagus; the other
five divisions of infantry llnu ono of Ciwalry bud passed the
ilIoulltaiu.ll and concentrated on the Tormcs, carrying with
them fifteen da}'s' provisions, scaling-ladders, and the materials
for a bridge. Almeido. find Ciudad Rodrigo were in manifest
peril. Almeids, containing plIrt o[ the battering-
traiil, was very incompletely fortified, and on tho
£rst rumour of Msnnont's mo"cment 'Wellington
had thrown ill two militia regiments with R strong dctnch-
mellt of British artillerymen: the garrison ww> therefore
three thousnnd six hundred strong, and the governor Le
Mesurier laboured to complete the defences.
Of the norUwm militia which had been called ont before
the allies quiLted the ~ six t.housand infantry and three
hundred cavalry were under Sih'eira, three thousand infantry
under Trant, the samc number under John Wilson, and two
thonsand five hundred were under Leeor. But as PCrilOIlll
liable lo serve could only be enrolled by classes in rotation.
the present men, with exception of Silveira's, were peasants
unskilled in arms. All these offioors, f!lLye Lccor whose post
ww> at Castello Br-moo, had been for some time in movelllen~
and Trant and Wilson were on the 22nd at Lamego, wbere
Bacellar, commanding the pr<wince, fixed llis head-quarters.
Silvcira had the same dcstination hnt Ha march was slow,
and his ohjcct raUJCr to draw the wonder of his oountrymen,
for in his unqucnchable vanity he always affccted to act as an
indeJlendent general.
When Trnnt kncw Ullrmont's direction would be Oil Rodrigo,
not Gporto, he lldVllon(:ed from Lalllego, folluwed uy Wiloou,
intending to take post on the lower COll.; but on lhe march
he received Le Mcsurier's despatches, whicll induced him to
push bnstily with onc brigade tu tIle Cabc~a Negro mountain,
behind the bridgtl of Almoidu. His design wus to break down
the restored part of that structure and so prevent the enemy
from penetrating to Pinhcl where there was a ma.:,<>aziue; aud
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his movement Wllll well_timed, for two Freneh divisions were
then driving Carlos d'Espuno. over the plain beyond the Coo..
Marmont had come close to Rodrigo the 30th, the Splluiards
and Victor Alten fell be.ck from the Yeltes before him, and the
lutter, 'Who had six hundred excellcnt Germun cnvulr)', imme-
diately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending the
spirit of his orden nor the real situation of nffllirs retreated
at once to Castello BroMO, four long marches from Rodrigo,
lellving all the country open to the enemy's muraul1illg !larties.
Carlo! d'Espalia, who had eigllt hundred infalltry, retreated to
Fort Concc!ltion hut the :Frcneh laying 0. bridge at Caridnd
passoo !.Le Aguedll lInd drove him from thcnl,'C: he reached
the Cllbe~a Negro with only two hundred men at the moment
Trant arrived. The latter seeing no French CIlvalryon the
ptain, threw skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of tllO
road beyond the bridge, and escorted by some gnides dressed
in re<1 uniform galloped to the glads of the fortress, commlllii_
Clltoo with the govefllor, and drawing off 0. few Euglish cavtllry
convalescents who ha}lponed to be in tlie place returned at
dnsk. He immediately co\'ered the Cabe~aNegrowith biVOUAC
fires, And in the evcning Le 1lfesurier sallied from the fortress
and drove back the enemy's light troops. Two divisions of
infantry had come to storm Almeida, but t!lesC VigorollS
o.ctions stopped them and their general excuscd himself 011
the ground that Trant"s presence indicated the vicinity oC
British troops; in this error he marched llext morning up the
Coo. towards A]fayatcs, where Murmont met him with two
other divisions and eight squadrons of cavalr,}', llll\'ing left one
division to blockade Rodrigo.
Tront now sent bnck the horsemen to Almcida, and to
cover the magazines of Celorieo marched upon Guarda where
he was joined by Wibon. Sih-eirn should also have been
there, but instend of crossing the Douro 011 the 5th and marcu-
illg to GuarJa, he onl,}' crossed it on the 14th and hnltcd at
l..amego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry and four
hundred cavalry who had soon some service thcre were
scarcely six thousaud raw peasants in 11. position, strong if
tlle force had been sufficient to hold the riJge of .Porcas and
othcr heights behind it, but dangerous for a 9111ali fort.-e,
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bCClluse it could be turned by the right and left And the line
of retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had
Trant any horsemen to seout, for Baccellar, a weak old man
who had ne"er seen an enemy, was at Ce1orieo and retained
the ollly squadron of dragoons in the vicinity for hiB own
guard.
Trant and Wilson held their ground however with six
thouSD.nd militia fLncl six guns from the (hll to t11e 14t11,
keeping the enemy'B marauders in cheek. 'flley were al.t;o
prepared to move by the 11igh ridge of the Estrella to Abrantes
if tlle French should menace tllat fortress; which was 1I0t
unlikely, for :Marmont had mO"cd on Sabngsl, and Victor
AlteD, abandoning Castello Branco when the l~rellch were at
Memoa fifty miles distant, had crossed the. Tagus at Vilha
Velha, and it is said WIl8 going to burn the bridge. Thc
l'reueh parties then traversed the Lower J:leira in every direc-
tion, ravaging the country in sucll a shameful manner that
the whole population fled before them. The Portuguese
general Lecor however, being a good soldier, stood fast with
the militia at CasteUo Branco. He ehecked t1lc French
cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and Bomc of the
stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry
destroyed tho rest of thc magazines nnd fcll back to Sarnadas
one short march on the road to Vilha Velha; next day
wlien the Freneh retired he followed and harassed their rear.
Trant seeing i\farmont's divisions spread in searcJl of flUp--
plica, formed the daring design of seizing him in his quarters
at Sabugul, but Buccelhlr's procrustillutioll fortunately delu.yed
the execution of this enterprise which was too hardy for such
trooll8. The distance was twenty miles, Bud Wellington, when
Trant advertcd to the mn,,"Tlitude of thc objc<:t, keenly replied,
'In war nollting i8 IJ{) bad as/ailure and dc/eat;' whicJI would
have been the case here, for in the night of the 13th when
Trant would have made the attempt" Marmont having 11 counwr
rlesign of surprising Trimt was lending two brigades of infantl)
and four hundred cavalry up the mountain. lie
cut ofl' tile outposts aud was entering the stret::ts
at daybreak with his borsemen when the alarm
was beaten by onc drummer; and lhis being takea
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up nt hnl,(lrd by all the other drummers in different parts or
the towu, Clluscd the French marshal to fall back
when a brisk ellllrge would lllwe placed everytJ)ing
at his mercy; for the beating of the first drum Wt1S
neciJental aUll no troops were under arms. 'l'rant got out of
Guardn, hut he llad only onc day's pro"isiolls and tIle French
cavalry could gain Cclorieo whilll their infantry uttncked him;
wlJerefore he relreutcU, and ill good order for tlJree or four miles,
but there was 0. wooded declivity leading to the lIolldego, and
wltiie he was passing the river forty dragoons sent np l)y
Buccellar the evening before were pressed by the French and
galloped down through the renr.guard, whereupon these lust
seeing the enemy dismount to fire and finding the wet hacl
damaged their own powder fled also and the French followed
with hue and cry. All the officers behaved firmly and the
Mondego was finally passed, yet in confusion and with the loss
of two hundred prisoners. Marmont might tllen have crossed
the river on the flank of the militia and galloped into Celorico
where there was nothing to defend the magaziues, but he
halted and permitted tho disorderly rubblo to gain that lllllCe.
He was compassionate llOwevcr, for when Ile fouud they were
but poor undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry
to cut tbcm down, and no man was killed during tho whole
action altlJough the horsemen were actually in the midst of the
fugitives.
Bacccllar dcstrored a qUllntitr of powder at Cclorico and
retreated with Trllllt's Jleople towll.rJ.a Ll1l11ego; WilsoD re-
mained at Celol"ico, nnd when the eDemy drove in his outposts
ordered the mllgaziucs to be destroyed, but the order WM only
Imrtly executed when the French retircd, and OD tllO 17th tl:e
militia. re-occupied Guarda.. These secondary 0llerlltions of tl1e
militia. produced an l1uduc effect at tlle time, and show how
trifling lICcidents will mar the greatest eomhillfltions. The
Euglish general's arrangements for the protectiou of Ikira had
been ntterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Sih'cim on
ono side, tho rapid rerrent of Altcn on thc other j aod tl\o
French, deceived by some red uniforms and bivouac fires Oil
the Cnbec;a Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to
ruJl after a few thousand undisciplined militia-meD who were
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yet saved by the accidental beating of a drum: it is as curious
also to find l\ marshal of France acting pcrsolllllly 118 a partisan
to surprise some unuiscilJlinoo milititl. and yet effecting nothing.
However the affair spread C<lIIsternation as far as Coimbm,
ancl nlanning reports reached Wellington, whose 0IX'rations it
is now time to notice.
When Soult's retreat was ascertained the allied lIJ1lJ.y
marched towurtb the TllguS, and on the Hth Alten's flight
becoming knowD he was ordered to recr05S that river and go
hr.ck upon CflStcllo Braneo. The I Gth the advanced guard of
the army reached that town, and the same day a militia officer,
flying from Coimbra in the general panic, came to head-
quarters and said the enemy was master of that town; but
tho next hour brought Wilson's report from Guardn, /lud
BeresfOl'd caused the unfortunate wretch whose feara led him
to give the false informntion to be SllOt. At tllis time Bren-
mer's division WllS near Th>drigo, but the remainder of the
Freneh army was eOlleentmwd, in number twcnty-cigllt thou-
sund, on the neighbouring riuge overlooking Penrnntleor.
l.farmont was inclined to £ght rather than relinquish tbe
seizure of a convoy intended for .Rodrigo which he designed to
cut off; but wben he lleard tbat it had tuken refuge tn
Ahneiua he clllluged Ilis mind, for llis own situation was
hecoming dangerous. Almeida and the militia at Onarda
wcre on hill right flank, Rodrigo WIlIl on his rcnr, tIle Con. antI
Agneon behind him were swelled by hellvy rains whicll fell
from the 13th to the 19th, and tlle llO'ld had broken his bridge
Ilellr Caridad. There remained only the Pnellte de Villar on
the upper Ague<!a for retreat, and the roods leading to it were
bud aud llllrrow; the mllreh from thence to 'l'amllmcs was
circuitous Md exposed to the attacli: of the allies, who could
move on the chord t,hrollgh Rodrigo, and then his retreat
could only be through the pass of Pcrales upon Coria. Wcl-
lillb"1on. 11Oping' to fall Oil hilt\ before he could cross the Coo.
was moving on Pedragoa; but the allies were not all over the
tragus and a. sufficient force could not be collected before the
3ht: on that day howe"cr the Agucda subsided, the French
restorcd their bridge, the 1:Ist of their divisions erossed it on
the 24th, and Marmont thus tenninated his operations with·
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out loss. His troops were then ~O'fI.in spread o"er the Jllalng
of Leon, where oomo of his smaller posts had been harassed by
Juliuu SanchclI but where the Gll1licLIIU arlllY had done
nothing.
Bcresford now disbanded tire Portuguese militia, and Wel-
1ington made groot exertiong to rc-victual Almeida and
Rodrigo, intending to loove Fieton witll a corps upou the
Agueda and march himself agaiust Andalusia, following his
origilllll dcsign. The first dh'ision tlleroforo returned to
Castello de Vide, and as Foy had meauwhile re-occupied
Truxillo, Hill advauced to observe him, and the fifth Sjlanish
army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of sup-
plying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of
Marmont had destroyed 011 the intcnnedinte mn","'Ozines unll
dispersed UlC tllelUlS ef transport on the lines of communica-
tionj the Portuguese go"ernment would not remedy the
ineonnmicnee either tllCre or on the other frontier; ond Elva.~
und BadajOl:l were sulleriug from the same cause aB Ciudad aud
Almeida. In this dilemma, complying with necessity, an
tmmilit.'ITyand dsmgerolls remedy was adopted. Telling the
Portuguese government that on it he would throw the respon.
6ibility of losing Badajos and Elvas if hoth fortresses were
not immediatel}' re-victualled, he used the carriages and mules
of the Untl}' to bnng up stores to Almcida and Rodngo, and
quurtered his troops at the poinh of water curriuglJ. His
army WIIS therefore sprp.ad from the Morena to the Tngus,
from the 'fagus to tIle DOUTO, from the Douro to the l>Iondego,
Oll 0. line four hundred miles long in fnee of three hostile
armies, the most disWllt ouly u. few- marches from hia out·
posts. It was indeed scarcely possible for the French to re-
assemble in mnsses before tIle ripening of the harvest; still the
allied troops were danglJTOusly disseminated, and the invasion
of Andalusia which would have becn SUcJl a glorious termina-
tion of the campaign was perforce abandoned, and the fifth
great epoch of the war terminated.
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OENERAL OBSERVATXONa
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I~ tbiij camlJaign the }'rench were too much scattereu, ano.
oceupieu the COlmtries bordcring on Portugal mtller as a con-
quered territory than " field of operations. 'fhe armies of
the north, of the centrc, and of Portugal, might have pre-
sented a hundred thousand men on a field of battle; yet
Wellington captnred two great fortresses within gtm-shot as
it were of them all, and IVilB neyer disturbed. This WM
causcu pnrtly by jealousies, partly by Napoleon's orders, whieh
the genemls could not or would not understand in their true
spirit, and therefore neglected or executed th~m without
vigonr. Yet French writers have sought to fast.cn all the.
failures on him: it is eMy to spurn the dead lion! Thus
MontLrun's expedition to nid Suchet has been urged as the
cause why Ciudnd Rodrigo was lost. Napoleon however did
not desire that his mareh should be held in abeyance for a
wook on some vngue nlmOtlrs, and be finally sent at l)rcciscl~'
the wroug period; neither t.lit.l he contemplate that general's
idle displny at Alicant after Y111encia had fallen. But ilI-
executed and llUrtful as this expcditioll doubtless was the loss
of Rodrigo CIlnnot be directly traced to it. 110ntbrun was at
Almanul the 9th of January, and the 19th Rodrigo was
stormed. If he had not been at ~<\.hltal\za he would have been
at Toledo or Talaver8, eight marches from Salamanca; and as
the eommtncement of the siege was not known unlil the 15th
e\'en at Vnlladolid, ho could not hllove been on tho Tormea
before the 25th, which would have been five days too late.
The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at this erisis of the
Valcncian operations, Slid \lis intent was toot MOlltbnm
should llaye rcnched that city in DecemLer, whereas he did nut
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nrrive until the middle of January. Hn.d he heen n week
earlier, that is, lmd he marched at once from Toledo, Mahy
could not have escaped, Alicallt would have fallen, llnd if
Biake had made an obstinate defence at Vfllenci~ the value of
such a ~inforcemcnt would have ooen acknowledged.
Valencia WllS then the most imporrent point i.u the Peninsula
lIml there was no apparent TCason why Uodrigo shonld be in
danger; tlIe emperor could not calculate upon the error.'! 01
his own generals. Montbrull Wfl8 not detached on a falsc
llriuciple, Ilia march was eonooived ill perfect IICCOro with the
maxim of concentrating on the important poiut at tIle deci-
sive moment: errors c-"I:trancous to the original (icsign broll~ht
it within the principle of disscmiun.tion. The loss of ROOrigo
may be uireetly tr'.wed to Mllonont's want of vigilance, to the
scauty garrison, IInd the Russian war which compelled the
emperor to weaken the army of the north: fiIUl.lly to the
extravagance of J osepll. Marmont expressly nsserts that at
Madrid three thousand meu devoured and waskd daily the
rations of twenty-two tllousand; the stores thus eonsume(l
would llQ\'e entlbled the army of Portugal to keep eoneen-
trakd, in wllieh ellSC Wellington conld not Illlve taken Rodrigo:
ami if the army of the eeutr6 IlQd heeu efficient Hill WQulll
have incurred great danger and Soult's power been vastly
augmented. But i~ is llOt Napoleon's skill only that ha." heen
llSSAiled by these writers. Wellingtoll is blamed for not
crusl:llng Soulul.ln's division at 'l'nlllll.llieS bctWC<:1l the 23rd
alld the 26th of January; bnt Souham, a good general, never
entered Tamamcs except with ca"alry scouts; he remained at
Matilla, whence onc foreed mareh would have placed him
behind the 'formes in sufety. In SUcll a shal10lV lIIl\1lner have
the important operations of this period beell tro:!ated: uDr will
the causes commonly assigned for the fall oC Ba.dajos better
bear examination,
'MarmQnt imtead of joining Soult if~ ElIlremadura, fol•.
lowed a plmmom in Beiro.' ' It tUU his vanity and jealous1J
of tIlt duke of Dalmatia tlwJ, wst BadaJos.' Such are the
assertions of J;i'rellcll and English writers. N everthelcss Mar-
mont never ::mticillated success from his mo'-ement into Beu-a,
and far from avoiding Soult be earnestly desired to 00-
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opernte with llim. Moreover this invlISioll of Bairn was the
conception of Napoleon, the gTetl.teat of nil captains; 9.1J(1 it
~s lIot difficult to allow that the design WfL'l capacious Ilud solid.
Suppose ManJlOnt had aided &ult, and the anllY of tllo centre
Iw,cl fll~o (lone so. If tho)' made nny error in their oombin~
HOlls Wellington lVoulcl have defeated them sepllMllcly; jf they
effected their junction he would have retreated, IInd Dudnjos
would have been succoured: but eig-lIty thou'!Alld French
would have been Assembled by long IllnTchCll in the willt,cr
mins to the groat tlctrimcut of tlICir allilirg elsewhere, I>ud,
unless they came prepared to take Elvas without any ade-
quate object. For Wellington, after the fall of CiudaJ
Rodrigo could have repeated this opeTation llS often liS he
plcascU, which, besides the opening made for insurrection in
Spuin, would have stumped a cbaracter of wcakncss on the
French arms.
Nflpoleon judgcd better. He dislik(',d timid operations, he
desired that his po\\'crful armies should Lhrow the fillies on the
defensive and IJC indicated the meaus of doiug so. Wellington,
he said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo had
called Hill acroflS thll 'l'agus, and to prevent that movement
Soult Wll8 directed to send twenty thousand men llgnillst tho
Alemtejo. 'file fall of Ciuull.d, by compelliug the ullies to
defend it gave the Freneb choice of ground for R battle, and
at R distflnee from the sea. It was for ft~armont to seize the
occasion, but not by joining Soult who !lad eighty thousand
excellent troops; he at tho worst t'Quld be only driven from
Anualusia upon Valencia or Madrid, whereas if the army of
Portugal or a part of it should be defeated on the Guadinna
tile blow would be felt in el'ery lmrt of Spain. Mannont's
business WlIll, he said, first to streugthen his own position at
SllamanCll. as a base of operations, and tbeu keep the allies
constantly engaged on the Agueda until lle was prepared to
figbt a general battle; meanwhile Soult could take the for-
trc8ilCS of the Alemtejo or draw off Rill from Wellington,
who would then be inferior w Uarroont llud yet Hill hilllSelf
would be unequal to fight Soult.
'Fix your quarters,' said tIle emperor, 'at Salamanca, work
day and night to fortif,)' that placo----orglluize a new battering~
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train-form mll.gazines-!lend strong admnecd guards to
menace Ciuuad and Almeida-harass the allies' outposts, even
daily-threaten the frontier of Portugal in all directions and
send prnties to rnvage the nearest villages-repair the ways to
Ahneidll. and Gporto, and keep the bulk of your army At
Toro, Za..lUOrll, Belleveute alllI Avila, wl1ich lire fertile uis-
triets, and from whence in four dap you can concentrate the
whole upon Salamanca :-you will thus keep the allics in check
on the Agucda, Bnd your troops will repose while you prepare
for gr~at opcrat.ions. You havc nothing to do with the south.
Announce the approach of your lIew batterillg-truin, and if
Wellington marches to invest &dajos with a few divisions
Soult will be able to relieve it; but if Wellington g<les with
all lllB forces, unite your army, march straight upon Almeid:l,
push parties to Coimbrn, overrun the country in various direc-
tions and be assured he will return. 'l'wenty.four hours after
the receipt of this letter you should be on your Wl\.r to Sala.
mllnca, nud your advanced guards should be in march townrds
CiuJad UoJrigo and Almeidn.'
If Mnrmont had thus concelved the war he would ha.ve
commenced operations before the cnd of Jllnuary; but this
lct~r, written tho 15th of February, reached him in the lntter
elltf of that month, and fountl him desIlontling and fearful e\'en
in defence. Vacillating between his owu wishes and the
emperor's orders he did nothing j had he, as this despatch
rcromllienJed, commenced llis operotions in twenty-four hours,
hie advanood posts woultl Illlove been near Rourigo early ill
Mareh, when the allies were, as hllS been sIlOwn, disseminated
all oyer ])ortugal, find when only the fifth division 11"113 left
upon the Coa to oppose him. 'l'he works of Almeida wero
then indefensible lInd tILe movement upon &dajos must have
necessarily been suspended. Thus tIle winter season would
have pnssed away uselessly for tbe allies, unlcs.s Wellingtou
turnt.>tl to nttuck Mm·mont,1l difficult operntion lIud dangerous
to the Alellltcjo wbile Soult heM Badlljos, for that marsllul
had received orders to attack Hill with twenty thousand men.
Hero then the crrors were in the execution, the emperor's com-
bination was evidcntly Bolid. It remains to test hill sceOlltl
combinatioll designcU to bafl.le the siege of Badajos.
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Mannont wag so to dispose his annJ' tlt:J,t he could COil·
centmte in four da)'s,-he wns to invade DelTa when Welling_
ton crossed the Tllgus,-he was to menace Oporlo,-to attack
Almcidn,-and Coimbrn was to be occupied. These operations
would have brougllt the allie; back, Of()llUSe the (Illl of JX>dlljos
could not be expcded under tlJnlc lVeeks, which would have
been too long to leave Beira find tile fortresses at the mere)" of
the invader; but Mal'IUout did not rendl the Agucdn until the
31st MllfCU when the siege of Bud:tjos was near its CQnclusioll,
-be did not storm Almeidll nor attack llodrigo, nor cokr
CoiJubra nor menace Oporto,-yet llis feeble operations forced
lord Wellington to relinquish tho invasion of Andalusia nnll
return to BoiTa. Again therefore the error was in the exoou·
tiou. And how inferior in hardihood the French general was
to his adversary! Wellingtoll with eighteen thousand men
escaladed Badajos, a powerful fortress defended by all cxcc.llent
governor and five thousa.ud l"'rellch vetcralJs,-:~hrmollt with
twenty-eight thousand men would not attempt to storm
Rodrigo, although its breaches were scarcely healed and its
garrison disaffected. Nor did he assail Ahneida, which, lmnlly
meriting the nallle of a fortress, was only occupied by tlll'ce
thousand militia scarcelya.ble to handle their arms; yet in
Almcida. he would ]\l\ve fouud l\ battering-train witl} whicll
to take Ciudnd Rodrigo and thus 1\l\ve balanced the
eaml>nign.
Marlllont like Bessihes wished to be employed in the
Russian expedition, and bad asked to be recalled, or that the
whole northern district from Sebastian to Salamanca, includ-
ing Madrid, suould be placed Ullder his orders. U!lless that
were doue lle said he could only calculate the operations of
his own troops; the ot11er generals would make difficulties,
would move slowl)', and thc king's court was ill open llOstility
to the French interest. The army of t110 nort,b lmd in retir-
iug from Leoll scrupulously carried away everything t,hat
could be useful to him in the way of bridge or battering
eqnipages, or of ammunition or provisions, altllougll he was in
want of aU thcsc things. Thcn showing bow discord WQS
ruining the }'rench armies he pretended that his own force,
tIle p<Jsts of communication and wakhing of the GaUiciau
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army being provided for, would not furnish If,ore than thirty-
four thollSAnd men; but the imjlerial wllster-rolls on the 1st
of lIarch show sixty tbousan(l fighting men present with the
eagles. He also stated the allies as sixty thousand strong,
well provided and reaily to attack him, .....hereas the returns
of that urwy give but fifty-two thouSAnd men including Hill's
corps; thirty-fivc thousand ouly could have passed the Agueda,
and their penllry of means prevented them from even holding
together on the northern frontier: in like wanner he assumed
that t .....o of the allied divisions were left Ullon the Agueda
when the army marched a",oninst Bndajos, whercll.ll no morc
than six lnmdrcd cavalry remained there. All these things
l)rove that Marmont from dislike to the war or natural want
of vigour .....:18 not equal to his task, and his diversion begun
too late and executed without energyeould have little effect
upou the siege of BadajOll: his first design of detaching three
divisions to aid Soult and retaining the other two to menace
Ciudad HoJrigo would ll!lv(l beeu better.
It is fitting now to test the operntious of the armies of the
south lInd of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of:
the secret of its inactivity is to be found in Marmont,'s letter.
Everything at :Madrid was confusion iutrigue waste aUll want
of discipline: the union of court and lIrmy was ruinous. Not
so at Seville where the hand of an ahle general, an indefatig-
able administrator, may be traced, and the unravelling of those
intricute combinations which produced u. seeming want ot'
vigour in Soult will furnish at onetl his apology and the eulo-
giUln of Wellington. The army of the south, powerful on
paper, did not furnish a just proportion for the field, hccause
IIlost of the reinforcements though borne on the rolls were
retained by the generals iu the llorthern n\i1itary governments.
SOlllt had sixty-sc\'en thousand French and six thougaml
'MCOpl1teros' present uuder nrms in September j hut then
fol1owed till; surprise of Girurd at AroJ'o de ],folinos, the
operntions of Hill in December, the failure of Godinot at Gib-
raltar, the check snstained by Sem6Ie at Bornos, and the siege
(of Tarifa, which diminished tho number of men and occasioned
fresh tl.rrangl:meuts 011 different points. The harvest of 1811
lJad failed in Andalusia as in all other parts j the inhp,bitan+..s
•
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fed on herbs, t1le soJdicrg had only 1\101£ r'fltions of bread j and
ll(~ither reinforcements of men, nor C9uVOYs of money, nor
UllLlllUlIitiou, nor clotLtes, !J:1l1 come from France or from
Madrid for a. long period. It was in this state Sou]t received
orders to send twenty thOUsalld mon against the Alcmtcjo.
But his Polish troops, tho skeletons of regiments, lUIU tho
picked mell for the imperial guards, in all fifteen thousand,
after halting at Despenas Poros while Suchet was before
Vnlcncia were then marching to France: &llestcros also
came with twelve thousand men to the Ronda aod his detach.
ments defeated MutlulsiulIt Cartama, which occasioned anotlter
change in the French disllositions. Moreover Suchet's suc-
cesses increased Soult's difficulties. TlIC fugitives from
Ynlencin. gathered on the remnins of the Murein.n tmny, nnd
hence fifteen thousanu men, including the gll.lTisous of Cartll3-
gena IInd Alieant, were again assembled on tllC frontier of
Grenada where during the expedition to Estremadura the
Frencllllll(l only three bnttaliolla and some Cfl.\'alry.
By thcse drains the urmy of the sonth wus, if the garrison
of Badajos be excluded, redueed to forty-eight thousand l~rench
sabres and bayonets when its enemics were augmeuted by
twenty.fiye thousand fresh mCll. Soult had indeell, besides
this force, five thouSIl.nd o.rti1lerymen nnd other attendant
troops, amI. six thouBtllUl eswpelero8 Wopuble of taking the field,
while thirty 1I1ousaml eivie guards held his fortified posts;
but he was compelled to reduce hill gauillons and even the
C<lmp before tllC hill. to thc lowcst numbcrs consistcnt with
safety, ere he could brillg twenty-four thoutl8ntl :French into
the field for tile lJUeCQur of Badujos, aud even tllen he nearly
lost Seville. These difficulties kept him from the Alcmtcjo
in Milrch when his presence would llavc dclayed the siege lmtil
a bottle WM fought; but he 1IlId then no fear for the fortrcs.q
OOClLUSC lLmnQut on the 2211U of Fcbruary llnd l'oy on tlle 28th
had aunounced, that ifBndajos were menaced, three divisions of
the army of POltugal theu in the valley of the Tagus would
enter Estfemadurn,-llnd thc~e divisions unit~d to DariCllu's
and Drouet's troops would have formed all anny of thirty
thousand mell, 8ufficieet to delay the siege. But Mll.rmollt,
haying subsequently received orders to move into Bcirn passed
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the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and tllUS
unintcntiomllly deceived Solllt j and whether his letters were
intercepted or carelessly delll.Jed it was not until the 8th of
April Soult knew of his delJarlure for Salalllanca.
Wellington's operations were however so very rapidly pushed
that Slult cannot be censured for falsc CIIlculations. No
gencrol could suspcet the Pieurina. would be taken by storm
without Leing battered; still less that Badajos with its lony
walls, its brave garrison, its celebrnted governor, eould be
carried before tlle couuterscarp was blown in or the fire of
t4.e place ruined. In fine, the surpassing resolution lInd anf-
pMsillg fortune of the Briti~h gellcrul and llis troolJS could uot
be divined; moreover lIS the French use no iron ordnance in
Il. siege ooult's calculations were based on the effect of brass
artillery, which is comparatively slow: with bross guns tlle
hreuebes would have required three days more. The fall of
Ballajos may therefore be traced to the Russian war which
drew fifteen thoUl!llnd men from the army of the soutll,-to
the irresolution of Marmont, who fonowed neither the em-
peror's !llall uor llil> own,-to the too great extent of country
occupied, wbereby time and numbers were swallowcd,-prin-
ciplllly to the prompt vigour of the English general and his
overstepping the rules of lIrt: the siege therefore was not, lUJ
has been said, a great slaughter for a small affair, it was not
the fate of BadajO!! but tllllt of the Penillsula which was
decided on that night of blooll. Here tile question arises, if
Soult, actiug upon the jlrineiplcs laid down in his Jetter to
Joseph just before the battle of Talavera, should not have
opernted agninst the allies in great masses, relinquishing POIl-
session of Grenada, Malaga, ill fine, of everything savo Seville
and U.e eumjJ before the !sIll.. If beaten frollt Andalusia he
could have fallen back on Sucllct nud thus presented a head
of invasion stronger than before, while Marmont renewed t11e
light in Estrcmndum. Such a chequered game, Wellington's
political sitUiltion in Englaud and Portugal considered, would
have gone nenr to decide the question of the British troops
remaining in the lnttcr country.
That fortune aided the English general is true, but it was
in the mallner she favours the pilot., who watching every
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l.lblluging wind, cvt>.ry Slliftillg current, makes all subservient
to his purpose. Ascertaining with great pains the situation
or each nuversMy, he hl\d suga.ciollsly met their dillcrent
modes (Jf warfare llud with 11 nice haud adapted his measures
to the successive exigencies of the moment. 'rile :mllY of the
centre w]jcrc disorder was paramount he disregarded j Mar-
mont whose tempermhCllt was hasty he deceived by affected
slowl\css; Soult he forestalled by quickness. 'l\l'icc l}(~ in·
duced tho duke of Hagusll to scnd his divisions into dil;tunt
quarters when they shoultl have been concentrated, and each
time he gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad
Hodrigo; again when to obviate the difficulties raised b» the
Portuguese government he spretiu his own troops that he
migbt feed and clothe them on their march to the Alemtcjo:
this he could not have done if the French bad been concen-
trated, neither conld he have so well concealed that march
from tbe enemy. In Estremnduro lie kept his foree compact
and strong to meet Soult, from whose warfare he cxpected II
powerful opposition hard to resist, yet not likely to abound
in sudden stroke.il and therefore furnisl1ing more certain
ground for calculation as to time. And then he used that
time so wOllderfulty at the siege that even his enemies
declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been
censured for over-cautiou WfIS now dreaded as over-daring!
His daring waa llOwever in no manner allicd to rashness,
his precautions multiplied liS hig entllrpriscs augmented.
Marmont.'s divisions in the valley of the Tagus could by
movulg on Estremadura in March IUl.\'e delayed if not pre.
vented tIle siege; but Wellington, with forecast of such an
evcnt, designed that Hill should make a forced march to
surprise Uw bridge llllll forts at Almaraz, which would ha\'o
compelled t·l1e Frcucl1 to move by the bridges of Arl.obispo
and 'l'ulltyera to reach the SCllne of action in Estremlldum.
This skilful stroke WllS bulked by the Mvcr,ccrlSing mia.
conduct of tile Portuguese government with respect to trims·
port; for the bllttcring.gtlus intcuded for rnli's enterprise
were tllus stoppcd at E\'ora. Neverthc!es.s the sicge Wflll
commenred, bcclluse l[nrmont was still ignorant of tliC allies'
llllU'eh aud hlld 1ll3dc no change iu his e::deud<,-d quarter8
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indicating 8 design to aid Soult: Hill also drove Drouet back
towards Ule },forena, and by oceupyiug Merida intercepted
the line of communication witb Almaraz, which auswered the
aame purpose. But tllC best testimony to the skill of the
o);lemtion is to be found in tho enemy's papers.
8oo1t. 1812.
, So calculated,' said Soul1-, ' was this siege, that it i"t1'=pted.
is to be supposed lord Wellington had intercepted MSS.
some despatches which explninert to him the system of opero.
tions and the irresolution of :Mnrmont.'
Nor when the latter wall in Beira and Almeida and
llodrigo were endnngered did the delay in Estremadurn
spring from rashness, there WIIS good ground for believing
Rodrigo would not be nttD.eked. For Wellington had sent
Colquboun Grant a celebrated scouting officer to watch
Mannont, and that geutleman in whom the utmost daring
was IlO mixed witll subtlety of genius and both so tempered
by discretion it is hard to say which quality predominated,
very rapidly executed his mission. Attended by Leon a
Spanish peasant of fidelity and quickness of apprebension who
hlld been his companion on many occasions of the samc
nature, he arrived in the Sulawlloncan district, IlllSSed the
Tormes in the night, and remained in uniform, for he never
llSsumoo any disguise, three days in tIle nlidst of the Frelleh
romp. Ho obtained exaet information of Marmont's object
and more especially of his preparations of provisions and
scaling.Jadders, notes of wllich he sent to llead-quarters from
hour to nour by Spanish agenb. On tlle third night some
peaSlluts brought llim Q generol order addressed to the French
regiments, saying the notoriolls GT'J.ut beiug within the eircle
of their cantonments the soldiers were to use their utmost
curtions to secure him, for which purp<lSe also guards were
Jllaced as it were in a. circlo round tho unny. Nothing
dannted, he consulted with the peasants and before daylight
nC;t;t morning entered the village of Hucrta close to a ford on
the TormeB and six miles from Salc.manca. A batmlion WIIS
in Huerla, and beyond the river Cllvnlry videttcs were pooted,
two of which constD.utly patrolled backward and forward for
the space of three llUndred plf(ls meeting always at the ford.
When day hroke the lo'reueh assembled on their alllml-post,
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and at that moment Crant was secretly brought oppollite the
ford, be and his llOrsr. being hidden by the gable of n house
from tlul infantry while lue peasants standing on loose stones
and spreading their large cloaks covered him from the cavalry.
There he calmly waited until the vidcttes were separated the
full extent of their beat, when lIC dll.8hcd through the ford
hetween them nnd receiving their fire without damage reachoo
n wood wlu~re tlle pursuit was bullled: Leon Lciug ill his native
dress met with no interruption and soon rejoined him.
He Imd before tMs ascertained that nleilllS to storm Rodrigo
were prepared, llud the French officers openly tal.kcd of that
opernLion; hut to test that project, to ascertain Marmont's
real force, and to diSClH'cr if he was not really going by
Peralcs to the Tagus, Grant now placed himself on a. wooded
hill near Tamames where the rood branched off to Ferales
aud to Rodrigo. There lying perduc until the French pll/lSe<l
by in march he noted every battalion aud gUll, aud fiueling
all moved towards nodrigo he entered TalllRIllCS aud dis-
covered they had left the greatest part of their acaling-la.dden
bellind, tlms alJOwing tlle intention to storm was not real:
this it WllS whieh allayed Wellington's fenrs for that fortress.
When J\Iarmont passed the COR in this expeuitioll, Grant
preceded him with intent to discover if his further marcll
would be by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon
Castello Branco; for to reach tho latter it WllS necessary to
descend from ll. very high ridge or rather succession of ridges,
by a pass at the lower mouth of whieh stauds Penamacor.
Upon one of the inferior ridges ill the pass tbis persevering
llfficer placed Ilill1seJf, thinking the dWllrf oaks with which
the hills were covered would effectually secure him from db-
covet)'; but from the higher riuge the :Freneh detected his
1110\"e111ents with their glustlcs; IIIlU Leon, whose IYllx-eyes
were nlwars on the watch, SOOIl called out, 'ale Fre:rn:M tiuJ
French r and pointed to the renr whence some dragoou5
came galloping up. Grant and his follower darted hltO the
wood for 0. little SI'11oo nnel then suddenly wl1eeling rode on
in a tliJTereut uirectioll, but at every tuTU lIew euemies
appearoo, and at last thc hunted Illen dismounting fled OD
foot through the thickest of the low oaks until tlley were
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again lIlet by infantry detached in small parties down the
sides of the pass and directed in their chnse by tile waving of
tho French officers' hats on thc ridge ahovc.
Leon fell exhlluswd and the barbarirlU8 who first C/llll.e up
killtd him in dCSjlite of his companion's entreaties. Grant
they carried without injury to Marmont, who with apparent
kindness invited Mm to dinner. The COllvcr811tion turned
upou the prisoner's exploits, and the Freuch man;hal said
that he had been long on the watch, knew all his haunts, llis
disguises, nnd that only the night before he had slept in the
French head-quarters, with other adventures which had lIOt
happened, for this Grant never used any disguise. But there
WlI.8 another Grant, also remarkable in his way, who used to
remain for months in the Frcnch quarters using all manner
of disguises, lIud the silllilllrity of nalllCll caused the actions
of both to be attributed to one, which is the ouly palliative
for :l\fnrmont's aubsc'luent conduct. Trenting his !lrisoner
with apparent kindness, he exucted from him nn especial
parole that he would not consent to bc relcuscd by the
Illlrtidas while on his journey through Spain to France: this
secured his captive, for Wellingtou ollcred two thousand
doUllrs to uny guerilla chief who should rescue Ilim. Tile
ell"llction of such 1& parole was a t-acit comllliment to the mall j
but 1.liInnont sent a letter with the cscort to the governor of
Bayonne, iu which, stilllll.bourillg under tho errol" that there
was only one Grant, he designate<! his captive as a dangerous
spy who lmd <tOM infinite mischief to the French army, and
whom he had llot eAccutcd on the spot out of respect to
something resembling un unifonn which he wore: but he
dCllircd that at Ba.yonne he should be placed in irons and sent
up to Paris.
'i'his proceeding WIIS too little in accord with Frcnch honour
to be supported, and before the Sp,mish frontier wns ]lussed,
Grunt, it matters not how, Wag made acquainted with the con-
tents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne in ordinary
C83CS was for the prisoner to wait on t]le authorities and
rereive a PllSllp'ort to trJ.vel to Vcrduu, which was duly llocom·
plished; the deliver)' of the faM letter beiug' by certain
means delayed. Grant then with sagacious boldneas resolved
nu:.. IV. L
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not to escape towards the Pyrenees, tllinking he would nntu~
rallt be p'ufSued in that directioll; he Uwught if t·he governor
of Bayonne did not recapture llill) at once, he would for his
own sel:uritJ suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be
no further tllOUght of; wherefore on the instant he inquired
at the hotels if anr French officer was going to Puris, and
lilldiug that Souhllm, then on his return from Spain, was 80
bent, he boldly introduced himself and asked pennissiou to
join his party. The other readily assented, and while travel.
ling, he vcry often rallied his companion about his adventures,
little thinking he WM then nn instrulllent iu forwarding tho
most dangerous and adroit of them all.
In passing through OrlelUlS, Grant b)' a species of intuition.
discovered an English agent, and from him received a reoom-
mcndation to another secret agent in Paris whosc I\ssistancc
wouM 00 necessary to his final escape; for he looked upou
Murlllout's double dealing and the expressed design to take
away his life as equivalent to a discharge of his purole, whieh
was moreover only given with respect to Spain. When he
arrived at Paris he took leave ef Sonharn, epened Rll inter-
course with the Parisian agent, from whom he obtained money,
and by his advice avoided appearing before tJle police to have
Ilia passport examined. He took a lodging in a vory publio
street, frequeuted the coffee-houses aud visited the theatres
witllOnt fear, becuuse the secret agent, who had been long
established and was intimately oonneded with the police, had
ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on
foot.
When some weeks bad elapsed, the agent told him a pass'
port was rell,dy for one Jonathan Buck, an Amcrican who hill
died suddenly on the day it was to have been claimed. .Boldly
demanding this passport he departed for the mouth of the
Loire, heCl\usc ccrt'lin rellsolls, not nccessary to mention, led
him to expect more assist:mcc there than at nny other port.
There however new difficulties awaited him and were ovcn'OlUc
by fresh exertions of his surprising talent which fortune
lICCmed to delight in aiding. He took 11 passage for Amcric.
in a ship of that uation, but its departure beiug unexpectedly
delayed he fnLukly explained his Lrue situation t\l the caV!.a.iu,
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who dl:8ired him to assume the charact.cr of 8 discontented
senmo.n, and giving him 8 snilor's dress and forty dollars sent
him to lodge the money in the Americau consul's hands as a.
pledge that lle would prosecute the C8}Jtain for ill-usage when
be reached the United States. 'l'his heillg the custom on such
OCClUIiolls the consul !,'lIve him Il. e\!rtilicnh: which enabled hinl
to pass from port to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship.
Thus provided he prevailed upon Il boatman by a promise of
ten Napoloons, to row him in the night towards a small isluml,
where English vessels watered unmolested, aud in return per·
mitted the few inhabitants to fish and traffie without interntp.
tion. The boat sailed, the masts of the Rritish shills were
dimly seen on the other side of the island and. the termination
of his toils appeared at blind, when the boatman from fear or
malice swldenly returned to port. Some men would then
have striven in desperation to force fortlllle and so Imve
perished,-the spil·its of others would ha"e Bunk in despair,
for the moner promised was all he had, and the boatman not-
withsumding hia breach of contraet demanded tllO wholc: with
inexpressible coolness and resOlution, Qrant gave him one
Napoleon and a rebuke for his misconduct-he threatencd
reference w the police but was no marell in subtlety for his
opponent, who told him plainly that he would then denoullOO
him as aiding the escape of a prisoner of war and would
adduee the great price of his boat as a IlNOf of his guilt I
A few days after Grant engaged all old fisherman '1'110
faithfully performed his bargain, but there were no English
vC!!8els nCl\r the island; however the fisherman cast his net.<!
and caught some fisll with whieh he ~iled towards the sOllth-
ward, where he had heard there was an English sllip of war.
In a few hours they obtllined a glimpse of her and were steer_
ing that war, when a sllOt from Il. collst-battery brougllt them
to and a. boat with soldiers put off to board them. The
fisherman called Grant his son, and the soldiers were only
sent to warn them not to pass the buttery because tlle
English vessel they were in sellrch of was Oil the coast. '1'he
old man, expecting this, bribed the soldiers with his fish,
U8SUrillg t11cm he must go with his non or they. would starve,
aud thllt he wus l:lu well acquainted with the (;~XlS~ he could
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always elIC1l.pe the enemy. His prayers and present-s pre-
vailed, he was desired to wait under the hattery till night and
then depart j but under pretence of arranging his escape from
the Euglish vessel he made the soldicrs point out llcr bellrings
so exactly, that when darkness fell he nm ller straight on
board and the intrepid Gmnt stood ill safety on the qUllrter-
deek.
When ho reached England he obtained permission to ehooso
a :French oflk'Cr of equal rank with himself to send to France,
that no doubt migllt remain about the propriety of his cscallc.
Great WM his Ilstonishment to find in the first prison he
visited the old fishcmlll.fi nod his real son, who had mcanwllilc
boon captured notwithstanding a llrotection given to them
for their 8Crvicesj but Graut's generosity and benevolence
were as remarkable as the qualities of his understantling; he
soon obtained their release, sent them with a sum of money to
France, returned to the Jleninsll1n., and within four months
from the uute of his first capture was again 011 the Tormes,
watcbing Mannont's army! Other strange incidents of his
life could be told, wete it not more fitting to quit lL digression
already too wide; yet I was unwilling to plLSS unnoticed this
adventure of that generous, spirited, and gentle-minded mun,
who having served hill country nobly and ably ill every
climate died not long since exhausted by the continual hard-
ships he had endured.
Having shown the prudence of Wellington with respect to
the eUlnpnign geucmlL)", it remains to c01l.llidex the siege of
Blldajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence tha~
not skill but fortune plnmed his 8mbitioua wing j a proceed-
ing indeed most consonant to the naturll of man j for it is
hard to. avow inferiority by attributing an action $0 stupen-
dous to superior genius alone. A scientific examination
would be misplaced in a general history, but to notice leading
lloints involving the general coueelltion will not be irrelevant.
The choice of tliC line of attack, justified by the English
engineers ll8 that requiring least expenditure of means and
time, lllls by the French engineers been censured. Colonel
LaUlllrre affirms tllat the frout next the castle was the one
least susceptible of defeuce i because it bad neither ravelin nor
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ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks, and offered no fa.cimy of
retrenclling behind it: 1I. view confinncd by Phillipon, who
being the best judge of Lis own weak points, did for many
days think it was the true object of the allies' approaches.
But Lamarre adwmcca t\ far more interesting question, when
he S!I~'8 Badajos might have been taken by escalade and storm
the first night of the siege with less difficulty than on the
7th of April. Then, he says, the defences were not 80 com-
plete, tho garrison WI!S Icss prepared, and surprise would ha.vc
availed aomewhat,-whereas at the second perio<.l the breaches
were the strollgest part of the town, and as no other advan-
tage had been gained by the besiegcra the chances were in
favour of the first period,
This reasoning allpears sound, yet the fact is one whieh
belongs not to tile rules but the secrets of the art, and they
arc only in the keeping of grent captains, That the brenches
were impregnllule has indce<l been denied by aome of the
English engineers, Colonel Jones says the centre breach blUl
not the slightest interior retrenchment, and the sword-blades
in the 'friniulllJ might have been overturned by the rush of a
denso mass of troops. This opinion is at variance with that
of the officers and men engaged, and it is certain
thnt all the brenehes were protected by sword-
blades; if the centre breach 'Was not retrenched
it was rendered very difficult of approach by t11e deep holes
digged in front" ond it was more powerfully swellt by fhmk-
fire than the others were. It is ~lso n mistake to suppose no
dense rush was made at the great breach. Engineers intent
upon their own art sometimes calculate on men till they tIo on
blocks of atone 01' timber, ne,!ertheless where the bullet
strikes the man will fall; the sword-blAdes were fitted into
ponderous beams, and these last, chained togother, were let
deep into the grouud; how theu WllJ> it lJOssible for men to
drag or push them from their places, when behind them stood
reso1nte combatau~ whose fire swept the foremost ranks
aWlLY~ This 6ro could not be returned by tho soldicra
engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear,
because from the slope of the hreaoh tliey could only see their
own comrades in the front; and then thc dead bodies, and
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tlle struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked
planks rendered Il. simultaneolls exertion impossible. The
broaches were impregnable!
And why was all this striving in blood agninst insurmount-
able difficulties 1 "Why were men sent thus to slaughter when
the application of a just science would 1lave rendered the
operation comparatively eMy 1 Because the English ministers,
80 ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of its
exigencies j because the English people are warlike without
being military, and under the pretence of maintaining a
liberty which they do not possess oppose in peace all useful
martini establishments. Expatiating in their schools and col-
leges upon Bonum discipline aud Romall \'alour they are
heedless of Roman institutions; they desire like that ancient
republic to be free at home and conquerors abroad, but start
at perfecting tbeir military system lIS a thing incompatible
with a constitution whieb they yet snffer to be violated by
every minister who trembles at the exposure of corruption.
In "the beginning of each wllr England has to seek in blood
the knowledge necessary to insure suceess, and like the fiend's
progress toward FAlen her conqucring course is througll chaos
followed by dClltb! But it is not in the details of this siege
we must look fur "\\'elliubrWn's merits. 1'he apportioning or
the number of guns, tlle quantity of ammunition, the aOlount
of transport, tlle tra"Cing of the worll:8, the ehoice of the
points of attl\ek, are matters wit1lin the province of the
engineer. The ,'alue and importancc of the place to be
attacked in reference to other ubjods of the ClIlIlpaign, the
time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrange-
ments necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the
calculation of the resourecs (rom whence the meana of attack
arc to be drawn, theS() arc in tho province of the general.
With him rests the choico of shortening the scientific process,
the judging how much or how little ought to be risked, how
much trusted to valour and discipline, how much to his own
genius for seizing accidents, 'Whether of grolmd, of time, or of
conjuncture, to nccelcrate the gain of h13 object.
All armies come to a siege with great advantages. For first
the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants)
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they are few agllinst a many, ure on tIle defensive, are an
excised portion of their own army, and are without news
which da1l11)8 the fiery spirit; they are compelled to await
their advcrslIry's time and attAck, their losses seem more
numcrous in )lroportion to their forces, bccauso they nre more
concentrated, ami the wouuded are /lot safe even ill the hos--
pitals,-a.nd lIS 1I0De caD hope to maintaiu a fortress eventually
without the aid of a succouring army thcir llltimnte prospect
is death or Cllptivity. The besiegers on the contrnry have Il
certaiu retL"Cat, know the rcal state of affairs, feeL more assured
of tlleir object, have hope of profit and a secure retreat if
they filii, while the besieged fnintly look for succour and
BCarcelyexpect life. '1'0 this may be added that the inbahi~
tants arc generally secret enemies of the gUll'iSOll as the
muse of their own suffcringa. '1'he number of gullS and
quuntity of ammunition in a fortrcss are do.ily diminished;
the besiegers' means, originally calculated to overpower the
other, may be increased: time and materi,\ls arc therefore
against tho besieged, and t,lle scicnt.ilic foundation of tho
defence depends 011 the attack. which may be varied white
the other is fi;;:ed. Finally the firmness IInd skill of the
defencc gencrally dcpends upon the governor, who may be
killeJ, whereas many ofiiccrs amongst Hie besiegers are capable
of conducting the attack; aud the general, besides being per.
eonally lc.~s exposed, i.~ likely Il.'l the chief of an army to be
11 Illan of lIlore spirit aud capw.:ity thau a simple governor.
It follows theu that fortresses must fall if the besiegers sit
down before them according to the nlles of art; and when
no succouring army is nigh the time neeeS8ar~' to reduce allY
place ma.y be calculated with great exactness. When these
rules cannot be attended to, when everything is ineguI.lr and
doubtful, when tll6 geneml is hurried on to the attempt, be it
easy or difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must
measure Mm by the greatness of the exigency aud the energy
with which he nets.
Wellington's object was great, his difficulties foreseen, Ilis
success complete. A few hours' dela.y, an accident, a turn of
fortune, and he would again have been foiled! ay! but this
ill Wlll', always dllllgcrouslllld uncertain, an ev-er-rolling wheel
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and armed with scythes. Was ·the object worth the risk_
did ita gain compensate the los9 of mell-was it boldly, greatly
ncquired1 These are the true questions and tlIO~' may 00
ullswercu UmB. Suchet had suvjugated Arn,,"'01l by Lis mild.
ness, Catalonia. aud Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia,
Soult bad tranquillized tlle mass of the people, and his genius,
solid and vast, was laying the decp foundation of 110 kingdom
close to l'ortugal; he was formi.ng such great establishments,
amj contriving such plaus as woulLl if jlcrmitted to heoome
ripe, have eMbled him to hold the Peuinsula alone should
thc French armies fail in nil other parts. In the celltre or
Spain the king, true to his plan of roising a. Spanish party,
was likely to mlly round llim all those of the patriots whom
diwolltent or weakness of mintl or corruption might induce
to seek a plausible excuse for joining the invaders j and on
the nortllem line the French armies, still powerful, WCl'e
strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all tha
important points of Leon and Old CllStille. The great army
which the emperor was carrying to Russia might or might uot
beliuccessful, but this was Mill only moment wlleu nil offensive
war lIgainst his army in Spain .could have been carried on
with snccess: and how could any extensive olfellsiveoperation
have been attempted while Badlljos remflined in the enemy's
possession 1 If \'{ellington had udvaueetl in the north, Soult-
Illaking Badajos his bMe would l\ave threatened Lisbon; if
Wellingtoll marched against the Frcneh centre the SRme thing
would have happened, and the army of the north would also
have acted on his left flank or have retaken Rodngo. If !In
attempt had been made agaiust Soult it must Illwe been by
the lower Guadinna, when the French anJ1Y of Portngal
coming down to Badajos could have either operated against
the rear of tlle allies or agahlst Lisbon.
Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operntions by
the :\llie9, nnd to take it was an intlispensalJle preliminary.
Yet how take it1 By regular or by irregular operations1
For the first a certain time was required, which from the ell pe-
nenee of former sieges it Wll.'l not to bo expected the enemy
would allow. What then would have beeu the rCllnlt if thus
year after year the allies showed they wcre unable c,"cn to
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give battle to their enemies, much less to chase tllem from the
Peninsula. How was it to be expected that England would
bear tbe expell~e of II }lrotracted warfare uffonliug no hope
of final success' How wcre the opposition clamours to be
replied to.in Parliament1 Row were the seeret hopes of tha
continental goverumeuta to be upheld if the military }lOWer of
England, Portugal, and Spain united was unable to meet even
a portion of the secondary armies of NapoleoD, while with
four hundred thouBllnd men he stalked, 0. gigantic eouqucror,
over the wastes of Russia1 To strike irrllgulurly then was
WelIingklu's only resource. To strike without regard to
rules, trusting to the courage of his men aud ro fortune to
bear him through the trial triumphant. Wll8 such a erisis to
be Ilegleeted by a general who luld undertaken on his own
judgment to fight the battle of the Peninsula1 Was he to
give forec to the ligllt declamation of the llour, when general
offieers ill England were heard to 8Il.}' that every defeat of the
Frend} was a snare to decoy the Britisll fnrtllcr into Spain!
Was llC to plaec the probable IOM of a few thousand men,
more or lUllS, in opposition to sueh a conjuncture, nnu by
dediuing the chance offered show that he despaired of success
llimllelf1 Wha.t if he failed 1 he woulcl not havc been, 8sve
the loss of 11 few men, worse off than if he had not attlleked :
in either ease he would have been a buJllel1 general with a
linking cause. But what if he sueceeded1 The horizon was
bright with the coming glory of England!
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BOOK THE SEVENTEENTH
CHAPTER I.
[1812.'
THE English cabinet neither understood nor duly appreciated
t,hc importance of Wellington's winter campaign; but t]16
French saw with anxict), that he Imd snnpfMld the chain binding
him to Lisbon and acquired new military buses on the
Guadiana Ilnd the Agucdu; that he could choose his field of
battle and Spain would soon feel the tread of Ilia conquering
soldiers. Those soldiers seeing ollly the enemy desired
to be led forward, but their genoml had still to encounter
political obstacles. In Splliu the leading men, occupied with
personal intril,'Ucs peruicious projects for the reduction of their
rC\'olted colonies and their new constitution, neglected the
wsr at home. In Portugal and the Bnwils a jealons opposi-
tion to the English general kC!lt pace with his successes, In
Englaud, the cabinet, swayed by Perceval's ll.l1rrow policy,
vacillated betweeu a desire to COUqUCI' aud a fcar of expense.
The Whigs, greedy of office Rnd dexterous in parliamentary
politics, deafened the country with t,beir clamour; the public,
deceived as to the nature of the contest wondered how'
the Freuch kcpt the field, aud with the millu,tel'l:l still doubted
wlletllCr their general was a great man or an impostor. Lord
Wellcslcy's resignation and the consequent predominance of
the Perceval flloCtion left small hope of l\ llllcce~ful termination
to the war; but Welliugton had studiously avoided political
intrigue and his brother'll retirement did not all'ect his ller-
sonal position: he was still the general of England, unde-
graded by factious ties, responsible to llis country only fOT his
IIoCtions, The miniskril might, he Mid, relinquish or continue
the struggle, supply his want...., or defraud the hopes of tIle
nation bJ" timorous economy, his effort.s must be Ilroporlioued
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to his menns; if they were great so would be his enterprises;
but he felt assured the people of Engltmd would not endnre to
forego triumph for a niggard parsimony. It was in this
temper he lllUl besieged B3dajos, and soon afterwards political
affairs in Engll\nd assumed l\ new fonn.
Lord Wellesley opeuly denounced PercevllI's mismanage-
ment of the war, the public mind was uusettled, and the prince
regent, his yenr of restrictions hnving expired, invited the
Whigs to join in a new administrotion. But the heads of tllat
faction woulJ not ware place with Percey"l, and he, luw;ter of
the secrets relating to the detestable persecution of the
prinooss of Wnles, c(mld uot he removed. On the 11th of
May he WllJl however killed in the House of Commons, and tlltlt
honible crime was politically no misfortune to England or
the Peninsula. Fresh negotiatiollS upon a more enlarged
scheme of policy were then commenced, but personal interests
again prevailed. Lord LiverpOOl would uot unite with lord
Wellesley; the Grey and Grenville faction would not serve
their country without having the disposal of all the household
offices; lord Moim, judging a discourtesy to the prince regent
too lligll a price to pay for their adhesion rcfused that con-
dition, and the materinl.s of a now Cl\binet being drawn from
the dregs of the Tory footion lord Liverpool bOOllmc Ilrime
minister. It was Ullforlunste that lord Wcllesley'8 vigoroU8
talent should have been rejected for lord Liverpool's mediocrity,
but this remnant of a party, too WCl\k to domineer, proved
1e&8 mischievous with respect to the Peninsula than the pre-
ceding governments. There was no persoual interest opposed
to Wellington, and the military policy of the Cl\binet yielding
by degrees to the attraction of his 11500nding genius WtlS finally
absorbed ill its meridi:m sptelldocr. Many practiCl\1 improve-
ments llad al80 heen growing IIp in the official departments,
especially in tlUlt of war and colonics, where sir Henry Bunbury,
the under-secretary, an nllle officer cll:perienced in the wants
of an arlllY 011 sen'ice, Ilad reformed the incredible disorders
whie11 pervnded that department during the first years ef the
contest. The re;rult of the polidcnl crisis was therefore eOlli-
rarativc1y fnvoumble to tLe lleninsulll. contest, the stor), of
which shall now be resulliad.
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If Wellington, pursuing his own views, had overthrown
Soun on the banks of the Guadalquivir and destroyed the
'French arsenal at Seville, his campaign would have ranked
amongst the most hardy and glorious that ever graced a
general; and it is no alight proof of the uncertainty of WlIr,
tllll.t combinations so extensi\'c and judicious should have been
marred by the negligence of a few secondary authoritie8 at
pointe distant from the inunediate scenes of action. He had
indeed tlnder·estimat.ed the force oppoacd to him both in the
north o.nd south; bnt the bro.,·ery of bis troops and the moral
power of reeellt success would have horne I·hat error. And
his profound judgment was manifested in the foresight with
which he ell:amilled and provided for everycontingency, although
I,is calculations, embracing the whole system in the Pellinsula,
were necesSll.rily dependent upon the ill-judged operations and
the negligent concert of mell over whom he had little inllueuce:
aU his successes were snatclled from tIle midst of conflicting
political difficulties, as gems brought up from the turbulence
of II wllirlpool. Thus wllCn Castoiios, caproin-general of
Collicin as well as of Estremodura, went to the lutter province
arrer the recapture of Hodrigo, Wellington advised him on all
the probable movements of tbe enemy during the siege of
Dada.jos. Marmont, he told him might msrch into Estremn-
dura with or witllOllt the divisions of Souham rmd Bonnet.
In eithcr CiIllC Abadia should enter Lean, uud according to
his means attack A.storga, Bcnevente, Zamora, and the other
posts fortified by the ellemy there; and Carlos d'Espaiia,
Sanehez, Saornil, in fine all the partida8 of Castille and the
Asturias, evcn Mendi7.l1.bcl, W\1O was tIlen in the 'Montana S1.
Ander, should come to Abadil~'sassistance. He promised thut
the Portuguese cavalry under Silveira and &ecellar shoult!
1lll8S the Simnish frontier, and allOwed Ihat twenty-five thou-
sand men could thus be put in motion on Marmont's rear,
IInd a powerful diversion effected in aid of the siege of Badlljos
nnd the invasion of Andalusia. Then he considered the case of
GlIllicia being invaded by five. divisions of the army of Portugal,
'wllile the three other divisions and the cavalry then in the
valley of the TlIgus and about Bejar acted in concert with
Soult. To help Abadia agaillst thut attack, Bacee]]ar llnd
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Silvcim had orders to hnross tIle left flank aud renr of the
'French with infantry and cavalry 8S mudl as the nature of
the ctlse would admit, regard being had to the safety of their
mw miLitia, nnd to their cOIlIlcxion with the right flank of the
GalJiciull army, whose r<:tr~\t WIIlI to be lJy Gronse. But the
French instend of falling on Gallicill might inn«le l'ortllgal
nortll of the Douro. Abadin was then to ItIlI"llSil their right
f1llnk and rCilr whilo the Portuguese opposed them in frollt:
anti whether they fell ou Gallicia, Portugal or Estremadura,
Carlos d'Esplliia and the partidall and Meudizabel would have
un open field in Loon and Cnstille.
ustl}', tho operiltion which really hnppene<! was considered,
and to Illeet it Wullingwu's arraugcmcnts were, as we have
seen, calC\llated to cover the magazines on the DOllro aud tlle
Mondego; and to force the enemy on to the hll.1Ten difficult
liue of couutl'y leading towlll'd CWltello Brll.Jloo, while Abadil~
and the guerilla. chiefs entered Cnstille and Leon on his tear.
Carlos cl'Espai'ia had also been ordered to break down the
bridges on the Yeltes and the Huellto in frOllt of Hodrigo,
snd that of Bm'ha. de l'uetco on the Agneda.. Marlllout
would tl111s have been delayed two days, and tlte mlign.:r.inea both
at Castcllo Branoo lllld CeLorieo sll.ved by the ncar approach
of the allied army, but ESIJlIilll. did none of these things,
neither did Abadia nor Mendizabel operate so lIS to be felt;
and their remissness, conJllcd with the other fanlts noticed,
marred Wellington's defensive armngelllcnts and brought him
back to fight Mannont. When tho.t general passed the
Aguoo/l. in retreat, the allies in default of the provisions so
foolishly sacrificed lit CllstcltO Branco could not follow, and the
distant IUtlo"'Uincs 011 the Douro and MOlldego were the only
resources. Then also Rodti~ and Almeida were found un·
provided, and ete they eould be furnished nnd the inter4
mediate maguzilles 011 the COlllllluuications restored it was loo
late to invade Andalusia.. For lIS the harvest tipens thcte
early in June, IInd a fortnight Inter ill Estremll.dnra, Marmont
eould hln-e followed march by march; and Nilpo[eoll had
tepelltedly told him tllllt he had only lo watch Wellington,
becanse a temporary absence ftom Castille was of little C{ln~
sequence while the army of the north guarded the cow-
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municatioll with France. Thus the greater mcROI! and better
arrangements for supply would havo been lost for the allies,
and the discontent of the Rodrigo garrison and the npproilCll
of ll. new balteriug-lraill from li'rallce made it dangerous to
move far from that fortress. Moreover Castanos like his
predoce<lsors failed to bring the GlIllician flrmy into acti\"ity,
and again painfully proved Umt no aid would C(llnC from thflt
quarter.
Wellington, yielding to uecessitr, then revolved other pro-
ject.s. The harvest north of the Grcdoe and Gata mountains
being mnch lilter tlum in Estremadura. find Andalusia, would
preserve his commissariat superiority in the field longest there;
ami a decisive blow girell to MlIrtllQut wouh.l certainly relieve
Audalusin, becauI;C 1fllJrid would tllcn fall, and Soult, cut otl'
from the great communication with Frllllce, would fear to
remain. Hence to force n battle upon Marmont became the
ohjed of the moment, and it might be etl'l.Wtoo by a vigorous
invasion of CasUlle; but a happy result depellded on the
relative skill of the generals and the numbers and goodness
of the troops. Marmont's rellutation WlIS great, yet hitherto
the CS!!l\ys 11ad been in favour of the Englishman's tnlents.
The British infuntry WM eXl.WUent, the cavulry well horsed
and more numeroU8 than it had e,'er been; the French cavalry
had been greatly rcdul.Wd by dmfts for the Russian contC$t, by
the separation 01 t]le army of the north from that of Portugal,
and by frcquCl1t and harilSsing marchcs. Marmont eould
indeed obtain horsemen from tho army of the centro and the
army of the llorth; but his own were weak autI his artillery
badl,r horsed, whereas the allies' guns were powerfully equipped.
Evcry man in the British llrmy e:<pected victory, and this was
the time to seck it, oo-,auJ>e, lI'iihout pitched battles tho Frendl
could never be dispossessed of Spllin, and they were now com-
paratively wcakel' thull tIJey hall. yet Ul.Wll or wero expeeted
to be; for sueb witS the influence of Napoleon's stupendous
geui'us, that his complete success in Russia alld return to the
Peninsula with overwhelming forces WAS not doubted even by
the British commander. The time and chances were thero-
fore Prolliliolls, aUll it was ouly lleteS.'lllry to eombille the
primary and secondary 0pcl'l\tiolls so as to isolate llnnul,lut
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long enough to force 8. battle. If that result was not obtained.
there would still be 8. gain, booouse the marel! of the other
generals to his aid would relieve many places and give the
Spaniards opportuuities to act, which was II.lw<\ys the OOgis Of
Wellington's plans: in fille, whilo ho had Portng;11 as a strong-
hold for retroo.t any ollcllsive movement lJoyond hel' frontier
could not fat! to burt the French.
To effect this i8011ltion of Marmont's army the first COli-
dition was to be early in the field us the rainy season would
pemlit, and before the coming harvest enabled the other
Freneh armies to move. But Ml\rmont could avail himself
in succession of the Tormes and tho Douro to protTlICt the
campaign until the ripening of the harvest euabloJ. reinforoo-
ments to join him; and hence the security of the allies' flanks
and reaf during the operations, and of their retl'C<lt if over-
powered, WlUl to be previously looked to. Soult might attack
lIill witll superior numbers, or detl1Ch a force across the
'l'agus, whieh in conjunction with the army of the centre, now
dirootcd by Jourdan, could advlUlee upon Portugal by the
\'alley of the 'l'agus. Bouts and lUAgazincs supplied from
Toledo :md Madrid were already being collected at the fort of
Lugar Nnevll. near AlmllrfLZ, IlDd from thence lIS from a !llac\l
of Qnus tht! French could move upon Corill., Plusencin, :md
Cnstello Branco, menacing Abrantes, Celorieo, Ciudatl
Rodrigo, and Almeidll., while. detaclllllents from the anny
of the nortl! reinforced the army of Portugal. But to ouviate
this Il(st dll.nger Wellington planned one of those enterprises
which are regarded with llStonishment whcl\ achieved, and
attributed to madncas when they fail.
It has been before l>tllted that the left bank of the Tagus
from Toledo to AlmarfLZ is linC(1 with ruggell mountains, the
Wl~r8 through which, impracticable for un anny, are diflieult
even for sman divisions;-thllt from Almaraz to the frontier
of 1'0rt\lgal the couutrr is more open, )'et still difficult, aud
the TaguB only to be crossed at certain points to which bad
roads leading tllrough UlouutlLius d%C\lnded, But frolll.
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Alm:naz to Alcantara. all the bridges bad heen long ruined,
and those of Arzobisl>O and TlIlll.vern, situated between
Almaraz and Toledo, were of little vnluc because of the
mountains. Soul~'8 pontoon equipage had been taken in
Ba.dlljoa, nlld the l<~rench had therefore no ptl8S,1.O'C over the
Tagus front Toledo to Portugal save by Marmont'a hoat.
bridge at Almaraz, Wllich was protected by three forb and
El bridge-hea.<!. One of those forts, called lUigusa, was a
magazine, and though not finished was very strong, being
i!lIukoo with 11 fiel\( work autl havillg within it "' loopholed
stone tower twenty-the feet bigll. On the south sirle of !.he
Tugus the bridf,'e had a fortified head of masonry, flanked by
a redoubt called Fan Napoleon, placed on n height in advance..
This fort, imperfectly constructed inasmuch as 3 wide berm in
the middle of the SCllrp enabled escaladiug troops tu land and
refix their ladders, was strong, having a seeond interior
defence with a loopholcd stonc t.ower, ditch, drawbridge, and
palisades.
These works, armed with eighteen guns and garrisoned
with a thousaud men, insured cOlllmand of the river; but Lhe
muuutuillil on the left buuk precluded the passage of au army
towards lower Estremadura save by the royal road to Truxillo,
v.>hieh, five miles from tile river, passed over the rugged Mira-
bete ridge, on the summit of which other works wcre dra-wn
aeross the throat of the pass. 'l'here WIiS also a large fortified
house connected by smaller posts with the ancient watch-
tower of Mirab.ete, wbich itself contained eight guns and was
sl1froundcd by a mmparl twelve foot high. If all these forti-
fieatiolls and the Roman fond of tll(l Puerto de Pico, wh.ich
W:LS lIeillg repuircd, Imd 1Jecn completed, the eommUlliclItioll
between 8ou1t and :llarmont anhough eircuiwus would lJave
been secure. Wellington feuring this, had l\S before related,
arranged a fine enterprise, wi~h design to surprise them
previons to the siege of Badajos: hc wus then thwarted by
the Portuguese government, hut llOW directed Hill to attempt it
with a force of six t-housand men, including four hundred·
ca..-alr}', two ficld batteries, six iron twenty-fonr pound
howit7.cra, and a pontoon train. The affair WNI now how-
ever one oi extreme delicacy. When the army was round
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Badajos tllc resistance of thc forts only was to be cared
for. At this time Foy's division was in tIle valley of the
l'agus---D'Armllgnac occupied TlIlllvcrll with troops from the
army of the centre-Dronet had eight thousaud J(ll!tph" Cor-
infantry at IIillojosa de Cordoba, and his cavalry I..,.pond~nce,
1tlSS.
was on the road to 'Mcrlellin; he was consequeutly
nearer to Merida than Bill was to Almuruz lInd might
easily intercept his retreat. Soult also could detach a force
from Seville, by St. DlIala, against sir Willinlll Erskine, wllO
was with t!le cavtdry lllld the remainder of Hill's infantry ncur
Almendralcjos.
Wellington having considered these points scnt Gral\(l,m to
Portalcgrc with the firs' and sixth divisions and Cotton's
Cllvall')', Bnd thus, including Erskine'a corps, twenty thoUSllnd
lllelL were ready to (lrotect Hill; but Drouet might still illt.er-
pose between him liud ErskillC and beat them ill detail before
Ornham eould come up, wh(lrcfore other combilllltioll9 were
maue. }'irst; 'fhe moment for action WIIS chosen when Soult-,
bllvillg sent detachments in various directions to restore his
comnluuieutions in Andalusia, had mar<:hed llimself with '"
divisiou to Cadiz. Secondly: Rumours adroitl}' spread, {lud
deUIOIl$lrutiolls with the Portuguese militia of the Alcmtejo,
caused the French to beli.~ve ten thousand men were moving
dowll the GUlH]ianl'l towards tilc Ni(lbla., prcj)l\l'fItory to the
invasion of Andlllusio, a l:otion upheld by the force undcr
Grahalll,-by cavalry purlics being pushed towards the
Morcnll,-by restoring the bridge at Mcridll, with the avowed
intentiou of sending Hill's battering find pontoon troin to
Alwcudralcjos,-aud by covering the CoNoha. rouds with
exploring officers, who made o~tentatious inquiries as to the
FreD~h posts on that side of Andalusia.
All unexl~ded diflielllt,Y oecun'cJ at Merida. 'l'wo ard'CIl
of tbe bl'idge had been brohn, the opcning was slxt}' feet
llDd large timber was senr<:c; Hill's mar(lh was thus u(luger-
ollsly dolllYcJ u fortlliglJt. 011 the 12th of ],hy however hI)
crossed the Gundinnu and re(lch·ed his pontoOJIS llnd !J(lflVY
howit1.cTS, which Cllme from Eln'l9 by the Montijo road, and
it wa.~ 11 large convoy; for fift}' country carts besides the gun8
and Iimbu carriages were used for the pontoolls, ladders,
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and ammunition. The 15th he reached Truxillo. Mean-
while to mislead the French the par~idag of the GUlldalupe
mountains came down to different points between AlmaNL7.
ond Arzobispo, as if seeking for a place to CllSt 0. bridge thnt
Hill lIIight unite with Wellington in the north. Foy's spies
gave him timely and true notice that Hill had crossed the
Gundinna, but they also told him, and he believed
r:~~ Report, them, tllRt gclleral IJad fifteen thou8lIond mCIl,
and that two brigades of cavalry followed: onc
report C\'CU raised his force to thirty t·housand.
On the 16th, Hill lllwing reached Jaraicejo formed three
columns and made a night mflTcll, intending to surprise
simultanoously the tower of Mimbete, the fortified house in
the pass, and the forts at tile bridge of Almaraz. His left
column directed against the tower Wll3 under general Chowne,
-the centre, having tIle dragoons and artillery, moved by the
royal road under general Long,-the right~ composed of the
liftieth, seventy-fiue, and nine~Y-8ecolld rogimcnts under Bill
in person, was to penetrate by the narrow and difficult way of
L Cueva and Roman Gonlo to the bridge. Day broke before
the columns reached their destillll.tion and all hopes of Bur·
IJrise were e.);tiuguished. 'fhis UlltowUrd beginning was
unavoidable on the part of the right aud centre column, hut
if Chowne l18d not been negligent lie might llave carried die
ClIstlo of Mirabete before daylight.
An attentive examination convinced Hill that to reduce all
the Mirabete works he must inenr more loss than was justifi-
able, and finish in 811Ch plight that llc could not afterwards
take the forts at the bridge, the ehief objects of his e.''(pedi-
tion: yet it WlIS culy through the pass of MirJ.beto thut the
artillery could move against the bridge. In this dilemma,
after losing tho 17th and part of the 18th in fruitless attempts
to discover some opening through whieh to reach the valley
of Almllmz with his guns, he resolved to loove thom on tilo
sierra with the centre colunlll, make a false attack on the
tower with Chowne's foree, aud secretly march himself by
Roman Gordo to stonn the other forts defended by eighteen
b'UUS aud powerful b'llrrisons! This rewluwou wus lIlore hanly
~ it would appear withou~ reference to the general state
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of alTairs. For his march had been secret and amidst variou8
divisions of the enemy, and he was four days' journey from
MeriJa, his first tlOint of retreat,-he expected Drouet would
be reiuforced and advance towards lIlcdelliu, and hellctJ,
defeated or victoriOU8 at Almam7., Ilis own retreat would be
difficult,-exeeedillgly so if defeated, because his British
troops could uot 00 repulsed with a small Ju~s, 1111(.1 he should
113,'e to fall back through a. difficult country, with soldiel'll
dispirited by failure find burtll(lned witll wounded mell.
Then harassed in fluuk by Drouet, pursued by Foy amI
D'Armaguac. he would have been exposed to misfortunes, awl
every slanderous tongue would have been let loose on the rash-
ness of attacking impregnable forts: a military career hitherto
80 glorious might thus have terminated in shame, but totlllly
devoid of interested ambitiou Hit! was unshakcu.
'I.'he trooJls relllained concealed in thcir position lmtil the
evening of the 18th, and theu the gtmcml, reinforcing hig
owu column with the sixth Portuguese regilllcut a OOIllPllUY
of the sixtietb ritles Ilnd the artillerYlncll of the centre
column, commenced the dillicl1lt descent of the valley. He
dClligncd to storlll Fort Napoleon ixlfore daylight and the
lUan:L. Wllij less thau six miles, hut the leawug troops only
arrived a little hefore daylight and it WM doubtful if the
sroling-ladders, which had helm cut in halvC5 to thread the
short narrolV turns in the precipitous de~llt, would serl'll
for 1111 assault. Fortuuately some slIlall llills concealed the
llClld of tlle column, aad at that moment CholVlle commence(l
the false attack on the castle of Miro.bctc. Pillars of white
smoke rose 011 the lofty brow of the sierra, the heavy soun\1
of artillery came rolling over the w.lley, and the garri~on of
Fort Napoleon crowding on thc ramparts were anJtionsly
gll.ziug at these pol'tentolls sil,"uS of \v1Ir, when, qnick and
loud, a British shout broke on thcir eilU and the fiftieth
regiment, aided by a willg of the seventy-first, CIIllIe bounding
over the lleurest hills.
Surprised the French were to see an enemy so close while
the Mirabete was still defended, yet they were not unprepare.l,
for a lllltrole of English co.\"alry had been seen from the fort
on the .17th in tbe pass or Homflu Oordo; llud in the eveniug
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of tllo 18th Il woman of that village hat! earried exact in~
formation of Hill's numbers nnd intentions to Lugnr Nuevll.
This intelligence had caused the commandant AUOcrt to
march in the night with reinforcements to Fort Na!loleoll,
wllich was therefore defended by six companies, including tho
thirty~niJlth Frond} ond the voltigeurs of 0. foreign regiment.
Ikiug really to figLt, wllon th(l first shout WIlS heard they
turned their llcads and wit·h a heavy fire of musketry nnd
artillery smote the assailants in front, while the guns of Fnrt
Rngusll took them in flank from the Ollposito side of the
riverj yet u rise of ground only twenty yunls from the fllm-
parts soon covered the British from the frout fire lInd general
Howard leading the foremost troops i;nto the ditch com-
menced the escalade. The gnat breadth of the bcnn kept off
t.he enUs of t.he shorlened ludders from the pumpet, but the
soldiers who first ascended jumped on to the bel'm itself and
dmwing up the ladders planted them thcre, then with l\
seeond escalade they force<! their way over the rampart, wllcn,
closely fighting, [ricuds aud enemies went together iuto the
retrenchment round the stone tower. Aubcrt was wouuded
aud taken, the tower was not defended and the garrison fled
towards the bridge· head, but tllO victorious troops would not
be shaken off, they entered that work al80 ill one confused
Jllass with the fugitives who continued their flight over the
bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed their headlong
charge slr~yiug the hindmost, and they would JInVC passed the
river if some of the bllllts had not Ucen destroyt'<! by stray
ghots from the forts which were DOW sharply cannonading
each other, for the English artiller.rmen had turned tIle guns
of Napoleon on Fort RaguSll.
Many of the French looped int.o tho water and were
drowned, the greatest part were Illade prisouers, :md to the
amazement of the conquerors the panic spread to the other
side of the river; jllC garrison of Fort H.aW1SIl., although
perfectly safe, abandoned that fort (1180 and fled with t.ho
others along the road to Naval Moral. &me greuadiers of
t11e ninety·scooDd, swimming over, brought baek several boats
with whieh the bridge was restored IIn(l Fort Ikgusa Sllso was
wall. The towers and otber works'were destroyed, the .storc~,
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ammunition, provisions, and boats burned, and In the night
the troop3 rcturneu to the ~icrrlt above, cnrrying with them
the colours of the foreign regiment and two hUllured ilnd
fifty prisoners, including a. cOllnunndant and sixtccn other
officers. The victors lost one hunured find eighty men, an
officcr of artillery was killed by his own mine after the action,
tlllt! capt:,in Canuler, a brave mUll, fell at tbe heat! of tile
fiftieth grclll\dicl'S Oll the rampart of Fort Napoleon. Hill's
first intention was to have directed a pnrt of his column
ognillilt the bl'idgc-head, lLSsailillg both works together; but
when the difficulties of the roau lllluTed t.hat llrojeet he fell
00 the nearest work with tIle leading troops, leaving the rear
to follow IlS it eonld, 'rhis promptness was nil esscntial cause
of success, for foy, he,lriug on the 17th thnt tIlt! ullies were
at 'fruxillo, ~:ad ordered D'Armaglllle to reinforce Lugar
Nnevll with a battnlion, wllich bting at Naval
Moral the 18th might havo entered Fort RilgUSQ. ~,'lt' 1{~port.
~ ~:s.
curly ill Ule morning of the IDthj iL diu 1I0t
however move until deven o'dock, find then meeting the fugi_
tives on the fond clIIlgl11 the pllnie and returned.
llliraLetc boiug \lOW cut off from the l'ight mlllk of the
Tagus Hill WllS preparing to redueo it with his heavy lll,til-
ler)') when a report from Erskine eauseu him in conformity
witll his instructions to commence a retrellt on 1I1cri(ln,
lenving Mirllbeto LloekudeJ Ly thc partiuas of the ncighbollr-
hood. Boult while nt Chiclaua hud hoard of tlle expedition
the IDlb, )·et only desired Drouct to mnke ll. diversion ill
Eslrelllnuura without losiug his communication with AIlUIl-
lusia; for the object of the enterprise escapeu him, and think-
ing he had ouly to check a movement whieh tIle king told
him wus mnde for the purpose of joining Wellingtoli resolved
to euforoo Hill'g stay ill Es!,remauura. In this ....iew he
recalled his detachments from the Nicbla where they had
just dispel"8Cd 11 body of Splluin.'ds at Cnstillcjos, llnd theo
forming u. large uivision at Seville purpo:sed to strengthcll
Drouet and enable him to fight a battle. But that general
antieip<lting his orders had pushed an ndvallccd gual'd of four
thoUSll.ud men to DOll Benito the 17th, :1IIt! his ca.valry
putrolcs passing the Guadilluu 011 the 18th had se:Jurcd the
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roads to Minjndus alld Meriua, wllile Lallemantl's dmgooDs
drove bnek the British ont-posts on tl1e side of Znfrn.
Confused by these demonstrations Erskine reported to
Grnham and to Bill that Soult wus ill ]~trcmadura with hia
whole army, wl1ereupon Grahnm ClIme up to ]~\llnj03 and
Hill retired from Mirabetc. On till! 26th he renched Merid&
11l1molested, and then DrOllet withdrew his auvflllccd guards
and Grnham returned to Castell0 de Vide. Kotwithstanding
tltis error Wellington's precautions llad succe<!ded, for if
Drouet had known Hill's renl object he would with the whole
of his troops, more than tell tllOusand, hllve mnreheJ rapidly
from Medcllin to fall upon llim as llC clime out of the plISScs
of Truxillo, tllld before Erskillc or Grahlllll could oome to IliB
aidj whereas, suppo.~ing he meaned to cross the Tagus his
demonstrations merely hastened tl1e retreat and sn\'ed Mira-
bete. To strike Hill in tho right place would llOwever have
required nioo arrnngcment9 find great activity, ns he could
have made his retreat by the road of eaeeres as well as by that
of Merida.
Wclliu!.10n although very disoonteuted that Erskiue'l; false
alarm had rendered the success incomplete, avoided any
publie expression of displeasure, lest the enemy who had no
apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete should
be led to keep it, and so cmbarr/lS.'l the allies when thcir
ollerations should require a. restorntion of the hridge of
Almaraz. To tllc ministers however he complained that hiB
generals, stout in action personally as the poorest soldiers,
were commonly IlO ovcrwhdwed with fellr of responsibility
when left to t.hemselvca that the slightest mow:ment of tlle
elleroy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread
unnecEssary alarm far and wide. Instead of expressing his
surprise, he should rather have relk-.::wtl on the cause of this
weakness. Every Brit·ish general kllew that without power·
ful iuterest his futlLro prospects and reputlltion for past
services would wither together under the first blight of mis·
fortune; that a selfish government would offer him up a yictim
to a misjudging public and a ribald press with wbom sn~ss is
the only criterion of merit. English generals sre fl.lld must
be prodigal of their blood to gain reputation, but they are
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neeesslU"ily timid in command when Ilo single failure even
without fl ftlult consigns them in age to shame and misery;
it is however undeniable that Erskine was not an able officer.
The king was equlllly disconl£nled with Soult, whose refusal
to reinforce Drouet had, he Mid, Cllused the loss of Almaraz;
aDd he affirmed that if Hill had been more enterprising, the
arseDal of Madrid migbt have fallen as well as the depSt of
Almaraz, for he thought that general llad brought up his
wiwlelorce instead of six thouaand men.
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WmLE the Anglo-Portuguese army was t,hu~ cleansing and
strengtllelling its position 011 the frontier of Portugal the war
ill other Ilurt8 Imd not been favourable. It has been shown
how Gallicia suffered from discord poverty n.nd ill~~ucccss ill
the field; that an extraordinary impost had been resisted by
all classes, especially at Corniia, and that tlle nnny torn
by fllotion wus become hateful to the people. In tllis 6tt1.te of
nllhirs the SCilt of government was removed to St. Jngo, the
troops in the Bierzo being placed under Portazgo. The prn-
dent oonduct and personal influence of Castanos who directed
these ehull&'Cs soothed indeed the J.,itternoss of fnction, lIlIl] the
regcney then assigned sixty thOIlSllnd men for the quotn. of
the province: but the revcnues were insufficient to put the
troops already under arms in motioll, and Castanos CQuld not
while Manuont WIUl Oil the Aguedu. bring even one division
into the field. As IISUnJ, appliClltion was made for Euglish
succours, y..t it was admitted Castm-lOs and the junta this
time made unusual exertions to ameliorate the soldiers' condi-
tion. Sir lIoward Douglas however still relied more on the
wlIrfllre of tue jJlIrtidllB, lInd his !>oliey, ulren.dy described,
was beneficinl; yet it was so offensive to the regular officers
and the predominant faction in tl1C Coms, always jealous of
the priestly iufluence, that !le was offered the command of six
thOUSlllld regulars to detach llim from the guerilla system.
Indeed the partidas would now have been entirely sU]lpresscd
by the supreme government if lord Wellington and sir
Henry Wellesley had not strenuously sUPl>orted the "iews of
Douglas.
From &lnmnnca to Irun the French communication WfIS
continually menaced by tlle Gallieian and Asturian forces, by
the English squlLdrons, by the partidas of the Moutaiill de
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oontander, of Biscay, of the Rioja, and those from Bnrgos,
and the Liebanll.. The occupation of the Asturias, a division
cousbllltly in the MOllt.o.ila, a corps threatening Gllllicin, and
the great strcngth of tl1c arlllY of the north were al1 consc-
quences of this stat4} of afTair3, and the military communication
was tl\us laboriouslymaintaincd; but the lines of correspondence,
011 which all concert of movements depended, were very
insecure, aud NUjJoleou continually excited his generals to
Beize en,ry lull in Wellill~>toll'S wurfare to put down the
bands. Without English succour he said thcy could not exist,
and as the seeret of tlu:ir strength was Oil the coast all points
favouring tllCir interoonrsc with English vessels should be
fortified; hc even directed at this time, that the whole
anllY of th6 north should bll cmploJed merely to scour tho
lines of corrcspondence. With n view to this phm of opera·
tions he I1M caused Santona to be made a very strong post
in the summer of 1811; and then Cll8tro, Portagalcre,
Bernco, ksquito, lInd Guetaria were likewise fortifieJ, and
btltweeu those sea-port!; all churcLLes, couvents, nnd 11Irge houses
nenr tho mouths of creeks find rivers wero entrenched. 'I'he
partidaa were thus debarred the coast and nearly eft:'\Ced in
the latt-er end of that year; but when the siege of Rodrigo
caused llonnet to evacuate the Asturias, the Montana was
ngain open to the seveutll army which was illllllcdiately suc.-
coured by Douglus, and being composoo priuciJmlly of po.r-
tidns WIL'J twcnty-tlnx:e thousand strong. In Mnreh, 1812,
Napoleon directed Bonnet to re-occupy the Asturias, but tIle
pnss of Pajares was then choked with snow amI he waited for
fiuer weather.
Iu May, MlIrlllon~ having returned frolll !)Oliugnl, tlll~
order was reiterated, aud the FrenclL tfPOPS Oil the OrlJijo,
augmented to fifteen thousand, <lrew the attention of tho
Callieians to tl1at qunrwr while Bonnet passing the moun-
tains of Loon with cight thousand lllell rc-occupied Oviedo,
Grado, au(1 Gihon, and established small posts communieating
through the town of Loon with the army of PortugaL Thus
u. new military line wua established which interrupted tho
Cal1icians' communication witl1 the pl\rtidllS j the chl\in of sea-
port defences was then contiuued to Gihon, a constllllt inWr.
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course with France was maintained, and those convoys came
safely by water which otherwise would have had to travel by
land esooTkd by many troops and in constant danger. Mar.
mont I\t the same time spread his troops in the province of
Leon, and, though harassed at first by the bands, fortified Toro
ami Zumorn 011 the Donro and converted tllrcll convents at
Salamanca into forts capllble of sustaining a regular siege: the
works of Astorga. and Leon were also improved, and posta
entrenched at Benevente, La Baneza, eastro Contrigo and
other points. The lines of the Tormes and Donro were thus
strengthened against the Eritish general, and four thousand
men sufficed to hold the Gallicians in the Bierzo and Puebla
de Senabria in check. Then the vast fertile plains of Levu
called the Tierra8de Campoa belonged to the French and their
dctachmcnta soon chnscd away thc buuds.
Sir Hownrd Douglas observing these things, and con-
sidering also, if Wellington should make progress in the
coming campaign that uew lines of communication with the
sea would be desitable, prop08ed that a. powerful squadron
with a batmIion of marines and a. battery of artillery should
be secretly prepared for a littoral warfare on the Biscay coost.
On this suggestion sir Home Popllam was sent from England
in May with a squadron, having on board scaling-ladders,
UTlllfl, clothing, and ammunition for the pnrtidas, and all
means to effect sudden disembarkations. But tIle ministers,
never able to sce the war in a true point of view, were alwa)'s
desponding or elated and sanguine beyond what reason 'var-
rauted. Popham WIUI ordered to seize some point and hold it
permancntly lIB an entrance into BiBC8Y by which tllo French
might be turned, if, as in 1808, they were forced to adopt the
line of the Ebro! Now at this period morc than three hun-
dred thousand Frendl .soldiers were in the Peniusula, one
bundrcd find twenty thousand were ill the northern provinces,
and witllout reckoning the army of the ecntre which could
also be turned in that direction, nearly fifty thousand were
expressly appropriated to the protection of this very line on
which a thousand lllarines were to be permanently established,
in expectation of the encmy being driven over the Ebro by a
'campaign whieh was not yet commenced I
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While Marroont was yet in Bcira, the seventh anny AM the
partidas of the Montana were excited to actIvity with sup-
plies transmitted through the Asturian ports by Douglas, but
the ferocity of the lealien was atrocious. Mina's conduct
was &lid to be revolting, and Merino having taken l;Ollle lilIll·
dred prisoners in April neAr Arando. hanged them all, sixty
ill retaliAtion for tll~e members of the 10041 jllllta. pnt to
death by the French; the others in the proportion of ten for
each soldier of his who had been shot by the enemy J The
ignorance and the excited passions of the guerilla chiefs may
be pleaded in mitigntion; bnt to the liisgrncc of England
Mcrino's mnrdcrs were rccorded with complacency in the
London newspapers and met with no public reprobation.
There arc occasions when retaliations may stop barbarit)" yet
the necessity should be clearly shown aud tlLC excrcise
restricted to thtl lIurrowest limits. Here sixt), innooout per-
sons WOre butchered to revenge the death of thrcc, and 110
proof offcred that those three were slain contrary to the laws
of war; bnt though the French conunitted many atrocities,
some in wantonness some in revenge, such savage deeds as
the cumte's are illcxcus"b1e. Whut if WQl>hingtoll had banged
twenty English gentlemen of family in retum for the death
of captain Hlllldy1 or sir Henry Clinton had caused twenty
American officers to die for the e:xeeutioll of Andr051 These
atrocities are inevitable in a guerilla system not subordinate
to the rcgulur gov\lrnmeut of urmies, aud they recoilu]loll
the helpltll>l> people of the eouutry who cannot fly from their
enemiefl. When the French occupied a district famine often
ensued, because, to avoid distant forages, they collected large
stores of provision from a small extent of conntry, and thus
the guerilla system while it harassed the French without
starving them harassed and starved the peollle. And lllauy
ehiofs who dared not otherwiso revenge 1Ilrronts or private
feuds would slay prisoners or stragglers so as to draw down
French vengeance on an obnoxions village or district, llnd this
produced associations of the llCollle for self defcnce, by which
the euemy profited.
After this inhuman ad Merino, finding a, large couvoy had
mnrehed from Burgos towards France endenvoured to interccpt
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it; and hIendizabel, whQ, notwithstanding his defeat by Bonnet,
had again gathered twelve Imudred cavalry, came from tlle
Liebana and occupied thc heights above Burgos. The French
immediatelY}llaeed their bagguge and followers in the castle
and recalled the eOJn'oy, wherenpon tLe Spaniards, dispersing
in bands, destroyed the fortified posts of correspondence fit
Sasamon and Gamonal and then returned to the Liebaull,
But Bonnet had now re-occupied the Asturias, the remnant of
the Spanish force ill thnt quarter !led to Memlizabcl ami t!m
whole shifted as they could ill the hills. Mina then displuyed
great cuergy. In February he repulsed an attack near Lorlosa,
lInd havillg conveyed the }lrisoners taken at Huesca to tIle
COllSt returned to Aragon and maintained It distant bloeknde
of Zaragoza itself. In March he advanced with a detachment
to Pina, captured one of Suchet's convoys goillg to lIequi-
nellz.a, and retired witll Ilis booty to llobl'es, a village on the
eustern slopes of tho Sierra. do Aleul>i(~rre. He WllS there
betr.Jyed to Pannetier, who camc with a brignde of the army
of the Ebro so suddenly uIJon llim that he escaped death with
difficulty. Ho re-appcnrcd in the Rioja, and though clll1sed by
troops from the firmy of the north csenped without much
loss lInd secrctly gained the defiles of Navas '1'0108a behind
Vitoria, wherll, on the 7th of April, having still £~·e thOUS:llld
men, he defeated a Polish regiment which was escorting the
enormous convoy thnt' had cscnpeu the curatc nud Mcmlizabel
at Burgos. Tile booty consisted of treasure, Spanish prisoaer3;
bagg~«e, followers of the army, and officcrs retiring to Francej
nil the Spanish IJl'isoners, four hundrl-J in number, were
released and joined Uina, and it is suid that one million of
frunes fell into his hallds, besides the equipages, arms, store3,
aud a quantity of ehureh plate.
On the 28tll he captured anotller convoy going from
Vnlcneia to Frunce, hut Ahl>C, rctently mndo govenlOr of
Navarrc, now directed combined movelllellts from Pampelulla,
b·.:a, lInd &1ngiiesa, ag,~illst hilll. And so vig-orously did
this geneml, declared by 1l1inu to be the IllOst formidahltl 01
all his opponents, nrge on tbe 0llcrauolls. thnt nfter It series of
actions on thll 25tll, 26th, lInd 28th of May, the Spanish
chief, in bad pligllt and with the utmost difficulty, escaped by
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!.os AreOll to Gllardia in llle Rioja: marsllul Victor seized
the 0JlPQ~tllllity to pul;S into Frauoo with the re-
mains of the convoy shattereu on the 7th, and all
the l>nnds ill the north were discoll1'llged; but Wellington's
successes, aad the confusion attending tIle departure of so
many French troops for thc Russian war, gave a powerful
stimulus to tlle partisan chiefs in other directions. The Empe-
cinado, ranging tllC moulItflins of Cuenca and Guadalaxara,
pu~hoo his ptlrties close to M:l'.lrid,-Durllll cntcred Soria alld
raised fl contribution ill the lower town,-Villa Campfl, UMSo-
caur, find Montijo, collling from the roounUiills of AlbarrAein,
occupied Molino and Oreguclla, and invested Daroea,-GAyan,
taking post in tIle yieiuit;>, of Belchite, made excursions to
the very gates of Zar""'oza,-the Froyle, haunting D> ,. 'v
." ••"nl, c ..
tlw llluulltaillS of Alcauitz Rnd the Sicrm do Gudur,
interrupted Suehet's lines of communicntion by Morelln nnd
Teruc1, and along the right bank of the ELm towards TortoU\..
Finally, Gay and Mirallcs infested the Garriga 00 the left bank.
It WIIS to repress these bands that the army of the Ebro,
containing twenty thousand meu of WllOlli sixteen thousand
were ullder Ul'll.lE, was formed by drafts from Suehet's llrlllY
and given to lkille. That gelleral repaired to Lcrida, Ollcurir.d
Upper Amgon with llis OWll division, placed Scveroli'g between
Lerida and Zaragoza, and Frere's betwecnLcridn,U..'lTCeloJla, and
'l'aragona; hut hi.!! fourth division under Palombiui elltered the
districts of Sarin and Colatayud to connect Suchet with Caffn·
relli, who llOW commanded the firmy ofthe llortll. The imperial
guards, one division excepted, having quitted Spnill, this ormy,
including the governments alld the reserve of MOlltllion, was
thus reduced to forty-eight thousand nnder arms; the reserve at
Bayonne was therefore increASed to five thousand men, and P,,,"
lombini was destined fina\l;>' to reinforce CoffilTelli and even to
march if required to the aid ofl\hrlllont. Evcnts howcvcr soon
ClluSed IkilJll to repail· to NnVllrr(llllHl broke up the nnllY of
the Ebro; wllCrefore it will be clearer to trace tho op(lmtiolls
of llis divisions sepilTlltcly ill the order of the llrovillccs
townrds which they were lit first directed.
Palombini relieved Daroea on the 23rd of February, and
findiug that Villa CawIJ8, MOlltijo, llnd Dassecour, waited fer
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him about tIle pa.sses of Toralva he turned them by the
XiloCil., rencheJ Call1tayud and fortified the COllvcnt of La
PCi'iIl, a. rocky eminence cOInmanding tlmt city find forming a
part of it. But on the 4th of Yardl, having placed his bag-
gage and artiUcry in this post under a guard of three llUndred
men, lIe JisIJers,:d his troops to Sl..'(Iur the country ulL(l colle<:t
provisions; whereupon the partidns reoommenced opcmtions,
and Villa Cumpll, cutting off two companies at Cumpillo the
8th, made a fruitless attelllpt to destroy the Italiull. colonel
pjsa at Ateca. Fivo hundred lIlell were scut agaillst him,
but he drawing them towards the moun\:.ll.ins of Albllrrncin
destroyed tllcm at Pozonhonda on the 28th, und SOOIl afwr
drove the Italians from their posts of communication as far
as the tOWIl of Albllrruclu on the roaU to 'reruel; nor did he
return to tlie mountains until Palombini coming up killed
some of his men. 'l'!le Italian general then changing his
plan concentrated his division on the pluins of llused, where
he Hulfereu Home privatiolJs but remained unmolested until
the 14th of April, when he again marched to co·operate with
Suchet ill a combined attempt to destroy Villa Campa, Tlle
Spanish chief evaded bot,h by passing over to the soutllern
slopes of the Albarnlcin mountains, UI\(I beful"e the ItalillllB
oould return to HlISCd, Gaya.n, in concert with t]10 nlcalde oC
Calutayud, had exploded a plot against the convent of La
refia.
Some of the It..,liull officers, illcluolillg the CQIllDilllldullt,
roslJly accepted an invitation to tl fC:ll.5t. While sitting at
t,able Garllll appCll.red on a neig-hbouring height, the guests
were seized, many armed citizells ran UI) to surprise the con-
vent and sixty soldiers wero made prisonel"il 01" killed in the
tumult below; hut the historian Vacuui, who had declined tu
flttend the fCflst, made a vigorous defence, and general St. Pol
and colonel Schiazzetti coming from llused :I\ld Daroca raised
the siege. Schiuzzelti lILtl.l"l;hed ill llUfsuit, alld as his advllnC(.'(1
guard was surprised Ilt Mochllles by a. subtle <leecit of the
alcalde, he slew him, whereupon the Spanillrds killed the officcrs
taken at the feast of Calatayud. Ga)'an bafiled his pursuers
and then moved by Mt!dina Ce\i anll Swiu to Nuvflrre, tiJink·
iug to surprise a mUlley OOU\·O.)' going to Burgos fOI" the Ill1uy
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of Portugal, but being followed on one side b,. a detaehmeo'
from Hused and me' on the otller by Caffarelli he was
driven ugain to tIle hilla above Daroca. HlIrtl lIe rencwed
llis operations in concert with Villa CllmplI llnd the Empcci-
mulo, who Cllme up to Medina Cc\i while DUl'iIn dcacendc(l
from the Moncayo hills. This menacing union of bands
induced Reille to detach general Paris with a French regimen'
llnd a troop of hussars to the aid of Palombilli; wbere_
upon Durau and Villa Camps were driven, tllQ une towards
AlbarrllCin the other 'towards Soria. In June, llftcr vlIriOUS
marches, the two French gcnernla Imitcd dislodged the Empc-
cinado from Siguenza, chasing him so sharply that his hand
dispersed and fled to the Somosierra.
During Uu~e operntiolls l[illll was pressed b~' Abbe, hut
Duran entering 'l'uuelll by surprise destroyed the artillery pare
and carried off a bllttering-tmill of six gUllS. Palomhini WM
then only a few marehes from Madrid, and the king, alarmed
by Wellington's preparations for opening the campaign,
ordered him to join the army of the centre; these orders
ooiug iutercepted the Italian general unwittingly retraced his
steps to Illlr£ue DUfflll, amI quickly recovering all the guns
taken at '1'udela drove the Sprlnish ehief tl1rough the Rioja
into the mountains IJeyond the sources of the Ducro. Caffa·
relli was then on the Arga with a Jivision of the ann,. of the
north, and a brigu..!e bad been scut by Rcillc to thc Aragon
river with the .... iew of J($troying Mina, who WIIS placed by
AbM in great dllugcr. Pnlombiui was collecting bonts to pnss
tllC Ehro lImI join thcm wllcn duplicfltes of tlle king's orders
rcncbcd him, which saved Mina. Caffarclli returned to Vitoria,
and the Italians reaching Madrid in Jnly became part of thc
anny of the centre, llaving Illarelloo onc hundred and fifty
miles in seven days without a halt. Retul'Iling now to the
other divisions of the army of the l:LJru, it is to be observed,
that their movcmcnts being chiefly directed against the
Catlllans belong to the relation of that warfare.
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OPERATIONS IN A.RAOON AND CATAl.ONU..
After tho battle of .A.lmfullo. in Catlllonia, the fall of Pcnis_
cola in Valencia, and the arrival of Reille's first tlivision Oil
the Ebro, DeCl\ell, who had succeeded Mae<IOll;\ld in Upl1er
Catalonia, spread his troops along the coast with a view to
cut off the communication lJctweou the British nuvy und tho
interior, where the Q\talatl ILrmy still held ccrh.Lin position~.
l.nmarque having a division of fi\'e thousand men seized and
fortified Mataro in February, drove Milnns from Dlanes and
occupied lhe intermediate space, white dctuclullonts from Bar-
celona fortifietl MonCfldn, hIongat., and 1Ilo1iuo del lky, to
secure the pluin of Rareelona. The line from Rlllncs to Calda-
gnes, including Caneh, St. Filien, Palamos, and other ports,
was strenoo1.hened and placed under genoral Be~mn:lIl, GOlleml
Clement WllS posted in the vicinity of Gerona to guard the
interior French line of march from Hostalric11 to Figuerns.
Torto:ro, )fequincllZ3, and Taragona were garrisoned by de-
tucluuelllll froni St-veroli'a division, w!lich, quartered between
Zaragozn nnd Leridn, was in oommuuiClltion with Bourke's
and Pannetier's brigades of the first division of the army of
reserve. Frere's division was on the cOllllllunication between
Arllgon and Clltalonill, and a division undcr QUC8llel, composed
partly of national guards, WIlS in the Cercllliln. }'inlllly l>
moveable reserve of eight thousand men enabled Deeaell to
march from l)lace to place as occasion required: hnt the
supreme commaud of Valcacia, Arugon, and Cutulouia WliS
with Suchet.
Cnrdona, Rusa, Seell d'UI'gcl, and the 'Mcdas islands still
belonged to the CutlllullS, and they had ten thousand men in
the field. Lacy WllS at Curdona with Sarsfiell1's division and
ROme irrcgulllr forces,-Grcen wns organizing llll experimental
corps at Montserrat, near whicll place Eroles was also quar-
teroo,-Rovil'll continued about the mountains of Olot-Ju::m
Clnros was now nbout the mouutaius of H06tall'ich,-Jlilullll,
:Man80 and the brigand Gros, driven from the coast line, kept
the hills near Manresa,-Gay and lllira!lCll were on the Ebro.
But the communication with the coast being cut off all these
chiefs were ill want of provisiollil and storell, and the French
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were forming new roaus along the sea line beyond the reach
of the English ship guns. Lacy, thus debarred the coost, ie<i
his troops with difficulty and had fI grcat Dllmbcr of pl·jSOllCrs
and deserters to maintain in Cardonu. and Eusa, bCClLuse
Coupign)' refused to receive them in the Balearic isles.
In conStant dispute witl\ tlle junta: and the generals be was
abhorred by the people, aud iu his spleen desired Codringtoll to
C!IunollaUe all the llCa-<.'Oast towns ill tIle IlOliSession of tLe
French, sayillg he would give the illllllbitallts timely notice:
but he did not do so, and wllen Codringtoll rclueooutly opened
his broadsides ullon Mataro, mnny of the people were slain.
The Catalans, complaining of this croel injudicious
operation, affected Eroles more than ever, and
Lacy therefore !reut llim with a few mell to his
Dative district of 'falarn, oswnsibly w raise recnlits and make
a diversion in.A rngon, really to deprive llLlll of his division and
reduce his power.
In the Catalan army however tIle distress became 80 great,
that Snrsfield was about to force his WilY to tile coast lInd
embark his division to L'OUlffiellce a littoraL war-
fnrc, when Eroles haviug quiekl)· raised aud
armed l\ Ilew division enwred Aragon, and Snrsficld followed
,him. After reaching Carus in the valley of Vellllsque, Eroles
menaced the district betweeu Fraga and Huesca, hut those
places were occupied by detachments from Dourke's brigade
of the MWy of the Ebl'O; Severoli liliJO arrived from Valeucill,
whereul»Ou the SpaniurU retired up the vulley of the lsubellu
to some heights Iloove Rodu, a village on the. confines of
Aragon. He had ouly a thousand regular infantry, throo
guns and two Illlndred cavalry, having left five hundroo mell
ill t11e vll1ley of Yellasque. Dourkc knew ~bis, and cncouragcd
by the vicinity of Sevcroli followed hastily from Benavarre
with two thous:llld men of all arms. Erolt'S fiuding 110 IUUst
lose !lis men in the Vennaque or fight a b'lttle, alld expecting
aid from oor.l)field, took >I pO.'litioll rough ill frent IInd sccured
all both flanks by precipices beyond which the ncigllbouriug
partidns immediatel)' gathered. Bourke keeping two battalions
in reserve attacked with the third, but after a long skirmish, ill
whieh he lost a hundred lIud finy men lind Eroles a. hllndl'cU,
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was beaten, was wounded, and retreated to Monza in great, confu_
FIOu. This combat, really honourable, was exposed to JouLt aull
rillicule at the time by the extravagance of Eroles' despatch,
wherein he affinncd that his soldiers finding their muskets teo
hot had made use of stones, and by this mode of llction destro)·ed
a thousand ofthe enemy!
Se\'eroli now advanced and Eroles retired to Talarn, where-
upon the Italian general returned to Aragon, Meanwhile
Lacy who had increased his forces approaclled Cervera, and
S....rsfield, accused by Eroles of 1I&\'ing treacherously abandoned
him, joined Gay :wd Miralles on the bills about 'l'aragona to
straiten that placo for provisions, Milans and Milnso, nlso
uniting, captured a oonvoy at Arenis de Mar, and the English
squadron intercepted several vessels going to Barcelona, To
meet this new cOUlmotion Decaen relieved Taragolla on the
28th of April, and then mB-rehed with three thousand men
towards Lerida, but, on the way, hearing Sarsfield was near
Villa Franca, he took the TOad of Braffin and Santa Coloma
iastead of Momblancll, and suddenly turning to the right
defeated him, and then continued his own march by Cenom
towards Lerids.. Lacy immooiately abandoned Lower Cata-
lonia and concentrated Manso's, lIilans', Green's, and San-
field's divisiolls in the UIOUl1tnius of Olot; they were reduced
in numbers but be reinforced them with select som~tenes,
called tile prefercnce companies, and sceing Dccaen remained
near Lerida, he marched rapidly against Ole convent of Mataro
with five thousand men, lUId with good hope, for the garrison
was only fi\'e huudred, the works not strong, and Codrington,
who had anchored off lohtaro at Laey's desire, lent some ship
guns,-yet his sailors were forced to drag them to
the point of attack, because Lacy and Green bad,
in breach of tlleir prollliso, neglected to provide
means of transport.
A few hours' firing broke thc wall of the convent, but LacJ',
llearing Decaell was coming, raised the siege and buried the
English b'UllS without CoJriugton's knowleJge; the Fl'cncb
found these guns and earried them into the convent, yet to
cover his misconduct the Spnnisb general said in the ollieifll
gazette they were safely re-embarked! After this disrcput.
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able transaction, Manso, who alone had behaved wen, retired
with Milalls to Vich, Lacy went to Cllrdona, the French
re·vietuaHed Barceloua, and Eroles' ancient division was to
bis great discontent turned over to Sul'l:illcld, who took post
IICl1r Molino. del Rey and romllined there until the [ith of
June when n. detAChment from Barcelona drove him to the
Cillnpo de Taragona. On the 14tJI Milans was defeated near
Vich by a detachment from the Ampurdam, and Lamarque
following &rs6.eld into tlle ClImpo defeated him agaiu ou the
24tb near Villa. N uavs. Uf Sitjes: till! Spullisll geucral waa
wounded, yet made hiij way by Santa Colomo de Qucrault nnd
Calnr to Cardollll. where hc rejoined Lacy. Lamarquo then
joined Detaen in the plains of Lerida, whero all the French
moveable forces werl! now aasembled with ll. view to gather
the llarvcst: a vital objc<:t to both parties but attained by the
French.
Lacy's flight from Mutaro, the several defeats of Alilans ami
&rsn.eld, and the disoontent of Erolea, disturbed the whole
princilmlity j and the general disquietude was augmented by
the increase of all the frauds and oppressions which the ei\'il
and military authorities under Lacy practised with impunity.
Everywhere there was a disinclination to serve in tIle regular
army. 'file 80matene Ilrgued, U1Ut while Le should he an ill-
ullCd soldier undcr a hal! general, bis family would become
victims of French revenge or stllrve, becausc the pay of the
regular troops was too scanty, were it even fairly issued, for
his own subsistence; whereas by remaining at home he could
nourish his family, defend it from straggling plunderers, and
he ready to join the troops ou great oecasious. In llOwe dis-
tri<.1s the people, seeing the army could not pro-
tect them, refused to supply the partidns with
iood, unlcss upon contract not to molest the
Frendl ill their vicinity; IInd tlle spirit of resistance woul(1
have entirely faileJ, if Wellingtoll's SUClXlS3eS at Ciutllld {\lid
Badajos, and the rumour that an English army was coming to
Cu.talonia, had not sustained hope.
In the north, the pnrtidlls aided by Pophnm'a etpedition
had compelled Rcille to romove to Nayarre that
Cnffarelli might turn his whole attention to the
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slde of Biscny and the Montana. DocRen then roocived
charge of the Lower as well as UPllcr Catalonia, which weak-
cned llis position; and confusion was produced by the arrival
of French prefects and councillors of state to organize u. civil
administmtiou. This measun, ostensibly to restrain military
licentiousness, had probably the ultimate object of prepnriog
Catalonia for an union with France, he<:aW:ic the Catalaus who
have pcculinf customs llnd n dialect of their own scarcely roll
themselves Spnniards. These events embarrassed the Frencl:i
army, but their genoral !lfogress was visible in the altered
feelings of the people, whose enthulIiusm wus stilled by the
folly llntl corruption of their lenders.. Rctluccd in number,
distressed for provisions, the Oatalnn soldiers deserted to t110
enemy, a thing till then unheard of in that province j and the
junta were like to have been delivered up as a pc:nco-oll'cring
to tlle FrCllcll, who passed even singly from one
part to the other. The people of tlle sea-eonst
towns rcadil~' trnffickcd with the poollle of Barce-
lonn, when neither moncy nor threats could prcvail on them
to supply the British squndron; and Claros an4 Millms were
charged with conniving at this traffic, and of exacting money
for the landillg of corn when their own lloople and soldicrs
were starviug. But to such a degree was jllLtriotism overlaid
hy the love of gain, that English colonial produce seizcd
in Barcelona and other pnrt;s 'ViUI sold by the enemy to
French merchauts, who undertook to ClIrry it off and pay with
Jlrovisions on the spot, which they succcs3fuUy exccntc<l by
mea.ns of Spanish vessels corruptly licensed for the occasion
by CabIan authorities. Lacy was accused of treachery and
t~TlUlDY. He had quarrelled with the Brit,is!l ll:.l.Val ofiicers,
wns the avowed cllemy of Eroles, the secret cnlumnintor of
Sar3ficld, and was of no courage or cuwrprisc in the field.
Nor 'I'M the story of his previous life calculated to check
ullflwourable opinions. It was said he had beeu balli~hed for
ILll intrigue to the Canaries, from whellce he deserted. to the
Frendl, and again deserted to his own countrymen when the
war of independence broke out.
Under this man the frauds whieh affect the civil depart-
ments of all arlllies in the field became destructive, and t1leir
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extent may be gathered from a single fnet. Notwitllst8mling
the eMrmous supplies granted b)· Eugland the Catalans paid
nearly t.hree millions sterling for tlH~ expense of the war,
besides contributions ill kind, yot their soldieI'l:l were always
distressed for clothing, food, arms, nutl. ammunition. This
amonnt of specie might exeite dOl1bt, were it 1I0t that here as
in l>ortngal the quantity of eoill acculllul'lted from the expen-
diture of the armies and lllLl'ies Wll$ itnmelJ.'le. Gold however
is not always the synonyme of powe:r in war or hapllillcss ill
peace. Nothillg could be more wretelled than Calalonia.
Singly tLe people were exposed to nU tlU,l licentiousness of
WlU"; eolleclivdy to tLl:' robberi~ and revenge of friends lilld
enemies. Whell they attempted to supply the British vessels
the French menaced them with death; when they yielded to
such threats the Ellglish ships menaced. them with bOlllbartl.-
melit llud lllulider. All the roads were infested with brigands,
and in the llills large bands of people, whose fll.milies nnd pro-
perty had been destroyed, watc1led for straggling Frenchmen
and small escorts, not to make war but to live on the boot)' :
when this resource fll.i1ed they lllulldered their own l:ountry-
men. While the land was thus harassed, the ~el\ sw~nned
with privateers of all nalions differing from pirates ouly in
Ilame; and that no link in the chain of infamy
might be wnnting. the merchants of Gibrl\ltar
forced their smuggling trade lit the ports with a
shameless disregard for tIle rigllts of the Spanisll government.
Catalonia seemed like some huge carcass on whieh all manner
of mvenous bc:asts aB obscene birds und all rllptilcs had
gathered to fcoo.
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CHAPTER Ill.
OPERATIOXS IN VALE..'\""C1A AND MURCL\,
SUCllET ha\'ing recovered his health was again at the head of
the troops, but tlle king's military authority was so irksome to
him tllst he despatched an officer to represent the inconveni-
ence of it to the emperor,previous to that monareh's departure
for Russia. In l'('ply, lIe was desired to hold his troops COll-
centrated and move them in the manner most conducive to
the interests of his own command. Hence, when Joseph,
desigllillg to act against WeUillgton ill Estremadura, dcmanued
the aid of ono divi8ion, Suellct rcplied that he must then
evaouate Valencia; and 88 the natural line of retreat for
the Freneh armies would, during the contemplated operations,
be by the eastern pro\inces it would be better to abandon
Andalusia first! This must have convinced Joseph that his
authority \I'M but a name, aULl Suchet, from a natural disposi-
tion towards order and because bis reycnue from the fishery of
the Albufera. aepenued on the tranquillity of the llrovince,
took infinite paiJlS to confirm hili own POWCl'!l, His mode of
llrocoeediug, Ilrut!enL /lllU firm, \I'M wonderfully sucressful
Valencia, altllough onc of the smallest pro\'inrell ill Spain anti
not uaturally fertile, was from t,he industry of the inhabitants
olle of the richest; combining manufactures with agriculture,
it possessed great resourccs whieh had been injured by the war
without supplying its cxigencies. The people expceted a
bloody vengeance for Calvo's murder of the French residenl.ti
at the comnlcnccment of t11e COJltcst, but their fears were soon
<lHa)'ed; discipline was strictly preserved, and Suchet, having
IlUpprcsscd the taxes imposed by the Spanish government.,
!;ubstituted others which were more equal and less onerous-
To bar oppression in the collection he published his demands.
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authorizing resistance to contributions not named and demandeu
by proper officers; and he employed the native authorities Il9
he Ilau uone in Aragon. All imllolitic restrictions upon
industry and traffic wero remo,'eu, and the government of the
inVllders was thus found less oppressive than that of the
Spaniards.
Napolooll hnd, to punish the murder of the French residents,
imposed a contribution too heavy as Suehct imagined e,'er to
oe paid; the eml)Cror, however, calculating the resourC(!S of
Valencia by n eOlllparisOIl with Aragon, would not abate the
demand, llnd so exact was his judgment, that wheu Suehe~
accrpt.cl part in kind and gave discount for prompt pay-
ment, this i~post WillI sfltislied with little p~sure in one
year, Th~ current expenses of the troops were also )ro-
vided, and yet the people did not suffer as in other provinces,
nor was their industry cramped, their property so injured. as
under their own government. Valencia therefore remained
tranquil, and the mischief of negligence and disoriler was made
manirest by contrast. Aragon partook of the advantages of
this conquest, so did Joseph's court: the contributions were
diminished in the former, and large BUms were remitted to the
latter to meet Napoleon's grant of one..fifth of the war contribU4
tions in favour of the intrusive government. This prosperous
state was estuhlished also in the face of an enemy daily
increasing in strength. For the regent, Q'Donnel, had gi\'en
Blake's coDlmand t<> his own brotller J0ge}lh, who collected
tllC remains of the annies of Murcia and Valencia, raised new
levies, and dnring Suehet's illness had formed a fresh army of
twelve or fourteen thousand men in the neighbourhood of
Aliennt. In the Balcario isles also, Roche and WhittingiJam's
experimental divisions were c1edared ready to take the field,
and liftcen hnndred British troops commalJ(lcd by general
Rosa arrived at Canhagenn. To avoid tlle fever there these
last remained on shipboard, and were thus more menacing to
the enemy than Oil shore, because they seemed to be only
awaiting the arrival of a new army which the French knew to
i.o coming from Sicily to the Cllstem coast of Spain. And llS
the descent of thia army commenced a remarkable episode in
the history of the war it is proper to relate its origin and
pro~ess.
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Sir John Shunt had been succeeded in Sicily b)'lord William
BClltinck, a man of resolutioll c;'padty [tllll spirit, just ill his
lIctions and abhorring 0prression, but of n. MlIguinc im_
petuous disposition. Determined to ameliorate tIle eondition
of the Sicilian pcopie, bc, after surmounting many difficulties,
removed tl.LC queeu frullL power, vtlSteu tllo di\1.lctioll of lIfTlIir;J
in the crown prince, obtained from the barons l\ renunciation
of their feudal privileges, and mused a rcprescntutive constitu-
tiou to be proclainH...u. Believing the court sublllissive Lecause
it wlla silent, and that the bnrom~ would adhere to hill system
because it gave them the useful power of lcgisbtion in lieu of
feudal Jlrivileges alloyed by ruinous expenses and the degrada-
tion of CQurti~rs,-the dignity of independence at the cost ouly
of maintaining tho rights of the people und restoring the
honour of their country :-believillg thus, he judged the large
British foree hitherto kept in Sieily as mueh to overawe l,he
court as to oppose the ellemy might be dispensed with. He
thought the expected improvement of the Sieiliull lIrmy llud
the attachment of tho pOOlllo to the new r~olitiCflI system,
would penuit ten thousand men to be emplo)'ed in nid of the
Peninsula, or in Italy; and in January wrote of these projects
to tho English minislel'8, IlmI Bont bis brother to Portugal to
consult upon tho best mode of acting.
Such an opportune offer to create a. diversion on the left
flank of the French armies WIIS eagerly accepted by Wellington,
who immediately SClIt engineers, llrlificers, Ilnd a bnttering-
train eOlliIlletc, to aid the eXIXlctcd expedition. But lord William
13entinek WM soon Tnndc sensible, that in large communities
working constitutions are the offspring lI(lt the generntors of
nntional feelin~ and habil-s. The)' canuot be built like cities
in the desert-, nor Ollst as bre;lkwuters into the 800 of public
corruption; gl'1ululll1y ILnd ns insect rocks eome IIp from the
deptll8 of the ocean they mnst arise if they are to bear the
stonllS of human passions. Lord Wil1illffi was soon Ollposed
br the Sicilian court with falsehood and intrigue, the constitu-
tiou was secratly thwnrtoo by tho barous, the Neapolitan
S,!IllY, composed of foreigners of all nations, was (liligently
augmented with a view to overawe both the English and the
the people, the revenues and subsidy were fuikc misapplied,
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filLU tlte native Siciliun army, despised and neglected, was in-
capablo of servil.io. ]'illllUy, instead of goiug to Spuin with
tell thou!lll.lld good troops, he could only selld ll. suoordinat,o
general with six thOUSAnd-British, Germnns, Calabrese, Swig.~,
and Sicilians, -the British and Germaus ouly being either
morally or militarily well organized. To these however,
ltoche's and WlliLtingbum's ICI'ies, reprcsellle(l to be twelve or
fourteen UJOus:mu strong, were udu('(l, the Spunish govern-
ment having placed them at the disposition of general Mllitland
tlle commander of the cxpedicion. Thus, in May, twenty
thousand men were snpposed ready for a descent on Catalonia,
to wllich quarter Wellington advised them to proc<:oo.
But now other objects were presented to lord Willi:uu's
sanguine mind. 'rho Austrian govCMlmCllt, while treating
with Napoleon W(lS sccretl)' encouraging insurrections in Italy,
Croatia, Dalmatia, the Venetian states, the Tyrol, and Switzer_
land. English as wel! as A ustrian agents wcre active to
organize a Vllll~ conspiracy ngllin~t tho ]'rench Cillperor, au,]
there IVUlI (J, desire, especially ou the part of England, to efCllto
a kingJom for one of the Alls~riall archdukes. l\I\lrn~ was
Jiscontented with France, tlle MOlltenegrins were in arms un
the Adriatic coast, and the prospect of a descent upon Italy in
unison with the. wishes of the people, appe.'l.red so promising
to lord Willillln that he stopl)C(1 the expedition to Clltalonill,
reasoning thus:
'In Spain, only six thOllSAnd middling troops can be
employed on a secondary operation and for a limited period,
whereas twelve tllOusanJ Britisll soldiers, and six thousllnd
men composing the Nellpolitllll. army of Sicily, can land ill
Italy, a grand t·hcodtre where succcss will most eJlicuciousl)"
assist Spain. 'l'he obnoxiolls Ncapolitan force being thus
removed, the native Siciliall army call be organi?ed, and the
new constitution established with more certainty.' 'l'he time,
also he thought critical for Italy, not SO for Spain, which
would suffer but a temponlry depri,·ation, seeing that failure
ill. Ituly wouhl not p",'dudo after aid to Spuin.
Impressed with these notions llC Bent the expedition to
Pllhua. in Sardinia and Mabon ill :Minorca, because, from those
places, he could easily direct them against Italy, and mellu~
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while tlley menaced the French ill. Spain. But the conception
of vlISt aud daring euterprises, even the execution of them up
to a certain point, is 1I0t vcry uncommon, they fnil only by 11
little! tllat little is however the eS3ence of genius, the pJlial
of wit which bcl(l to Orlando's nostril changed him from a
frulltic giaut to n perfect commander. Noitllcr the greatness
of this project nor the apparent facility of execution weighed
with Wellington. The rcco\'cry of Italy would he said be a
glorious and might be a feasible exploit, but it was only in
prospect. Spain WtU! the better field, the war ill the Penin-
sula existed; ycnrs had been devoted to the cstalllishment of
a 80lid base there, and experience showed the chance of victory
was not imaginary. England could not support two armies.
The principle of concentrating power on an important point
was as applicable here as on a field of bnttle; Italy might be
the more vital point, yet it would be advisable to continuo tJie
wllr already establisbed in Spain: it would evcn be better to
give up Spain and direct the whole power of England against
Italy, rather than undertake double operations on sneh an
extensive scale when the Illeaus nccessory to snstain one were
so scanty.
Apparently convinced, tile ministers forbad lord William w
pr~d and expressed discontent at his condnct. 'l'hcir
former instructions hfl.d llOwever given him 8 discretionary
power to act in Italy, alid had so misled him that, besides
delaying the expedition to SjJain, he bad placed twelve
hundred men under admire! :Fremuntlc to nssist the MOllteu&-
grins. He was also entangled in a negotiation with tho
Russian admiral Greig relative to the morch of a Russian
army j a. Illarch plunned lIS it afterwards npIJenred without
the knowlmlge of the Russinn oour~ and which, fwm the wild-
ness of its conception and the mischief it would probably !lave
effected, deserves notice.
While the Russian war was still uncertain, admiml T~chi·
c1lagof, h8.\·ing sixty tllOusand lIlen on the Danube, proP(JBOO
to mnreh through Bosnia snd the ancient Epirus to the llIQuths
ot t·he Cattllro, and there embarking COffiffieuoo the impending
contest with France in Italy. He was however withou~
xcsourcell, and expecting to arrive in 8 etarviug aud miserable
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condition on the Adriatic demanded through admiral Greig,
commanding a squadron in the Meditcrrauean, that lord
William should supply him with fresh arms, ammunition, and
provisions, aud aid him with au auxiliary force. '1'lIat noble-.
man saw the ubsurdity of this scheme, but he was falsely :n_
fonned that Tscllichagof trnsting to his good will had oom-
menced the march, he had thus only to cJloose between aiding
an ally whose force if it arrived at all and was supplied by Eng_
land would help llis own project, or pennit it to ravage Italy
and so cllRuge the people of that country from secret friends
into ueauly enemies. It would be foreign to this history to
consider what effect the absence of 'l'sehichagors army during
<the Russian campaign would have had upon :r-....apoleou·s opeu.-
tions, but this was the force whose march to tbe Bcrcsina
aftcrwlLrds compelled the emperor to abaudon Smolensko and
continue the retreat to Wursaw.
In the midst of these afiairs the miuister's imperative
orders to look only to the OOllSt of Spain arrived. The nego-
tiation with the Russians Wag immediatdy stopped, the pro-
ject of landing in Italy was relinquished, the minor expedition
in the Adriatic WlI8 recalled; but the descent on Catalonia
had been delayed, ita dest.inatiol1 maue known lo Suchet by
the French minister of wnr, and all his preparations wera
matured. Nor was this the only mischief produccd by tho
English cabinct's vacillating policy. Lord William was
empowered to raise money on bills for his own exigencies, and
being desirous to form a military chest for his Italian enterprise,
invaded WeJlington's mOney lliurkets. With infinite trouble
and difficnlty that gencral hnd just opened a sonrce of supply
at from five shillings and fnnr-pence to five shillings and eight-
pence the dollar,-lord William's llo""Cnts offered six shillin!,,'S
and eight-pence, swept four millions from the markets and
seriously embarrassed the great operations. This unlmppy
commeucement of the Sicilian expedition led to other errors,
amI its arrival on thc ooast of SJY..iu did not take place until
after the campaign in Cllstillc had commenced; but lIS its pro-
ceedings connected the warfare of Valencia immediately with
that of Catalonia, and the whole with Wellington's operations,
the)" caD1lot be 'lroperly treated of in this place. It is bow~
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ever fit to note here how an illiberal and factious policy inevi-
tably recoils upon its authors.
In 1807 sir John Moore, witll that lliJ.gacity und manliness
which distinguishcd bis Cllrccr through Iifll, informed the
ministers, that 110 hope of 11. sllcccasful attack on the French
in Italy could be entertained while the British army upheld
the tyrallllical systelll of tile di~solut6 and treacherous Neapo-
litan court in Sicily. And Ill; HO change for the Letter could
be expected w11ilc tlle queen was allowed to govern, he pro-
posed that the British cabinet should either relinquish Sicily,
or, assuming the entire control of the island, seiM the queen
null sellu her to her nativl,l Austria. 'rhis he ju<lged llecesllllry
t,o render the Inrgc Hritisll army in Sicily aVllilahlc for the
field, beeause the Sicilian people could then be justly governed,
and thus only oould the organization of an effective JlIltive
force attached to England and fitted to off.:r freedom to Italy
be cff~'Ctcd. He spoke not of constitutions but of justice to
the people, and hence his proposal was rejected as a matter of
Jaeobillism. Dnnnmond tlle English plenipotentiary even
betrayed it to the queen, n woman not withont magnanimity
yet flO capable of 1>Iootly deeds, thnt, in 1810 SIlO ~retly
proposed to N apoleou R seeond Sicilian vespers for the English.
The emperor, detesting such guilt, tllrew her agent into prison,
yet the kaces of the conspiracy were detected b>· tl\o British
lluthoritics in 1811; nud in 1812 lord Willituu seized the
govcmmcnt as before recommended by AIooro, and did finally
expel the qucel\ by forec. .And because these measures were
not resorted to in time, lll) was now, with an nrmy of from
tweuty-fivo to thirty thousand men, sixteen thousand of wllieh
were Britisll, only able to detach a mixed force of six thousand
to aid lord 'Wellington. At the SlIme time the oppression of
Ireln.nd required that sixty thousand fine soldiers should
remllin idle nt home, while Io'mnoo with n Hussilln war on
hand WAil able to overmat,(:h the allies in Spain. Bad govern.
ment is a. scourge with a double thong J
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OPERATIONS IN A."DALU5U. AND ESTREMADunA.
PREVIOUS to Hill's enterprise agaiust Almllraz, Soult, after
driving BaUestero~ frum the Rolldu llud restoring' the COlllillU-
nication with Grenndn, lICnt three thomnlHl melL into th(~
Niebla; partly to interrupt tlle mlll'Ch of some Sponitu'Cls
coming from Cadiz to garrison 13atmjos, partly to menllCC
Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still lingered Oil the Odie!
against the wishes of Wellington. Those generals immediately
filed nloug the frontier of l'ortugnl towards Estremoouro,
they were hastily followed by the Spanish trool)S sent from
Cadiz, and tho militia of the Algflrves were cHlled out to
defend t1le Portuguese frontier. Soult however remained on
the defensive, for he still expected the advance of Wellington,
which the approach of 80 maDy troops, the seeming reluctance
00 quit the..Niebla, the lauding of men from Clldiz at Aya-
moute and the rumours set afloat by dlll British geuerul
appeared to render Cilrhlin. Nor did the sU1"Prise of .L\lmumz,
whieh he thought to be aimed at the fln)lY of the south and
not agaiust tlle anny of Portugnl, alter his views.
Now the ad\'antage gained by the fall of llodrigo and
BadajOll was clearly illustrated. WeUiugtoll could llleuuCll the
north the south or the Cillltre, the French generals in cnch
quarter eXp<lewd him aud were IInxious tlmt the others should
regulate their movements accol'Clingly. Nonc would help the
other, and the secret plnns of all were llllralyse{] until h was
seen Oil which side the thuuderbolt would fall. '1'his was of
most consequence in the south, for Soult's 1,Illns were YS,st,
dangerous, and ripe for execution. After the fall of Badlljo..l
he would nuL push 11 l!Cad of troops into Estnmmdura wllill;l
his rellr aud flanks could be assailed frolJ.l ClIdi~, Giuraltar, ullll
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:ATureio.; it was 110wevcr essential to crush &llcatcros, whieh
oould not be cJl'eeted while Gibraltar and Tarifa offered him
refuge. Soult therefore resoh·ed to reduce Tarifa and theu
lay siege f.<l Cnrthagena and Alicflnt, and only awaited tlte
development of Wellington's designs ngainst Andalusia to
commence his own operatiolliJ. Great and difficult llis plan
was, yet profoundly calculated to effect the maill object of
fixing his base so firmly tlmt, mangre the forces ill the I61a,
he might enter upon and follow up regular llftcnsive operations
in Estremadura. and against Portugal, instead of tIle partial
uneertaill expeditions llitherto adopted. In fine, he designed
to make Wellington feel that there was a powerful tlimy within
a few marc1u:s of Lisbon.
Thinking Carthagena and Tarifa and even Alieant mnst
fall with the aid of Suchet, whicb he expeded; or that the
siege of the first would bring down Hill's earlls and all the
disposable Spanisll troops to save it, he desired tllat Marmont
and the killg shonld keep Wellillgton employed north of the
Tngus, Re could then enter on the sieges contcmplllted, and
yet leave a force under Drouet on the edge of Estremadura,
strong enough to mttke IIill operate towards Carthil,,"ena
instead of Se,·ille. If this happened he designed to coucen·
trate all his finely orgnnized and experienced troops, force on
a general battle, and if victorious, the preparations being
made beforehand, follow up the blow by a. rapid march upon
Portugal, and so enter Lisbon; or by drawing Wellington in
all haste to the defeuee of that capital, confine the WHr while
Napoleon was in Itussill. to 0, eonJCr of the PeuilUlula 'fhis
great project was in the spirit of the emperor's illstructions.
That great captain had desired his lieutenant,s to mnke Wel-
lington feel that his enemies were not passively defeusive by
pressing him close on each flnnk; and 110 endcnvoured to
make Marmont sensible tlmt if it was useless to ent-er the
llorth·east of Portugal alld fight a gencral battle on ground
favourable to Wellington, it was eontrary to all military prin.
cijlles to withdrew several days' march from his outposts and
by such a. timi(l defensive give him the power of choosing when
and where to strike.
Now the loss of Badajos and the defensive war against the
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increasing forces of the allies in the south of Andalusia, ren·
dered it extremely onerous for Soul~ to llress Weltillgtoll's
Dauk in Estrcmu.dura; it WU!! therefure a profound moditica-
tion of the emperor's views to urge the king nnd Marmont
\0 active operll~iol\ in the north, while be bc3iege<l Tarifa and
Carthagena with an arm)' in mass, ready for a sudden stroke
in the field if fortune brought the occasion, if otherwise, sure
of fixing a solid base for future operations agaillSt Portugal.
He wisbed to commence the siege of 'l'o.rifa in May when
Wellington's return to Beira had relieved him from the fear
of an immediate invasion of Andalusia; but the failure of the
bar~'est in ISII and the continual movements during the
winter, had so reduced his magnl:ines of provisions and ammu·
nition he could not move until the new harvest was ripe
and fresh convoys had replenished his exhausted stores; his
80ldicrs were on short allowance and famine raged amongst
the people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in Morocco
had 80 firmly re-established the French interests, that the
emperor rdused sUPlllies to tlJO Hriti.;;Jl Ilnd fitted out II
equadroll to insure his subjects' obedience. To counteract
this, Viali, em!l!oyed in the early pllrt of the Will' hy sir Hew
Dalrymllle, was sent hy sir Henry Wellesley with a mission
to tbe court of Fez; it failed from the intrigues of the
notorious Charmilly, tllen at Tangier nnd unsuspected because
connected by marriagll with the Euglish consul there: imleeti
from 8 mean hatred to sir J ohll Moorc there were not want--
ing persons in power who endeavoured still to uphold this
ma.n.
When Soult's plans were so far adva.nced, he earnestly
demanded that all his detachments and sufficient reinforce-
ments, together with artillery, onk-ers, money, llud couvoys
o( amlllunition should ue scut to him for the siego of Cur-
thagena.. Pending their lIrrivaJ, to divert the attention of the
allies, he repaired to Port S1. Mary where the Frendl had
from the eireUlnstanccs of the war ill Estrcmadlll1\ been a
long time inactive. lic brought down with him a number of
the ViIlalltroy mortars, llnd ho.\·illg collected about thirty
gun-boats in the 'l'rocudcro canal, commenced a serious born·
Lnrument of COOiz on the 16th of May. But while thus
102 PENINSULA WAR. [llfAV, 1812.
engaged a Budden IllUdiug from English vessels wus ellected
on the Grenada coast, Almcira was abandoned by the French,
the people rose along the sea line, and Frcire coming from
Murcia entrenched himself in his old position of Venla de
Babu!, eastward of Gronada.. Ho waa there surprised and
bcntcn with loss, and the insurre<:tic)D on tile coast was soon
queUed; yet the march of reinforcements intended for Dronet
was thus delayed, und tluLt enabled Hill to tnke Atmaraz.
Eallestcros, whose forres had subsisted during the winter and
spring upon the stores of GibroltuT, then nlhnnced against
COllroUX'9 division on the GUlIdll]ctC.
Tbis Spanisll general caused equal anxiety to Soult and to
Welljngton, because his proceedings involved one of those
iutricate knots by which the important jJl.lrtij of both their
opemtions were fastened. The English general judged, that
while the Spaniards' large and increasing force, wllich could
be aided by a disembarkation of five or six thousand men
froln the 191a, JIlenaced tho blockade of Cadiz llud the commu-
nications between Seville and Grenada Soult must keep a
considerable bod)" in observation, and colUlequently Hill would
be a match for the French ill Estremadura. Yet the efficaeJ'
of this diversion depellueu Upoll lio\'oiuing buttles, seeing that
if BoJlostcros' army was crushed, the French, reinforced in
Estrema.clura, could drive Hill ever the Tagas, which must
bring Wellington to his succour. 80ult was for that reason
ClIrnest to fight, uud BaUesteros, a man of infinite IlrrogtWce,
dcsJlised both. Baving obtainCll money and supplies from
Gibraltar to replace the expenditure of his fonner eMursion
against Seville, he marched with eight thousand lUen againsl.
Conroux, who iuduced him by an llppcafHUOO of feur to atlack
au entrenched camp at Bomos, alld then breaking forth
unexpectedly killed or took fifteen hundred Spaniards and
drove the rest to the hills, from whence they retreated to San
Roque. How thiij victory Wu.\! fclt ill Estrcmudurn lIhallllow
be shown.
Rill's enterprise 1100 put all the French corps in movement..
A division of Marmont'lI lIrmy crossed the Grcdos mountains
to replace Foy, who passed the TlIgUlI U)' the hridgc of Arzo-
bispo tmu moved tb.rough the moulltailll; of GW.lIJalulle to
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succour the garrison of Uirabete. When be returned the
Ilnrtidns of the Gundlllupe renewed the blockade, wbile Hill,
now strongly reinforced from the north, advanced to Zafra.
Drouct t11cII fdl back to Ar.ng'lla, and Rill detncllCd l)ennc
Villemur to his right and general Blade with the royals and
third dragoon guards to his left, to se<:ure the lll'lrvest. General
ltollemuuue had ill the sallie view advanced with two French
regiments of dragoolls, whereup<lll Hill, seeking to cut 1lim
off, directed Slndc to enter a wood and await further instruc·
tiOUB; but Blade hCllring Lnlleffiande WII<I uot superior in
numbers disobeyed hi.s orders and not only drove t11e French
with loss beyond tile defile of Maqllilln, a distance of eight
miles, but galloped through in pursuit, riding amongst the
foremost himself aud ullowiug his supports to join ill tlw
tumu!tuoua charge. In the plain beyond stood Lllllemandc
with his reservcs well in hand, lLnd soon breaking tlle dis-
orderly mass thus rus1ling on him, killed or wounded forty-
eight men, pursued the rest for six miles, reeO\'ercd all his
own prisoners and took more tllau a IJUudred inclnding two
officers frOln his ~dversar)'; and the like bitter rcsults will
generally attend what is ealled '<lashing' in war, wllieh iu
other words moons courago without prudence. 'l'wo days
after this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits have
beeu l,efore noticed, marched with fifty men of the 8Ulne regi-
ments to fetch off some of the English prisoners who had
been left by the Frcudl under a slender guard in the villlljl"B
of Maquilla. Eight>, of the ellelllY met him 011 the march,
yet by fine mnungemeut he o~rthrew them !lud losing only
one mlln himself killed many French, then execnting his
mission, returned with an officer and twenty other prisoners.
In this state of llff.\irs the defeat of Ballesteros enabled
80ult to reinforce Drouet with Barois's division of infantry
and two divisions of cavalry. They marched across the
Morclln, but for reasons to be hereafter mentioned b); the
roJsI road of St. OJ]a!ll, a line of direction which forced
Dro~et to make l\ fluuk march by his left towards Llerenll to
fonn his junctiou, which WII<I effccted on the 18th, The
allies then fell back gradUfllly towards Alhtlcrn, wbere being
joined by four Portuguese rcgimcnts from Badajos Imd by
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the fifth Spanish army, they fonned a line of battle funushing:
twenty thousand infantry, two thousand 6\'c hundred cavalry,
slid twenty-fouf guns. Drouet had only twenty-onc thou-
sand men, three thousand being cavalry, with eighteen guns;
the allies were therefore most numerous, but the French army
Wag better composed and battle seemed inc\'itable for both
gellerals had discretionary orders. However the French
Ctl,VaJry did not advance further than AlmelltlrnlcjOll, and Hill
who llad shown himself so Wiring at Aro)'o Molino and
Almaraz, now, with an uncommon mastery of ambition,
l"ermined from an action which promised him unbounded fame,
sillll)ly because he was uncertain whether the state of Wel-
lington's opemtiona in Cnstillc, then in full progress, woult!
warrant one. Yet his receut exploits had been 80 slllendid
that a great battle gained would, with the assistanee of envious
malice, have placed his reputatio'l 011 a level with Welling-
ton's. And his desire to try his fortune WlIS strong, for
having recei'-ed fresh instructions whcn some Frcnch cavalry
cut off two hundred Spaniards and a small British post at
Almandralejos llnd Santa. Marta, lle quiekly drove tllem from
both places witll (oss aud forced Drouct to conoontrate and
retire to La. Cranja. The transactions which ensued must be
reserved for another place, being entirely dependent on the
gcneral combinations; and those being of an intricate nature
cnnnot be unmvelled until 8 notion hllS been given of that
l:.olitical chaos amidst which Wellington's annyappeared like
the ark amidst the lowering clouds .and rising waters of the
deluge.
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CHAPTER V.
POLITICA.L SITUATION Oil FRAKCI;:.
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NAl'OLF,ON'g unmatched power of genius was now being dis-
played in n. wondcrful manner. H.is interest llis inclination
bis expectations were against war with Russia; but Alexander
and himself, each hoping So mcnacing display of strength
would reduce the otllcr to negotiation, advanced step by stel)
until blows eouhl uo longer be avoided. The FITuch em-
peror being capable of siueere fricm.lship had relied too lUuch
on the existeucc of a lilIC fceling in the Uussi(1Il empcror; Rnd
misled perllap8 by a sense of his own energy, did not suffi.
cientlyal1,)w for the daring intrigues of a eourt where secret
combinations of the nobles formed tlle rcal governing power.
That the cabinet of St. Petershurgh sllould be more t1HlU onli-
Ilarily subject to sudl comhiuations ut this period Wll8 the
necessary consequence of the greatncss of the intere>:ts involved
in the treaties of Tilsit a.nd Erfurthj the continenta.l system
hud deeply injured the fortunes of the Russian noblemen, anti
their sovereign's support of it was 8.11 nothing. During the
Austrinn war of 1809, when Alexauder was yet warm from
Napoleon's society at Erfurth, tile aid given to France was a
mockery, and the desire to join in a northern eonfcdemtion
was SCfI.rec1y eonceale(l at St. Petersburgll, where tllC :Frcneh
ambassll.dor was coldly treated. The rOJal family of Prussia
were iudccd, at the same time, mortified by a reception which
inclined them to side with France against the wishes of their
people and their ministers, but iu Russia, Rolllllnzow alolle
WlIS averse to dedllring tueu against Napoleon. Austria,
anticipating the explosion, was only doubtful whether the
king of Prussia should be plmished or his people rewarded,
whether she herself should befriend or plunder that monarchy.
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A ~ that time also the Russian naval commander in tile
Adriatic, being onlered to snil to Aneona. for the pnrpose of
convoying Marmont's troops from Dalmatia to Italy, said hill.
Sllips were not sea.\vorthy; yet secretly he told the governor of
Trieste they would be in excellent orocr to assist an Austrian
corps B"l'I'fIinst the French! Tsehichagofa projeet of marching
upon Italy was also remarkable in a political view; for it was
to be madc without Alexander's knowledge and conducted
upon princillles agreeable to tIle wisllCS of the poople. At a
lutcr period in 1812 admiral Grieg IIlso )lrOllOSOO to place
an auxiliary Russian army under either Wellington or lord
WiIliam Bentinck, !lnd it was accepted; but the Rus~an am-
bassador in London unequivocall)· declared the emperor knew
llothing of the matter!
With n court so situated Mgry negotiations rendered war
incvitable, and tIle Rllssian cabinet, which had determined on
hostilities though undecided M to the time, knew of the secret
prOClJedings of Austria in Italy and of :Murat's discoutent.
The Hollandel'9 nlso desired inrleJlcndenee, anrl tlte dl'<lP Ilatrcd
the Prussian people bore towards Frnnce was notorious. Ber·
nadotte, resolute to cast down the ladder by whicll he rose,
WIIS the secret adyiser of tllese practices in Ituly, and was
(llso in communication with the Spaniards. Thus N11poleon,
hllying A. war in Spain whicJl required three hundred thou$ll.lld -
men to keep in a balanced state, was foreed by resistlass cir-
cumstances into another and more formidable contest in the
distant nortll, when the whole of Europe was prepared to rise
upon his lines of communication Dnd whcn Ilis extensive
sea-frontier was exposed to the all-powerful navy of Qreat
Dritain. A conqueror's m'lrch to Moscow amidst such dan-
gers was a design more yast, more hardy, more astounding
than ever before entered the imaginlltion of num; yet it WIIS
achieved and solely by the force of genius. With two hUll·
dred thousand French solcliers organized lIS a pretorian guard
Napoleon stepped resolutely into the heart of Genoan)', and
monarohs and nations bent snbmissively before him; secret
hostility ceased, and, Bemrilotte cxcepred, all thc crowned and
anointed plotters quitted their work to follow his chariot-
wheels. Dresden saw tIle ancient story of the King of Kings
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rellewed ill his persoll, and the two hnndred thousand French
soldiers arrived on the Niemeu in oompauy with tirO huuurt,<l
thousand allies.
On t1ult river foul' hundred thousand troops,-I have seen
the imperial returns,-were assembled by this wonderful mun,
all tciplined warriors and proud of the unmatched genius 01
their leader. Yet in that hour of ui:t.~.)· elevntioll, Nfl1)oleon.
sensible of tlIe inherent wc-..lkuess of llo throne unhallowed by
time, described in one emphatic phrose tho delicacy of hiB
political position. For when on the bunks of the Niemen he
saw twelve thousand enirassicrs, with armour flashing in the
sun and cries of salutatioll pealing in unison witll the thunder
of the horses' feet, passing' like a foaming torrent to"'a!xls the
river, he turned towards Gouvion St. Cyr WlW8C republiCllll
principles were llotorious Qnd t1lUs addressed him.
'No mOllarch (lver had such an anny1'
'No, sire.'
'The French arc a fine pcople tlIey deserve more liberty
and they shall have it; but St. Cyr, no liberty of the press I
That army mighty as it i.a could 1I0t resist the SOllgs of
Parisl'
Sueh then was t11e IIIl.tnrc of Napoleon's powcr thnt success
alone could sustain it; success whieh depcnded ll.'3 much upon
others' exertioDs as upon his owu stupendous genius, for
Russw. was far dista.nt from Spaiu. It is said, upon what
authority is unknown, tunt ll~ one moment he resolved to OOIl-
eelltrnte all the French troops ill the Peninsula behind the
Ebro dul'ing this expedition to Russia., but the capture of
Blake's force at Valencia changed his view'8. Of this design
there are no traces ill the military movements, nor in Joseph's
oorrespondenee CIlptured at Vitoria; aud t11ere fue iJldicll-
tions of a contrary design; for ut that period foreign ngents
were detcch:d cxnmining the lines of Torrcs Vcdrlls, und Otl a
:Frcnchlllun who killed Ilimsdf when arrested in the Brn;o;iJs
were found proofs of a mission for the 8llmc object. Nor is
it cllsy to discern why three hundred' thOllSfmd men should be
crowded 011 a narrow slip of ground and fed from FJilncc,
already overburthened with the expenses of the Russiall war,
when if ri)..;hUy handled they could have lnuiutlliucd ~helll-
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selves on the resources of Spain and near the Portuguese
frontier for 3 year a~ least. To have given up the Peninsula.
west of the Ebro would have been beneficial only from
increasing t.he jealous), of the Spaniards towards tllcir allies;
but if the British general had thus been driven away he could
have carried his army to Italy, or have formed in Germany
the nudeus of {I grent northern confederatiOll on the emperor's
rear. Portugal WlIS therefore the !lOint of all Europe: in
which the British strength was least dangerous to Napoleon
during t,he invasion of Russia, and an immediate war with
that eWjlire was not a certaiu event Ilrevious to the capture
of Valencia. Napoleon was undoubtedl)' nnxious to avoid it
while the Spanish oontest continued: yet with a far-reaching
European policy in wbich his English adversaries were defi-
cient, he desired to eheek the growing strength of that fearful
:l!ld wicked power which now mellilCCB the civilized lVorld.
His proposal for peace with England before llis departure
for the Niemen has also been misrepresented. It was CIllled
a device to reconcile the French to the Russian war; but tlley
were as eager for that war as he coutd wish them to he, ami it
is more probable it spnmg from a secrct millgiving, a pro-
phetic sentiment of the consequent power of Russia, lifted, II!J
she would be by his failure, towards universal tyranny. The
ostensible groulld of his quarrel with Alexander was the COll-
tincntal s)'stcmj but in this propoSQI for pe1loo ho ofl:ered to
acknowledge tlle house of Braganza in Portugal, the house of
Bourbon in Sicily, anti to withdraw his army from the Penin-
sula if England would join him ill guarantceiug the crown of
Spain to Joscph, and a constitution to be armllgcd by 8
national Cortes. This was a virtual renunciation of the con-
tinental system for the sake of peace with England; and 8
proposal which obviated the charge of aiming at uuiversal
dominion, seeing that Austria, Spain, Portugftl, and England,
would have retained their full strength while the limits of his
empire would have been fi..'\ed. The offer was made also at a
time when he was most powerful, when Portugal was, as
Wellington himself ncknowlooged, far from secure Dnd Spoin
quitc cxhallSted. At peace with England Napoleon could
easily have restored the Polish nation and Russia would have
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been repressed. Now Poland has fallen and Russia. stalks in
the plenitude of her barbarous tyronuy.
Pol~iad sttlM ofEllyland.-The new administration though
despised by the country was not the less flOwerful in parlia-
ment, and its domestic policy was tllerefore characterised by
all the corruption and tyranny of Mr. Pitt's system without
his redeeming genius. The press was persecuted with malig-
nant ferocity, and the government sought to corrupt all it
couLd not trampll.l upon. Repcated successes 11lId rendered
the Peninsula. contest popular with the ardent spirits of the
nation,1"Ind war-prices passed for glory with merchants, land-
owners, and tradesmen; but all the price of food augmented
faster than the Ilrice of .labour the poorer people sutt..,red;
they rejoiced indeed at their country's t.riumphs because the
Bound of victory is n!wn.ys pleasing to warlike cars, hut they
Wl'.re discontented. Thinking men, llllbiasscd by faction and
not da?zled by miLitary splendour, perceived in the enormous
upenses incurred to repress the democratic principle and in
the coDllequent transfer of property, the sure foundation of
future reaction and revolution. The distress of the workillg
clil8Ses produced partial insurrectiolls, und the nation ut large
WIIS beginning to perceive that the gf.lverning powers, whether
representative or ex.ccutive, were rllpncious usurpers of the
people's rightsj n perception quickened by malignant 'Pro-
seeutions, by the insolent c:dravngance with whiell tile 1mblic
money was la\ished on the family of PercevlIl, and by the
general profusioll at llOllle while lord Wellesley declared the
Will' languished for want of Suswllllllce abrond.
Napolcon's oontinentalsystem, although ill the nature of n
sumptuary la.w which the desires of men will never sul1er to
e'list long in vigour, "IllS yet 80 'effieient that the British
governmeut WIIS driven to encourage and even prowet illicit
trading, to the detriment of mercantile morality. The island
of Heligoland was the chief point of deposit for this commerce,
and by tradius energy and tlle connivance of continental
governments the emperor's system was cOlltinulIlly bamed.
Neverlheless ita effects will nut quickly pass away. It pressed
Barely upou the manllfllCturcrs at the time, created rival Cl:I~
blishments on the continent, and nwo.kcnf;d in GCMnllUy a
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commercial spirit by no melloDS favouruble to Enghmu's'muDu.
facturing superiority. But ultimate consequences were never
considered by the Dritisb ministers. The immediate obje<:t
was to procure money, Bud by virtually making bunk-notes a
legal tClH.ler they sooured unlimited meaus ut home tllrough
the medium of loans and taxes, whieh a corrupt llnrliafficnt
insured to them aud which by reaction insured tl\e corruption
of parliament. This resource failed abroad. They could send
from England enonnous supplics in kind and did 90, cont-meta
being an essential part of their system of corruption, aptly
described as bribing one-half of the nation with the money of
the otlIer half in order to misgovern both. Specie was how-
ever to be bud only ill OOIl1]llll'tltively small quantities, ond at
a premium so exorbitant tllat the most reckless politicilW
trembled for the ultlrnate consequences.
The foreign policy of the government was simllle, namely,
to bribe all llowers to war down }'mncc. '1'0 Hussia every-
tlling save speeie WtlS granted, and amicable rela.tions with
Sweden were immediately re-established. because she had
openly violated the continental systeul by perllllttiug the
entry of British goods nt Strolsund. But wherever wisdom
or skill was required the English minist·ers' resources failed
altogether. With respect to Sicily, Spain, Ilnd Portugal, this
truth was notorious; imd to preserve HIe poliLieal support of
the tr-'Il1ing interests at llOme, n degrading and deceitful Jloliey
quite oppoged to the sllirit of Wellington's counsels WflS
followoo in regllrd to the revolted Spanish colonies. Their
short-sighted injustice was howevel' mosL glaring with regard
to the United States of America. Mutua.! complaints the
dregs of the war of independencc, had long characterised the
intercourse between the British and A'nerican governments,
Rucl were turned iuto edreme hntrcd by the progre:s of the
war with France. The British government in 1806 pro-
claimed contrary to the law of nations Do bloclmde of the
French·coast '\:hich could not be enforced. Kapoleon in
return issued the celebrated decrees of Berlin and Milan,
which prodnceJ the 110 less ceJeurotoo oNera ill council. The.
commerce of all ncutrols was thus extinguished by the arro-
gance of the belligerents j yct the latter finding it convenient
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to rell\x their mutual violence granted licences to each other's
ships, and by this scandaloUll evnsion of their own policy
caUlled the whole of the evil to fall upon the neutr.u who was
called the friend of both pfirties.
Unwilling to go to war with two such powerful states, the
Americans were yet resolved not to submit to the tyranny of
either; but tho Eng1ish injUlltice was the most direct and
extended in its operatlous, and it was embittered b)· the
"lolenee used towards the 8CIIffien of the Uoire<! States: not
less than six thousand sailors, it was said, were taken from
merehaut vessels on the high SCll8 aud forced to serve in the
British men-of-war. 'Yherefore, fifter first passing retaliatory
or rather warning acts called the non-illwrooufSC,
non-imp0Ttation llnd embargo acts, the Americans
finally dedared war at the moment wben the
British government, alarmed at the consequeuces of their own
iujusti~'C, had rescinded the orders ill council. The immediatt>
effect of these tlling3 on the contest in the Peninsula shall be
noticed in another place: the ultimate effects on England's
prosperity llave not yet been unfolded. The struggle pre-
maturely told the secret of Americau strenf:,>'th and drew the
attention of the world to a people, who, notwithstauding tbll
curse of blllck slavcry wllich clings to thcm adding' the most
horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile
spirit and rendering their republican vanit)" ridiculous, do in
tllCir general governmeut uphold civil instilntiolls which havo
startled the crazy dlll;potisllJs of Europe.
PolitiooJ,state ofSpain.~Bad government is more hurtful
thall direct war; the ravages of the last are soon repaired and
the public miud is often purified and advanced by adversity;
tho evils springiJlg from the former seem interminable. In
the Igla de Leou the unscemly currents of folly, altllOugh less
rllgillg 1I1all before, continued to break opon new chauuels nud
yet uualll.lrllled nonc of the old. 'I'hc iutrigucs of Cnrlottu
were uurelllitted j uud though the tlungcr of pro\'01ting the
populnce of Cndir. restrnin()(l Ilnd frighten()(1 her advocates in
the Cortes, she ollposed the English diplomacy with reiterated
Ilnd not quite unfouuded accusations, that the revolt of the
colonies was being perfidiously fostered by Great Britain.
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Henoo the 6Cheme of mediation, revived. in April by lord
Castlereagh, was received by the Spaniards with outwa:rd cold.
ne:8 and a secret resolution to reject it altogether: nor were
tlLey in want of rClIllOns to justify their proceedings. For tlu~
mediation, commenced by lord Wellesley when the quaml
was yet capable of adjustment, WlIS now renewed when it
could not sllcceed. English commissioners were to carry it
into execution and Infantado was to join them on the part of
Spain. Mr. StunTt was to have been oue of the OOlOmlllSiOll
1Ifr. Sydcnham being to su~cd him at Lisbon, but finally 00
remained in Portugal and S,rdenham joined the commission,
which he thus described.
, I do not understand n. word of the Spanish language, I am
unacqullintcd with tllC Spanish chnrnctcr, I know very little of
Old Spain, and 1 am quite ignorant of the state of t11e colo-
nies, yet 1 am part of a commission composed of men of dif-
fereut professions, views, habits, feelings, and opinions. The
mediation proposed is at least /l yoor too Ink, it has boon
forced upon the government of Old Spain, I have no confi-
dence in the ministers who employ me, find I am fully per.
suaded they have not Ule slightest confidence in me.'
It W!l8 essential to havo Baroa::ii's SC<lrct articlo, which
required England to join Old Spain if tho mediation failed,
withdrawn; but this coutd not be done witllOut the consent of
the Cortes, and llublicity would have rnined the credit of the
mediation with the colouists. Nor wuuld the distrust of the
iattcr hnve been nnfounded, for tllOugh lord Wellffilcy had
offered the guaroutee of Great Britain to any arrangement made
under her mediation, his successors would not do so! • The,)'
eml)OlI'cr us,' &lid Mr. Sydenllll.tn, 'to negotiate lUlU sign a
treaty but will not guarantee the execution of it! My opinion
is tlu.t the formal signature of a treaty by plenipotentiaries is
in itself a solemn guarantee, if tllere is good faitll and fair
dealing in the transaction; tilld I believe that thl!; 0IJiniuII witl
he confirmed by tile authority of every writer on the law of
natiollS. But this is certainly not the doctrine oC our present
IOinist~rs, they make a broad distinction between the ratifica,.
tion of a treaty and the intention of seeing it duly observed.'
Ftillure was inevitable. The Spaniards wanted the commis-
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siouers to go first to the CIlrn.cetIB, where the revolt being full
blol\'Il nothing oould be eHected j the Rritish government
insisted they should go to 'Mexico wbere the dispute hud not
been pushed to extremities; and after much useless diplomacy
which oontinued until the end of the year tJu;: negotiation ail
Mr. S)'deullam had IJredicted proveu abortive.
In March the new oonstitution of S)lnin was solemnly
adopte<.l, and a. decree settling the succession of the crown was
promulgated. The infant FraJlcisco de Paulo, the queen of
Etruria, and their reslJective descendants, were excluded froul
the succession, which was to fllll to the princess Carlotto. if
tho infnnt Don Carlos failed of heirs, then to the hcrcditar)'
princess of the Two Sicilies, and so on, the empress of France
and her descendants being especially excluded. This exhibi-
tion of popular power under the IJrotoxt of burning NIlpoleon's
sohemes struck ut the principle of legitimacy. Ami WhOll
the extraordinary Cortes, deciding that the ordinary Cortes
which o\lght to assemble evcry year should not be convoked
until October 1813, secured to itself Il tenure of powcr for ~1I'0
years instead of onc. discontent increased at Cadi;o; and in tho
provinces,-close conncxion being kcpt up between tlle mal-
contcnta and the Portugucse government wllich was tllcn the
stronghold of arbitrary power in the Peninsula. The local
junta of Estremadura. adopting Cnrlotta's claims in their whole
extenh, communicated secretly with the Portuguese regency,
And more openly wiUl Mr. StUl1rt, propo..~ing to rcplncc nU
acting provincial lluthorities with perwns llcknowledging Oar-
lotta's sovereignty, and declaring they would abide by tIle ncw
constitution only so far as it acknowledged what they called
legitimate power; in other words ~he llrwcess was to be sole
regent. Yet this party was oot influenced by Oarlotta's
intrigues, for thcy would not join hcr agcnts in any outcry
Rgtlinst the British; they"lllerely resisted democracy, and they
desired to know how England would view their llroceediugs.
The Biscayalls angrily rejected the new constitution ll!l 0llposed
to their ancient privileges; the other provinces received it
coldly; Ilnd the abolitioll of the inquisition, now openly llgi-
tatcd, gave 0. point around which rallied an the clergy and
all the clergy could influence. l'hc Cortes thus assuiled was
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also weakened by its own factions, yet the republicans gained
strength, for Jord Willium Bcntinck's new constitutiou in
Sicily encouraged them, alarmcd their opponcnts in Spain, and
produced fear and distrust in tlie government of }'ortugaL
Amidst the varying subjects of interest however, the insane
project of reducing the colonies by force remuined u favourite
with all partics; nor was it in rclrttion to the oolonies only,
that, while demanding aid from other nations in the names of
freeJom.jlVlticc and humanity, tbey showed themseh·es devoid
of those uttributcs thcmselves. "The humane object of the
abolition· of the slave-trude Ims !Jecn frustfllted,' Mid lord
Castlereagh, 'because not only Spanish subjects but Spanish
Jlublie officers and governors in ,'arious parts of the Sllanish
colonies arc instrumcntal wand accomplices in the crimcs of
the contraband slave-traders of Great Britain and America,
furnishing them with flags, papers, and solemn documents to
entitle them to the privileges of Spanish cruizers, and to
represent their property us SplUlish.'
With respect to tlie war all manner of mischief WM abroad.
The regular cavalry had been entirely destroyed, and when
with the secret permission of their own government some
distinguished Austriu.u ofliccrs proffered their services to the
regoenCJ to restore that ano they were repelled. Nearly all
the field artillery had heen lost in action, the arsenals at Cadil.'.
were exhausted, nlost of the heavy guns ou the works of the
Isla \\'ore unserviecable from eonst.ant and useless firing, the
stores of shot diminished in nn nlorming mnmler, no sums were
appropriated w the support of the founderies and the British
artillery officers' remonstr:mces on1r produced 3 demand for
English mOlley tu llut tlw fOlllltlcries into activity. To crown
the whole, Abadia, recalled frum Gallicia at the express desire
of sir Henry WelIesley because of his bad conduct, WM now
made minister of war. In Centa, notwithstanding the pre-
sence of n small British foree, tlw Spanish garrison the galley
slaves and the prisoners of war, who were allowed to range at
large, joined in a plan for delivering that l)130eto theMoors j not
from treacllCry but to avoid starving, a catastrollhe ouly staved
orr by frequent assistauee from the lll11gaziuCl:I of Gibraltar.
Ceutu. might then have iJeen acquired by Ellglu.uu in exchauge
1812] BOOK HlI.-CHA P. (I. 20f.o
for the d<.bt due by Spain, aDd general Carnpbell urged it on
lord Liverpool but he rejected the proposal, fearing to awaken
jealousy. Yet the notion came originally froln the people
themSlJlves, and that jcnlonsy whicll he feared W/l.S lllrcndy in
full activit)" being 0111y another name for the democratic spirit
then rising in opposition to the aristocratic principle upon
which England nllonled her assistance to the Peninsula.
'l'he foreign policy WlIS not less absurd than the homo
policy, thongh nccc~ilIlrily contracted. Cnstro, the cnvoy at
Lisbon and agreeable both to the Portuguese and U,ritish
authorities, was replaced b,r Dardaxi who was oppose<! to both.
'This man having been just before !lent on a special mission to
Stockholm to UTrllUgo a trcnty with thnt court was referred
to Russia for his answer, so completely subservient was Bcr-
nlUlotte to the czar; onc point however was characteristically
discussed by the Swedish prinec and tl1e Spanish envoy.
Baruaxi demanded assistance in troops, Bernadott-e wanted lJo
subsidy which wo.s promised witho11t hesitation, but when secu-
rity for payment was desired the negotiation instantly dropped l
A treaty of alliance was however concluded. between Spain
nnd Itussia ill J wy, and while Dardaxi was thus pretending to
Huusiwzo Swodon, his own governUlcllt uy unceasing solicita-
tions extorted from Euglaud a million of money with tlrms
lIud clothing for one hundred thouSll.nd men, iu return for
which five thousand Spaniards were to be enlisted for the
British ranks.
To mise Spauish soldiers was 8 favourite project with many
English ofiicen who sUll uelieved ill Spanish heroism. Geue-
ral Graham had not disdaincd to offer his ser\'iecs alld Joscph
was disquieted; for the CMalallS Ilad before formally demanded
such a policy and a like feeling was expressed in other places·;
bllt when the proof of sincerity CAme only a few hundred hall-
starved Spaniards of low condition eulistcd. Recruited prin-
cipally by the light division, they were carefully taugnt and
kiudly trcal.ed, yet they did not make good soldiers. The
government however dem!luded lInd obtaiued urlM clotbing
lInd equipments for ten thousand cavalry, though they had no;
five hundred regulnr llOrsemen to anTI, and hnd just rejected
the aid of the Austrian officers. These supplies were like all
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oihers embezzled or wasted, and wiLh exce)ltion of ll. trifling
amelioration in CurIos J'Eilpana's c0'l)!) effected by Wellingf..oll
himself, the subsidy produced no benefit, for every brancll of
administration was cankered and the public mischief porten.
tous.
}'erdinand living contentedly at Valcn~ay rejected nll plans.
for escape; Kolli and the brothers Sagas had been alike dis-
regarded. TIle councillor Sobrnl, who Imd long lived at
Victor's hend-quarters llnd betrayed him, tnlvellcd with that
marl!l.JaI to France, and now )lroposed to carry the llrince off,
but was likewise bamed; Ferdinand would listen to no pro-
posal save through Escoiquez who live(l at 80me distance,
Sobral would not trust him and eSCll.pcd to Lisbon, fearfnl of
heing betrayed by the prince. Joscph was meanwIlile ad-
vancing towards the political conquest of the country and
spoke with ostentation of assembling: a Cartes ill his own
interests; but this WM to eovcr ll. sccret interoousc with the
Cartes in tbe Isla de Loon where Ilis llartisans called' .AJhm.
cesad08' were incnasing. For many of the democratic partr,
seeing the gulf separating tllelll from the clergy and from
Enghmd could never be closed, and tlmt ll8d government
deprived them of the people's support, looked to Josepll as
having principles more in unison with their own. He offered
to adopt the new constitution with SOllle modificrltions, and as
mnny of the Cortes were inclined to Ut'eCpt his teI'Il18 ills
llritish policy WllS on the eve of Mtin when Wellington's iron
arm again fixed the destiny of the Peninsuta.
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CHAPTER VI.
PQUTICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.
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HERE the internal condition had not improved. The govern-
ment, OOJUllosed of civilians, was unable and unwilling to
stimulate the administration connected with military lIfl"airs,
and the CQmplaints of the army wwhing the Erazils drew
reprimands from the prince; but instead of meeting the evil
with suitable laws he only increased Beresford's authority
which was already sufliciently great. The fQl'eigller's power
was augmented while the native authorities were degraded ill.
the cyes (If the people, and as their intluenoo to do good
dwindled their ill·will increased; yet their power of mischief
was not lessened, because they stit] formed an intermediate
link between the military commander and the subordinat~
Iluthorities: thus the pnssive patriotism of the people, the
abuses of the government and the double-dealing at the
Brazils, counterbalanced the extraordinary energy of lord
Wellington and Mr. Stuart. The latter had foreseen that the
regent's oonecssiolls at the time ef Borers arrest would pro-
duce but a momenhl.ry c[C<lt, and the intrigues of Rio Janeiro
rel1.ved when lord Wcllcsley qIJitted the British cabinet,.
But previotls to that event, Mr. Sydenham r6jlr6sentcd so
strongly the evil of lord Strangford's conduct that lord
Welleslcy would Imvc immcdiately dismissed him, if Syden-
ham, who was offered tbe situation, bad not refused to pront
frolll the effC<lts of his own report. Lord Louvaille was then
w be appoinled alIJ.lJllSsudor, and as he was to toueh at Lisbon
alld consult WeJlingtoll whether to press for the prinoo's
return or for a. cllange of regency, a confidential agent was
seut direct to Rio Janeiro w keep lord Stnl.Ugford from iuter-
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mediate mischief. Lord Louvaine was however OD bad terms
with his uncle the duke of Northumberland, who was zealo&s
for lord Strllugford; !lnu to u government relying on corrup-
tion the discontent of Il noblcmno having parliamentary
interest was necessarily more important than success in
war. Hence anolher man WlIS to be sought, and as tlle
Portuguese prince 111u1 now acceded to Wellingtoll's demands
the effect of this clmugc was nwaited. 'Meanwhile thl! dissen_
sions in the English cabinet excluded the consideration of
other affairs, and lord Strtmgford pursued his evil career until
~evere rebukes from Wellington und Stunrt convinced him
that his tenure of office was not sure.
It was however prior to this salutary check on the Bra-
zilian intrigues that the prince, intimidated by lord Wel·
lesley, bad given Beresford despotic power over the military
at.lministrotion, had agreed to the reforms llroposcd, and
empowered Wellington to remove principal Soum from the
regency. Lord Castlereagh also, adopting lord We11esley's
policy in this mutter, insisted that nil the obnoxious members
SllOUld be displaced; and this blow at the Soum faction was
accompanied by the death of LinllaTCS the bead of the house,
an event whieh paralysed the court of Hio Janeiro. Neverthe-
less tile family was still so powerful that Domingo SouZ&, now
count of Funehal, succeeded Linhares as prime minister and ye~
retained tlle embassy t.o the English court. And \Vellillgton,
whose long experience of Indian intrigues rendered him the
fittest person possible to deal with the exactions and political
cunning of a people who so mucb rescmblc Asiatics, now
opposed tIle removal of the obnoxious members from the
regency. He would not even dismiss the principal. For
with a refined poliey he argued, that ol,positiou to his measures
arose as much from nationlll as individual character-that
some of the authorities being obnoxious to their own court
were dcpeudent upon the British Ilower for support,-that
among them were persons of great ability, and no bene-
ficial change could bc expected, because the inflneuce already
gained would be lost with new men-the latter would have
the SlIme faults with less talent lInd less dependence on the
British power, the dismissed ministers would ~ome active
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cnomies, tlHl ]mtrinrch wonld go to Oporto wllere his power
to do mischief would be increased, Bnd principal SonzB would
then be made patriarch. It was indeed desirable to drive
this mall, whose absurdity was so great as to create a sus-
picion of iU!lll.uity, from the regency, but IIC could neither be
persuaded nor forced to quit Portugal. HiR dismissal had
been extorted from tIle l'rinee by the British government,
and he would have secret influence over the ch·il admini~tra.­
tion and be considered a martyr to foreign influence, which
would illcrease llis popularity while his l,ower would be
augmented by tIle sanctity of his character as patriarch. A
change would therefore bring small advllntage and any
refonn would be attributed ro the English influence, agninst
which the numerous interests involved iu the preservation of
abuses would instantly combine.
On the other hand the real nature of tIle war had never
been fairly before the pcople. They had bem deceived, flat-
tered, cajoled, their prowess extolled beyond reason, the enemy
spoken of contemptuously; but the reJ;ourccs of the Dation,
which consisted neither in its armies nor in its revenue, nor
in its oonsting, but in the sacrificing of all interests to the
prosecution of the contest, had never been vigorously used
to lllect the emergeueies of the war. The regency had not
811peuled to the patriotism of the pOJlulation nor euforced
so.critices, though absolutely IleocsSflry, because, n-s the Eng-
lish general honestly observed, 110 l)C(Iple would ever volun-
tarily bellr such enormous burlhens: strong Jaws and heavy
penalties could alone insure obedieuce. 'I'he Portuguese
goverument relied upon England Bud llCr subsi.lies, and
resisted every attempt to draw fortll the natura! resources.
Their subortliuows eVllded or executed COI,.Uptl)' lIlld vexa.-
tiously the military regulations, nnd the c11ief supporters of
all this mischief were the principal and his faction.
Thus dl'llgged by opposing forces Wellington took :to middle
course. That is, he strove by reproaches and redoubled
activity to stimulate the patriotism of the authorities, he
desired the Bl'itish ministers at Lisbou and at Rio Janeiro to
paiut the duugerous state of Portul"ral in vivid colours, und
urge the prince to enforce refonn of groSll abuses whiclJ in the
VOL. IV. ..
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ta;;:es, the customs, tlle general expenditure MU the e.""<ccu(ion
of orders by inferior magistrates, were withering the strength
of the nation. And at the same time, amidst the tunnoil
of llis duties in the field, sometimes actually from the field of
ollttle itsdf, he tmllsmitted memoirs upon the Ilnluro of thetie
Ililfcrent evils lInd the remedies for them which will fltt~t
to the latest llosterity the greatness and vigour of his capacity.
His efforts aided by tlle suspension of the subsidy produced
IlUrtiul reforms, out the chnrncter of the prince preveuted
general or permanent cure; his wcnkness mnde him the tool
of court intriguers. and his obstinacy was to be warily dealt
with, lest aomo dogged conduct should compel 'Yellillgtou to
put his often-repented threat of abandoning the country into
exccnt·ion. This occult knot could neither be untied nor cut;
the difficulty migllt with appliances be lessened but not swept
llway, aud the British general, involved in ceaseless disputes
and suffering honrly mortifications the least of which would
have broken the spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle Qi
he could to vicwry.
Viewing U\e contest 6S one of life or death to l)ortugal he
desired to mnke the whole politiclIl ccono.my of the etate a
simple provision for the wnr, aDd when thwarted his reprooche9
were as bitter as tIley wer(l just; nevertheless the men to
wllOm they were uddresRoo were not devoid of merit. In after
times, while complaining that he could find no persons of talent
in Spain lle admitted that amongst the Portuguese Redondo
possessed probity (lud ahility, that Nogucira was a statesman
of CllIltleity equal tt, tho discussion of great questione, and that
no mOllllreh in Europe IHut a better pnblic servant than l<'OrjllS:
even the xestle9s principal disinterestedly prosecuted mel\Sum
for forcing the c1ef"o"Y to pay their just sllare of the imposts.
But greatness of mind on great IJCCll.8ions is II rnre quality.
:Most of the Portnguese considcred the AAC1'ifices deman<1ed a
sllarpcr ill than submission, and it was impossible to unite
entire obedience to the will of the British authorities with an
energetic origiual spirit in the Ilutive b'Uvcrnment. The Souza
faction was always violent and foolish j but the milder oPP<>-
~ltion of thc thrce gentlemen above mentioned was e:l:eussble.
Wellington, a foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing
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his own go' ernment., forwarding his own fortune j final success
was sure to ~end him to England resplendent with glory find
beyond the reach of Portuguese ill-wilL The native authorit-ies
had no such prospects. 'l'heir exertions brought little of per-
sonsJ (time, the)' were odious to the prince Ilnd his favourites,
and they feared to excite the enmity of the people by a. vigour
unpleasingto their sovcreign and sure to draw after-evil upou
themselves-from the French if tlle invasion succeeded, frOll
thcir own court if the independence of the country should be
ultimately obtained,
But thus much conceded for the sake of justice, it may be
affirmed with truth tllat the conduct of the Portuguese and
Brazilian go\'crnments was always unwise, ofteu base. Not-
withstanding the prilll:C's concessions it was acnrcel)· possible
to remedy auy abuses. The Lisbon government, substituting
e\'asive for sctive opposition, baffled Wellingtoll and Stllart
by proposiug inadequate law8 and suffering etTeetualmetLSures
to be neglected with impunity, and the treaty of commcrm Witll
England always supplied a source of dispute, partly from it·s 118·
tural diffiClllties partly froln their own bad faith. The generaL's
labours were thus multiplied not abated by llis ncw powers, ami
in measuring these luUours it is to be noted, so entirely did Por-
tugal depend upon Englaud, that Wellington instCfld of drawing
provisions for his army from the country, in a mamler fed the
wholll nation and WilS onen forced to keep the army magazines
low that the people might live. This is proved by the importa~
tion of rice, flour, b6l'lf, and pork from America, whieh increased
each yoor of the war in a. surprisiug manner, the price koolling
pace with the qlllHltity, while the importation of dried fish, the
ordinary food of the Portuguese, dooreased. In l'llkln's
1808 the supply of flour and wheat from New Statistio
'rabl~".York was sixty thousand barrels. In 1811 six
hundred thonsfiud; ill 1813, betwccn se\'euand eight hundred
thouBllud. Ireland, England, Egypt, :&rbary, Sicily, the Bro~ils,
Spain and cven }"'rllllce, contributed likewise to the cOllSuml}-
tion, which grcatly cxceeded the natural menns of Portugal:
Englisll treasure therefore eithcr diredly or indirectly fur-
nished the nation ItS weU as tlle armies
Iu Portugal the peace revenue, including the Brazils the
p2
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colonies and the i~lands, even in the most flourishing periods
Illl.d never exceeded thirty-six: millioIl/l of cruzado. DOVllI:I; in
]811, although Portugal alone raised twenty-five millions, this
sum added to the British subsidy fell very short of the actual
expenditure; yet e<lonomy was opposed by the local govern-
ment, the prince Wll3 continually creating useless offices for his
favourites and cncoufflging law-suit.'l and appeals to Rjo
Janeiro. The troops and fortresses were neglected, although
the military branches of expense amOilnted to more than
three-fourths of the whole rcceiptB;-"-..imd though Mr. Stnart
engaged thnt England either by treaty or tribute would koop
the Algerines quiet he could not obtain the suppression of
t.he Portuguese navy, which always fled froro the barbarians.
It was 110t until the middle of the year 1812, when admil'ld
Berkcley wllOse proceedings had at times produced consi_
derable inconvenience was recallc<l, that Mr. Stunrt with the
aid of admimlllartili, who succeeded Berkelcy without a seat
ill the regency, effected this naval reform.
Rather than adopt the measures suggested by Wellington,
such ns keeping up the credit of t111;} paper-money by regular
payments of the interest, the fair alld gellcral collection of the
'.Decima,' and thc rCllression of Qbuses in the custom-house, the
llrsentll and tho militia, always more costly thall the lino, the
government projected the issning of fresh l'llper, Slid endea-
voured by unworthy stoek-jobbillg schemes 00 el'adc instead
of meeting the difficulties of the times. To cllcck their folly
the general withheld the suusidy and refused 00 rceei\'e thei'r
depreciated puper into tllC military chest; but neither did this
vigorous proceeding produce more than a momentary return
to honesty. The working people were so cruelly oppressed
they would not labour for the public except under the direc-
tion of British officers; force IIlone could overcome their
repugnance and force was employed, Ilot to forward the
defence of the couutry but to meet lmr~ieulal' interests snd
support abuses. And so generulty base were tile fidalgos, that
c\'cn the e1laritnblc f1id of money reeeivw from .England
waa shamefully and grcedily claimed by tIlC rich, who insisted
tllat it was a donatiou to all snd to be equally divided.
Welliugtoll's ellergies were squllllderetl on vexatious details.
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At one time he was remonstrating against tlle oppression of
tile working people, and devising remedies for local abuses;
ut another snperinl:cnwllg the ullplicutioll of the English
e1Ulritics and arranging the ffien.sures noocssury to l"Cvive agri_
culture in tlle devastated districts; at nil times endeavouring
to refonn the general administration and in DO case supported.
Ne\'er during the war did lIe £nd flU appeal to tIle patriotism
of the Portuguese go~'ernmcllt answered franklJ j ne\'er did
ho propose u measure which WtU! uccepted without difficulties.
'fhis: opposition was at times carried to SUc1l lL ridiculous
extent, that when some Portuguese nobles in the French ser-
vice took refuge with the curate Merino and desired from
their own government ll. promise of sufety, to which they were
l'Cl\lly entitled, the regency refused to giye that fIllsumnce;
nor would tlley publish IIn amnest,y whieh the Englisl} geneml
desired for the sake of justice, and from policy also because
valuable infermatiou as to the Frcnch llrllly could have been
thus obtainoo. Thtl authorities would ueither Sll" yes! nOr
no! UJld whcn gcneral PUlDplollll 1Ill!llied to Wellingtoll per-
sonaHy for some nasllTallCC, the latter could onlyanswcr that
in like eascs Mascarhenas had been Imnged and Sabugal
rewarded I
To force an entire change of government seemed to some
the ouly remedy for the distemperature of the time j but this
might hll\'e produced llllllrchy, und wouhl huvo encourngcdu
dcmocratic spirit contrary to the general policy of tile Britisll
cabinet,. Wellington desired futher to have the prince regent
at Lisbon or the Azorcs, whence his authority might
under tile influence of England be morc directly used to
euforce 6lI1utary regulatiolls j he llOWCVCr judged it esseutiu.l
that Curlotta ~hould not be with him, and slltl 011 the other
hawl laboured to come back without the !lrLnCC, who Wllll pre-
vented from moving by continued distnruullccs in the Bfflzils.
Then Mr. Stllllrt. despairing of good, proposed the establish.
ment of a militllry government at Ollce, but ·Wellington would
not agree although the mischief afloat clogged every wheel of
the military machine.
A law of king Sebastian which compelled all gentlemcll
holding laud to take anus WM now revived, but desL::rtioll
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which hRd commenced with the first nppointment of British
·officers increased; and so many persons SRilcd away in British
vessels of war to eVlHle military scrvice in their own country
thnt Rll edict was published to prlwcnt the pTllcticc. Bercsford
checked the desertion for a moment by condemning dcserterg
to hard labour an.d offering rewards to thc country people to
deliver them up; griping want uowevcr renewed. the evil at
the commencement of the campnign, nnd tho terrible severity
of condemning nineteen at once to death did llot repress it.
The ca.l-mry, at all times inefficient, was nearly ruined, the
meu were fll.iut-hellrled, tIle breed of horses almost oxtin~
and shameful pceulation.q amongst the officcrs incrcased the
mischief: onc guilty colonel was broken nnd his uniform
stripped from his shoulders in the public square at Lisbon.
'fhese examples llrwuceJ. fear and aswnislullcnt rather thau
cofrc<.iion, the misery of the troops continucd, and tho nrmy,
although by the eare of Beresford again numbering thirty
thousand under arms, decLined in moral charocter and spirit.
To govem armies in the field is a great and difficult matter.
But in this contest the operations were so iutimntely con-
nected with the civil Mlllinistration of Portugal, Spain, and
the Brazils, and the contest 50 affected the policy of every
nation of the civilised world that unprecedented diffieulUeg
spnmg up, and the ordinary frauds nnd cmbarrAASments of
war were greatly lIugmented. Napoleon's continental s}·stem
joined to his financisl measures, which were quite opposed to
llebt and paper money, increased the pernicious effects of
the English bunk restriction; specie, nbundnnt in Fmnee,
had nearly disappenred from England anti WllS obtained from
abroad at an incredible expense. The fcw markets left for
British manufactures and colonial produce did not always
mnkll returns in the articlcs uC~SlIry for the war. Gold,
indispensable in certain qnantities, 'I'M supplied, and this
entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in the
proportion of only olle-llixlh of wlldt was required by an
army which professed to Jlny for everything. Hence continual
clfort3 on the part of the government to force markets; hence
a depreciation of value iu goods and bills; hence a continual
&truggle ou tlle part of the general to sustain a. contest
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dependent on such a precarions system. Dependent also it
was upon the prudence of three governments, oue of which
bad just pushed its colonies to rebellion when the French
armies wero in possC8sion of fonr-fifths of the mother country;
another was 11Our1y raising up obstacles to its own defence
though the enemy had just been driven from the eallitalj the
third was forcing a. war with America, its greatest and surest
market, when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain the
struggle in the Peninsula!
A failure of the preceding YCfl.r's harvest 0.11 over Europe
had rendered the supply of Portugal very difficult. Little
grain was to be obtained in any country of the north of
Europe accessible to the British, and the necessity of payillg
hard mOlley reudered even that slight resource uulL Sicily
and :lIllltu. were thrown for subsistenco upon Afrieu., where
colonial pNlducc was indeed available for commerce, yet the
quantity of grain to he had there was small and the Cilpricious
barbarians rendered the intercourse precarious. III December,
1811, there was only two months' cousulllptioll of corD in
l'ortugul for the populatioll, although the magazines of the
lLrmy contained more than three. To America thcreforo
it was necessary to look. Now in 1810 Mr. Stuart had
given treasury bills to the house of SalllPllYO for the pUI'ehllSe
of American corn; bllt the disputes between Ellgland and the
Unittlti States, the depreciation of English LiIl!; frow the
qUllu~ity in the market, together with the expirution of the
AlllCriCflll bank charter, praventcd &\mpnyo frnUl oomlJlcthlg
his OOTlllllisllion. Nevertheless, although the inercllsing bitter-
DesS of the Jispute discouraged a fCnewal of this plan, some
more bills were given to the English minister ut Washington
with Jire<:tions to purehusc corn for Sampa~'o to resell ill
Portugal as before, to fill the military eIJ6'St. Other bills weru
sent to the Brozils to pnrchllSe rice, and IlII the consuls in tho
MeJikrrnnClllJ werc desiroo to enoour~"C the exportation or
gTain and tIle importation of colonial produce. In this mauner,
despite of the miniskrs' incapacity, WellingtoIl found resources
to feed the population, to recover some of the specie expended
by tlle army, alld to maintain the war. But as the year
aUvauced the lloll-wtercoun,:e-ad of congress, which ¥
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caused a serious drain of speeie from Portugal, was followed
by an embargo for niucty days, and then famino which already
afflicted parts of Spain menfI.CCd PortugaL
:Mr. StUIll't knew of this embargo before the speculators did,
Bnu sent hj~ agents ordcl"$ to bu)' up witb bard cash at a certain
llrice 0. qUllntity of groin which hatllotcly llrrin!u at Giumltar.
He oould only forestall the speculators by a few days, the cost
soon rose beyond his moans in specie, but the new harvest
being nearly ripe this prompt effort sufficed for tIle occasion:
11Ilppily so, for the American dcclamtion of wllr followed nud
American privateers took the Illace of American flour ships.
Stuart's energy redoubled. Seeking for grain in all parts of
the world, he discovered that in the Brazils a sufficient quan-
tity might be obtaiued in exchunge for Euglish mllonufacture3
to secure Portugal from Absolute famine; ann to protect this
traffic and preserve t1lat with the United States, he persuaded
the regency to declare the neutralitJ' of Portugal and interdict
the sale of prizes within it.s wl'lterg. He also, at \Vellington's
desire, besought the English admiralty to reinforce the squadron
in the Tagus and keep cruisers at particular stations: finally
he pressed financial reform in Portugal with the utmost vigour
and some success. His efforts were however strangely coun·
terncted from quurters letlSt expected. The English consul in
the Western Isles, with incredible presumption, publicly excited
the islanders to war with America when Mr. Stunrt's eBorts
were directed to prevent such a calamity j the admiralty
neglocted. to station cruisers and tlle Americau privateers had
tltll8 8 free muge II.lollg ilie Portuguese uud A.frican COllSts.
Mennwhile English mercantile cupidity broke down the credit
of the English commissariat paper-money, whicb was the chief
me<lium of exchange on the immediate theatre of war.
This paper had arisen from a silllllle military regulation.
Wellington, on assuming the command in 1809, found that
all persona gave their own vouchcrs in paymen~ for provisions, .
whereupon be proclaimed that none save commissarics should
thus act j and that all local accounts should be paid within one
month ill rendy money if it was in the chest, if not, witb bill~
<>1\ the commissary-general. 'l'hcse bills became numerous,
let their vll1ue did I\ot sink, because tbey enabled tuoae .....ho
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had really furnished supplies to prove their debts without Eol·
lowing the lllmd-quartera; twil they had an advantage over
receipts inllSmucli llS they distinctly lloiuted out the person
who was to pay; tlley whe also in accord with the customs of
the country, for tIle peollle were used to receive government
bills. The possessors were paid in rotation whenever there.
was mOlley; the small holders the real furnishers of the army
first, the speculators last, n regulation consonaut. to justice and
upllolding the credit of the paller.
In 1812 this paper sunk twenty per cent. from the sordid
prlM:tices of English mercantile ho\lSC.'l whose agcnt~ secretly
depreciated its credit llnd then purchased it; IInd in tllii> dis-
honesty they were aided by SOllle of the commissllrio.t not.-
withstanding the vigilant probit.y of the chief commissnry.
Snms lIS low as ten-pence made llayable in Lisbon were to be
seen in the hands of poor country pl.1)ple on the frontiers.
By these infamous proceedings the smaner dealers were ruined
or forced to mise their prices, which hnlt their sales lUll! con-
tracted tIle markets to the detriment of the soldiers; and
there was much danger that the people g'I.'neral1y would thus
discover the mode of gctting cash for bills by submitting to
high discounts, which would soon have ren\l.cred th., contest
too eo~tly to contwue. But the resources of Wellington llnd
StlllLrt. were not exhausted. 'I'hey contrived to !lreSerVe the
neutrntity of Portugal, and by mcans of licences continue(l to
have im!lortations of American flonr until the cnd of the war;
a lery fine stroke of polie)', for this flour was paid for with
En~Iish goods lOud resold at a eOll.llidtlmLle profit for B!lecie
which went to the military chest. They had less SUCCCSll in
upholding the Portuguese govcrnmeat pilpcr credit. Bad
faith and tIle necessities of the native commissariat, which
now caused an extraordinary'issue, had combiued to lower its
credit. From England the conde de FunchaI, Mr. Villicrs,
and Mr. Vansittart proposed a bunk and other schemes, such
as s loan of one million snd a half frOIll the English treasury,
which shall betrcated at length in another place. Wellington,
ridiculing the falhwy of a go\'ernment with revenues unequal
to ita expenditure borrowing from a government which was
unable to lind specie sufficient to sustain the war, remarked,
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that the money could not be realized in the Portuguese trea..
~ur)', or must be so at tl,c expense of 1I military chest whose
Lollow sound already mocked the soldiers' shout of victor),.
J\gain thcrdoro he demanded Tefo~m, offered to t!'lke the
responsibility and odium upon himself, explained in detail his
,'iews and avowed his conviction that the exigencies of th(l war
l10uld be thug met, lInd the most ve.,,-utious illlpQsts UpOll the
poor abolished. Hc UJl\(lc as little impression upon }'unchal
as he 1100 done upon Linhnrcs. Money was nowhere to be
had, he had been compelled to trade himself, and he now tole-
rated for the sake of the resources it furnished a contraband
commerce which he discovcrl'ti Soull to have established with
English merchants at Lisbon, exchanging the quicksih'cr of
Almadcn for colonial produce. But in bis own pcr,onal re·
sources lie wus still to find the means of beating the enemy in
despite of the mat.<lhless follies of the governments he served,
and he did &0, but colUIJlnincJ that it was a lluru te.Bk.
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TilE political positions of the belligerent powcr and the chains
connecting the war with American as well as European inte-
rests baving been shown, the minor military events narrAted,
and tlle point where the dccisi~·e struggle was to Le made
indicated, uougllt remains to tell save the strength and pecu-
liar preparation on cach side ere the noble anlliea dnshCiI
together in the shock of battle. Nearly three hundred thou-
sand Frcnch still trampled upon Spain, aud so successful hild
been the plan of raising Ilative soldiers that forty thousand
Spaniards well organized marched under the king's ballners.
In May this immense army was named and distributed as
follows.
Seventy-silo; thousand, si1:ty thousand being with the eagles,
fonned the 'armies of Catalonia and Aragon'
under Suchet, and occupied those two proYinccs
and Valencia. }~orty-nine thousand, of which
thirty-eight tllOusand were with thc englcs, composed the
'army of the north' nnder Caffarel1i. They were distributed
on the grand line of communication from St. Sebnstian to
Burgos, but two dh-isions of infantry alld onc of cavalr)' with
artillery were always destined to reinforee Marmollt when
required. Nineteeu thousand, sevenleen thousnnd being with
the eagles, formed thc ' amlY of llle centre,' which occupied a.
variety of postl:l on II cirele round Madrid but alll'il)'s had one
division ill :u.. M£l.neha. Sixty-three thousand, tift)'-six thou·,
Mnd beillg with the cag;t':lI, composing the army of the south
under Soult, occupied Andnlusia "nd a part of EstrelUlldura;
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but WIDe were still detained in distant go,,"crnmellt8. lIar.
mont's: army of Portugal was seventy thougand strong, fifty-
two thousand being with the eagles, and a reinforcement of
twelve thousnnd was coming from France. He uccupied Leon,
part of Old Castille Rnd the Asturias, Illlving hi~ front upon
the l'onllCS Ilud a division watching Galllcill. The Spanish
jura1lwntadM were pl'incipall)' employed in Andalusia and
with the flrmy of the centre, BUcI the experience of Ocai'la,
of Badajos, and mllny other places, pro\'ed that for t.lHl intru-
sive monarch they fought with more vigour than their
countrymen did against him.
In March JoseplJ hud been appointed commllndcr-in-chiefof
all the French armies, but the gencrnls AA usual resisted his
authority. Dorseune denied it altogether,-Calfarelli, who
gu(Xee<1ed Dorsenne, disputed even his civil power iu the
governmentll of the north,-Suchet evaded his orders,-Mar-
mont neglected them, Rnd Soult firmly opposed his injudicious
, C military plans. The king was distressed for money,JO>ep ,'. (lr_
rl!l'p<)n(lcnet. and he complained that Marmont's army had con-
~IS8 SUllied or plundered in three months the whole
resources of the province of '1'oledo Ilnd the distlict of Tala-
vera, whereby 1.fadrid a.nd the army of the centre lVere famished,
1tfarmont retorted by complaints of the wasteful extravagance
of the king's militar.r adlllinist.rlltion in the capital: thus dis-
sensions were generated when the most uboalute union WlIS
required, After the fall of Badnj08 Joscph thought the allies
would move against J,Iarmont in Castillc, against himself by
the valley of the '1'agus, or against Soult in Andalusia. In
the first case 11e Jesigned to aid Mllrlllont with the tlivisious of
the north, the army of the centre, and fifteen thousllnd men from
the army of the south, In the second case to draw the arm}'
of Portugal and a part of the army of the south into the valley
of tllC Tagus, while the divisiollS from the army of the north
elltercd Leon, III the third cuse, half of Mannont's army
reinforced by 0. division of the army of the ccntre WIIS to pass
the Tngus at Arlobispo and follow the allies. But the army
of the centre was not ready to take the field Ilnd Wellington
knew it. .Marmont's complaint was just, waste and,confusion
plevuilcd ut Mtldridj and there was 80 little military vigour
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that the Empecinado and othcr partida chiefs pushed their
excursions to the very gates of that capital.
Joseph finally ordered 8uchet to reinforce tile urlllY of the
C(lutre, aut] huving as before said called up Palombiui from the
army of the Ehro, directed Soult to keep onc-third of t]le
army of the soutll under Drouet so far in Estremadura as to
communicate directly with Trielhard in thc valley of the
Ta","UIl; and Drouct was to pass that river if Hill passed it.
It was neccssarr, Joseph said, to follow the English army and
fight it with a.Uvantuge of numbers; to do whieu required a
strict co-operation of the three armies, Dronet's corps bcillg
the pivot. Marmont and Soult being each convinced that
Wellington would invade their separate proviuces, desired the
king so to view the coming contest and compel the other to
regulate his movements thereby; the former complaiued lIlso
toot having to observe the Gnllicinns and occupy the Asturifl8
Jlis foroo;; wara diSliamina~dj IInd he I\.'lked for reinforcements
to chase the partidas who impeded tl1e gathering of provisions
in Castille and Lean. But the king, overrating the importance
of Madrid, designed rather to draw more troops round the
capital; aud he objecled to Soult's projects against Tarifa.ll11d
Cl\.rthngcna; arguing that if Drollet was not ready /:Q po.ss the
Tagus the whole of the allies could unite on the right bank
and penetI'llte without opposition to the capital, or that We1~
liugton would overwhelm Marmont.
Soult however would not let Drouet stir, and Josep},
jealouil of thllt lUarshal's power in Audlllusill, threatened to
deprive him of his command; the inflexible duke rclllicd that
the king had already virtually done so by sending
orders direct to Drouet, t·hat lie WIl8 ready to
resign but lIe would not commit a gross military
error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in time to help Marmont
and would be too wcak for the protection of Madrid, and his
absence would ruin Audalusia; for the allies wliose force in
Estremadul"ll was very eonsideroble eould ill five marches
reach Seville and lnke it on the sixth ;-thoy would then eom-
munica~ with the fleets lit Cl\(liz, woulcl change their line of
operations without loss. and unite with thirty thousand other
troops, British and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, the liIla,
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the Nieblfl, on the side of Murcia, flno under Bnllcstero9 in the
nond... A new army might also come from the ocean, Bud
Drouet ollce beJond the Tagus could not return to Andalusia
in less than twelve days,-Murmollt could scurcdy come thero
in a month,-thc force under llis own commandwus spread
all o\'cr Andalusia; if oollccte<l. it would not furnish thirty
thousand sabres and bayonets exclusive of Drouct, and the
eVllcuation or the province would be unavoidable.
All t11(1 French misfortulles he snid had arisen from not
acting in large masses, and the army oC Portugal by spread-
ing too much to its right would ruin this campaign as it had
ruined the llrecedillg one. 'Marmout shouLd leuve ouc or
two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of his army in
poaitinn on both sides of the ptlss of Banm, the left near Pla-
sencia the right extending towards Somosierra, which could
be occupied by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not
thcn advance by the valley of the 1'agus without lending bis
left flank; nor the Tonnes without lending his right flank.
Neithel could he attack Marmont with effect, because tbe
latter could easily concentrate and according to the nature of
the attack sccurc his retreat by tile valley of the 'l'agua, or by
the province of Avila, while the divisions on the Torm($,
reinforced by two others from the anny of the north, would act
on tlle allies' flank.' For th()se reasons he would not le!;
Drouct qnit Estremudura, yet he would rei.nforce him and so
press Hill tllnt Grflhflffi, whom he supposed still at Portalegre,
would be compelled to bring UI) the firijt aDd suth divisions.
In fine he promised that a powerful body of the allies should
be compelled to remain in Estremadurn, or Hill would be
defcuted Ilud Badujos invested. TillS dispute rnged during
May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile tlle English
general, well acquainted from the intercepted letters witll these
dissension!!, made arrangements to confirm each geuernl in his
own peculiar views.
&mlt was the more easily deceived, bcenuse he had ob-
tained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the
Portll",<Y\J($e government, Wellington's most secret despatches
to Forjas containing an account of his army and his first.
d($igns against the soulh, w()re printed, and thc invasion of
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Andalusia lvas only relinquished the middle of May. Hill's
exploit lit Almal'tl.Z menaced the north and south alike, but
he adroitl), spread a report that llis object was to gain time
for the inyusion of Allllulusiu, and Wellington's demonstro-
tiol\'> were all calculated to aid this nrtiticc und impose upon
Soult. Grl\ham indeed rotUnlOO to Bcira with the first snd
sixth dh'isions and Cotton's cavalr),; but Hill was reinforced,
Graham's march was sudden and secret, and the enemy was
tllWl again deceived in all quarters. Marmont and the king
by reckonilJg the nUiIlbiJr of the English divisions thought
the bulk of the fillies WfIS in the norUl, IInd did not discover
that Hill's corps had been nearly doubled in numbers though
his division seemed the same; while Soult, not imluediately
aware of GrahlUll's departure, found Hill more than a match
for Drouet and tllercfore still expected the allies in Anda-
lusia.
Drouet wisllillg to obey the king rather than Soult had
drown towards Medellin in June, and to force him back,
Soult, as before noticed, sent his reinforcements from Seville
by the road of Monasterio. Then followed those movements
iUld counter-lliovement.!! in Estremadura already rclat-ed, each
side being desirous of keeping a great nnmber of their advl!r-
!!llries in that province. 8oult's judgment Wll8 the sonndest.
Drouet could DOt have crossed the Tagus without peril to
Andalusia, but in Estrcmadura he aided Marmont by drawiug
meu from Wellington until the latter's army was less nume-
rous than t.he arm)' of Portuh'Ul, uud very inferior to what
that llrmy could 00 mised to by detMhmcnts from Cafl'urelli
and the king. But while the French gcnernls disputed
Wellington completed his dispositions. He lmd at IMt esta.-
blished a general system fol' giving intelligence, and as his
campaign Wll! one wllieh posterity \\ill delight to study the
fonndations on which it rested shaH be exactly shown.
His reasons for seeking a battle have been stated, but he
sought it oonditionally llnd at advantage, beco.w;e to enforce
tho eoncentratiou of the Freneh lVas sure /,'Uill witllOut fight-
ing. Of ninety thou!!lllld Anglo-Portllguese \Iuder hiil com-
mand six thousand only wore in CaJiz; but Wutchcren \VIIS
still to be atoned for, the regiments which had served there
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were so sickly that cmly thirty-two thousand British aoldiell
were ill line. The Portuguese were twenty-four thousand,
and so distrilmled by brigades or regiments, that ill speaking
of English divisions in battle the Portuguese soldiers are
always included, and their fighting wus such as to justify the
general ,term. Two thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand
infllutry with twenty-four guns were wilier Hill, who had
also the support of fonr Portuguese garrison battolions and
the fifth Spallisll army, Twelve hundred Portuguese cavalry
under general D'Urbsn were ill the Tras os Monte!, Three
thousand five hundred British cavlllry Ilud thirty~six t]lollsaud
infantry with tift)'-four guns were under Wellington's per-
sonal command, which was enlarged by three thousand 6'"e
hundred Spaniards, cavalry and infantry, under Carl06
D'Esplli"is lInd Juliall Sanchllz,
To lengthen the french commllniOlltions Almafllz had been
destroyed. To allOrten his own Wellington resolved to repair
Alcllntara. which had been placed within bis positions by Hill's
recent operations. '1'he breach in that slupendous structure
WIlS ninety feet wide and one hundred and fifty feet llbovo
the water-line, yet the fertile genius of Sturgeon furnished
the UlOllIlS of passing it with hea.vy artillery, and without the
enemy being aware of the preparations made until the momcut
of execution. In the arsenal of Elms he secretly prepared
Il. network of strong rOJles after a fashion which permitted it
to be divided and carried with its appurtenances to Alcantara
Oil seventeen carriages. Straining beams were then fixed on
euch side of the bruken arch, eahles werc stretched ucro:s th~
chasm, the net-work was drown over, tarplllllin blinds were
placed at each side, IInd the J)caviest guus 1)lL'jsed iu sufety.
This remarkable feat procured a short internal line of com-
munication along good rOllds, while the enem:r, by the de-
struction of the bridge at AlmllNlll, W!l8 t1lrown upon Il long
external line and very bad roads: thus Hill wus suddenly
brougllt fourteen days' march 1l000rer to Wellington thlUl
Drcuet WllS to Mllrmont.
Agriculture iu Portugal was seriously embarrassed by the
military demand for drought cattle, and yet the subsistence oC
the troops could only be carried a. few marcbes beyond.the
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Ag'lleda. Sailors and pcAAl>ntry were now flet to remove the
obstructiolls of the Douro and tlHl TllguS, and the latter,
which under PhiliIl the Second Ilad been navigable from
Toledo, was opened to Mlllpica near Alcalltara, tlle Douro to
Barca de Alba Oil the confines of Spaiu. This relieved the
interior of PortugAl from tho burthen of land carriage, and
the ffillg'!ll':incs were brought np by the l'ngus to Alcnntllrl\
on one flank, and by the DOlJrO to within tl. short distllllCC of
Almeidn, Uodrigo and Salall1anca on the other. Rut the If\.':!t
line Wag supplied from t.he sea, and American privateers were
to be apprehended beealls(l the Admiralty neglected the pro-
tection of the coast. Suddclll.y also the Illlvigatioll of the
Douro was slIsp<mdcd by the overhcated l.elll of a eommis-<:nf}'.
who being thwllrted by tIle t-ardinC9a of the native oontmen
issued of Ilia 0'1'11 authority fin edict establishing regulations
and pronouncing pllins and penalties. l'he river craft in-
stantly diSflppearcd and lhe government endeavoured to give
political importance to the mattcr, which WM the more
embll.rrllBsing os the boatmen hud bofore been so Ilverse to
passing the olel ]loinh of nAvigation that severe illcnsllres
were necessary to compel them. .
When t.his vexation wos overcome Wellington had still to
dread, if Ilis operatiolls led bim far into Spain, that bis sub-
si~tence would not be sure, for there were olljeets of nh50\ute
necessity, especially Ulcut, which eould only he procured wit·h
ready money and he had no spcciCl--lord \Yillinm Bcntinek
had 8'lvept the Mediterranean money markets by his ill.
advised competition, and the English ministers chose this
period of emborrassment ignoT:llltly and injuriously to inter-
fere with the mode of issuing bills. His resolution to advance
was not indeed shaken, hut when describing his pluu of cam·
paign to lord Liverpool IIC finished with these rellll1rkuhJo
·words. 'I am not inscnsiblo to IOS5(l11 and risks, nor am I
blind to the disndV'lntllg<ls under whielt I undertake this
operation. My friends in Cast.ille, and I believe no officer
ever had better, assure me that we shall aot want provisivns
even before the barvest will be reaped; that there exist con-
cealed granaries whieh shall be opened to us, and that if we
call pay for a part credit will be gi\'en to us for the remainder,
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and they have long given me hopes tl1ftt we should be able
to horrow mone}' in CUlltille upon Britl!;ll securitieo;. In case
wc should be able to maintain ourselves in Castille, the
general action Ilnd its results being delayed by tIIC enemr's
lllunrouvres, Wllicll I think not improbable, I have ill COlltem-
Jllntion other resources for drawing supplies from the country,
and I 81\511 have at nil event-s our' own magnzines st Almeida
and Cilldad Rodrigo. But with aU tlwse prospeas I cannot
'l'q/lect witlund shuddering upon the probahilitylhat we elv.dl be
distressed; flO7' upon the oolUWruenCf18 which. may result jr()f/l
OUT wanting 'T/WMlI in tlle interior 0/Spain.'
All 'Vellington's difficulties were political and all created
by others, but hig purely military combinations were never at
fault; for though he sometimes underrated his enemy's force
his preparations Illld always an ample margin for miscalculll'
tion, and his projected operations were now profouudly con-
sidered. His right was secured by Hill's success against
Almll.rllZ, because the valley of the 'l'agm. was exhausted of pro-
visions, and full of cross rivers which required" pontoon tmin
to pass if the Frcnch sllOuld menace Portugal seriously in that
line: moreover' he had cl'l\lsed the fort·ress of Monte Santos,
whieh promcted the Portuguese frontier between the TllgUS
and &arigo, to be put into a state of defence, nnd the relltora-
tioD of A1caDtara gave Bill the power of quickly interfering.
On the other side if Marmont, strengthened by Caffarelli'lI
divisions, sllQuld operate strongly agaiust Ilia left a retreat
was open upon Rodrigo, or across the mountains into the
"alley of the Tagus. And his own flanks being t1ms secured
his combinations to weaken those of his enemy embraced the
whole Peninsula.
1°. He Jirected Silveim lllld <l'Urball to file from the Trns
os Montes by the Douro along the CJlCmy's right flanl, Ilnd
rear, and form a link of eonncxion with tlle Callieian army,
with which Castanos promised to besiege Asterga, when the
Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tonnes. Meauwhile
sir HOlllo POphlllil'S expedition was 10 eomnleuoo opualious
in concert wilh the seventh Sponish army on the COllSt of
Biscay, and so draw Cllftill'(~lli's di\'isioIlll from the succour of
.Martllont.
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2°. 'fo hinder 8uchet from reinforcing the king or making
a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition was to
menace Catalonia and Valencia in cOllcert with the Murcian
army.
3°. To prevent 80ult overwhelming Hill Wellington rclicd_
on the garrison of GibrJ.ltar llnd the Anglo-Portuguese amI
Spanish troops in the lsIn de Lconj--on insurrections in tha
kingdom of Cordoba, where Eehevaria going from Cadiz by
the way of Ayamonte was to organize the llartidas of that
district;........on Ballesteros's army-but he dreaded the rasb-
uoo of this general who might be cruslled iu U Illomeut,
which would endanger HilL aud reudcr success in the uorth
nugatory. It was this fear which Mused him to keep so
strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult's resolution
to }lrevent Dl'ouet from quitting Estremadura even thoug~
1Ii1l should cross the Tagus was wise and military. For
though Drouet's juu<...tioll would have given the king aud
Marmout 1l mst superiority in Ct>8tille, the geneml advllllmgc
would have remained with Wellington; seeing Hill oould
always, by crossing the Tagus at Alcantam, ]la"e misled
Drouet to do the same at Arzobispo, which would have led to
nothingj and I-holl Hill eould have returned, thereby giving
Drouet three marches for his onc; or he nlight have joined
Wellington b)' the sllo1"ter line. amI Soult, wllllting llumhertl,
oould not have profited from Ilis absenoo. Wellington also
might retire within Portugallllld render Drouet's movement a
false one, or moving by Alcantara. have gained 1I. fortnigllt to
lltt.ack Soult in Anda.lusia. Tbe king's plan depended on t]le
~xlld co-operation of Pertlons jeulous of each other and far
froUl o1K.'<I.ieut to himself. uutl their marches ooultl llot lJe
jnstly timed eithor, because of the great tlismnccs llnd tho
long lines of communication: their corrcsfIOudenec also W/lS
consllmtl)' intercepted and brollgllt to Wellington. The know-
ledge thus gained on one side alld delll)'ed on the otller had
already caused the timely reinforcing of Hill; and it kept
Palombini's division away from Madrid three weeks, which
finally proved of vital consequences as it rendered the kiug's
operation to succour Marmont too late.
Hill's uploit at Alwaraz aud the disorderly stuh: of tLe
.2
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army oC the centre, having in a manner isolated ?!far-
IIIOU1-, the importalloo of Gallicia ami t,he Asturias with
respcd to the projected operations Wfl,S incrCllScd. 1'111} Galli·
dans could act in Castille upon the French renr fIod so weaken
the line of defence on the Douro; or, marching throngl] the
Asturias, SjlrellJ iusurrecliou along the coast to the Montuull
de Santandcl' find tllcrc join the seventh army. This made
Wellington judge that Bonnet must continue to hold the
Asturias, and that be should oot find him in the field; and
though Marmollt had fortified different parts in Castille his
army wns still widely sprcnd, nnd fIS Soult had observed,
cxt.cnded to ib right instead of being concentrated on its left
near Banos, which gave additionnl chances to the English
general. :Marmollt indeed, adopting the lines of the Torllleil
and Donro, hnd collected magazines, um.l the king hud formed
others for him at Talavera and Scgovia, yet he did not
approach the Agueda, but continued to ocropy a VlISt edeut
of (;Oun1ry for the convenicnce of feeding until June. When
he hcurd of Alcalltaru. bci.llg reswred and of Illugazines beiu~
formed at eneeres, he said thnt tIle lsltter would be on the left
of the Guadiann if Andalusia were the object, and though ill-
IllllCed for an army acting against himself they were admirably
Illaeed for an army which havillg fought in Castille should
afterwards operllte against Mndrid, becnuse they could be
transported at once to the right of the Tllgus by Alc'lutaTS,
ilnd be scenred by removing the temporary restorations.
Hill thcrefore would, he thought, rejoin Wellington to aid in
11 battle which witll prophetic feeling he said would be fougM
llCllr thc Tonncs, and he desired Caffarelli to put the di\'isiolJ8
of the army of the north in movenlent: he prayed the king
also to lllwe guns and a pontoon traill sent from Mlldrid, that
Drouet might PflSS at Almaraz and join hun by the Puerto
Pico.
Josepll then renewed his orders to Soult £lnd to CIl!fare11i,
hut only sellt two small boats to Almarnz; and Marmont, see·
ing the allied army snddenly concentrated on the Agncda,
re..:alled Foy from thfl valley of the Tllgug and, contrary to
Wellington's e.xl~cto.tion, Bonnet from the AsturiM. His first
design wag to assemble his troops at Mcdiila del Clmpo, Val-
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ladolid, Valdesillns, Toro, Zamora, and Sa.larnllnCll., leaving two
battalions anda brigade of dragoons at Benevcnte to
ohscl've thcGallidans. Thus tlle bulk of his force 1'1"" 9, p. '~3.
would line the Duero, w11i1e two divisiolls fonned an advanced
guarJ on thcTorrncs,and t.he whole could be oonOOlltrared ill five
dars. His plan was to hold theTol'mcs until Wellington's whole
army was on that river, then to eoucentrate behind the Duero
and favour the defence of the Salamanca forts until reinforce-
Illents sllould enable him to drive the a!lies llack to Portugal;
Imd he warned Cuffilrclli the forts could not of thclllsclvt:s llOlJ
Ollt more than fifteen dars. Marmont wns a man to be feared.
Quick of apprehension, oouragcoua and scientific, he had ~pc­
ricnce in war, moved troops with great facility, was strong of
body, in the flower of life, eager for glory and although
neitllCr a great nor a fortunate commauder such a onc as
might bear the tl'lst of fire. His army WII8 wenk in elwalry
but finely organizctl, Dnd he ,had with Illlcoossful diligence
restored the discipline which had been so shaken by the mis-
fortunes of Massena's Cll.llIllaign, and by un.:easi.ng operations
from the battle of Fuen.tes Ouoro to his own retreat out of
Beirll.
It llM been often affirmed thnt the 'F'reneh were eneoumged
by their IClldel'8 to misdeeds llllmntchrd in wickedness nnd
peculiar to the nation. Such ll.'lsertions sprillgingfrom morbid
national antipathies it ill tIle duty of the historian to correct.
All troops will behave ill when ilI-go"erne<l, and the best
commanders canllot ut times prevellt the perpctrntioll of the
most fdghtflllmischief; this truth, so important to the wel-
flltC of nlltions, m'ly he jlro\'ec1 with respcet to the Peninsula
war by the avowals of the genel'llls on either side, and by
their endeavours to arrest the evils whieh they deplored.
When Dorsewle returned from llis expedition against Gllllida,
in the latter end of J8ll, 116 reproached his soldiers iu the
follllwillg tt:rlllli, < The lields Imv!' been devas-
tated tl.lld uOll.lles have bcen burned; ~llCse excesses
llre unworthy of the French soldier; they pierce
the llearts of the most devoted and friendly of the Spa-
niards, they are revolting to honest mcn And emllarrass
the provisioning of the army. The gcncral.in-chid sees
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them with sorrow, and orders, thnt besides a pcnnanent roun-
martini there. shall be at the head-quarters of eacb division of
every ann, a roilitar,r commission whieh shall try the following
crilllCll, und ou conviction scntenoo to death without appeal,
execution to be donc on thc spot iu prcsrncc of tho troops.
, 1°. Quitting a post to pillage. 2°. Desertion of ali kinds.
3°, Disobedience in face of the enemy.. 4,0. Insubordination
of all kind8- 5°, Mtloruudiug of all kinds. GO. Pillage of all
kinds.
'All pe1'$O'I1B military or ot/IeTS, '8luJi be considered Q.8 pll.
lagers, wlw quit their post or thmr Tanks to enLer lw-uses, ~c.,
or who ti8e violence to ob~in fi'Q1Tf tloe inhabitanta '/Iwre tium
tM1J arl! kgaJ1y entitled w.
cAll pe71!OT18 slwll be consUkred daerters WM slwll.. ~ fQl.md
witlwld a paa~rnt beyond tlle advanced pO$ts, and frequent
jJf.«role8tk.y and 'ni!J1tt slw,ll be S/llU to arrest all periJ011,S beyond
the ovlposls.
'Bifrne the enemy wlum in camp or cantonments -ro"ll.<alJa
shall UIke place tvtr'lJ 'lour, and all persons ahsem without
lea~ twice f"l.mm7lg, 8'UJ1l be cuunWd deserters and Jtuloed as
BUd/" The servama and BUtlerS of the camp are a'fllCWlhle to
lhis as well as the soklier.'
This ordcr Mannont, afkr rcproacbing bis troops for like
e.'i.oosses, renewed with the following additions.
, Conaidcring that tlM diMrdlYf's of tlie arrnylta1XJ am'Ced ra
tJ~ hi:;hest degree and require tIle mOBt 'Uigrnous mea.mres 0)
repression, it isln'Y1Ned,
'1°, AU n<ftl.commissioned o.fJU:ers and 1J()ldiers found (f
quarter ofa league fT()tI~ their quarters, camp, Q1' post, toitltOUt
leave, slwJj, be judgfXl pillaglYf's ana tried lnJ ehe militGMJ COIl~
misGion.
'2°.. T~ gens4armea s,wJ1 examine tlle baggage 01 all
BUtlerS and followers, cmd sluUJ, seize all t>JTecu tlta/, 4J1P'Ulr to
be pillaged, and shall bum tohat wiIJ, burn and bri7l{l a~ goU
and suver to t~ pa?f7TUVJteT-gen.eral under a protXs verbal-,-
and all penom W'lOse effects haVe hem seized aB pillage to u/£
amQunt of <me lw.ndred Nuns, sfwll be sent to the military
commissicm and on conviction euffer death.
, 3°, .J.ll o.fficrrrs wlw shall, not take proper measures to reprus
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dis(fr(/ers under their command shall be sent in arrest to~
quarters tlu!re to be judged.'
'l'lleli llPlloiliting the number of bagguge animals to euch
company upon a scale which ooinciJes ill a reUlllrkllble man-
lier with the 1111owanC<l1l in the British urlll)', Mannout Jireeted
the overplus to be sei7,cd and de1ivcrQl.t under a legal proccss
to the nearest villages, ordering the provost- general to look
to the execution each day and report therOOll. Finally he
clothed the llrovost-general with all the powers of the military
commissiOllS, aud }lroof was Boon given that his oruers were
Dot mere threata, for two captains were nrrcstcd for trial, and
110 soldier of tho twenty-sixth regiment was condemned to
ue'lth by one of the provisional commissions for stealing
e1lUreh vessels.
Such was the conduct of the French, and touching the con-
net of the English, lord Wellington in the Sllllle montll
wrote thus to lord Liverpool.
; The ouJ;r(J{!e8 oommitWd by tAe British. soldiers belonging
to this army 'U:lve become so enormous, aM tlLtlj lu.we prodU«d
al~ effect on tl.e minds of the peqple of tlle country so injuriQUS
to tl.e cause, alld likely to be so dc.ngerous to the army itself,
elv.a I request yuur lordship's early atwllUm to tlle subject. I
am sensible tIle best 'll.ea8Ures to be adopWd on tlds BUhject are
tlw8IJ qfprevention, and 1 beliet,1.l tlte1'l.l arefffW qf)ioors wllO lIat'8
J1aid fIUlre «Uentilm to t!.e subject than I have done, and I llUt'l.l
00en so far II'll(;re8sful as tliat ftw outrages are commiUed by
t"~ soldiers wlw are witll tlteir regiments, after the regimenu
have bWI a slwrt time in t!Ji~ oountry.'
'But in tIle exirmdW. 8Jls/em Im wt.icl. tu are (UJling, small
rktad,rr.ents ojsoldicrs must be 11/arclled long distances thrv1J{}h
ti,e countr'lj, either as escorts or returninglrom being e8CQTt8 to
prisrmers, or coming fron~ llOSpital8, ~., and 1UJtwitkstanding
Illat tlleiIe ddad,menU are never allowed to mard. f.:JXepting
under tl.e cOllull",.,d 0/ 0"''' ojJicer or more in prop01'tUm. u> its
~i.ze, and tluu evenj precamum i8 udwn to provUJejor tile reglb
l«Tit'!] of tlt.eir 81dnistence, tllerl.l is 1UJ illsla~ oJ lIu! fflQ,rd. of
O'lJ:l of a;ue detachments that outrages of even) de8criptilm are
'lOt commiUed, and I am $(jrry to say witl. impunity.'
, 'File guard-f'ooll/,8 aTe tlU!iJ"fjore crowded wil" prUQllerSj a,1d
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tlu; qffenca of which tliey have been guilty remain ttnpullished,
to the destru<:li<m. of lIte discipline of the army and W tl0
injury oj tlu; '1'eptdatWn 0/ tlw country for justice. I Jw~
tlwuglu 1J, proper to lay tlltU cireumslatu:e3 before !Jour l0rd-
ship. 1 am aoo.ul to mQve the army jurtlurr forward into
Spain, and I aslfUre '!Jour kYrdIJhip, that 1 have not «friend in
that country wlw luJ,8 Mt written t() tn6 in dread of IIM oonse-
quenw whid~ must re$Ult to the aNny and to the cause front
a c01Itinuunce cftltWJ disgrace/v./, irregularities, whicJ~ [ declare
I JUl1;e it ?Wt in 'my jXJ1JJe'l" to 'fJ'l'tVent.'
To this should hawl been ndded tho insubordinlLtion
and e"il passions awakened by the unchecked plunder of
llodrigo and BlIdajos. But long had the English general
complained of the bad discipline of his (lnlly, lInd the foUo\\,o
ing extracts from 0. letter dated ll. few months later show that
his distrust was not ill-founded. After observing that the
soldicrs' cOllstitutions were so shaken from tile Walchercn dis-
onler and their owu irregularitiel\ tlmt the British army was
almost a moving llOspital, more than onc-third or about twenty
thousand men being sick or attending upon the sick, he thus
describes their conduct.
, 'l'Iu; di80rders which tkue /!Oldiers have are ofa wry trijli1lJ,!
de8eriptUm, thelj are OO1lsidered to rrmder tltem ineapable of
Be1'1'ing witlt tllcir regiments but they certainly du not incapa.-
citate tltem /rum CQJ/lmiUing outray~ of oJ1 descriptWnIJ on
their pa8l!a{Jc t/t'rfnIIJh tIUJ OOU'Iltrlj, and in the last m<n>emenJ8 0/
tJu; lmpitala tlUJ soldiers lUJ,ve not tmf,y plu.ndered tlUJ inJw.bi-
tWits of tlU!ir property, but the lwtpital stlYiWJ which mov«l
with the llOspiUd8, and /tm'e sold the plunder. And all tkn
outrayeIJ are commiltlld will. impunity, 7W proof can be bruugM
on oalll bifOT'B a cuurt.martUU tlmt any indit:idwd liodlJ com-
mitted an autrage, and UU! soldiers 0/ tlu; arm,y are becoming
litlle better than a band of robbers.'-' [ have carrU:d tM
establishment and autMrity of t/UJ l'rot1O,l-mardwl M/ar WJ
either will go; tJwe are at tltis moment not lest than one~
tJ08f.-marslud and nine1een OMistant pr(ftX)st-rna'l'8ludB attadwJ to
t!UJ lJW(ffaJ, divi8ion8 0/ cavalry and infanl/Mj, and w the llM-
pital stations to pr~ orrkl', but litis estabUshm~llt i8 flOC
IIU.DWie1lt and 1 lw-ve not l!1./l means of increastllg it.'
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For remedies he proposed the admitting less rigorous proof
of guilt before courts martial; the fonning a military police,
melt UII 'he Frendl and otlter armt'e8 possessed; the enforcing
officcrs' attention to duties; the increasing the Imy and respon~
sibilit}, of non-commissioned officers and throwing upon them
tlie chicf care of tho discipline_ But in treating this part of
the subject be broaclled an opinion which can scarcely be sus-
tained even by Ms anthority_ Assuming somewhat unjustly,
that the officers of his army were from consciousness of like
demerit geuerally too leniellt in their sentences on eacb otller
for ncglect of duty, he says, 'I am inclined to entertain the
opinion that in the British army duties of inspection and
control over tlle conduct and Jlabit.s of the I!oldiers, the per.
formance of wllich by somebody is the only effectual check to
disorder and all its consequences, are imposed upon the sub-
altern officers of regimenl:3, which duties Britisb olliecr." being
of the cl(}8lj of gentlemen in society and being require<! to
flppcar fill S11Ch, have never performed and wltid~ they will
net'er perflYt"m. It is very necessary howe\-er tbat tllC duties
should be perfomlCd by somebody, and for this reason and
having observed the advantage derived in the gunrds from the
re81lcctable body of 1l0ll-oommissioned officers iu those regi-
ments, who pcrfonn all the duties required from subaltcrns in
the marching regiments, I bad suggested to your lordship the
expedicncy of increasing tlle pay of the non-eollllnissioned
officers in the army.'
Now it is a strangeassumlltion that a gentleman nccessarily
neglectB his dnty to his CQuntry_ When well drilled, which
was not always the case, gentlemen by birth gencrnlly per-
formed tlleir duties in tlle l)eninsuln more oollseientiollsly than
uny otllers, and the experience of every commanding officer
will Lear out the assertion. If the non-commissioned officers
could do all the dut.ies of subaltern officers wh>- SllOUld the
country bellr the useless expense of the latter1 But in truth
the system of the gufll'ds produces rather fl, medium goodn{'SlI
than superior excellence; the system of sir John Moore,
fouuded UpOll tIle princIple tllat tLll u!lio::o::r~ ol..,mlrl thoroll,g-hly
kllow and be rcspollsible for the diseiplino of their soldiers,
better bore the teat of cxperiencc, All the British regiments
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of the light division were fanned in the camps of Shotn-C1ifi
by that most accomplished commander; very many of the
other acknowledged good regimenlB of tile ann)' had been
instructed by him in Sicily; and wherever an officei' formed
under )100ft obtained a regiment, whether British or Portu-
guese, that regiment was distinguished in lhiB war fOr ita ills-
cillline and enduring qualities.
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Os tlH~ 13th of June, the periodic mins hnving ccnscd and
the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the
Agueda and marched towards the Tormes in four columns,
one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th
he reached the Valmusa stream witllin six miles of Salamanca
lIud drove a lhellcu delacluuent acrosS the 'l'ormes. All the
bridges, save that of SalUillOllCU which was defended by tho
forts, had been destroyed, and 'there was ll. g'Rrrison in the
castle of Alba de Tormes. The 17th lIe plISsed the river
above and below the town by the deep fords of Sn.nta Martn
and Los Cantos, and general Henry Cliuton invested the forts
the same day with the si3:th di\·ision. Marshal Marmont
immediately ret·ired with two divisions and some cavlIlry to
Fueute el Sauco Oll the road of Toro, being followed by a
strong advanced guard of tho ll.ILies, and Salamanca instantly
became It BCCne of rejoicing: I.he houses were illuminated,
Rlld the people, shouting, singing, and weeping for joy, gave
Wellington I.heir welcome while his army occupied the moun_
tain of San Christo\'al five miles in advance of the city.
SIEGB OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.
Four eighlcen-poundllrs had followed t·he army from
Alillllida, three twenty-four pound bowitzers were
furnished by the field artillery, a:Jd the hatterillg-
tmill used by KiJI at Almarnz had passed the
Ilridge of Alcantn.n\ t!lll 11 tb. The strength of the forts had
been undcrrntcd j they contained eight hundred men, and
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Wcllingl<ln's it was said thirteen eonyents and twenty·two
i;:;:kb. colleges had been destroyed for Uleir const,rue-
liS$. tiOll, SUIl Vincellte, GO culled from the Itlrgtl
(;Ollvent it enclosed, was the key-fort, IInd sitl1lltcd Oil l\ per.
pendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes. Irregular in form
but well flanked, it was sepal'at,ed by a deep ravine from the
other iorts, eullcu St. Cajetuuo and La Mercel.l; these also
stood on high grollnd, Ilnd though Bnm}]er than San Vinccnte
nllU of a squarc foml, had good bomb-proofs and detlp ditches
with perpendicular scarps imd eountersCilrps.
In thll llight of the 17th coloucl BurgoJuc, the engineer
uireeting the siege, commenced 11 Imttery for eight guns nt
the distaIJce of two hundred and fifty yards from the main
wall of Vineente; and as the mins of the destroyed convents
rCllderoo it impossible to excavate, earth was brollgM frOIll a
disiallce, Lut the mOOlt was up, the !light short, the enemy's
musketr.\" IWlLVy, the workmen of the sixth division in_
experienced, and at, daybrcak the battery was still imperfect..
An at.tempt had l>een made to attach the miner secretly to
the eounier~ClLrp, aud when the vigill.lnce of a. trained dog
burned this the attempt Wfl.'! openl)' madc, but n. plunging tire
from tllC top of the convent stopped progress,
On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruius,
mustered nll the eucllly'a fire save 011lt from loop"liOlcs, ami
I.,'olollcl Ma)', directing the artillery scn'ice, placed two field-
llicCCil on a neighbouring convcnt cancd San Bernardo, over-
looking the fort.
In the night the first battery was armed, covering for tll"O
field-Iliccea as a ooullter-battery was r....isOO a little to it~ right,
nud a second battcry for two howitzcrs was constructed on
the Cnjetano side of the I'lwine. Ncxt morning seven guns
opened, and at nine o'clock had cut away the wall to the
level of the counterscarp. The second breaching Lattery
whioh was lowor down the BOtlI'P then commenced its fire'
but the iron l\()witzcrs were unlllect for llatt.ering ordnance.
lInd t]le enemy's muskctr)' knockcd down a captain lIud
twenty gunners; ammunition also WlUl scarce, and as the
Frencll could eusily cut off tLe Lrellt;h in the night the
£rc CCIllit.'t!.
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The 20th at mid-day oolonel Dickaon arrived with more
iron howitzers from Elvn.<l, and the second Wtery, reinforced
with additiollnl pie<:es, revived its fire agninst a re-entering
angle of the convent a little beyond the former breach. The
wall was soon broken and a huge cantle of the convent with
its roof went to the ground, crushing many of tlle gnrrison
and laying bure the inside of tIle building: carcasc3 were
irnmcdilltely thrown into the opening to hurn the convent,
bnt the enemy mnintained tho post and extinguished tho
f1amell. A lieutenant and fifooen gunuers were lost this "day
on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly
gone the attack was suspended until fresh stores could come
up from Ahneida.
During the progress of this siege the general aspcet of
atTairs hud materially chang<..od on both sides. Wellington
had been deceived as to the strength of tile forts, and iJltcr~
coptcd returns of Soult and Mllrrnont's armies now proved
they also were far stronger than he had expected: at the
same time he heard of Bullest,eros's defeat at BanJos, and of
Blade's uufortunate eavalTY action at Mll&'uilla. He llad
calculated on Bonuet holding Lhe Asturias, but that general
WllS in full mllTCh for Lean; Cnflil1'elli also Wall preparing to
TCinfo~e Mnrmont and the bliUinnt prosrcct of the enmpni{,'ll
WIIS Sllddenly clouded. On the ot11Or hmHl, Bonnet having
relinquished the Asturias after six days' occupation t11ree
thousand Ollllieillns were ill that province llnd in cornmllnica~
tion with the seventh army, and the maritime e:o:pedition
under Poplmlll l,ad sailed for the coast of Biscay. Nor was
the kiug's sitUlltion agreeable. The partidas intercepted llis
deaputches so ~urely tlmt it WUg the 19th ere MurmOllt's
letwr, lI.nnOU.lleillg Wellington's advance llnd saying Hill also
Wl18 in march fOT the north, reached Madrid. &mlt llad
detained Drouet, Sllehet would only send oue brigAde towaTds
lIIadrid, and Caffilrclli, angry tlJat Palombini sl\ould march
upon the capital instead of Burgos, ke)lt back the uivisious
promised to Mannont. Joseph then seeing he must depend
on his own force, gave orders to hlow up Mirabcte anti
abandon La Mancha on one siue, and the forts of SomosielTll
and Buitl'llgo on the oth.er, with 11 viell' to uuite the llrmyof
tuc centre.
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A uetaclLlllcllt under colonel Noil\ct, emplo}'ed to destroy
Buitmgo, WIlS attacked on his return by the Empooinado, but
Noizct, an able officer, defeated llim find reached Madrid with
little loss. Palombiui's murcll was then hastened, lIDd impe-
rative orders directed Soult to scnd ten thousand men to
Toledo. The garrison of Scgovia was reinforced, Mannont
was infonncd of Hill's true position, and the king advised
him to give uott10 to Wellington, for he supposed the latter
to have only eighteen thousand English troops: but he hod
twenty-four tllOuSllnd, and had yet left Hill so strong that he
desired Mm to fig]lt Dronet if occasion required. In tbis
state of affairs Mormont ullited at Fuentc cl Banco on the
20th, four JivisiollS of infl\utry nud 0. brigade of cnvalry,
furniahing twenty-five tllOU!lfInd men of all arml:!, with whieh
he marched to the succour of the forts. His apllroach oYer
fln open country was descried far off, and a brigade of the
fifth division was immediately drawn from the siege, the
battering-train WIl.!l sent across tho 'l'ormea, and the army
formed in order of battle on the top of tile Christoyal
height.
This position was about four miles long and weU defined,
the ascent ill front sleep and taugled with hollow roads and
stone enclosures attached to villages; the summit was brood,
even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by
the upper Tormes, the left dipped into the country bordering
the lower Tonnes, for in passing Salamanca that river makes
8 sweep round the back of the position. The infantry heal')'
cavalry and guns eroWlled the summit of tile mountain, but
tIle light cavalry fell hack from the front to the low country
(HI the left, where there was a small stream aud u marshy
flat. The villages of Villllres and Monte Hubio were behind
the left of the position-the village of Cabreri1.Os marked the
extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river....
'1'he villages of Cllristo,"al, CastiUauos, and Moresco, nearly in
a line, were in front below, but the lust WIIS withiu the allies'
ground and the position comJlletcly eommlUlded nil the
country for many miles: the 11eat waa excessive and there was
neither sllade, nor fuel to cook with, nor auy water neercr
than the Tonnes.
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About five o'clock iu the cvcuing the encmy's hOl"llemeu
"'pproaeheJ, pointiug towards the left of tlla position os if to
turn it by thc lower Tormes, whereupon the Uritisll light
cavalry made ll. short forward movement find a pm"tilll chl\rgo
took place, but the French opened six guns and tllC English
retirOO to their own ground neilt Monte Rubio and Villares.
'rhe light division, whicJ1 Wl\..'1 held in reservc on the summit,
immediately elosed towards the left of tl1e position, but. WhCll
the cllemy ba.lted returned to its former ground ill the centre.
Munuont's main body bad meanwhile bonlc in onc dark
volume agai.nst tllo right and IUI.1ting at the very foot of the
l~ition scnt n flight of shells on to the summit, nor did this
fire cease until the Freneh general, driving back 0.11 the out-
posts, had obtained possession of Moresco and established
himself behind the village and Castellanos within guu-shot of
the allies. 'I'llat night the English generol slept on the
ground Mlongst the troops, and at tho first streak of light tho
nrl1)ics were aga.in undcr arms. Soon some Sigllllls were inter-
changed betwccn Mannont ami the forts, yet 1>oth sides weTO
quiet until evening, when Wellington detached the sixty-
eighth regiment to drive the French from MOlesco. This
ntmek succeeded, bnt the troops being recalled just as day-
light failed, a body of French, coming unl~rceived tllrougll the
st811ding corn, broke into the villuge us the 131'itish were col-
lecting tllcir posts from the different avenucs, and did con·
siderahlc execution. In tlle skinnish fln officer Milled MflCka}'
being suddenl}' surrounded refused to surrender, and singly
fighting against 8 multitude received more wounds than the
human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still
lives to show his honourable scars.
On tl1e 22nd three di\lsiolls of infantry 811d a brigade of
cavalry joincd Murlllont, who, having llOW llCllrly forty thou-
suml men in hllnd, extended his left aud seized 11 llart of tlHl
height in advanec of tho allies' right wing, from whellec he
could disccrn the whole of their order of battlc and attack
their right on evcn terms. But tllcn Gral1fllll with the seventh
division dislodged the French by a sharp skirmish hefore
tlley could he formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont
withdrew from llis dangerous position to some heights ohont·
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six miles in his rear. It was thoug-llt his tempestuous advanCll
to Morcsco with sllch an inferior feree OD the evening of the
20th should have been his Tuiu. Wellington saw this error,
but argued, tlmt if the French marshal came to fight it was
better to defend a very strong position than to descend and
combat in the plain, seeing that his Imperiority was not such
liS to insure a victory decisive of the ClIrnpnign; IInd in CMc of
failure a retreat across the Tormes would llUve been very diffi-
cult To this lllay be added, that Ulue was at first some
confusion amongst the tlllie8 before tIle tr(01)8 of the diifcreut
nations could form their order of lmttlc,-that the descent of
the mountain townr<ls t110 enemy was by no meaDS casy,
because of the walls and the two villages which covered the
French front,-alld Hlat MnmlOnt, who had lllcnty of gU1I8,
and troops extremely ready of movement, could also ha\'c
evaded the action until night. This reasolling, good on the
20th was Dot so on the 21st The allies, whose infantry was
a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous and
mudl better mounted tlmll tile ltrench, might then JlllVC been
poured down by all the ronds passing over the position at da}',
break, eud Murmont, turned ou both flallks and followed
vellemelltly, could uever have made his retreat to tIle Douro
tllrough the opell COlllltry: on the 22nd however when the
French gCllcml hud TCcei\'ed his other divisions the ehances
were no longer tile same.
Mannont's lIew position was skilfully chosen. One flank
rested 011 Cuoozu. Vcllosa, the other ut Huerta, thc centre W8B
at Aldcll Rubin. His right wall refu8Cllalld he abandoned the
Toro road, but he covcrm} that of Tordesillas, commanded the
for<! of Huerta with Ills left, and could pass the Tonnes 10
operate by the other bank and COlllllltUlicate with his forts.
Wcllington Illude corresJlollding JiHpositiolls, closing up his
left towarda Morcsco, Ilnd pushing the light division along the
salient part of his position to AJdca Lengua overhanging a
ford, which WILS howe\"er searcel}' pTllcticable at this period.
GrahalU with two divisions was IJlaced at lhe [(mls of Sauta
Marta, and the heavy German ctIYfllry undcr Bock crossed the
Tormcs to watch tllC ford of Huerta: by t-his disposition the
allies covered Salamanca Ilnd could operate on either side of
tilc 'l'ormes on a shorter line than the }"reuch.
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On the 23rd the two armiea remained trnnquil, l'ut at
break of day on the 2Hh somo dropping pistol-shots, llnd
now lllld then a shout, came faintly from the mist which
covered the lowcr ground be)'ond tIle river; the hravy sound
of artillery sueeeeded, and the hissing of the bullets as they cut
through the thickened atmosphere lllaiuly said the French were
over the Tonnes. Soon the fog dispersed and the German
horsemen were secll in clos.:! order, retiring before twelve thou-
Sllnd :French infantry who were marching steadily 011 wards.
At intervals twenty guns would start forwards antlscnd their
bullcts whistling /\Ild tearing up the ground beneath the
Germilns, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out,
capped all the hills in succession and peeriug abroad gavo
signals to the main body. Wellingtoll Immediately sent
Grahlllll across the ri\'er by tbe fords of Sauta Mltrttl. with the
first aud seventh divisions and Le 3fnrellllnt'B brigade of Eng-
lish Cflvnlry; then eoncentmting the rest of the nrmy between
Cabrerizos and Moresco awaited his adversary's progress.
Dock continued llls retreat in t]le SIIlne fine and equable order,
regardless alike of the cannolll'lde and of the light horsemen on
llis fbuks, until the enemy's scouti:! llad gailled a height above
CalvariSll. Auaxo, from w)iCnoo, at the di;;tauoo of three miles,
they for the first time pereei\'cd Graham's twelve thousaud
men and eighteen guns on au ordcr of battle perpendicular to
the Tormes. From the Sllme point also 'Wellington's heavy
columl}S were to be SCfln clustering on the height abo'\'e the
fords of Santa Mnrtn, aud the light division was descried ut
Ahlea Lengua, ready either to advance ugllill8t the Freuc!.1
trooJls left on the position of Aldea 1{ubia, or to pass the river
w the aid of Gmllnm. At this f1PJlllfition ],fannont faeed about,
repa.ssed the TormC!l find resumed his fonner ground.
Wellington'S dispositions were very skilful, hut it would
IICeffi thnt unwilling to stir before the forts fell he bad again
refused the advfllltagtl of the moment. Refused, not misjudged
the occasiou, since the whole theatre of operation was dis-
tinctly SCfln from St. Christoval and he hud passed many hours
in enmest observation. Hill faculties were indeed so fresh and
vigorous, that after the day's work he wrote a detailed memoir
upou the propoBll.I for establislJiug a blink in Portugal, treating
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that and other lhmncial schemes in all their bearings ",;tb
a master h:l.lld. Again...t llis deliberate dcdsion therefore the
following criticism must he aJ\'IUlced.
Marmont Ill'(! the best forJ to pass tIle Tomlcs, the allies
had a greater number of fords and a shorter line of operations.
Grulllllll by vigorously attacking the Fnmcll on the left bank,
miglit have driven thcm upon the single ford of Bucrto. if
not reinforced from the heights of Aldea Rllbia.
But the allies could also have been reinforeed by
the fords of SUllta llarta uml those of Cll.l;reriZOSt
and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it WIIS not good
at this early season; a partial victory would then have been
achieved, or 11 general hatUe brought on when the French, dig..
ndv81ltagoollsly ooorcd up ill the loop of the TOntlC8, would
lllwe 113<1 no esc.'1,pe if defeated. Nor is it easy to see how they
could have avoided a. serious defeat, if Wellington had moyoo
wil-h all lhe tr.oOpll on the rigllt bank l\,"'lliust the divisions
left on the hill of Aldcu. Rubill.; for their Ilnny would havo been
separated, une part on tbe hither one on the further bank of
the Tonnes. It was said at the time that Mal'mont hoped to
draw the whole of the !IUies across the river, when he would
have seir.-::d the position of Christovlll, raised the sie~ and
maintained the line of tl1e Tormes. He C()uld hardly have
expected WelliJl),>wn to commit so groSll an error. It is more
likely that holdiug his 011'11 army to lIe the quickest of move-
ment, his object Wl\.S to separate the allies' force in tllc hopes
of gaining some pt<rtial advantagll to enable him' to communi·
cate with his forts, whieh were now in great danger.
011 the lligiJt of the 23«1 the heavy gUlls were brought to
the right 'of the Tormes, and a tllird oottery to brooch San
Cajetano was armed with four pieces, but the line of firing
being oblique only beat down the parapet aud kn~ked away
the Jmlisades. Time however presst'll and the escalade of
that fort and La. Mcrecd was oNlcred. It comlllenced at ten
o'clock and in half an hour failed with a loss of one hlllldrCl:1
and twenty men and offieers; the wounded were brought. oH
next day mIller truce and the enemy had all the credit of the
fight. It is Mid general Bowes demogcd tho engineer's piu
.lUld caused the assault to fail. It might be so, but he l!:ed
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nobly. His mnk was ahove the lca.diug of so small 8 party,
he was early wounded, and while having llis wound dressed
hearing thnt the troops were yielding, returned to the 6gM
and fell at the foot of the breach.
The siege beiug now suspended for wnut of ammunitiou Ule
guns were sent across the river, uut illlllledilltdy brought lmck
in COlls!X]ucllce of t!lurmout open\ting on the left bank.
Certain works were however pushed forward to cut the corn·
munication between the forts, llud the miner was att.'\Che<l to
the clifl' on which La Merced stood; the final sueees~ wns not
llOwever influenced by these operations and they need no
further uotice. The 26th amlllullitioD arrived from Ahllei~ln,
the second nud third batteries were ro-ul1ued, the field-pieces
again plaeed ill tllC convcnt of Sun Bernardo, and the iron
howihel'S, throwing hot shot, set the convent of San Villcente
on fire in several places. The garrison extinguished the flames
and this balanced combat continued during the night, but OIl
the moruing of the 27th, the fire of Loth butteries Lcing redou-
bled, &n Villcenw WlllI ill 11 blaze, the breach of San Cujetnno
improved, Il.nd wllcn Il. fresh storming part}' was asscmbled
the white flag waved from the latter. A negotiation ensued,
but Wellington judging it an artifice to g:~in time orderell
tll6 assault; then San Cajetano seareely'fired a shot and the
flame8 tit Sau Viuceute prevented defeuee. Seven huudred
prisoners, thirty pieee8 of artillery, provisiolls arms allll
clothing, and no secure 1)ll.'lAAge over the 'l'ormcs, werc the
immediate fruits of this capture, not t11e less }lrir.cd that the
brCl\ehes were found to be more formidnhle than those of
Rodrigo, und the assault might have fuiled if the garrison hud
gained time to extinguish the llames ill San Vineellte. The
allies lost ninety killed, and their whoh'l loss since the llassage
of the 'l'onucs was neurly five hundred, of which 01le hUlldretl
and sixty fell outside, the rest in tlie siege.
MUl'mont had llllottoo' fiftoon dfl}"s of rcsistl:moo, hut from
the facility with which SlIn Vineente caught fire five would
bflve been too many if ammunition hsd uot failed. He would
however have fought on the 23rd, when his force was united,
had Ile not I1ellro from Caffllrelli that 11. powerful body of
llllllUtry, with twenty-two guns aud all the cavall}' of the
••
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north, were in march to join. This it was which sent him to
the heights of Villa Rubin to avoid Ilo premature action; but
on the evening of the 26th signals from fue forts
indicated tlnlt they could still hold out three days,
and Mo.rmont, from fresh intelligence, no long€f
expecting Caffarelli'g troops resolved to give battle
on the 28th. The full of the forts, made known the evcnlug
of the 27th, again changed this determination, lmd withdraw.
ing his garrison from the castle of Alba de 'l'oTme9 he
retreated during the night towards the Duero by the roads of
Toruesilllls ami Toro.
Wellington imnwdiatcly destroyed the works at Alba IInd
Salamanca, and following by easy marches encamped on the
Guarena tlle 30th. NC:lt day he reached the 'I'rabanoos, his
nJvauceU guard being at Navll del lky. On the 2nd he
pll$Cd the Znpnrdicl in two columns, thc right marching by
:Medina ael Campo, the left followiug the advanced guard
towards Rueda. FrOlll this }llace tlJo French rear·guard WM
cnnnonaded and driven upon the main body, then filing over
the bridge of Torclesillas. Some were killed, some made pri-
sonen, hut tllcre was great confnsion and a heavy disaster
would have lJcfa.l.lcn the French, if the Euglish geneml had llot
been deceived hy false information that they had broken the
bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted
letters that Marmont intended to take a position near Torde-
si11as, this relloct made him suppose the encm}' already over
the Duero, and his troops were not lrufficiently concentrated
for an attack.
Marmont had fortified posts at Zamom and Toro, had broken
_ • ,. the bridges at those places at Pucnte Dllero and at,"D,p.~. 1 hTudela,prcscTVing on y that ofTorde.sillas; ClllO\'\'"
post-ed bis left at Simancason tbePisuerga, which was unfordable,
and the bridges at that place and Valladolid commanded by for-
tified posts. His centre wns at 'l'ordesillas, very numerous,-Ilis
right was on heights opposite PoJlos. His position was strong,
but the third division, now unaer general Pakenham, imme·
diately Beiz.oo tbi'l ford of Pollos, .....hiuh gave a command of the
river there, bCC/luse there WilS a plain between it and the
enemy's heights. This ford was however difficult and insufficieui
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for passiug" the whol~ army: wucrefore head-quarwl'8 wero
fixed a~ Huedu, nud ~he troops disposed ill II compact form.
Thc hcad WII3 pltwed in opjlosition at the ford of Pollos and
the bridge of TordcsillllS, the rcar occupied 1[cJina del Campo
a.nd other poiuh on the Zalll1rJiel and 'l'rabaneos rivers, to
meet any movemeut from the Yallll.Jolid side. MlIrlllollt'g
line Crom Vlllladolid to Zamol"a WI1.8 sixty miles, frolll Silllan-
cas to Toro llLove thirty; hut tue ailtunl oooupatioll wns only
twelve; Cor the bend of the rivcr gavc him the chord, the
allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The
advantage was tllcrefore Oil his side, but to comprehcnd the true
l)osition the secolldllry coincident operations must be known.
FoUowiug ~hoir orders, Silveirn had filed up the Duero to
the Esla river mcnacing the j'rcllch oommuniCDtions with
Bellcvenw, whilc d'Urban passed the Ducro below Zamora
on the 2lith and cut off all intercourse between the French
army and that place. When Marmont feU Lack from A.Jdea
Rubia, d'UrLau rearossed ut ]hesllo de la Hibem to avoid
being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond
Toro to Castramonte, behind tbe rigM wing of the enemy's
new position; and Wellington designed tllll.t ClIStafios, II.fter
investing Astorga, should come down by Benevente and con-
nect hiwelf with Silveirn. 'rhis operation, without disarrll.u;,'
illg the siege of Astorga, would have plllced twelve or fifteen
tJlou&lDd infantry cavalry and arW1cry bcllind tho Eala,
having secure lines of retreat and cousequeutly able to check
t!le enemy's foraging Jmrties and reduce him to li\~e "110n his
fixed magazines, which were scanty: the following Spanish
l'roorastiulltioll Illarred tlle uula combination.
Castafios, by help of the succours received from England,
had asscmbled fifteen thousand men at Pontefcrnda undcr
the command of Snntocildcs; but !le pretended 110 Imd no
battering guns until sir Howllrd Douglas pointed thcm out in
the arsenal of Ferrol, and showed him how to convey them to
the frontier. Tlten Snlltocildes movcd slowly, lInd when
Bounet's retreat from the Asturias was known, eleveu thousand
meu invested Asto!"',,'U, and four thousauu 1llllrchetl tOBella-
vente when Marmont hn.d recalled his det.nchmcnts from that
aide. The batteriug-trnin only reached Villa Franca del
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Bicrzo on the 1st of July j yet the guerilla chief, Marquine1.,
appeared !loout !)UlCIlCill, and the otlwr llllrliJas of Castille
acting on 0. line from Lcon to Scgovia intercepted the corrc..
spondclloo with the king, and secured tIle Oamp<> de .'l'ierrO$
for the subsistence of the Gallician army j-anu to the surprise
of the allies, who had so often llCllrd of the enemy's terrible
devastations that they expeeted to find CastiUe a desert, those
vast plains and undulating hills were covcrd with ripe COfo,
or fruitful vines, and the villages boro few marks of the
1'lL\'ngcs of war.
It has been before shown that three t,housand Gallicians
(Juwred the Asturias, and in concert with the seventh army
Imu Imrassed Bonnet's rotrent from that kingdom; and though
the French general forced his way by the cnstern pllSSUS to
Aguilar del Campo, and chased the neighbouring bands away,
his movement· was onc of tlie great errors of tlie campaign.
Napoloon :lnd Welliugtoll felt alike the illlporwlloo
of holding the Asturias at this period. '1'he ono
directed they should be retained, the other calcu-
lated that such would be the case, and the judgment
of both was quickly made manifest. For the GaUi-
cians, who would not havc dared to quit the Bierzo
jf Bonnet 11I\d menaced tllcir province by Lugo or by the coa.-t
line, invested Astorga the mOlllent he quitted the Asturias.
AmI the pnrtidas of the Ilorth, who 1100 been very much
deprcsseo by Mina's defeat, recovering eourngc, moved towards
the coast, where POllham's expedition which sailed on tho
18th of June from Coruiia soon appeared, a formidable spec-
tacle, for there were five &lil of the line with £ftecn frigates
and brigs. Lesquito was immediately attacked on the sen.-
hord by this squadron, on the land side by tIle Pastor, and
wllen captain Bouveriegot a gun up to breach the convent the
Spaniah chief assaulted: he was repulsed, but the garrison, two
IlUndred and fifty strong, surrendered to tlle sqnadron the
22nd, and on the t·wo following days Benuoo and Paleneia fell.
'The partidus failed to uppear at Guetaria, yet Cllstro and
Portagnlcte in the Bilbao river were attacked the 6th of July
in concert wit.h Longs, and tllOugh the latter was rebuffed at
Bilhao the squadron took Castro. The .enemy recovered some
JUl.... , H!12.~ nOOK XYIII.-CHAP. 2. 247
of their posts the 10th, and the 19th Mina. and Pastor coming
down to co-operate against Gueteria were beaten, and the
British seamen were driven to their vessels with t1lC loss of
thirty mell and two guns.
It WlUI tho opinion of generol Carrol who llccompanicd
tllia expedition that tlle plan of operations was ill-arranged,
hut the local succc:sses merit no attention, the great object ot
distracting the enemy WlUI obtained. Catfarelli heard at the
same moment that Palombini'g division had heen called to
Ma.drid,-that Bonnet had abandoned the Asturias,-that a
Gallieian division bad entered thut province,-thnt n IJOwerful
English fleet containing troops was on the coast and acting
in concert with tJl the partidas of the north,-that the
seventh army was menacing Burgos and the whole cOuntry
was iu commotion. Trembling for his own districts he
instllntl.r arrested the lUarch of the divisioUll destined for Mar-
mont; and although the king, who llllw,'ery clearly the real
object of t11e maritime expedition, reiterated tile ortlers to
march upon Segovia or Cuellar wit11 a view to reinforce either
the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, Catfarclli
delayed obedience until the 13th of Jul)', and then sent bnt
eighteen Imndl'OO cu.valr)' und tWlJtlty guns.
Bonnet's movement, whieu only brought a reinforcement of
six thonsl\nd infantry to Marmont, tll\lS kept nWilY Caffllfelli'a
troops, twelve thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole
Frendl line of communication and caused the 8iege of Astorga.
to be commenced. And wllile Donnet WHll in march by
Palcncia lilld Valladolid to the IJositiou of TordesiHas, the
kiug uCllrd of MlIrmont'a l'etrcllt frOlll the Tonnes lllld that
all Euglish column menaced Arcvalo; wherefore not being
ready to move witll the army of the centre and fcoring for
A\'ila he withdrew the gnrri.~on from that place, aDd thus
lost his direct line of eorrcspolldellcc with the army of Por-
tugal, because Scgovia WIlS ellvironed by the partidas. In
tbis state of affairs neithcr Wellington llor Mannont had
reason to fight upon the Duero. The lattcr because llis posi-
tion was so slrollg he could safely wait for Bonnet's IUld
Cl.lffllrdli's troollS, lInd meunwhile the king could operate
against the allies' communications. 1'00 former hecause he
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could not attack the }'rench except nt great disadYUllUlgO j
for tllC fords were little known, and that of Pollos deep. To
pass the river there and form within gun-shot of the cnemy's
left, without ot11er combinations, promised nothing hut defetl~
and the staff-officers sent to examine the course of the river
reported the advantage of ground to be entirely on tbOil
cnemy's side, except at Custro Nufio, half-way between Pol!os
and Toro.
While the French commanded the bridge at TorJesillas no
attempt to force tILe passage of the river could be safe, seeiug
that Marmont might fall on tho allies' front and rcar if the
operation was within his reach; if beyond his reach, that is
to say near Zamom, he could cut their communication with
CiudaJ Rodrigo and )'ct Ilresen'c his own with C\.lfarelli and
the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the
fords should beoome lower, or the combined ollerntious of the
Gallieians and llartidas should compel Mannont to detach
men or uislodge for want of provisions. In this view he
urged Santocildcs to press the sicge of Astorgll vigorouslr,
and send every man he could spare down the Esla. An
intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender
on the 7th, but this seems to have boon a device to keep the
Callicians in that quarter, for it was in no danger, and &n-
tocildes, e;l:peeting it:s fall, would not detach IflelL Hcw(wer
the vicinity of d'Urban's cavalry so incommoded the French
right that For marched to drive them ooJond the Esla,
whereupon general Pakenllam crossed the ford of Pollos with
some of the third division which quickly brought Foy back,
and Marmont then endeavoured to augment the number and
efficiency of his cavalry by taking a thow!Ilud horses from the
infantry officers and the sutlcrs.
On tIle 8th Bonnet arrived, and the French marshal
extending Ilia right to Toro commenced repairing the bridge
therc. Wellington, in like mflllner, stretched his left to the
Guarena, yet kept his centre still on the Trnbancos and his
right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford or
Pollos. III tllis situfltion the anniea remained for some day&.
Grnham and Picton had gone to England in boo. health, and
the principal powder mngm:ille at Salamanca exploded with
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hurt to many, but no other events worth recording occurred.
The weather WWI fine,. the country rich, the troops reeeived
full ratious, Bud wine WM BO plentiful it WBII hard to keel) the
soldiers sober: the caves of RUOOll, either uatural or cut in
the rock below thll surfacc of the earth, wero so immcllIIc aud
80 well stocked, that the dnmkRrds of two armies failed to
make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many
men of both sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both
sides tIle soldiers, entcring the river to bathe, held ami<:able
intereouree, rallyiug eacu other about tho battles yet to 00
fougllt, and the camps on thc banks of the Ducro secme<l!lt
times to bdong to onc army: so difficult is it to make brave
men hate each other. The officers of the allies were anxious
to receive the signal of battle, they were discontented at its
beiug delayed, and mllny amongst them murmured that the
French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Hence
had Wellingwu been fillBlJy forced bnck to PortugBl his repu·
tation would have been grievously Bssailed Uy his own people,
for the majority, peering through their misty politics, saw
Paris in dim perspective and overlooked the enormous French
armies close at hand: their general's mind was however filled
with elLte und mortificutioll, aud ull croSl:\ lUld evil circum-
stAnces seemed to combine ngainst him, .
'l'he medintion for the Spnnish colonies hnd just failed at
Dadiz, under cirClllll8tanees which left no douht that English
influence was powerless and French influence increasing ill the
Cortes. Soult bad twenty-seven gull-boats in tbe Troeadero
canal, shclls were cast da), aud night into the city aud the
people were alarmed j two thousand :Freneh had murehed from
Sauta Mario. to &willc, apparently to rClinforce Drouet in
Estromadur8; Eehevll.ria had effected nothing in the kingdom
of Cordoba, !lnd French troops were assembling to ilttAck
Ballesteros, wllose rashness might alone brillg Welliugton
back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain Mina's defeats
and their influence upon the other partidas were known, the
effect of Popham's operations unknown, or at least doubtful,
but Bonnet's division had arrived nlld tile G;lllieianll beforo
Astorga wanted ammunition. In Cnstillo the activity of the
partidas diminished when the army crossed the Tormes, the
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chiefs seemcd inclined to leave the hurtLcn of the war to the
allies, and this feeling was n?t confined to them. It had hoon
arranged that fresh forces should bc miscd lIS the enemy
receded in this campaign, and clothing and eqnipmentll snp-
plied by England werc placed at tIle disposal of Wellington,
who to avoid the burthell of carriage had directed them to
Comna; yet now when Loon and the Asturias were in a
manner recovered no man would serve volunt-arily. There
WS/:l greut euUmsiasm in words, tLcre had always been so, but
thc fighting mcn werc not incrCllScd, and cven tIlc jura-
f1~, many of whom deserted at tllis time from the king,
well clothed and soldier.like men, refuscd to enter the Engli.;;h
="'.Now also ClImc news that lord 'Yilliam Bentinek's plsll3
""ere altered, and intercepted despatches showed that the king
had again ord('red Drouet to pass the 'l'agus; Soulfs resist-
ance to this order WllS not known, and Wellington therefore
saw :Marmont's army increase, heard that the king's army,
reinforced by Drouct, was 011 thc poiut of taking the field,-
tlmt thl' troops from Sicily, DIlon whose oJlerntiolls he depended
to kcep all the army of Aragon in the custcm part of Spain
a.nd even to tnrn the king's atkotioo that way, were to be
sent to Italy,-and that two millions of dollars which he
hoped to have obtained at Gihraltar llad been swept off by
lord William for this Italian expedition, which thns at once
deprived him of men Rnd money! The latter was the most
l>erious blow, the promised remittances from England had not
arrived, the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nClIrly
impossible to feed thc army even on tllc Ducro, and to "eo-
ture fnrther into Spain withont money would be akil\ to
ma.dness. From Gallicia, where no credit was given, came
thll supply of meat and a sloppuge there would have made
the war itself stop: no greater error llad boon committed by
the encmy than dela}'ing to conquer Oallicia, which could
many times have been donc.
A. credit of half 110 million lltlu bccn obtainoo frolD the
Treasury to answer certain certificatcs or notes of hand, which
the secret Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed;
but this resource Wl\!l now suddenly stopped by tlle English
minlliters, who objeckd to the irre<o'lllur form of the certiii.
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ClLtcs, beClluse Wellington with llig usual sagacity llad adapted
them to the habits of the people he was to denl with I Hia
troops were four, his staff six, hig muleteers nearly twelve
months in arrears of pay, and he wag in debt everywllere, and
for everytlllng. The Portuguese government was clamorous
for the subgidy. Mr. Stuart acknowledged that iLs distress
WlliI great, lllld desertion from tho Portuguese troops, aug-
menting in an alarming manner, was seemingly increased by
severity, showillg the misery ofthe soldiers. Wellington alone
maintained the llnuy in its forward position at this tim~; for
ht;l had extende!1 his CQmmercial speculations into Gallicia,
and had persuaded tllC Spanish authoritic~ of Castille to give
up tl Pllrt of their rcVt;lnUll in kind to the army, receiving bills
on thl! British embassy at Cndiz in return. Eut the situs,.
tion of affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the
generals.
'The arrears of the Ilrmy are certainly getting to au alarm-
ing pitch, aud if it is sll:fferoo to illel'ease we cannot go ou;
we havo only here two brigades of infantry fed by our oll"n
commissariat, and wc urc now reduced to OtiC of them, having
barely bread for thig day, Ilnd the commis,;nry IlM not a
farthing of money. I know not how we shall get on!'
Such were Eeresford's words on the 8th of July, lInd on
the 15th Wellington wrote even more forcibly.
, I have nevcr, said Le, Loon in such distreo;s as at present,
and some serious misfortune must happen if the gOYCMUnent
do not attend seriously to the subject and supply us regularly
with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese
,go\'ernmeut are a. joke to ours, and if OUI' eredit was not
better than tbeirs we should certainly starve. As it is, if we
don't fiud lllmllS to Jmy our bilL; for butcher's meat tbere will
he un end to the war at Ollt-c.'
. Thus stript as it were W tllc skin the English general
was going once more to hide his nakedness in tile mountains
of Portugal, when Marmollt, proud of llis own unripened skill
aud perhapg from the experience of Slln Christoval uuder_
yaluiug his adversary's tactics, desirous also, it was said, to
gain a \·icwry witllOut tllC !lrcsellce of a king, Marlllont,
}lushed Oil by fate, madly broke the chain whicb restrained
his enem~"8 streugth.
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CHAPTER Ill.
WHEN Wellington found by the intercepted letters that the
king's oroers for Drouet to cross the 'l'agus wore imperative,
he directed Hill to detach troops in the sallle Jlroportion; find
as this reinforcement, coming by t116 way of Alcantnra, CQuld
reach the Duero as soon as Dronet could rea<:b Madrid, he
hoped still to maintain tile 'l'ormes, if not the DUClO, not-
withstanding the king's power. For some money long
expected from England 113d at last arrived in Oporto, and he
tllought the G1l11icialls though inert must soon be felt by the
enemy: moreover the harvest on the grolllJ(I, however abun-
dant, could not long feed the French multitudes if Dronet and
the king should together join Marmont. Fearing the action of
Joseph's CIlvlllry, he 1I0W ordered D'Urhllll's horsemen to join
tIle army on the Duero j but to understand tIle remarkable
movemeuts about to commence the reader must bear in mind,
that the Freneh army from its peculiar organization could while
the ground harvest Ill.Sted operate without any regard to lines of
communication; it had supports on all sides and procured its
food everywhere; the troops were taught to reap the stand.
ing corn and grind it themselves if their cavrJ.ry could not
sci7.e flour in the '1.. illngcs. 'fhis organization, approaching
the ancient Roman military perfect.ion, gave them great advan·
tages j it baflled the irregular and threw the regular force of
tile allies entirel)' upon the defensive; for if their Iillllks were
turned a retreat onl), could savc tIle communications, but the
Frcneh offered no point for retaliat·ion. Wherefore, with a
force 001111>0800 of four different nations, Welliugton was to
execute difficult evolution8 in an 0IloU country, his chances of
S\ICCCSS being to arise onl), from the CIlsm\l errors of his adver-
sary, who was au able general, knew the country perfectly,
and led an army, brave, excellently discilllincd, and of oue
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nation: tIle game would have been quite unequal if the
English had not been so strong in cavalry.
FRENCH PASSAGE' 01" THE DUERO.
In the eourse of tlle 15th aud 16th Marmont, who had pre-
viously made several deceptive movements, oonccntruted his
beautiful Ilud gnllllot army between Toro aud tIle Hornija
river. Intercepted letters, {lCnsants, deserlcrs, llud public talk
had all for several duys lIssigned the fonner place as his point
of passage. Ou the morning of the 16th the English explor.
ing officers, passing the Duero neur Tordesillas, found only
the garrison there, and the evening reports said two Freneh
divisiolls had already passed tlle repaired bridge of 'foro. WelT
lington then united his ccntre and left lit Canizal" on the
Guarena during the night, intending to attack those who had
passed at '1'oro j but as he llad still some doubts of the enemy's
real object he left Cotton on the Tmhaneos witll the right
wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson's
cuvalry. Meanwhile Mtlrmont, recalling his troops from the
left brink of the Duem, returned to 'fordesillas and Pollos,
passed that river at thOlJe points and occupied Nava del Rcy,
where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of the
17th, lIome of his divisions having marched forty miles and
some fifty miles without a halt, The English cavalry posts
were driven over the Trabanoos, and advice of the enemy's
moycment was instantly scnt to Wcllington, but he wn!!
then near Toro, it was midnigbt ere the information reached
him, and the troops under Cotton remained near Castrejon
behind the Trahancoa dnring the night of tbe 17th without
orders, in a. bad position, close to the whole Freneh a.rmy.
Wellington hastening to their aid in person ordered Boek's
Le Marcbant's and Alten's brigfldell of cuvlilry to follow him
to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at, Torrecilla. de
la. Orden six miles in rear of Castrojon.
At daybreak Cotton's outposts were Il.o<>nin driven in by th~
enemy, and the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artilr
lery immediately formed in front of the two infantry i1iviBions,
which were drawn up, the fourth division on the left, the light
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division on the r,ight, but at 1I. consideroble distauee from clICh
other tllld ~eparated by [\ wide ravine. Tuc country was like
the open dOlVllS of England, with here Ilnd there water.gulleys
ury hollows and bold naked heads of IUlld; and bel\iud the
most prominent of th<l.3e IlISt, on the ot,her sido of the Tm-
baucos, lay the whole :Frcneh army. Cotton seeing only
llOrsemeu advanced with llis cavalry l\,o-ain towards the ri\-er,
hut cautiously, by his right, along some high table-lanu nnd his
troops were lost to the view of the infllOtry, for the morning
fog was thick on the stream and nothing could be descried
beyond. Soon however the deep tones of the artillery shook
the ground, the sharp ring of musketry wn.q hcard in the mist,
and t.he forty-third regiment psssed hastily through Ca3trejou
to support the advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which
separated the fourth from the light uivil>iou, there WIIS auotLer
rnvine 'with a marshy bottom between the ll\t~r and the
cavlllry, and the village of Castrejon was the only good point
of pa.s:age.
Now the cannonade became lleo.vy aud tho spectacle sur-
prisingly be/lutiful. The lighter smoke /lnd mist curling up
in fantastic pillars formed a huge and glittering aome tingtd
of many eolours by the rising snn; llnd through the grosser
vapour below dlC restleS5 horsemen were seem or lost lIS the
fnme thickened from the rapid play of the guns, wllile the high
bluff head of land ]JO}'olld the Trabancos, covered with Fuach
troops, apPCllred by an optical deception e10lle at hand,
dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned witll gigantic
soldiers who were contillunlly breaking off and sliding down
iuto the figllt. Sllddeulya dislllountOO cavalry officer stalked
from the midst of the smoke towards the line of info.ntry with
0. gait peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody
handkerchief to his llcart; but t.hat which seemed a cloth
was a broad and dreadful wound, a bullct bzul entirely t:\fllced
the flesh from his left shoulder /lncl from his bl'CllSt, and had
carried away part of his ribs, his heart W!\S bared and its move-
ment ph.iuly discerned. It was a piteoU!l aud yet a noble
sight, fOl' Ilil> countenance though ghastly WIl8 firm, his step
searedy indirotcd weakness, nnd his voice never faltered: this
unyielding lWUl'S name wu Williaw.s, He died a short dig-
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tauce from the fielu of uattle, auu it Wtl.l! said in tllC arms of
his SOil, a youth of fourteen who had followed his father to
tllC PeninsulA. in llOpCS of obtaining a oommissioll, for tlley
were not amuent.
Cotton maintained this exposed position with skilt and
resolution from daylight until seven o'clock, at which time
Wellington arrived in company with Beresford, and proceeded
to examine the enemy's movements. At tllis mOllu.mt somll
French horsemen, not IllnIlY, broko suddenly u,wny from the
hend.land beyond the Trnhanoos nnd callle gal10lling on lIS if
deserting, but soon with headlong eOllrse they l1lountc<l the
table-land on which Cottoll's left was posted, and drove a whole
line of cavalry skirmishers hack in oonfusioll. The English
reserves on that side then advanced from Alaejos, and these
furious swordsmen, scattered by their own cllargl.l, were in turn
driven back or cut down; yet thirty or forey, led by unoble
officer, brought up their right shoulders ond came over the
(l(lge of the table-land, above the hollow wllieh separaooa the
British wings, at the instant when Wellington aJl(1 Beres-
ford arrived on the same slope. Infantry piqucts were in
the bottom, llnd higher up near the French were two guns
covered by a squadron of light cavalry dispvsed in perfect
order. Wben the French ofliecr hat saw this squadron he
reined in his horso with difficulty, llis troopers gathered ill
a confused body round him seemingly !UI lost men, and the
British instantly charged; bnt with a shout the gallant French-
men soused down upon the squadron and the latoor tnrning
galloped through t.he guus; then t110 whole mass, friends and
enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying M\"lIY
lord Wellington and Beresford, who with drawlI swords and
1I0llle difficulty got clear of the tUUlult. The French hOll$e-
men, when quite exhausted, were attncked by a. rcservo
squadron and most of them were kilted, but their indomitablo
lender, when assililed by thrcc enemies at once struek one
dead lrom his horse, and with surprising exertions saved him·
selt from the other two, though they rode hewing at him for
a quarter of a mile.
Marmollt llaving ascertained tllat a. part only of Welling_
ton's anllY was before him, now crossed the Tubaneos in two
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columns, turned the left of the nllics, and marched stmight
upon the Quarcna. The British retired by Toreeill& de la
OnIen, t·he fifth division in onc column on the left, thz fourth
divLsion on the right., the light division on &Jl intermediate
line nearer tIle enemy, 811d the cavalry on the flanks and l'ClIr.
The air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds and the
close order of the troolls rendered it oppressive, but the mili-
tllry spcctncle was strange aud gtlllld. l'or then were soon
the hostile columns of infantry, at only half musket-shot from
each other, marclling impetuously towards a Cl?mmon geal,
the officers on ench side pointing forwards with their swords
touclling their eaps llnd waving their hands in courtcsJ, whi!c
the German cavalry, huge men on llUge llOrses, rode between
in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. At
times the loud tones of I,;omlllund to llasteu the IJlll,I'ch wcre
llCllrd passing from the front to the rcar, and now and then
the rushing sound of bullets came sweeping ovcr the columllll
whose violent pace was continually accelerated. Thus moving
for teu miles and keepiug the most perfect ordcr both partiCll
apllroodled the Gunrcna, when the enemy sccing the light
division, although more in their power than the others, out.-
stripping them iu t1ltl march, increased the fire of their guns
and menueed an attaek with infantry. The GerlUlUl cavalr)'
instantl)' drew close round a hollow dip of ground on the left,
which offered tlle means of batHing the enemy's aim, the
colnmn then p1ungt:d down aud ren minutes aft-cr was in the
stream of t110 Guarena. br.twccll Osmo and CastriJlo; tlle fifth
division entered the river at the same time but higher up on
tIle left, and the fourth division passed it on the right. The
soldiers of the light division, tormented by thirst yet long
Ilsed to their enemy's mode of warfare, drank liS they marched,
but the fifth division stopped in the rh'cr for a fell' momeuts
and on tlle instant forty Freneh guns, gathered on the heights
above, sent a tempest of bullets amongst them; so nicely
timed was the operation.
The Guarcna, flowing from four distinct sources wllieh unite
below Castrillo, offered a very s.trong line of defence, but
Marmont hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage
and scize the table-land of Vallesa, brought up his artillery to
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the front, and to distract tlle allies' attention he directed Clausel
to }lUSll the head of the right oolumn over the river at Cas-
trillo. But Wellillb-ton, expecting him at Vallesa from the
first, had ordered the other divisions of his army originally
Msembled at Cllni7.111, to eross onc of the upper brllnches of
the river, and they reached the table-land of Vallesa before
MarmOllt's infll.lltry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapi-
dity of tlle murch, could muster in strength to attempt the
passngc of thc other branch. Clausel sent Carier's brigade of
cavalry aeross the streum at Castrillo, supporting it with a
column of infautry, and tho fourth division Illld just gained
the heights above Canizal when Carier's horsemen entered the
valley on their left, and the infantry in one column menaced
their front. The sedgy banks of the river would lla\'e been
difficult to fon-e, but Victor Alteu, 11 very !>old man in action,
WllS slow to seize an uuvllllmge; he suffered the Frenell cavalry
to cross nnd form in oonsidemble 1l11mbers witllOut opposi-
tion, and then llSsllilcd them fcebl}' with sueccssiv(l squadrons
instead of by rcgiments. The result was unfavourable at
first. The fourtecnth and the (lenoan llllssars were hard·
pressed, the third dmgoons came up ill support but were
immediately drivell UMik ngaill by tho fire of sOlUe French
infantry, and the fif{ht waxed hot with the others, many feU,
but fintlll)' Carier was wounde<l and taken /lnd the French
ca'''Ulry retired. During this nction the twenty,sevcnth IInd
fortieth regiment.<l, coming down tIle hill, broke the cnemy's
infantry also with an impetuous ba.yonet cltnrge, and Alten's
hOl"Semen sabrcd some of the fugitives.
This combat C06t tbe Frellcli, who llUd advanced too far
without support, a geueral lllul five hUlldrctl soldiers; but
Mannont, though baffictl at Vllllesa and beatcn nt Castrillo,
concontrated his army at the latter Illaco in such a mUllucr ng
to hold both banks of tllC GUllrena. Wcllington then reClllled
his troops from Vatlcsn, IInd lIS the whole loss of thc allies
WM not moro than six hundred, nor tllat of t,hc French more
than eight llUndre<l, and both sides were highly excited, the
'day still roung and the positions although strong open nnd
within cannon-shot, n battle was expected. Marmont's troops
had however been marehing for two days and nights inccs.
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wntly, Wellington's plan did not admit of fighting unless
forced to it, or under Bllcll eircumsttlllCC9 lIS would eunble him
to erush his opponent aud yet keep the field afterwards against
the king.
By this series of signal operations, the French mnrsl13l bad
passcd a great river, taken tho initiatory movement, surprised
t.he right wing of the allies and pushed it back above ten
miles. The Mlvnlltngcs are however to be traced to the pecu-
liarities of the English general's situation which have been
already notiet:d, and his w.ctieul skill was manifested by extri-
cating his trooj}s from their dangerous position at Castrejon
without loss, aud without being forced to light a battle. He
appears to have erred only in extending his troops to the right
when he first reached the Duero, for sooing that Marmont
could at pleasure pllSS that river and tnm his flanks, llC should
have remained concentrated 011 the Cuarena and only IJllshed
cavalry posts to the line of tIle Ducro above Toro. Yor
SllOUld he have risked his right wing so far from his main
body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the
18th; he could scarcely havc brougilt it off without sevcre
loss if MamlOnt had been stronger ill cavalry, and instead of
IlUshing forwards at once to the Gllarella had attacked him on
the IlIf1l"ch. On the othcr hand the security of the French
general's movement from the 'l'ruuauCQ!l to tbe Guureua.'
depended entirely on ropidity; for AA his columns crossed the
open conntry on a. line parallel to the march of the allic:l, a
simple wheel by companies to the rigllt would luwo fonned
the latter in order of battle on lli~ flank, wlliIe the four divi-
siOIlB already on the Guarena could havo met them in front.
On the 16th ManllOllt {ailed in a glaring manucr. Ris
intent was, by menacing the communication with Salaman('1l,
and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back and strike some
decisive blow during thcir retreat. Now on the ew:ning of
the 16th 110 had passed the Duero ut Toro, gained Il. da)"s
111litch, llml was then aetUillly nC/ll'Cr to S"lmnancn than the
allies were; had he persisted 'Vellington must llflve fought
him to d~dHntage or have given up Salamanca, and passed
the Tormcs at IInerta to regain the communication with
OiuJa(l Rodrigo. This advantage Marmout relinquished, to
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make 8 forced march of eighty miles in forty-eigltt hours, and
to risk tl1e execution of a variety of nice and difficult evolu-
tious, in which he lost fl.bove a thousand men by the sWQrd or
by fatigue, and finally fonnd his ndverso.ry on the 18th still
fadng him in the very position which he had turned on the
evening of the 16thl
The 19th the armies maintnined their rcspeetivc ground in
quiet Ulltil t.he evenwg, wheu MarmOllt concentrated his troops
in one mn.~s on his left llear the villoge of 'l'llrozona, ami
Wellington, fearing for his rigllt, agaill passed the second
branch of the Quarell8 at Vallesa. and El Olmo and took post
Oil the table-land above tllOse villages. The light divisio~
being ill front, advanced to tIle edge of the table-lawJ over~
looking the ellelll}"~ main body, which WlI8 ut rest round the
bivouac nrc..q and the piqucts would have been quietly posted,
if Sir Staplcton Cotton coming up at tlle moment had not
turned a. battery of six.pounders upon a group of French
officers. At the first shot the cnemy seemed surprised, at the
second their gttuncrs rUIl to their pieces and ill a few moments
0. rcply from twelve eight-pounders showed the folly of llro-
voking a uscless combat; an artillery olliecr Wll3 woumled in
the head, se\'cral British soldiers fell in diflerent parts of the
line, one shot swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and
the division had to withdraw several hundred yards in a mor-
tifying manner to avoid Ulllleeessary effllsion of blood.
}'onnod in two liDes 011 the tablc-ltmd of Vallesa the ullies
offercd a fair tllOugh not an cMy field to the enemy, and Wel-
lington expccted a battle. For tIle range of heigllts which he
occupied trended backwards to the Tormcs on the shortest
line, and IlS he had thrown n Spllnish garrison into the castle
of Alba de Tormes he thought Marlllont could not turn Ius
right, or if he attem!lted it he would be ijhouldered off the
Tormcs ut the ford of Huerta. He was mistaken. Tho
french generul Wll8 more perfectl~' ac(pUlinted with tho ground
and moved his army with a wonderful fucility. On tho 20tll
M the day broke instead of crossing tJl(l QuaTCna to dispute
tJle high land of Vullesa, he marched rllpidly in several
columns covered by a l~werful rellr-guard up the river to
CautIO la Piedra, llod crossed the stream there though the bunks
"
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were difficult before any disposition could be made to oppose
him. He thus tamed the right flank of the fillies and gained
a new range of hiUs treuding towards the Tormes, and parallel
to thoso leadiug from Vallesa. WellwgWD immediately mude
g, oofre;;ponding movement, and then commenced flU evolution
~imilar to that of the 18th but on a greater scale both as to
numbers and length of way. The allies moving in two lines
of battle within musket-shot of tllC French endeavoured to
cross their wurch at Cuntalpillo, tlle guns 011 both sides again
exchanged their rough SIl1ntations as the accidents of ground
fflvOllfe/1 their plll.y, find ~<YfI.in the officers. like gnllrmt gentle-
men who ooro no malice and kllCW no fear, made their mili·
tary recognitions, while the horsemen on each side watched
with eager eyes for an opening to charge; but the FrencJ)
moving as oue 1ll1Ul ulong the crest of the heights preserved
tho ICIld and made no mistake.
At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were out-
flanked, and all this time Mannont had so skilfully managed
his troops that he furnished no opportunity even for a partial
attack. Wellington therefore fell off a little and Illude towards
the heights of Ca~a Vellosa and Aldeo. Rubin, intending to
halt there while the lIixth clivision and Alton's cavalry, forcing
their mareh, seized Aldea Longun and secured the position of
Chnstoval. But he made 110 effort to seize the ford of Huerta,
because Ills own march had been long and as the French had
ptlSwd over neurly twice as lUuch ground he t1lOught they
would not attempt to reuch the 'l'ormcs that tlay" However,
when night approached, although his second line had got pos-
session of the heights of Vellosa., his first line was heaped up
without much order in the low ground between that l)lace ami
HomiUos, the French army crowned all the summit of ,the
opposite llills, and their fircs, stretching in u hnlf circle from
Villaruela to Babila Fucnto, sllOwed that tlley commanded the
ford. of Ruem: they could even lllwe attacked tlle allies with
great Mh-antage had there been light for the battle. The
English gelleral theu ordered fires to 00 made, aud uuder
cover of the sllloke filed the troops eff in sUl"(:essiou with
celerity towards Vell08il ilnd AMeil Rullill, but during the
movement the Portuguese cavalry coming in from the froot
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were mistaken for French and lost some men by cannon-shot
(Ire they were recogni.se(l.
Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result
oftllis day's operatious, which llUd been entirely to the advAll·-
. tage of the French. Marmont lllld shown himself perfectly
acquainted with the country, he bad outflanked and outmarchcd
the allies and gained tJle command of the Tormcs; and as his
junction with the king's ilrmy Will> thus sceured lie might fight
or wait for reinforcements or eOlltillue his operations l\S it
seemed good to himself. But the 800pe of Wellington's cam-
paign was hourly being more restricted. His reasons for
avoiding a baUle except at advantage were stronger than
before, bclcuuso Calfurclli's Cll.vahy was 1I0W known to be in
march and the army of the centre was on the point of taking
the field; hencc though he should fight and gain a victor,.,
unlcss it was decisive his object would not be advanced.
That object wns to deliver the Peninsula, which could only be
done b,. a long course of solid operations incompatible with
sudden and rllSh strokes unauthori7.ed by anything but hope;
wherefore yielding to the force of circumstances he prepared
to return to Portugal nnd abide his time; yet 'with a bitter
spirit, not 600thed by the rocolleet.iou that he bad refused
the opportunity of fighting to udvll-ntll,,"e c"XQctly oue mouth
before, and upon tile very hills he now occupied. Neverthelcss
that steadfut temper which then prevented him from seizing
an adventitious chance, would not now let bim yield to for·
tUM more than she could ravish from him: he still hoped to
gi.ve the lion's stroke, and resolved to cover 8nlumanca and the
communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to tIle last moment. A
letter stllting his inllbility to hold l\is groun(l Wf18 however
scnt to ClIStniios, bnt W(i8 intercepted by Marmont, who there-
upon exultingly pushed forwards with so little
regard to the killg'S movements, that Joseph
imagined the letter a subtlety of Wellington's to
d1'll.w tue !,'rencu generol into a prelDtlture battle.
On the 2bt while the allies occupied the old position of
Chriiltovnl, the Frcnell throw Il garrison into Aloo de Tonnes.
from whcnce the Spnlliards l13(} been witllflmwn by CurIos
d'.Espaiia. without the knowleclge of the English general, B
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nlQttcr soon to prove of infinite importance. Mo.rmollt then
pasacd the Tonnes by the fords between Alba and H ncrta, und
moving up the valley of Machacon encamped behind Clllvariza
Ariba, at the edge of a forest which extended from the river
to that place. WcUiugt.ou also IlUSSCU the Tormcs ill the
COllrse of tlu:l evening by the bridges fiod by the fords of
Santa Marta and Alden Lengua; hut the tbird division and
d'Urban's cavalry remained on the right bank and entrenched
themselves at Cabrerizos lest the French who bad left a
division on the height6 of Buhila Fucnto SllOUld re-cross tho
Tonnes in the night and ovcnvhclm them. It ~WI8 Into when
the light dh·i.sion descended the rollgll side of the AIdeD.
Lengua mounbUIl to Cl'OSS the river, and the nigbt came sud-
denly down with Dlore than oommOll darkness, for a storm,
that common precursor of a battle in tho Peninsnla, WIl.'l at
hand. 'l'orrents of rain deepened the ford, the water foamed
and dlUlhed with increasing violence, the tllUuder was frequent
and deafening, tlle lightning passcd in sheets of fire dose over
the column or played upon the points of the bayol1ets, and a
flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon guards near SSllta
Marta killed. many men !lnd horBCS; hundreds of frightened
animals then breaking loose from their piquct ropes and
galloping wildly about were supposed to be the enemy's
eavalry ehargil1g in the darkness, and indeed some of their
patrole;; were at hand. But to a military eye there WllS nothing
more imposing thll.Il the dose lllid beautiful oruer in whieh
the soldiers of thllt noble light division were sem by the
fiery gleams to step from the river to the hank and pursue
their march amidst this astounding tunnoil, defying alike the
storm and the enemy.
WellingOOn'l> position 'I'M nCllrly the same as Hmt occupied
by Gmlmm n. month before when the forts of Sal.amanctlo were
invested. The left rested in tbe low ground on the Tonnes near
Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards Calva-
riza de Abaxa. The right wing extended along a rangc of
heights which euded also in low ground hulf a mile from the
villnge of Aro}lilcs; this linc, perpendicular to the course of
the Tormes from Huertato &\Iamnnea, covered that eity. But
Marmont extending his left along the edge of the forest still
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menaeed the lincof communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and
in the night advice came that general Ohauvel, with two thou·
sand of Caffarelli's northern horsemen and twcnty guns, had
reachet.ll'ollos on tlH: 20th lmd wouhl surely be up the 22nd or
23rd. A final retreat Wll.'l rendered impl:rative by this accession
of cavalry, and Wellington, to avoid the action of the latter
while retiring, resolved unless the cncmy should commit some
llugruut error by attacking him to go back to l'ortugal before
Chauvclllrrivcd. But at da~·break hIarmonl., who had called
Ilia troops from Bnbiln Fuentc over the 'l'onnes by the ford of
Ellcina, hrought Bonnet's and Maucune's divisions np from the
forest Ilnd occupied Calvariza de .Ariba; he also took posses-
sion of a wooded height close to the allies on which was un
old ChllPcl cullC<! Nuestra Sciiorn de Ill. Pena, thus showiug
)Iis resolution to fore<: on n battle.
.At a little distance from the French left l\Dd close to the
English right, were two isolated hills called the Arapilet or
llermanitoa, aoout half euuuOIl·S!Jot from each other. Stoop
and IIIl.vagcly rugged they were, find had the French gcnerul
gained them he could have formed across Wel1illgton's right
and compelled him to fight on bad ground with llis back to
the Tormes. 'l'lJey were however ucglooted by the English
uutil colonel Waters observing }'rench troops stculing towards
them told BcrCllfcrd, who trCMed it ligl!tly; then 110 told
Wellington, who instantly sent the seventh ~adores to seize
·the most distant. Now ensued a combat similar to that be·
tween Ca'Sar aud .Afranius at Lcrida, for the French Beeing the
C311Udores apIJroaehing, broke their own rankB, and running to
the encounter gained the first Hcrmunito and kept it but
were repulsed from the second; at the same time a detach·
ment from the seventh division, flanked by a. squadron of
German hussars under Victor Alten, assailed the Scfiora de
de la Pena height and won back half of it, yet the French
kept the oU..ler balf aud Alwn was wounded.
'l'his dispute for the HermanitoB rendered a retreat difficult
to the nllies during daylight; for though the rock gnined
by the English was like a fortress in the wny of the Frenc11
o.rmy, Marmont, by extending his left and gathering a. force
behilld his own Herwanito, could still frame a dangerous
264 PENI~SULA WAIL [JeLY, 1812.
battle and pounce upon the allies during their movement.
Wellington therefore extended his right into the low ground
and placed the light companies of the guards ill the village
of Arupiles, while the fourth division, witb exception of the
twenty-seventh regiment which remained on the Hcrmanito,
took post on a gentle ridge behind the village. The fifth and
sixth divisions werc massed on the internal slope of tho
English Hermullito where n grCllt scoop ill the ground hid them
from the enemy; but a shnrp cannonade wtlS cxchnnged from
the tops of those hills, on whose crowning rocka tile contend·
ing generals stood like ravenous vultures watching for their
quarry.
Marmont's project was however not yet IIUfficicntly deve-
loped. His troops coming from Bahiln Fucuro were still in
the forest several miles distant, he bad only two divisions up,
and the ~upo.tion of, Cnlmriza and the Senora de la Pena
were daring strokes to cover the concentration of his army;
they were well calculated to lleccive, for he could evcn then re-
cross t.he Tonncs, and so nct on thc right bank. Ncvcrthclcss
the seizure of the Hcrmn.nito seemed to fix his operations on
the left of that river, wllerefore the first and light divisiolllJ
were brought up to confront the force on Calvariza, and the
third division and D'UI'ban's horsemen, passing the Tormes by
the fordA of Santa Mart41, were posted nearAldeaTejada, entirely
hidden yet so placed as to command the main I'OIld Ul Cindad
Rodrigo, The allies' position WllS thus suddenly reversed. Tho
left rested on the Eoglisll Hermllnito tlle right on Aldea Tejada.
The rear had become tIle front, aud the interval between the third
ond fourth divisious WM installtly filled 0)" 0. simple counter-
mnrch with Bmdford's PortugUCElC infantry, the Spaniar<1s nnd
the British cavalrr, all massed about the \'iUage of L,s Tones.
This new position bad breaks and hollows which concealed
most of the troops, and those CX!JOsOO to view seemed and
were indeed pointing townros tho lWdrigo rond in retl'('.o.t;
the dust of the commiSSflrillt nnd bnggllge retiring eould bo
seen for miles, and, save the proximity of the armies, nothing
indicated an approaching battle, This could not last long.
About twelve o'clock Marmont, fearing that his menacing
position on the Hermullito would induce Wellington to assail
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it in force, hnstily brougllt up Foy's Bnd Ferey's divisions in
support, placing the first wi,th some guns on a. wooded height
lying between tile Hermnnitos and the Seliora de la. Pens;
the second, reinforced with Uoyer's dragoons, he posted behind
:Foy on the ClIolvuriw. ridge. His feur was not ill founded,
Wellington, thinking he conld not retreat sufely by day
without llOlding both the hills, had actually order':d tho
sercnth division to attack whcn Mllnnont's disposiiton
induced him to stop lest he should thus bring on a battle
disadvnntngeousl.r: he IJrcferred waiting' 011 eveu(.s, certain
that by night he could retire, and thinking Mal'lllont's rash
"llnity might lead him to !l8Sail the position of the allies,
He was not mistaken, Although the French division
CQlIliug frow Babila }'uenw had not yet come out of the
forest, the :Frcuch mo.rslml, fenring the allics wonld retreat
before he could form his order of battle, suddenly directed
Manonne with two divisions, covered by fifty guns and sup·
ported by the light cavalry to move by their left and menace
the Rodrigo road, designing if his adversary IDO\'ed in oppo-
sition to fall on him by the villlt","'C of Aropiles with six
divisions of infantry nnd Boyer's dragoons, who were taking
fresh ground to their left of tlle French Hermanito, leaving
only one regiment of cll.vlllry on Foy's right. The positions
of the two armies now embraced an o\'al basin formed hy
ridges enclosing it like all amphitheatre, the Hermunitos being
the door-posts. It was about a mile and 1I. half broad from
north to soutb, nnd more than two miles 10llg from east to
west. On the northern and western ridges stood the lIllies,
their line running from Wellington's Hermuuito by Las
TOlre;; towards Altlca Tejatln. 'rhe cu.sterll side was held by
the French, and their left undcr Mancune was moving along
the southern ridges; but his mareh was ,vide and loose, thero
was a long interval between him and the troops about the
Hermanitos, and the divisions dest.illoo to fill this gap were
still in the forest. The mll-SS of artillery covering this mareh
was however velY imposing, und it opened its fire grandly,
taking ground to its left by guns ill successiOn as the infAntry
mo\'w ou; and these lnst lUarched eagerly, continually t'Oll~
irllcting their distanco from the allies and bringing up
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their left shoulders liS if to 0I1v(10))6 Wellingtoll's position
ilud cmbra.C(l it with fire. At this time also Bonnet's troops,
oue regiment of which lleld the French Hermonit-o, carried
the village of Arnpilcs, and though driven from llUrt of it
ug:tin muilllaiued a ficree struggle.
Marmont's first ll.rrongcmcnts had occupied soveral hours
without giving positive indication of his designs, and Welliug.
ton, ceasing to watch him, had retired from the Hermanito,
and was I)'ing down when, noont three o'clock, It report callle
that the Prencl} left was rapidly pointing towards the CiuulId
lwdrigo rom!. Strrrting up Ill} repaired to the high ground
and obscl"'o'e<l their movements for some time with a stern
contentment, for their left wing was then clltircly separated
from the centre; the fault was flag-raut uuu he fixeu it with
the stroke of a thunuer-holt. A few orders issued from hig
lips like the hlC8ntatiOIl.'l of a wi~llrd, and suddenly the dark
1I1/lSS of troops which covered the Euglish Hermanito seemed
agitated by some migllty spirit; rushing violently dowlI the
interior slope of the lJIountnin tlley cnteroo the grout Imsiu
nmidst n storm of bullets wllich appeared to shear aWll.Y the
whole surface of the earth ovcr which they wcre moving.
'rhe fifth division instantly formed on tIle right of tIle fourth,
connecting the latter with Bradford's Portuguese, who hastened
forward at the sume time from the right of the army, and tileD
Le Jlarehnnt's cavalry galloping 111) on the rigM of Brad-
ford closed this front of battle. The sixth Rnd seventh
divisions, Buuked on the right by Ansou's light Cl!,Yalry, were
ranged on a second line, now prolonged by tlle Spanish troops
in the direction of the third division, which, reinforC<lu by
Arcntsehild's Gcmli\n llUssors Rnd D'Urban's Portuguese
horsemen, closed the extreme right at Aldea Tejada. A
reserve composed of the light divisions, Pack's Portuguese,
Boek's and Alten's cavalry, remained in heavy masses on the
llighest ground IxJhind ul!.
When this gmnd disposition was completed, the third di"i-
sion and its attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four
columns auet flanked on the left by twelve guns, received
orders to cross I·he enemy's line of march. The remainder of
the first line, including the main body of the Cllvalf)', W!lS
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directed to advance whenever tIle attaek of the tIlird division
should be developed; and as tbe fourth division must in this
forwnnl movemeut ueces:llrily leut!. it,s fhlllk to the enemy's
troops stationed on the Freneh Hcnlllmito, Puck's brigade
was commanded to assail that rock the moment the left of
the Dritish line should pass it. 'I'bns, after long coiling and
wiudillg like angry serpents, the annies suddenly faste.ued
together iu deadly strife.
DATTLE Ot' SAL.o\llASCA.
Mannont from the French HemlRDito saw the country
beneath iJim suddenly covered wiU. enemies when he was ill
the net of making a complicated evolution, and when hy the
rash advance of his left his troops were separated into three
parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other and
those nearest the enemy lleitllcr strong enough to hold their
ground JlOr knowing what thcy had to eneouuter. Tho third
division '1'l1li howllvcr still hiddcn from him b.r the western
beights, und he hoped tIle tempest of bullets under which the
Dritisb line was moving in the basiu beneath would check it
until he could bring up his reserve divisions, and assail by
the Arapiles villuge an(! the Englis11 Hermuuito. But this
his only ~SOUre{l was weak; t110 villa,,"O was well disllUt.OO,
the English Hermanito offered a strong bastion of defence,
and behind it srood the reserve, twelve thomand strong with
thirty guns. In tbis crisis, despatching officer after officer to
llasten up Ills troops frOll the forest, others to stop the
Ilrogn.'5S of his left wing, he with ficrce and snnguine e....11ee·
tation still looked for victory until he saw Pakcnhllm with
thc third llivision shoot like a. meteor across Maucune's
path; then pride and hope alike died Witll him, and dcspe~
rately he was hurrying in person to that futal point when an
exploding she\[ stretched bim Oil tbe earth with a broken arm
and two deep wounds in bis side---confusion ensued, and
his troops, distructed by ill-judged orders and eOllllter-orders,
knew not 'where to move, who to figM, or who to avoid.
It WlUI about five o'clock when Pakenham fell on i\Iaucune's
first division under Thomiercs, who bad thOll just reached nu
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isolated open lliU at the extremity of the southern range of
heights, expecting to see the allies in full retrcat to the
Rodrigo road closely followed by Marmont from the Her-
'lllanitos. The oounter-stroke was terrible! Two batreries of
artillery placc{l on the summit of the western height:<; sUlI.
dcnly took his troops in flank, Pakl'::nhnm's maM of infantry
l>upportcd by cavalry and gUlls was bearing full on his fl"On~
nnd two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and un·
conuectetl, were still behind in a wood where they (.'(lUld hOOT
but could not scc the storm which was bursting: from the
chief to the lowest soldier all felt they were lost, and in an
instant Pakenham the most frank and gallant of men com-
mellood the battle. Forming lines as they marched his
columns pressed to the fight, while the li'n:mcll gunnel'll,
standing up maufully, scnt showers of grape into tlle approach.
ing IllasseS and a crowd of light troops poured in their
musketry, under oover of which the main bod)' strove to open II
front of battle. But houring OllW(lfIls with the might of II
giant Pl1.kenham brolw the half-fonned lincg into fmgment3
nnd sent the whole in confusion upon the Sllpporting oolumns:
one only offieer, standing alone wittl unyielding spirit, fired
the last gull ut the distilll~ of a few yards, aud whether he
lived or died could 1I0t 00 seen for the smoke.
Some French squadrons now fcll on the flunk of the third
division; the fifth regiment repulsed a part, and the remainder
were charged by D'Urban llnd Areutschild's horsemen; in
the tumult the Oporto regiment under major Watson assailed
ll. t>quarc of infantry unsuccessfully, for Watson
.Appllodix s,
foil woundoo and his mCIl retircd. Meanwhile
Hl.k:cnllall\ continuing his kmpestuous course found the
remainder of 'l'homicres' division vcry imperfectly nTroyed
011 the wooded heights behind the first hill, offering two
fronts; tile one oIJIlollCd to the thirtl division IlDd its
lltkndont horsemen, the other to the fifth division, Brad·
ford's PortuguClle, and the great masses of cavalry and
artillcT)' which were now moving aeross the basin, At
this time Bonnet's troops had been repulsed from the
Ampiles Yilluge, and were in turn assailed by the fourth
division; but the }'reuch 6till kept their meu.aciug position
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ut the Henmmito, for Cluusel's division had arrived from the
forest, and the oonnexion between the centre and left WIlS in
some measure restored. '!\vo divisions of infantry and
Boyer's dragoons were indeed still in luarch from Calvanza,
Thomieres WIlS killed, Bonnet who had succeeded Mannout
was disablod, and heucc more confusion; but the chief COIll-
mand ha(l devolved on Clausel and he WIIS of a capacity
equaJ. to the crisis. 'fhe scene was however terrible. He
saw the fourth and fifth divisions and Bra.dford's brignde
hotly engaged and steadily gailling ground, Le Marehant'e
henvy rovalry, Allson's light dmgoon~, and Bull's troop of
artillery a.dvancing at a trot on Pakenham's left., and on
that general's right D'Urban's horsemen overl,'pping the
disordere"d UllLSSCJl of his left wing. Half an bour only
had elallsed siuce the battle commcnced aud lllrcu.dy the
}'rench had lost their commll.nder und two other generals, and
their left tnrned find tllrown into confusion WIIS enveloped.
And though Clausel's own division reinforced Maueune and
a front was spread along the southern heigllts of the basin
the arr-Jy was loose, it \\"1lS in lines, in eoluffius, in squares,
without uuity; u. powcrful sun played in tho lIIen's eyes, anl!
the light soil, stirred up amI driven by a brCC'.lC from the
west, came mingled with smoke full upon them in such
stifling elouds, that scarcely ahle to breathc aud unable to
see tl\ey delivered their fire at random.
In this opprCJlsed state, wlille Pakenhtllll was pressing their
left with a conquering violence, while the fifth division was
wIIStiug their ranks with fire, the intcrvlll between those
dh'isions Wag 81lddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust
wllieh moved swiftly forward cl\lTying within it the tramp_
ling sound of ll. charging multitude; it passed the left of the
third division in a chaotic 1ll1lSS, but then opening, Anson's
light cavalry and Le Marchaut's heavy horselllen were seen to
break forth at full B1)eOl.l, and the ne....t moment twelve hundred
French illfautry were trumpled down with u terrible clumour
l\Ud disturbance. Bewildered and blindcd they cast Ilway their
arnU> and crowded tllrough the intervals of the squadrons,
stooping and er~ing out for quarter, while the dmgoons, big
men and on big horses, rode onwards smitin!; with their IOllg
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glittering swords in uncontrollablo power, nud the third
division following at speed, shouted as the French lines feU in
succession before this dreadful charge.
Nur wel'C tlu~se vuliaut hor:;cmcll yet exLausted. Le Mitt-
chant llnd many other officers had fallen, but Cotton nnd all
llis smlf' were at their hend, and with ranks confused and
blended in oue mass tlley still galloped on l\,"U.iust II fresh
column from whence El. streum of fire emptied a hundred
sauJles, but with HUll oouragc and miglit tllo)' broke through
this the strongest body yet encountered, and lord Edwllrd
SomcTilCt with El. happy llCr3C\'cronoo continuing the charge Ilt
the head of one squadron calJturcd fh'c gUllS. The left was
thn entirely brokcu, two thousand prisoners were taken, the
French light cavalry forsook thilt part of the field, and the
three divisions nnder Maucuue no longer existed u.s 0. military
body. AlLflOn's Cll.vlllry had suffered little in the ehnl"/,"C, and
now pllSsing quite o\-er the ridge were joined by D'Urban's
horsemen and took the place of Le MarehlUlt's exhausted
meu. United with the third and fifth divisions and the guns,
they formed oue formidable line Illore than a mile iu advance
of where Pakenham hnd commenced the battle, and that im-
petuous offieer with unmitignble fury was still pressing forward
spreading terror and confusion.
'While tliese signal events whieh occupied about forty
miuutes were }lussing on the allies' right, u terrible battle
raged also in tlle ccntre. For the fourth division moving in
a line with the fift!1 aud under tIle same cannonade had driven
Bonnet's troops stcp by ste}l back to the south-eastern part of
tile bllSill, where tlley got mixed with the disordered masses of
Maucuue's and Clause!'!> divisious thou rctrca.ting before l'akeu-
ham and tIle cavalry; and the French Hermanito being thus
apparently isolated wn.s assailed b}' Pack's Portuguese about
the time of Le Marehant's charge. The French front of hattle
W<lS IlOW however fully developed and l;ollucctcd, for Foy L:ul
commenced a disto.nt Cllllllonlldc tl",<>tUllst the Brit,ish reserves,
while on his left Pack was mounting the :ijerlulIuito; fur-
ther on Bonnet's troops were still strongly fighting, and the
broken troops of the left Willg were mllying upon them.
Clause! had indeed made 11 surprisillg e[ort beyond all men'lI
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expectations, and a great chlmgewllS nlrendyvisiblc. Drawing
Ferey's di\'ision from Calvariza, he had placed it in the eeritre
behind Bonl\e~'s troops, and at tIle Sl\llle time united there the
light cavalry, Boyer's drngoollll, and the two divisions 80 long
eX11ed.cd from the forest. .By this able disposition he offered
a. mallS for the hroken left wing to nll1y upon, aud made &1'-
rut's, Brennier's, and Ferey's unbroken divisiollll, supported by
the whole of thc cavalry, cover the line of retreat w Alba de
TormCll, while another division was in mass close behind Mar-
mont's llerffiunito, and Foy relllll.iued uutoUl.:hcd 011 the right.
It 'I'M a grcut stroke, but not content with restoring an order
of bntt1e and snving his rd.rent Clausel attempted to stem the
tide of victory in the very fulness of its strength and rough.
nCllS. His hopes were founded on Pack's failure, for that
officer having ascended the French HernUlonito ill ouc eolnmn
was within thirty lll.lOOl> of the top aud 1.lelieved himself vic-
torious, wllen suddenly tile hirlncn French reserves leaped
forward from the rocks upon his front and left flank, there
was a thiek cloud of smoke, a shout, a strcam of fire, and then
the side of the hill was covered with the killed the wounded
and the flying Portugu~5e: they were scoffed at for the failure,
but uujustly, 1\0 troops could Il;lve wilhstood tll1lt crash upon
such steep ground, !lud tho pro]lriety of attueking tho hill at
all seems questionable. 'l'he rc.<lult went nigh w slUl.ke the
wholc bnttlc. For the fourth division lmd just then rcnched
the southern ridge of the basin, and one of the Lest regillleuts
in the service was actnally on the sumnlit, when twelve hun-
dred fresh adversaries lurJ.ycd on the reverse s1opl,l charged
up h.ill; the .British fire Wall straggling llwl ineffectual th6
tIOldiers being breathless lIud disorUorccl by 'he llre\<ious light-
ing, Md the French, 11'110 came up resolutely and without
linng, won the crest: they were even pursuing, when two regi-
meuts placed in line hclow checked them with a destructive
volley.
'l'his vigorous counter-blow happening simultaneQusly with
Pack's defeat, llcrmittcd Clausel, no longer fearing for the
Hennlluito, to meuace tllO left flunk nml rellr of till' fourth
division, but the fortieth regiment wheeling about with n.
rough charge eleared the rear und the French did not cngage
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more deeply in that quarter. Ferey howe\'er presged the front
of the division, Brenllier did tlle same by the fil'st line of the
fiftll division, fl.nd Bo)'er's dmgoolls came on at a. trot;
the allies were outflanked, O'i-enlllltched, lost ground, flnd
fiercely the French followed and the fight once more raged in
tlle basill below. Cole lw.cl fallen deeply wounded, Leith had
the 116ffie fortune, but Bcresford promptly drew Spry's POl-tU-
gucsc brigade from the sccond line of the fifth division and
thus flanked the advancing columns of the enem)'; yet he
nlso fell desperately wounded, nud then Boyer's dragoons came
freely into Il.ction uecu,use Ansun's oovlllry had been ehecked
by a beav}' firo of artillery. The crisis of the battle had now
flrriVed, Rnd victory was for tllC general who had the strongest
rescn'es in haud.
Wellington, wbo was seen that uny ut overy point precisely
when his presence W!lB most required, bronght the sixth divi.
sion up from tl10 sceond line, and its charge, vehement and
sustained, was successful, but the stnlggle WM not slight;
Hulse's brigade on the left went uown by hundreds, and the
sixty-first lUul eleventll regiments WOll their way through sll01l
n firo as British soldicrs only oon sustain. Some of Borer's
dragoons also, breaking in betweeu the fifth and sixth divi-
!>iOllS, slew many mOll and disordered tl1e fifty-tbird, yet that
brave regiment lost no grounu, nor did Clausel's impetuous
counter-attack avail ut ullY point aft.ct' the first burst. Tho
fillies retook the southern ridge, the French general Menno was
severely and Forey mortally wounded, Clausel llimself was
hurt, ll.lld wllen Doyer's reserve of llOrse clime on at a canter
for II reUt'CUliug charge they weTO broken by the fire of Hulse's
noblo brigade. 'l'hclI the ehflnging enrrent of battle once more
set for the Britisb. Pakenham oontinued to outflank the
French left, the Hermanito was abandoned, Foy retired from
the ridge of Cal\"ariza, and tho allied host, righting itself like
0. gnllant ship after a. sndden gust, again bore onwards in
blood and gloom. For though tllC air purified by thestonn of
the night was peculiarly clear, one '\'Mt cloud of smoke and
dust rolled along the busiu and within it was tlle battle with
all ita sights and sounds of terror.
When tJle English general bud restoreU the fight in the
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OOlltl'6 be rlireete(l the first divislOu to push between Foy and
the rest of the }'reueh army, which would have rendered it
impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was
not eX6euted, and Fois division and that which had just
descended from tlle French Hermanito were skilfully u!red by
Clausel to protect the retreat. 'I'he first, posted on uudlllat-
iug gronnd and flanked by some sqnadronll of dragoons,
covered the roads to the fords of Huerta. and Encina-the
second, now added to Maucune's command and reinforced with
fi.rtoon guns, Wlls 1llaced 011 a steep riuge ill frout of the forest
covering the roau to Alba de'l'ormes,-nnu behind thili.l ridge
the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder before the
third fifth and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington
immediately sent the light division, formed in two lines a.nd
flanked by some squadrons of drogoous, ngainst Fo~', sup-
porting it with the first division in columns, and flanking that
again on the right with two brigades of the fourth di,'ision
which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth divi-
sion restored the figlLt: the seventh division aud tlle Spaniards
followed in reserve, t·he country was covered with troops aud
a new amy seemed to have risen out of the cartb.
Foy, throwing out a cloud of skirmishers, retired slowly by
wings, turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground
upon the light division, which marched steadily forward witb.-
out returning a shot save by its skirmishers, and for two miles
this mlll"ch continued under musketry, which wns occnsionally
tllickene(l by a CAnnonade, yet "ery few men were lost,. tIle
French aim being bullied by the twilight and by the even
order and rapid gliding of the lines. The French generol
DesgfS,"iers was however kiUed, and the flanking brigades from
the fourth division having now penetrated betwccu Mauculle
and Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to extriCllte his troops
from the action, nevertheless he did it und with great dexterity.
For having increll8Cd his skirmishers on the last defeusible
ridge, aloug the foot of which Mm a murshy stream, he redoubled
his fire of musketry and made a menacing demonstration with
his horsemen just as the darkness fell, wllereupon the nritish
guns immediately opened, a squadron of dragoons galloped
forwards from the left) the infantry crossing the marshy stream
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with an imJlCtuous pace gained tlJC summit of tiw hill and
a rough shock seemed at hand; hut the main body of the
French had gone into the thick forest on tllcir own left dllring
the firing, and the skirmishers fled swiflly uhcr, covered by the
smoke nud by tllc dnrkncss.
Msucune was maintaining meanwhile a. noble battle.' He
was outflanked and outnumbered, but the safety of the French
BrlllY depended on his cour~""C; he knew it, and PukenhaUl,
marking his bold dcamennour, advised Ciillton who was imme-
rliately in his frrmt not to IlAAsil llim Imtil the third division
should have turned his left. Nevertheless tlle sixth division
was plunged afresh into action and under great disadvantage;
for l}ftcr being kept by its commander a long time close under
MUlICUllC'1l batteries, which ploughed heavily through the ronks,
it W/\''l suddenly directed by a staff officer t,o attack the hill,
Assisted hy a brigade of the fourth division the troops then
rushed up, but in the darkness of tlle night t116 fire showed
from arar llow tlle battle went. On the side of tlle British a
shoot of flame WIllI seen, sometimes ndvancing with all 6"en
front sometimes pricking forth in spear hends, now ffllling
baek in waving lines find anon darting upwards in one vast
pyrnmid, the al>Cx of which often approached yet never gained
the actual summit of tlle lllQuutaill,-the French musketry in
opposition, rapid as lightning, spnrkled along the brow of the
height with unvflrying fulness, find with what destructive e/l'ccts
the dark gaps nnd changing shapes of the adverse fire showed
,too plainly. But when Pakenham had ngain turned the enenlY's
left and Foy's division had glided into the forest Maucune's
tusk WWI completed, the effulgent crcst of the ridge became
hlaek and silent and the whole l"rench army vanished us it were
ill the darkncss,
During this combat Weltington, who was with the leading
ref,-iment of the light division, tumed towards the ford of
lluerta, leaving tbe forest to his right; for he thought the
Spanish garrison WIIS still in thll enstle of AlI.m de'1'ormes
and that the enemy must of llecessity be found in n cOnfullCd
lllasS at the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had 80
skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he disabused of
. his error by marching through standing coru where no enemy
JULY, 1612.] nOOK XVUI.-CHAP. 3. 275
could have preceded him,-nor by Foy's retreat into the forest,
because it pointed at first towards the fords of Ellcilla and
Gollzalo wllid.l that general might be clldeavourillg to gain,
sud the right willg of the allies would find him there: a
squadron of French dmgoolls also, bursting from the woods in
front of the fltlvflneing troollS soon nfter dilrk fired their pistols
and then passed at full gallop towards tlle ford of HllCrt.a,
thus indiclltillg great confusion in the defeated army, and con·
firming t.he notion Hmt it.s final rell'cat would be ill t.hat direc-
tiou. Had the ~tle of Alba been beld the FrelJeh eould not
hll\'e carried off tIo thiru of their army,-llor would they have
been in mueh better plight if Carlos d'Espaiia, who soon dis-
covered his error in withdrawing the garrison, had infonlle<l
Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it, and dishonour-
abl)' suffered the colonel who jltHl only obeyed his orders to be
Ctlnsured. 'fhe left wing therefore continued their Illardl to
the ford without llll2"eting any enem)', and the niglit being fnr
spent were there halted.; tlle rigllt wing, exhausted by long
lighting, had ceased to pursue lIfter tile action with Alaueune
and llma the French gained Alha unmolest<:d, but the action
did not terminate without two remurllULle al;l;iu~nts. \Vlli!o
riding close behind the fort)·.third regiment Wellington was
struck in the thigll by a. musket-ball which first pussed
through llis holster. Afterwards, when tlle night piquets llsd
been set at Hucrta, sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the
ford and returned a different rO:l,d, Wll8 shot through t!le ann
by a Portnguolic sentillc~ WllOse challl.Jllge he Lad di.\;regllrded.
Theec were the lilSt events of this famous battle, in which the
skill of the gencrul was worthily seconded by troojl8 whOflc
ardollr muy he appreciated by the following anecdotes.
Captain Brotllertoll of tlle fOUltecntL d(~lgoons, fighting OD
the 18th at the Guarena. llmongst the foremost as he was a[wa)'s
wont to do, had a sword tlll"llst througll his side, Jet he Wall
again on horseback the 22nd, autl beiug denied leavc to 1'lllU1Iin
in thnt condition with llia own regimeut secretl)· joined Pack's
Portuguese in UIl undress, und Wfil\ ll~'l"lin hurt in the unfortu-
nate charge at the HCl'lllanito. Such wel'e tllc officers. A
mUll of the forty-third, one by no moans distinguished ahove
bis eoru.rades, was shot throllgh thc middle of the thigh, and
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lost his shoes in passing the marshy stream, but refusing to
quit the fight limped under fire in renr of llis regiment, and
with naked feet and streaming with blood from his wound
marched for several miles over a oountry covered with Sll8rp
flints. Such were the soldiers, and the devotion of a woman
was uot wanting to the illustration of this great day.
The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle dis-
position and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the
dangers Qlld endured the privations of two campaigns with
thnt patient fortitude which belongs only to her sex, In this
bnttlc, forgetful of everything but the strong affection which
had so IOllg supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's
fire, trembling, yet iITesistibly impelled forwards by feelings
mOfe imperious than horror, more pierdog tha.n the fear of
death.
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DURIYG the few hours of darkness succeeding the battle
ClaWlel passed the Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba and
the fords below it, aud at dayligl1t wus in full retreat upon
Pencnmda covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington
having brought up the German dragoons and Ansou's cavalry,
also crossed the river with his left wing at daylight, and
moving up the stream came about teu o'clock upon the
l~relleh relir, then windiug without mueh order aloug the
Almar 0. small stream at the foot of a height nOllr tllC village
of La. Scrull. He launclled his cavalry against t.!lCm, and
the Freneh squadrons flying from Anson's troopers towards
their own left abandoned three battalions of infantry who in
separate columns were making up a hollow lope on their
right, hoping to gain the erest of the lleights before the cavalry
could fnll on. 'l'he two foremost reached the higher ground
and formed squares, Foy being in the onc and general Che-
mineau in the other. The last regiment, when half-way up,
seeing I3<>ck's dragoons galloping hard on fn.ced about in
column and commen~ a disorderly firej the squares above
also Illiel1 their musket.a with far greater effect, and the
Germans after crossing the Almur stream dropped fast, for
they had under fire tu pass a turn of narrow road anti clear
some rough ground before, they eould rflUgc their squadrons on
a charging front. By twos, by tbrcC9, by teus, by twenties
they fell, yet the rest keeping together surmounted the diffi-
culties of the ground and hurtling on the.column went clean
through it: then the squares above retreated and several
hundred prisoners were taken by these able and daring
Jl0rsemeu.
This chart,'(I W3o\l successful even to wonder, the joyous
\ictars standing in the midst of their CfIptivcs and of
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thommnds of ndmiring friends seemed invincible; yet those
who witnessed the scene, nay tho actors themselves remained
witJl the conviction of thi.s military trotll, that cavalr)" alone
are not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprise.
The hill of La Scroll. olft:roo a frigutful slleetac1e of the power
of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of the
(knllll.lIS Wllll markeu by their huge bodies. A few minutes
ouly 11lId tlle combat lasted lInd above a humlred had fallen,
fifty-one were killed outright, and in several places man autl
hOrilc boo died simultaneously, and so suddenly that falling
together on their sides they appeared still alive, the horse'l!
legs stretched out as in movement the rider's feet in the
stirrup his bridle in hfl.!ld, tile sword raised to strike and the
large hat fastened undcr the chin glvillg to the grim but
undistorted countenance a supern,tural and terrible ex-
presslon.
When tho }'rencll ffio.in body found their renr-guard at-
tacked they tnrned to its succour, but seeing tlle light division
coming up re-commenced the retreat and were followed to
Nava de Setroval. Near that place Chauvel's hon;cmen
joincd them from the Duero, aUll covered tho rOOl' with such
a resolute countenance thnt the allied Cfl.VlLlry, reduced in
numbers and fatigued with continual fighting, did not choose
to meddle again. Thus Clausel carried his army clellr 011'
without further loss, and with such celerity that his he'ad-
quarters were that night nt Flores de Avila forty miles from
the field of battle. After remaining a few hours there he
crossed the Zapardiel and would have halted the 24th, hut
the allied cavalry entered Cisla aud his march was then
continued to Arovalo. 'rhis WIUI a wonderful retreat, amI the
line was chosen with judgment, for Wellington naturnlly
expected the French anny would hlwe made for Tordesillas
instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however somewhat
slack. The British left wiug, being quite fresh, could have
asc:onded the 'fonnes on the night of the battle oDd reached
the Almnr before dayligllt, or passing at Huerta have marched
hy Ventosa to Peneranda; but the vigorous following of a
beoten ellemy was not a prominent charMteristic of Lord
Wellington's warfare. On the 25th he balted on the Zapar-
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diel and Adaja rivers, to let the commissariat which bad been
scnt to the rear the morning of the btlttle come up.
Mcnnwhile the king, having qnitted Madrid with fonrteen
thousand mcn on thc 21st, rCilChcd the Adaja and pushed hi~
e:walry towards Fontiveros; he was at BLasoo See Plan 9.
Sancho the 24th, within !l. few hours' mareh of
Arel'alo, and consequently able to effect a junction with
Clausel; yet he did not hurry his march for lIe kllew only of
the ad\'ance npon Sabmo.nca not of the defeat, ami Imvillg
scut many me30.Qcngcrs to inform Mnrmont of his allpronell
conduded he would Ilwait the junction. The next day lIe
received letters from bim and Clausel, dated Are- Klnl!'. eo,..
valo, describing the btllUe, and saying the de- ""'p<)ndcncc.
feal.ed a~my must pass the Duero immediately I>U'S.
to save the dep8t of Valladolid a.nd establish new commu-
nications with tllC army of the north: they promised however
to halt behind that riwr if llossible until the king oould
receive reinforcements from Snchet and Soult.
J oseph b)' a rapid movemeut upon Arevalo could still lltwe
effected l.Io juuction, but he illlmeuiately made a furced mateh
to Espinar, leaving in maseo Saneho two officers and twcnty-
seven troopers, who werc snrprised and takcn on the 25tll by
eight troopers under corporal Henley of the 14th dragoons.
C1anse! mOOe for Yalladolid by Olmedo, thus abandoning the
garrisons of Zamom, Toro, and Tordesillas to tlle allies.
'Welliugton thell brought Santoeildcs, who was now Oll the
E~la with eight thousand GaUieians, to the right of the Ducro,
across whieh river he communieatcu by Castro Nui'io with the
left of the IIllies on the Zapardiel. The 2ith the army entered
Olmedo. General Ferey had dicd there of his wonnds and
t11c Spaniards tearing his body from the grave were going to
mutilate it, when t,he solrJicrs of tllC light division who had
so often fougllt against tnis brave man rescued his CQrpsc;
tlley re·made his grave and heaped rocks upon it for more
security, yet with little need, for the Spaniards, with whom the
sentiment of honour is always strong wheu not stilled by
the violence of their pussions, illlmedintcly upplunded the
fiCtion.
On tlJe 2Gth Clausel finding the pUrlluit had slackened, sent
280 PENINSULA 'VAn. [JULT, 18\2.
colonel Fab"ier to advise tlle king of it, nud then passing his
right wiug ucross the Ducro by the ford nCII.r Hoccillo to
cover the C\'aetlntion of Vallndolid, marched with the other
wing wWlIrds the bridge of Tudclll; he remained howe\'cr
still on the left bank in the hope that Fabvier's mission
would briug the king back. J08cph had then passed !.be
l'lIcrta de Guadnrnmn, but immcdilltel,r repllSscd it and made
A. flank 1T!0vement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th and
pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de Nievll, There he
remained until tlle 31st expecting ClauseI would join him, for
he resolved 1I0t to (Iuit his hold of the IJILSSCS over th6 Guada-
rama, nor to nbnndon his communication with Valencia and
Andalusia. During these movements WelHngton had brought
Santocildes across the Duero to the Zapardid, aDd crossing
tll(l Eresma and Ciga with the ] st lmd light divisions and
the ClI.vo.lry, compelled Clausel to go over tile Duero in the
nigllt of the 29th, And that geneml, fenring the British
would then gain Aranda and Lermll. while the Oallieians seized
Duei'ias and Torquemada, retreated in three columns up the
Yalleys of the Arlanza, ~he Duero and the Esquiva, towards
Burgos, in brr~at disorderj for the soldiers, eneoumged c\'ell by'
Clnu3('I'3 officers of high runk, spread oycr the whole country
I",tk' to the llillagiug and assassinatin'" the country people:
Mhll'",T of 0
War, lath Clausel was forced to shoot fifty marauders ere the
Auglt'lt, 1812. wide spreading anarchy could he checked,
Valladolid was occupiod by the allies lllllids~ the rejoicings
of the inhabitants, and eight hundred sick nnd wounded men
were captured t11Cre with seyc:otecn pieces of artillery and
large stores. Three hundred other prisoners were taken by
the guerilla chief Martinez, and a large convoy on its way to
Soult was forced to retrograde to Burgos. The [eft wing of
the aUics then pursued the ellemy U]l the ArlllnZ&, while the
rigIlt wing moving against the king rcnchccl Cuellar the 1st
of August, Oil the same da.y the garrison of Tordesillas sur-
rendered to the Galliciaus, and Josellh having first dismantled
the CllStle of Scgovia llud raised a contribution of mone)" and
ehurch plnte retreated through the Pnertn de Gnadnrnmu.
leaving a reur-guard of ,?valry which escaped by tIle Ilele-
fouso pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. Thus
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the army of the centre was irrevOCll.hly separated from the
anny of Portugal, the operations against the latter were
"terminated, and new combinations were made oonfonnable to
the altered state of affairs; hnt to understand these it is
necesllary to look at the transactions in o~hcr parts of the
PenillBula,
In Estrcmadurn, after Drouct's rctrcnt to A7.llgUII., genem.
Hill had placed"astrong division of iufantry at lIIerida ready to
cross the Tagus, hut no military event occurred until the 24th
of July, whcn general Lallemtull! mado a fresh ineursion with
three regimllllts of cavalry, TIHl tiJird (lud fourth Portuguese
dragoons under oolonel ,Tohn Campbell retired before him in
good order, skirmishing, to tllll high ground between Ribera
and Villa Francs, and being there supported by Long's British
cavalry and Wynyate's borse artillery, turned and charged
with snccess. Lallemand then repilSSed the defile of Hinojosa
under lire of the gnllB, and being menaced on both flnuks uy
Long fLnd SllUle WM driven with a loss of lifty men to I.lem.
Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank
march towards Mertda and Hill fearing for Ilis detachments
there made a oorrespol\ding movement, wllereupon the
• F'reueh geueral returued to the Serena; but
though he received positive orders from Soult to
give battle 110 action followed anI! the ulTnil'l:l of
that part of the Pcninsula remained balanced.
In Andalusia Ballesteros had surprised oolonel Beauvnis at
03Suna, taking three lmndred prisonel'l:l and ruining the
French dcp<3t there, after which he moved against Malaga.
He was 0p!losed by Laval in front, amI Villatte being detached
from the blockade of Cadiz cut 01T his retreat to San Roque;
th~ road to Murcia was still open to him aliI! ho cacu.ped, but
his rashncss, thOllgll of lcss eonsequcnoo since tho battle of
St1.lamnuCIl, gave Wellington great disquictude, and the more
so that Joseph O'Donnel ]lad just sustained s. serious ddeat
nenr Alieant. This disaster, to be descl"ibed in Il more
fitting place, was oounterbalauced by information that the
revived expedition from Sicily lu\d reached Majorca, had been
joined by Whittingham's division, and had reecived the stores
and guns sent from Portugal. In the north, Popham's anna-
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ment had drawn Cafiarelli's troops to the coast, and although
this littoral warfare was not followed up the diversion was
effectual.
In Castille t,he siege of Astorga lingered, hut Santoeildes
was uow in full communication with Wellington, nud Silveirn
WM on the Duero; Clause] remained at BurgOll, and the kiug
being joined by two thousand mcn from Suc.hct's army could
concentrate twcnty tllOusand to dispute tJle passes of the
GUlldaramll. Hence Wellington, haviug nothing immedillte to
fear from 8o1l1t, nor from the [!nlly of Portugal, lIor from the
army of the north, 110r from Sucllet, menaecIl as that marshal
was by the Sicilian cxpedition, resoh'ed to attack the king in
preference to following Clausel. FOI" tllC Intter could lIOt be
)lUrBUeU without eXlwsiug Sala.mauca aud the Galliciaus lo
Joscph, who was strong in Cllvnlry; but that monarch might
bo assailed without risking much in other quartcrs, seeing that
Clauscl could not soon renew the campaign, and the imme-
diate fall of Astorga was expected which would let loose eight
thousand additional men. A strong British divisiou could
uloo be spnrcd to co-operate with Santocildcs, Silvcirn, and
the partidas, to watch Clausel while Wellington gave the
king a blow or forced him to abandon :Uadridj and it seemed'
probable the lllornl effect of regaining the capital would excite
the Spaniards' CllCrgy everywhere, and prevent Soult from
attacking Bill: if llll did llMnck him the nllies, choosing this
line of operations, would be at hand to give sueconr.
These reasons being weighed, Clillton was left at Cuellar
with t!to sixth uivi~ioll increused to eight tllOuSfmd men by
the addition of some sicklr regiments and by Ansoll's cavalry;
Santocildes WIIS pnt in communication with llim, and the
pllrtidas of MarqllinC".l, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act
with Anson on a prescribed plan. Thus, e;o;e1usive of Silveira's
militia and the GlIllicians about .o\storga, cighteen thou!lIInd
men were left on the Ducro, and the English general was still
able to march against Joseph with twenty-eight thousand old
troopa, exclusive of Carlos d'Espai'ia's Spaniards. He lu.u
also assurance from lord C:~Uel"Cltg'u tuat u Ctlusiderable SUll
in hnrd money, to be followed by other remittances, hOO been
sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importa.nce,
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because grain could be purchased in Sp>l.in ll.~ one-third the
cost of bringiug it up from Portugal.
When the kiag" rcguiued Mlldrid he expected to hear tlmt
ton thousand of tho army of the south were ut 'l'olcdo,
instead of whieh he received letters from Scult ]losi-
tivel}' refusing to send that detaehmcnt; find from Clfluscl
sll}'ing the army of Portugal WM in full retreat to Dllr.
gos. 'l'his rctreftt he regarded as a breach of :King', COr.
faith, becaase Clause! had promised to hold the ri'.ponMllee.
line of the Ducro if the allies marched UjlOn :uss.
lIadrid; hut Joscph, ulluble lo allprcciute Wellington's mili-
tary combinations, did not peroeivc that before he mllrcheJ
!\,"Uinst Madrid the English general had forced Clauscl to sook
a distant point to re-organize his army. Nor was the king's
perception of his OWll situation mueh clearer. He had the
choice of se\"erallincs of operations; that is, he might defend
the passes of the Guadarnma while his court and enormous
convoys evacuated :Madrid and marcllCd upon Zaragozu,
Valencia or Andulusia; or he might retire, anny /lnd eODvoy
together, ill one of those directions. Rejecting the defence of
the passes, lest the allies should tllen march by their right to
the Tagus and so intercept his communication with the south,
he resolved to march towards the Morena; nud from Segovia
he had ordered Scult to evacuate Andulusm and mect him on
the frontier of La Muucha. But to uvoiJ the disgrace of
seeming to fly before a detachment he occupied the Escurial
mountain, Rnd placed his IIrmyacross the roftdll lending from
the passes of tile Guadarama to Madrid. '''11ile in this position,
Wellingtoll's udvftnecd guard, C()luposcd of D'Urban's Portu-
guese, a troop of horse artillery and a battalion of infllntry,
passed the Guaclarama, aud the 10th the whole army was over
the mountuins. 'l'ilcn tho king, retnillillg only eight thousand
men in }losition, sent the rest of his troops to }Jrotcet the
mareh of his court, which quitted Madrid the enme day with
two or three thousand CIlrriages of different kinds and nearly
twenty thousand persons of all ages and aexcs.
On the 11th D'Urban drove back 1'rielhard's cavalry posta
and entered Majadahollda, wllilst some German infantr)",
Book's hea\"}' cavalry, and a. troop of horse artillery, occupied
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Las RoZIlS about a mile in his rear. In the evening, Triel-
llllrd, rcinforeed by Schiazzetti's Italian dragoons and the
lllllcers of Berg returned, and D'Urbllll having called up t.he
horse artillery would have charged the enemy's leading
squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled, and three of the
gUllS being Q\'cnurueu on the rough ground were taken. Th~
victorious cavalry then passed through Majadahonda in pur-
suit. The German dragoons, although surprised in their
quarters, mounted and stopped the leading French squadrons
until Scbiuzzetti's Ituliulls came up, when the fight wouhl
luwc ended budly if POllsollby's cavalry Ilnd tlle 8Cventh divi.
sion had not arrived, whereupon Triclhard abandoned Majada-
honda leaving the captured guns bellind him, yet carrying
away the Portuguese general Barbacena, t})(l colonel of the
Gerulll.n cavalry, and others of le'ls rank. 'l'he whole loss of
the allies wns above two hundred, find when the infantry
}las8ed tbrough Ro7.as a few hours af'l:er the combat the Ger-
man dead were then lying thickly ill the streets, many of them
in their shirts and trou~el'l> were strelcht:d on t11e sills of the
doors, furnishing proof at once of the suddenness of the
action and of their own bravery. Had the killg been prepared
to follow up the blow with his whole fon::e the allies must
have suffered severely, for IVellington trusting to the advanced
guard ha:d not kept his divisions very close together.
After this combat the killg retired to Valdemoro, where he
met his convoy from Madrid and when the troops of the
thrl,le dilTt:rent nations fonning his ami}· thus came together
a hurrihle eonfusiou arose i the eonvo}' WlIS pluudered and
the miserahle people who followed the court were made prey
of by the lieelltiolls soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man at all
times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, immediately
threw himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and
aided by the other generuls, with greut personal risk lIrrooted
the mischief and HUcccedCtl in making t1lC multitude file OW.T
the bridge of Aranjue!. The procession was howe"er lugu-
brious and shocking, for the military line of man::ll was broken
by erowds of weeping women and children and despairing
men: courtioTII of the highest ruuk were to be seen in full
dress desperately strnggling wit.h Sll.vage 80ldieTII for the pos-
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6ession of even the animals on which tllCy were endcnvouring
Ito save their filmi1i~. TI1C cavalry of the allies oould have
(driven the whole before them into the Tag-us, yet Wellington
did not molest them, either from ignorance of their situation
or what is more probable eompllssionating their misery; he
knew that the troollS by abandoning the convoy could easily
escape over the river 8nd he would not strike wllcre the
blow could only fall on helpless people without affecting the
military operations: perhaps also he thought it wise w lcavo
JO&eph the burthen of his court·,
In the evening of tIle 13th the whole multitude was over
the Tagus, the garrisons of Aralljuez and Toledo joined tIle
urmy, order was restored, ami the king received (cUenl from
Soult Ilnd Suchct. Thc firnt opposed the (wacuntion of An(la-
lusia; the s~ond gave notice that the Sicilian expedition had
landed at Alicant and a considerable army was forming there.
Irritated with Soult and alarmed for the SlIfetyof Sucbet, the
king then relinqnished his march towards the Morenn nnd com-
menced Ilia retreatto Valeneill.. The 15tb the lldvaneed gunrd
moved with the sick and wounded who wcrc heaped on country
cars, the convoy followed under charge of the infantry, while
the cavalry, .spreading to the right and lcft, endeavoured to
coll~t provisions. But the people, remembering the wnnton
devaste.tioll committed a few Illonths before by Moutbnm's
troops on their return from Alicant, fled with tlleir property;
llnd na it WllS the hottest time of the yellr fmd the desertcd
country was sandy and without shnde, tllis mllrcb of OM lmn-
dred and fifty miles to Almam:a was one of continual suffcr~
ing. The partida chief Oh&leoo hovered constantly on the
flllUks and rear, killing without mercy all persons, civil or
militury, who stragglcd or sunk from cxhaustion; IWd wllilo
this disllStrou8 journey WllS in progress another misfortune
hefcl the French on the side of Rcquciia. For the hUllSllfB
and"infantry belonging to Suehct's army, having left Madrid
to succour Cuenca before the king returned from Begovia.
carried off the garrison of t11at place in de~pite of the Empe-
cinado and made for Valencia; but Villa Campa crossing
their march on the 25th of Angust, at the passage of a river
near Utiel, took all their baggage, tbeir~, and three hun-
280 PENINSULA WAR. [AucuST, i~H.
(lred men. And theu the Empecinado invested Ouadalaxara,
which had a garrison of seven huudr(l{lmen.
Wellington soeing that the king hat! erOllSed the 'fagu~ in
retreat cntered :Madrid, ll. vcry ~emornble event were it only
from tIle affecting circumstauce~ attending it. He, a foreigner,
marching at the head of a foreign army, was lIlet and wel-
comcd tAl the eapitlll of Spain by llle whole remaining l'Opu-
IlltiolL The multitude who iJcfore that llOur had never
seen him came fortll to klil his approach, not with fcigned
enthusiasm, not with aeclamations extorted by tIle fear of a
conqueror's power, nor yet excited by the uatural proneness
of hmnau nature to laud the successful, for thero was uo
tumultuons cxultfl.tion; fnminc was amongst them and long-
endured misery hatl subdued their spirits; but with tears and
every otller sign of deep emotion tIley crowded around his
llorse, hung UIHJIl his stirrups, touched llis clothes, and throw-
ing theml>C!vcs upon the earth hles~ed him nloud as the fricnd
of Spain. His triumph WitS us pure and glorious as it was
uncommon, and he felt it to be so.
Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence of the
rnemy. 'fhe lktiro contained cUOrnJOUl> etorca, twenty thou-
llIl.nd stand of arms, more than one hundred and eighty picCCII
of artillery, and the eagles of two French rcgiment-8; it IUld
8 garrison of two thousand figllting mcn besides invalid.;; and
followers, but its inherent weakness was soon made manifest.
'l'he works consisted of an intcrior fort ffi.lled La Chinn, with
an exterior entrenchment; but tllC fort 'I'M too small, the
cntrenchment, too large, and casily deprived of water. In the
lodgings of a French officer 1l1l;0 was found tlll ONCI' directing
the cOlllllllludunt to confine his rcal defence to the fort; and
aecoNingly, in the night of the 13th, he abandoned the
cntrenchment, and next day accepted honourablc terms,
because La China was so contracted and filled willl combus-
tible Luildillga tllnt hill liue troops would with ouly u little
liring lllwe been smotllcred in the ruins; yet they were so dis-
satisfied that many broke their anns and their commander was
like to have fallen a vidim to their wrath. They were imme-
..liately sent to Portugul, amI French wl'iteT!:l with too much
t.lUth assert that the escort bnscly robbed awl munlered
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many of the prisoners. This disgrM:efuI action was perpe-
trated on the frontier of Portugal by tbe Spanisll garrison of
Ciudad lliJdrigo; tIle British troops, who furnished no escorts
after tho ftrst day's march from Madrid, are guiltless, aud lord
Welliugtoll made streuuous but unsuccessful effort.s to have
the Sp.'I.uish criminals punished.
Coillcident witll the fall of tIle futiro was that of Gun-
dallUara, which surrendered to tIle Em~inado. Tbis mode
of wasting an nrmy antI its resources, was de;ignuted by
Nnpoloon Il.q the most glaring and cxtraordinary of all the
errors committed by tIle king and by Marmont. And surely
it was so. For including tbe garrisolls of Toro, Tordesillas,
Zamora and Astorga, which were now blockaded, six thousand
IllCIl had beeu delivereJ us it were bound to the ullics; nud
with them stores and equipmenta suflicient for a new army.
These forts had been designed by the cmperor to resist the
pllrtidM, but bis lieutenauts exposed them to the British army,
llnd thus the positive loss of men from the battte of Salamanca
WM douhlerl.
Napoleoll had notice of 'Marmont's defeat as early as the
2nd of Selloomber, a week before the great l!llttle of BoroJillo;
the news was enrried by Fubvier, who made the journey from
Valladolid in one course, llnd having fought on tile 22nd of
July at the Arapilcs was wounded on the heights of Moskowa
the 7th of Septemberl Marlfiont, suffering alike in body lUld
ill mind, had excused Mmself with so little strength or clearue&l,
that the emperor, contemptuously remarking tbat the dcspateh
contained more comlllicn.te stufliug than a clock, desired his war
minister t,o dcma.nd wllY Marrnont had delivered battle without
the orders of the king 1 wIlY be had 1lot Illade his operfltions
subservient to tIle general plan of the campaign1 why he
broke from defensive into offensive operations before the anny
of the centre joined him 1 why he would llot even wait two
dars for CI1(lUvel's cavalry whicll he knew were close at
ll:lu(! t "From persoual vunity," l>Uid the cmpcror with
seeming sternness, "the duke of Uagusa hus sacrificed the
interests of his eountr~' and tho good of my service, he is
guilty of the crime of illlmbordinatioll and is the author of all
this misfortune."
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But Napoleon's wrath so just, aud apparently so dangerous,
could not even in its first violence overpower his early
frieudshill. With u. kindness, the reoolleclioll of whicll should
now pieroo MlIrmont's inmost soul, twice in the same letter
he desired that these questions might not even be put to his
unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured and Ilia health
re-established. Nor Wall this generous feeling shaken by the
m-rival of the king's agent, colonel Dcspl'C?, wllo reaclHld MOB-
cow the 18th of October, just afwr Murat had lost R battle at
the outj>os!:8 and when all hopes of peace with
Russia were lit em]. JOSCllh's ucsjlll.tlJhea, bitter
against all the generals, were especially so against
Mnrmont and 801llt j the former for ]lllving lost the battle, the
latter because of his resistance to the royal plan, . Soult's recal
was demanded imperatively, because be had written a letter to
tho emperor extremely offensive to the king; and it wa.q also
hinred that lle designed to make himself king ofAndalusia, Idle
stories of that marshal's ambition seem always to have been re-
sorted to wlieu his skilful plll:ns were beyond the military judg-
ment of his accusers; but Marmont Wll$ deeply b'Unk in culpable
misfortune, and the king's complaints against him were not
unjust. Napoleon had however then seen Wellington's des-
patch, which was more favourable to the duke of Ragusa tban
Josepb's rellOrti for the IlItrer was founded on Q, belief that
thn unfortuat-c gnneral knew the army of the centre was close
rot. band and would !lOt wait for it.; whereas the partidas had
intercepted so many of Josellh's letters it is doubtful if any
reached Marmout previons to the battlc. It was in vain
therefore that Desprer. pressed the king's discontent on the
emperor; that great man, witb unerring sagacitJ, had already
disentangled the truth and Dcsprez was thus roughly inter-
rogated as to tho conduct of his master:
WllY was not the army of the centre in the £eld a month
sooner to sucoour Mannontf Why was the emperor's example,
when in a like case he marched from Madrid against air John
Moore, forgottcu1 Wby, after the battle, woo not the Duero
passed Clnd the booten troops rallied on tlle fLrmy of the
centre¥ Why were the passes of the Glladarama ao carl)'
abandoned1 Why was the Tap crossed so 80001 Finall)',
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why were not stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro burned,
the eagles and the garrison carried 0111
1'0 these questiollil the king's agent could only reply by
excuses whieh must ha.ve mooe the cuergetie emperor smilr.;
but when, following his instnlctions, D6sprez harped upon
8ou1t's demeanour, his designs in Andalusia, nnd still more
upon the letter so personally offensive to the king, whiell shall
be more noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply, that he
could not enter iuto such pitiful disputes while lIe Wall at the
head of five hundred thousand men n.nd oooupied with such
immense operotions. With respect to 8oult's letter, he said
he knew his brother's real feelings, but those who judged Joseph
by his language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions
were natural und partaken by the other gencrnls; wherefore
he would not by recalling him deprive the armies in Spain of
the only military head they possessed. Alld then ill ridicule
of Soult's supposed trcachtry he observed, that the king's
fears on that IlCad must IUl.Ve subsided Ill! the English news·
papers said the dnke of Dslmatia was evacuating Andalusirl,
and he would of course unite with Suehet and witll the army
of the centre to retake the offensive. Nevertheless tIle emperor
without hesitation admitted all the evils arising from these
disputes between the generals and t.he king, hut suid, at. sudl
0. dist:mce he could not give pr~ise orders for their conduct.
He hud foreseen the mischief, and rcgrcttc(l more thlln el'er
that Joscph had disregarded his eoUUSClllotto return to Spain
in 1811; thlls saying he /1nislled the oonversn.tion, hut th\s
expression aboutJoseph not returning to Spain is vcrr relnnrk,
able. Nnpoleon spoke of it as of n well known fnet, ret
JOIle!lh's letters show that he not only desired but repcatedly
Offl;ll'ed to resign tho crown of Spain llllulive a )lri\'ato IllUII in
France! Diu the emperor mOllU that he wisho\l his brother
to remain a crowned guest at Paris 1 or bad some subtle in·
triguers misrepresented the brothers to each other? The
noblest buildiugs are often defiled in secret by vile Ilnd
creeping things.
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1°. ~1lenr.JU your enemy', flanks, protect '!four own, and be
ready tQ eom:entrate on the important pointll:
This maxim oontains the spirit of Napoleon's instnlctious
to his gCllernls after Badojos was succoured in 1811. At
thllt time he had ordcred the army of Portngal to occupy tho
valley of the TUg'"JS and the passes of the Credos mountains,
in which position it coyered Madrid and could readily march
to aid either the arlllY of the south or the army of the north.
Dorselllle who collllllllllded the Intl.cr could bring twenty-six:
thousnnd mcn to Oiudad Rodrigo, nud Soult could bring a.
like number to Badujos, bllt Wellington could not move
against one or the other without having Ma.rlUont upon his
flank; he could not move against Marmont without kwing
the others on both Hanks, and ho eould not turn his oppo-
l\t~nt's flanks save from the OCCll.n. He took Ciudad Rodrigo
and Badajos notwithstanding, but by surprise and because
the French did not concentrate on the important points:
this proved his superiority, but in no manner affected tile
principle of Napoleon's plan.
When the exigency of the Russian war had weakened the
llrmy of tile north, the emperor, giving Marmont two addi·
tional divisious, ordered him to occupy Castille, not as a
t1efcnsive llosition but as a central ofr..,nsivc one from whence
he could kecp the Gnllieinns in check, and by prompt menac·
iug movements bar WelliugWu from serious operations else-
where. Marmont was forbiddcn to invade Portugal while
Wellington was 011 the frontier of Beirn, tlmt is when Ll!
could not assail him in flank; and he W!\S directed to guard
the Asturias cnrcfully as a protection to the great Ijne of
communication with FrllOee. In :May also he Wl!S rebuked
for having withdrawn Bounet from Oviedo, aud for delaying
to re·occU!ly the Asturias when tho incursion a","'ll.inst .&lino
terminated. Bu~ neither then nor nft.erwards did he compre-
hend the spirit of the emllcror's views, and that extraordinary
man, whose piercing sagacity seized every chance of war, was
so disquieted b)' his lieutenant's wnnt of perception! that all
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the pomp and vuet political and military combinations of
Dresden eould not put it from llis thoughts.
'Twice,' said he, 'hna the duke of Ragusa ple.ccd an in·
terval of thirty leagues between his army and the Appendix ,.
enemy, contrary to all the rules of war; the
English genoml goes wJlere he will, the Freneh general loses the
iuitial movements Rlld is of no weight in the affairs of Spwn.
Biseny 8ud the north are llXPOSeJ by the evacuation of the
Asturias, &nt-onn and St. Sebastian are endangered, Md tho
guerilhs communicate freely with the coast. If the duke of
llagusa has not kept some bridges <ID the Agueda he
cannot how what Wellington is about, and he will retire
before light cavalry instead. of ollerating so as to make the
Ellglbh general concentrate bis whole army. The fabe
direction 1Ilrelldy giveu to affairs mnkcs it uc<:c85l1ry thllt
Caffarclli should keep a strong corps always in lllllld; that
the commander of the reserve at B3.yonnc should look to the
safety of S1. Sebastian, holding' three thousand men always
ready to march; finally that the provisional battalions and
depots of the interior should reinforce the reserve at lhyonue,
Le euenlllpeu on the Pyrenees, exercised and formed for
service. 11 Marm(Yll,t', OVWBiylits continue, tlllJl!/J tro<lpB will.
~ the disaBterl from becoming e::Ureme.'
Napoloon was supernaturally gifted in wflrlike matters.
It has been rccor<1cJ in pmise of Cresars gcncralsliip, tllat he
foretold the cohort.! mixed witll his cavalry would be the
cause of victory at Phul'SlIlia. 'fhis letter was written hy the
Freneh emperor on the 28th of Mny, before the allies were
collected on the Agucda, nud when ll. hUIlUrt'tl thousand
Frelleh troops were betWC\)ll the English geueralnud R'Iyonne,
and its prescience was vindicated lIt Burgos in October!
2°. To meet the emperor's views, MamlOnt should !IS Soult
advised, have left one or two divisions on the Tormes, ha\'e
encamped near Baiios and Oil the upper Ag"\u~da to watch the
allies. Caffarelti's divisions could have joined those on t·he
Tormes, and then Napoleon's plan for 1811 would have been
exaepy renewed; Madrid would hal'c been covered, a junction
wilh the kiug secured, allU Wellington could scarcely have
;t).oveJ be)'ollll the AgueUa. MacUlont, uPllan:nl!y beclluse he
u2
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would not ha.ve the king in his camp, run counter to the
emperor and to Soult. He kept no troops on the Agueda,
which might be excusable if to feed them there was difficult;
but then he did not concentrate behind the 'l'ormcs to sustain
his forts, neither did he abandon his forts when he abandoned
Salamanca; thus eight hundred men wore sacrificed merely to
secure his conccntration bellind the Duero. His lino of
opcrntions Wag pr.rpcndicular to the allies' front, in9tcad of
lJing on their flank-IIC abandoned sixty miles of country
between the Tormes and the Agueda--he suffered WeIJington
to tske the initial movement-lie withdrew Bonuet {rom the
AsturiAS, whereby he lost Clllfar~lIi's sup:>ort and realized the
emperor's {cafs. He regained the initial however by passing
the Dllcro on the 18th, and had he deferroo the IlD.SSIlge until
the king was over the Guadarama, Wellington must have
gone buck npoll Portugal with some show of dishonour.
But if Castafios, instead of keeping fifteen thousand Glllli-
clans before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of only
tweh'e hundred men, bad blockaded it lrith three or four
thoUS3Ud, and detuched Sautocildes with eleven thouSWld
down the Thla to co-opcrat-e with Silvcira and D'Urban,
sixteen tbousand men would have been acting upon Mar-
mont's right flank Ul Juue: and as Bonnet did not join until
the 8th of July he could soorcely have kept the line of the
Ducro.
3°. The secret of Wellington's success is to be found in the
extent of country occupied by the French armies a\ld the
impediments to tlleir military communication, while from
Portugal, an impregnable central position, he could rush out
unllxpcetcdly against any point. This strong post WllS how-
ever of llis own making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had
defended it, knew its full value and availed himself of an its
advantages. Tile baWe of Salamanca was accidental in itself,
but the tree WlIB plantc<l to bear such fruit, and Wellington's
combinations must be estimated from the general result. He
bad only sixty thousand disposable troops, and onc bundred
thousand were especially appointed to wateh and control
him i yet he passed the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand
in a pitched battle, and drove twenty thousand others from
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Madrid in confusion, without risking tlo single strategic point.
His campaign up to the oollquest of Madrid was therefore
strictly ill ~onl with the rules of art., although his means
and resOUr<lCS have boon shown to he precarious, shifting
and uuoortain; waut of mOlley alone wouM have prevented
him from following up his victory if he bad not persuaded
the Spanish authorities in the s>'lllmanC/l. collntry to yield
him tile revenues of the government in kind, under a promise
of rellaYUlent at Cadiz. No general was ever mere ell-titled
to the honours of victory.
4°. The allies' success indicates a fault in the French plan
of invasion. Tho army of the south, numerous, of approved
valour and well commanded, WUll of so little weig-Iit in i-his
cnmpaign lIS to prove that Andalusia WIIS a point pushed .
beyond the tnm line of olXlrntiona. Its conquest ill .1811 was
the killg's plan, and it was not liked by Napoleon though he
did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a
grave one. While the English held Portugal and Cadiz was
unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen ratller thnn a brain.
Had the communication with France been first established by
the southern line of invasion, to attack Andalusia would have
been methodical; or to hl\\·e held it lmrtially by uetuclllllcnts
for the sake of the resources, keeping tho huse of the anny in
E~tremadura, would have' ooen regularly within the northern
Ilystem of invasion. }c'or iu EstremaJurtl. Soult would llave
covered the capital, beeD more connected with the nrmy of
t11c centre, Bnd llis co-operation with Mnssella ill l810 would
probably llave compelled the Englisll to quit Portugnl.
Ikinforeing the army of the south with thirty or forty thou-
sand men would hllye had thl: Sllme effect if 80u1t could have
fed sueb a number. And ill favour of the invasion of Anda-
lusia it may be observed, tllut Seville was the great arsenal of
Spain, find the English witlJOut abandoning Portugal might
have \'ecll located in streugth at Cu.dll:, wllich would bave
compensated for the lOBS of Lisbon: finally tile Euglish
ministers were not then determined to defcud Portugal.
5°. When the emperOr dec1llred that SoIlIt possCllscd the
only military head in the Peninsula, be referred to a scheme
by that marshal to be noticed in the nex.t chapter j but having
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regard merely to the disputes betwccn llim Mllrmont flod
the king, Suchot's talents not ooing in'question, the justice Of
the remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon alwaJs enforced
tile miliw.ry }lrillciple of concentration on the important
poinb; but the king and marshals, though harping contiou-
ally upon this ma:<:im, desired to apply each in bis own
sphere. NOl'{ to concentrate on a wrong point is to burt
yourl;clf witll your own sword, und as each French general
dC8ircd to be strong, the ann}' at large wus Brottcrcd ill8tclld
of being concentrated. The failure of tbe campaign \I'M
attributed to Soult's disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of
the Tag-us by Drouet would have enabled the kiug to act
before Palombini's division arrived. But it Ims been shown
. that Hill could lu>vc bro\lgllt Wellington an equal or. superior
reinforcement in less time, whereby tIle latter could have
made helld unW the French disp"~fSCd for want of llrovisiollil,
Of by Il. ropid CQuntcr-movement have fullen upon Andalnsio..
If the king had merw:«l Ciudad Rodrigo it would have been
no diversion, for be had no battering-train; stillles;; could he
llave marched on Lisbon, for Wellington would then ha'-e
IJverpowered Sault and entered Cadiz before such an opera-
tion eould bceome dangerous. Oporto might have been
taken, but Joseph would have besit.'1ted to exehange Madrid
for that city. The ten tbousand men required of Soult by
the king on the 19th of June could have been at Madrid
1Jefore August, and the pusses of the GuuJaroIllll. thw; defended
until Mannont's army was l"C-orgAni~cd! Ay! but Hill
could have entered tIle valley of the Tagus, or being reinforced
could have inYllded Andalusia while Wellillgtou hpt the king
in check. Josep1l'lJ plan of opel1ltions, if exactly executed,
might IUloYe prt'Velltcd Wellington's progreAA on some pointa;
btlt then the Frcnch would have becn conccntroted in large
masses without striking flny decisive blow, which it was the
pith nnd marrow of the English gencrol'g policy to make
them do. It follows that Sonlt Illatlll l\ truc, Joscph a false
lIpplicntion of the princi}lle of concentration.
6". If the king llad judged well he would have merged
tbe monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the tent_
Holding only the Retiro and a few Jlost8 near 1[OO[id, he
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would have orgnnir.ed n pontoon train, established mngazines
at Segovia, Avilu, Toledo, und Talavera, kept his army con-
stantly united, and employed to opcn roads through the moun·
taillS and ehase the }lartidas while Wellingtoll remained
quiet. Thus acting lie would have been ready to succour any
rneuuce(l point. By illforciug discipline in his OWll army he
would have given a useful CXl1llJIllc, amI uy vigilance aud
acti\'"ity luwe insured the preponderancc of force wherever ho
rnarclllxl: he would have l1equircd the esteem of the l'reneh,
and the Spaniards would more readily havc submitted to a
warlike mOllareb. A weak man can wear an inherited CroWIl,
it is of gold, the people support it: it requires the strength
of a warrior to bear the weight of a usurped diadem, it is of
iron.
'f'. If ::\Iarmont and the king were at fault in the general
pl/lll of opeOltions, they wen.l not less so in the particular
tnctics of the campaign_ On the 18th of Jnly the army of
Portugal llllllsed t]le Duero ill admnee. Ou the 30tlt it re-
plllllIed tllllot rh'er ill retreat, having in twelve dllys marched
two hundred miles, fought three combats and a
general battle. One marshal,. seven generals, ~i'7~d~:~v.
twelve thousand five hundred men and ollieer.s,
had been killed wounded or takenj and tl1'O eagles, besides
those captured in the lktiro, several standards, twelve guns
and eight c:trriugcs, exelusive of tue arlillery aud slores found
ut Valladolid, fcll into the victors' hllnds. In the same period,
the allies marched onc llllndrcd and sixty miles and hnd one
field-marshal, four gencrnls, Bud nearly six tholll!ll.nd oflicCTll
and soldiers killed or wouuded,
This comparison proves Wellington's sagacity wllOn he
deoormlDcd not to fight except at great ad\'antage. The
French army, although surllriscd in tlle midst of an evolution
and instantly.swept from the field, killed and wounded six
thousand of the allies,..l-the elevcnth and sixty-first regiments
of the sixth division, had not togetller more than one hnndred
and sixty meu and oOlccTB left stauding at the cnd of tuc
oottle j twice six thousand then would hu.ve fallen in Q. more
CQUll.1 contest, and as Chau\'c\'s CM-airy aud the king's army
were both at hand, a retreat into Portugal would have followed
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a less perfect victory. The battle ought not. and would not
have been fought hut for Marmout's f~l;e movement on the
22nd. Yet it is certain, if Wellington hllll retired, the mUT·
11l1JfS of his army already louder tlU\1l Will> seemly would have
been heard in England; and if an accidental shot had termi.
llated his career all would have been tenninated. The Cories,
ripe for a cLange, would have aCCCllted the intrusive king, and·
the Amcricon waT just declared against England would have
so complicated affairs that no new man could have oontiullcd
the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians would
have been raised. It would have been said that Wellington
desponding and distrusting his brave troops dared not ven-
tUTe a battle all even terms, hence these misfortunes l His
nnme woulll hnve been made, liS si.. John Moore's was, a lllltt
for the malice and fnlscllood of faction, and his militAry
genius would have been measured by the ignotllnee o( his
detractors.
8°. In the battle Mannont had forty~two thousand sabres
nml ba)'onets; Wellington, who had reccived some detach-
ments on the 1Dth, hacl above forty-six thougnnd, but the
excess WIIS principally Spanish. The French had
:r.~l~~:r\,. sevcut)'-four guns, the allies, including a. Spanish
battery, had only sixty pieces. Thus Marmont,
over-matched in cu.vtllry and inftlntry was sUjJcrior in urtil-
ler)', nnd the figbt would lla\'e been most bloody if the gene-
..als had been equal, (or courage and strength were in even
halance until Wellingtoll's genius struck the beam. Scarcely
can a fault be detected in his conduct. It might indeed be
asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le Marehtlllt's
charge, brought up to sustuin the fourth, fifth, and sixth
divisions and keep of!:' Bo)'cr's dragoons; hut it WOllld secm
:1\ to cavil at an action which WIIS dcscribed at the time by a
French officer, as the' beating ofJurty tll.OU8a:nd men infarty
minutes.'
DO. In the description of tile battle, Marmont's own account
of his views and the time when he wus wOlmded has been
adoptedj but thcre are other versions which tend to place his
errors in a. stronger light. n is affirmed he twice sent
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orders to Maueune, once by Fabvier, once by
colonel Richemout his nide-de-eamp, to assemble
four divisiolls and press the English army, which
was, he said, in full retreat by the Ciudad Hodrigo
road. Mauellne replied that he was more likely to
be attacked hilllSelf, and in fact Pllkeuham fell
upon him very soon afterwards. That so far
from wishing or ordering his left wing to fall back on their
ccutre Murmont wus SIl.tisfieu the allies were retiring; that
being at dinner and in the net of holding his plate, ha
was struck by a shell just before Pllkenllaln'S attack corn·
meneed. That after the battle he had a violent altercation
with Maucune, who he reproached for having extended the
left so rashly, and when the latter pleaded the orders received
by l'abvier Marmollt exclaimed ab"ll.iW>t that ollicer and
denied that he had sent uny orders to pursue the allies.
However. tllll,t mllY bc, the battle of Salamanca. remarkable in
mlmy points of view was not least 80 in this, that it Wl!S the
first decided victory gained by the allies in the Peninsula. In
former actions the French hud heel\ repulsed, here they were
driven headlong as it were before a migllt.y wiud without help
or 6tay, ami thll results werll IlrOportioJlute. Joseph's seeret
negotiations with the Cortes were ('7ushed, his partillfins were
everywhere (Ibrulhcd, tho sinking spirit of tho Cotalans revivell,
the clamollrs of the opposition in Engl(llld were checked, tho
provisioual government of France was dismayed, the secret
plots against the Frencl} in Germany were resuscitated, al:.d
the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and shook the
colossal structure of Napoleou's power to it.'! vcry ulI.Se.
10°. Grout butUel:I aro often accidental; few l:,'Cnernls are
abl!:, or indcoo willing kl fix the place (lnd bour where they
shnll fight. Sn!nmnncn W(l.q an aeeid!:nt seized witll astonishing
vigour and quickness, hut still an accident. Even its results
wefe accidental; for tlle }'rcnch could never have repassed the
'rormes if Carlos d'Espaila. ulld not withdrawn the garri-
son frolll Alba, hiding the filet frOll! Wollingtoll; and this
would lllwe ruined the latter's ~wpllig1\ but fot' another of
those ehanccs which, rccuning so frequently in war, make
bad generals timid, and great generals trust fortune in adverso
,
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circumstances, Joseph was at B!lISCO Soncho the 24th, and
notwithstanding his numcrOllll cavalry the arm)' of Portugal
passed in retreat across his front at the distance of a. few miles
without bis knowledge; he tIms missed one oPJlortunity of
effecting his junction with ClauscI. Ou the 25th this junction
could still have uoou made at AroVlI]O, Ullt.l Wellington, as if
to mock the king's generalship, hlLltC<1 tlmt day behind the
Zapardiel; hut J oseph retreated towards tIle Guadnrllma, wrath-
ful that Clausel made no effort to join him, and forgetful that
as a beaten and pursued army must march it was for him to
join Olause!. But the true causes of these eTrol'8 were the
secret illcliuutiolls of the generala. J oscpli, dtltermiued to
keep his commullicntion with the oopital and with Andalusia,
wished to draw the beaten Ilrmy to Madrid, and Marmont was
willing to do so j but Clause1 desired to have the killg behind
the Duero, and if be had succeeded the result Olay be thus
trneed.
Clausel during the first confusion wrote tlmt ou!y twenty
tbou81md men eould be re-orguni1.ed;, this certainly did not
include stragglers find marauders; for 11 reference to the
French loss shows Ilearly thirty thousand fighting men left.,
and in fact Clause! did in a fortnight re-orgo.nize twenty
tlJOusand infLlntry, two thousLlud cLlvalry aud fifty guns,
besides gaining a knowledge of five thousand str,)gglcrs Clnd
marauders. No soldiers rally quicker after a defeat than the
French, and as Joseph brought to Blusco Sallcho thirty guns
llnd fourteen thousand men, tw~ thousand being horsemen,
forty thouSIIud infantry autl more thau six thousaud cavalry
with a powerful artillery might luwe been rallied hchind the
Ducro, exclusivc of CnlfJlrclli's divisions. Nor would Madrid
lmve been exposed to an insurrection, nor to the oper&.tioll of
a weak detachment from Wellington's army; for two thousand
men seut by Buchet had arrived in tllnt capital on the 30th,
Gnd there were in the severnl fortified points of the vicinity
six or sc\'en thOIlAAnd morc, who could have been united at
the Retiro to protect that d€pat snd the families attached to
the intrusive eourt.
Wellington would then have found a more powerful army
than Marillollt's again ou the Duero. But his owu lU'UIy
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would have been less powerful than before, for the reinforce-
menta from England 1)11(1 not sufficed to replace the current
consumption of men; and neither tlle fresh soldiers nor tIle
old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain the toil of the
recent operations. Three thousuud troops had joined since
the battle, yet the general deefCase, including the killed and
wounded, wns above eigM thoustlud, tl.nd the sick were rapidly
ilIlgmenting from the extreme hoot. It may therefore be Mid
that if Mi,rmont Wllll stricken deeply by Wellington the king
poisoned the wound. The English general had forc-caleulatcd
nll these superior resources of the enemy, nnd it was only
Mamlont's flagrant fanlt 011 the 22ud that could have wrung
the battle from him; yet he fought it I\~ if his genius disdained
such trial of its strength. I saw him Into in thll evening of
that grM.t day, when the advancing flashes of cannon find
musketry stretching lIS far liS the eye could command sllOwed
in the darkness how weIJ the field was won; he was alone,
the flush of victory was on his brow and his eyes were eager
and watchful, but IlLs voice WM calm and even gentle. More
than thtl rival of Mltrlborough, since be bu-u defeated greater
generals than Murluorough ever encountered, with ll. prescient
pride he seemed onl,)' to accept this glor,)' as nil CIll'llcst of
gteuttt things.
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CHAPTER I.
WELLI~GTOX'Soperations deeply affected the French in the dis-
tant proviu<:es, and it is necessary agnill to revert W the general
progress of the waf lest the true beartugs of IlLS military
policy should be overlooked. 'l'hc Imttlc of Salo.mauCiL, by
clcnring all the centre of Spain, reduced the invasion to ita
original lines of operation. Caf'farelli had concentrated the
scattered troops of tllC army of the north, and when Clause]
led back his vanquished troops to Burgol!, the whole French
hoat WIlIl divided in two distinet ports, each having a ~pnmto
line of communication with Frnncc, and a circuitous, ullcerfuin,
attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza,
insh,'lld of a sure and short. onc by Madrid. But Wellington
WlUI alliO forced to divide his army, and though his central
position gave him the initial power, his lines of eommu-
nicution were long and wcuk and the enemy powerful ilt
either flank. On his own simple strength in tlle centre of
Spain he eould not rely, and the diversions he had projected
llgaillSt the enemy's rear and flanks beclUlle more important
than ever. To these we must !lOW turn.
EASTElU' OPERATIONS.
'l'he lIarrntive of Cll.tnlonilln ll.ffnirs WIIS intcrrnpted when
the Frcnch gCIleral DeCIWIl, after fortifying the coast line and
opening some new roads beyond the reach of sllOt from the
English ships, was gathering the harvest of tIle interior.
Lacy was then confined to the monntain chain whieh
sepnrlltes the cOlUlt territor)" from the IJlaills of Lel"ida, anJ
from the CcrJ..iia; lilld the ilUlul"rediouary slJirit WllS ouly
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upheld by Wellington's successcs and the hope of
succour (rom Sicily. Lncy, dcvoted to tllc rc- C<><lrington,1158.
publican party in Spain, had MW boon made
captain-gcneral as well as commander-in-chief, and aoug1lt to
keep down the people who were generally of the priestly and
royal faction. He publicly spoke of exciting a general insur~
rectiOll, yet to the Euglish naval officers avowed his wish to
rcpress the patriotism of the somatenes. Not ashamed to
beast of his assassination plots, he reeeh'cd with honour a
man who had murdcred the aidc-de-camp of"
Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissensions amongst
his own generals, intriguing against all of tllelll in
turn; aud wllcn Eroles and Manso, tile peQple's
favourites, raised any soldiers, he trnnsferrod the
latter lIS soon ns: tlley were organized to SIlrs-
field's division, at the same time calumniating
that general to depress bis influence. He quar-
relled incessantly with Codriugton, and had no desire to
llee an English force in Catalonia, lest a geneml iw;urrcc-
tiOll should take Illuoo; for he fClued the multitude, 01100
gathered und nr:med, would drive him from the province ond
declare (or tlle opponents of the Cortes. And in this view
tlle constitution itself, although emanating from the Cort-es,
was longwithlleld from the Catalans, because the newl)" declared
popular rights miglit havc interfered with the arbitrary power
of tlle chief.
When the Allglo-Siciliau expedition reached ?lIahon, tll(l
hopes of the SjJUuiards nul! tIle feare of tllO :French were aliko
excited and the COR.'!t became the object of interest to both.
The Catalans opelled a. communiClltiOIl with the English fleet
by Villa Nue"a. de Sitjes, aDd sougllt to collect the grain
of the Campo de Taragolla; but Deeaell, then coming to
moot Suehet who hll.d arrived nt IWus, drove tllcm to the hills
again. Tho urida district was however Oprll to the enter-
prise> of Looy, because it wns at this period IWiJle had detached
general Paris from Zaragoza to llllccour the ltaliaD8 under
Palombiui; Ilnd that Severoli's division was broken up to
reinforce the garrisons of Lerida, Taragona, Barcelona, and
Zarngozu. When the army of the Ebro was dissolved, Luc}'
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rci!olved to mnrch UpOll Leriull., where he had engaged certain
Spanillrdil in the French service to explode the powder
magazine when he should approllc1\; and this odioU.'l scheme,
which necessarily involved t·he destruction of hundreds of his
own countrymen, WIIS vaiuly opposed by Eroles uud Sarsfield.
'J.'bcir divisions wero incorporated with other troops at
Guisona, flond the wholll journeying day and night reached
TTemp. Lacy lmving thus turned Lcrida, would have resumed
the mareh at mid-dll}", intending to attack next morning at
dawn, but the men were without food and so exhausted that
fiftccu hundred llUu fallen belJind. A council of war was
held and Sarsficld would have returned, observing' that all
communication with the soo Wl\ll aoondonC(l, that the harvesta
of the Cmnpo de Taragono. and Valls being left to
be gathered by the enemy, the loss of the corn
would seriously affect the whole principality.
Displeased at the remonstmnce, Lacy llent him back to the
plain of Urgel with 60me infantry and the cavalry to keep
the garrison of Blliagllcr in check, bllt in the night of the 16th
made him return to Limiana on the Noguera. Lacy himself
had meanwhite advanced by Agen towards Lerida, the explo-'
sion of the magnzine took plnce, many hOU6CS were thrown
(lown, two hundred inhabitants auu oue hundred lInd fifty
soldiers wcre destro)'e<l, two bastions fell and the place WIIS
laid open.
Henriod the governor, tllOugh ignorant of the vicinity of
the Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, tlle garrison
of &lu","ller hearing the explosion marched to the succour,
find whcn the 0lt,alan troops appenred, tile citizens, enraged
by thc destruction of thcir habitations, aided the French;
Lacy then fled back to '!'remp, bearing the burthen of a crime
which he had not feared to commit, but wauted courage to
turn to his couutry's advantage. '1'0 lessen the odium tllllll
inCllrroo he insidiously attribute<l thc fllilure to SarsfielJ's
disobedience; and as that general, to punish the people of
Dal'bastro for siding with the French aud killing twenty of
his men, had raised a heavy contribution of money
and corn ill the district, ho bccume so hnteflll, tlLllt
some time after, when Beeking to mise Boldiera i.lI
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those parts. tlle people threw boiling water at him from the
wimlowll all he passoo.
J3t,fore this event Suchet had 'returned to Valencia, and
Dllcaen anti Mnurice Mnthieu marched ngainst Green, who
was entrenched in tIle heMllitage of St. Dimas, OtiC of the
highest of the peaked rocks overhanging the eonveut of
Montserrat. :Manso wised the somatelles to aid
him, he had provlsions, and the inaccessible
strongth of his IJOst seemoo to defy capture; yet lle SUrI'CU-
dcrcd in twenty-four hours, and when the enemy despniring
of success wns going to relinquish tile attnek. He was 110
said forced by his own people, ret he signed the capitulation.
Dooaen set fire to the convent and the flames seen for miles
around was the signal that the warfare on that holy mountain
was fillislled. After this the French gelleral marched to
Lerida to gllther oor1l, aUtI Lacy again spread his troops in the
mountains.
During his absence Eroles had sccretly prepn.rcd a general
insurrection, to break 011t when tIle British army should
arrive, and it was supposed he designed :.0 change the goveMIo
ment of the province. Lacy himself again spoke of embody.
ing the somatenes if anus were given to him by sir Edward
Pcllew, but there was really no want of arms, the demand
Wlloll a deceit to prcven~ the llIuskets being giveu to the
pool>lo. A goneml desire for the lIrrivul of the British lrOllJ.'d
'I'M now prevalent. The miserable people turned fLlIxiously
towards any qnarter for aid, and this expression of COlllleiow~
hclplessness was given in evidence by tIle Spanish chiefs, and
received 11.9 proof of enthusiasm by the English naval com-
manders, who were more sanguine of success than experience
would warnmt. All eyes were now turned towards the ocean,
the French looked in fear, the Catalllus in hope; Rnd the
British armament did IljJjJcur 011" l'nlamos, but ufter three
days sprend its sails ngaill llUdstcered for Alicant, leR\;ng the
principality stupifie<l with grief and di.'lallpointment.
This unexpel:tcd evcnt was the natural result of previous
errors on all sides, errors which invariably attcud warlike
proceedings w11en not directed by a superior genius, and even
then not alwn}'s iwoided. It hUl:l been shown how JJJ..inistcrial
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vacillation marred lord William Bcntinck's first intention of
landing in person with ten or twelve thousand men on the
Catalonian coast; and how, after mueh delay, Maitland had
saLled to Pnhua with a division of si1\: thousaud men, Cala-
brinns, Sicilinll8 and others, troops of no likelihood savo that
some three thousand British and Germans were amongst
them. This force was aftenl"ards joined by "essels from
Portugal, having engineers and artillery officers on board,
and the honoured battering-train which had shattered the
gory walls of Badnjos. WcllingtoIl hoped mnch from this
expedition; he lllld himself sketched the general plan of
operationsj and his own campaign was conceh'ed in the
expectation that lord WilIiam, a general of rank and tepnt,'\-
tion having ten thousand good troops, aided wLth at least as
many Spanish soldiers disciplined under the two British
officers Whittingham and Roche, would have early (alien on
Catalonia to the destruction of Suchet's plans. And when
this his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force
would be disembarked of strcngth sufficient, in conjunction
'Ilith the Catalll.1l army, to take l'aragonll.
Jtoche's corps was most advanced in discipline, but the
Spanish government hesitated to place it under Maitland;
it first sailed from the islands to Murcia, then returned with-
out orders, again repaired to Murcill, and at the moment of
Maitlaud's arri"al olf Palnmos was, under the conuUllllCj of
Joseph O'Donncl, involved in a t-clTible catastrophe already
alluded to and Ilercnfter to be particularly narrated. Whit-
tingbam's levy remained, but when inspected
by tbe ,,!uartcr-master.genernl Donkin was found
in a raw state, scarcely mustering four thousa~d
effective men, amongst which were many French
deserters from the island of Cabrcra. The sumptuolls clothing
and equipments of Wbittinghllm's and IWche's men, their pay
regularl)' supplied from the British subsid), and very mnch
exceeding that of the oUler Spanish corps, excited ellvy and
dislike; there WIIS no public inspection, no check upon Ule
cxpenditure or the delivcry of stores; lIud Roche's conduct
in this last matter, justly or unjustly, was generally and
BC"erely impugned. Whittingham acknowledged that he
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could not trust his peo]Jle near tlie enemy without the aid of
British troops, nnd though the captain-genenll Coupigny
desired their departure his opinion was against a descent in
Catalonia. Mailland hesitated, but sir Edward Pellew urged
this descent 50 strongly that he nnully assented, and rcaehed
PululIlos with nine tuouSllnu Illell of all nations Oil the 31st
of July, }'et in some confusion us to the transport service,
wllieh the staff'...,fficers attributed to the injudicious meddling
of tIle naval chiefs.
Maitlnnd'5 first care was to open a communication with the
Spauish cOlllmanders. Erolcs came 011 board at once, and
vehemently and ulleeasingly urged all immediate disembarka.-
tion, declaring the fate of Catalonin and his own
existence depended upon it; the otller generals
showed less eagerness, and their accouuts differed
greatly with rcsJlcct to the relative means of the
Catalans :md the li'rench. Lacy estimated the enemy's dis-
posuble troolJs at fifteen thousund, his own at D<;mkln,
seven thousalHl iufulltryalld three hundred cavalry, ~ISS.
which he eould with difficulty feed or ]lrovido with ammuni-
tion. Saralicld judged the French to ho, exclusive of Suchet's
moveable column, eighteen thousand infantry and n\'o hun·
dred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest 'I'aragonu \I-;th n.
less force, and tllat a frce and constant communication with
the fleet was absolutely cssential in anr opcratio)l. Erolcs
rote<! tlle enemy at thirteen thousand infantryaud five hundred
cuvalr}', including' SUcllllt's coluUln; hut the reports of the
deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive of
8uehet'8 column and of the garrisons and migueletcs in the
cnemis service.
No insurrection of the somatencs had yet taken place, nor
was there any appearance of sueh an event; the French were
descried conducting convOJS along the shore with small
escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without
molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days
to 'reduce Taragontl. after iuvestment, Deellcll aud Mauriee
Mathieu were then near Moutscrrat with seven or eight
thousand good troops, and could double them in n. few days;
the Catalans could not so soon join Maitlaod's force, and.
vo!. IV, X
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there was a general, apparently an unjust notion, abroad, tIlat
Lacy was 8. Frenchman at llcart. It was feared the Toulou
fleet might come Qut aUll burn the tnmsports ut tlleir anchor-
age during the siege, ll11d thus the battering-train Gud even
the safety of the army would be involved in an enterprise
promising little success. A full council of war was unani_
mous llot to ll\nd, aod the reluctance of the people to rise,
attributed by CodrillgWn to the machinations of traitors, was
visible; Maitland also wns further sWII.Jed by the generous
and just consideration, that as tIle 80mntcne8 had not volun_
tarily taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a
step when u few days might oblige llirn to abandon them to
the \'cngeallOO of the enelllY. 'Vherefore, as Pnlamos appeared
too strong for a sudden Ilsflault, the armament sailed towards
Valencia to attnek that place on 11 Illan furnished by the
quarter-roaster-general DOllkin, in unison also with WeIling_
ton's scheme of operations, but MaiUand during tIlc voyage
changed his mind llUU proce(,'doo at Duce to A1ic~lIlt.
The Cfil:t\lans were not more displeased than the British
Imml commanders nt seeing the principality thus shaken off' j
yct the judgment of the latter seems to have heen swayed
partly from Ilaving given stronger hopes of assistunt'C than
circulllstances wum:mted, partl.r from tbat confidcllcc, which,
inspired by (,'()ntinUlll su<:<:ess, is streugtb 011 their own
c1<:ment but ruslmess on I>llOre. ClIIlWiu Codrillgtun froln
tllC great interest he took in f.lle stnlggle was
lleeuliarly discontented; yet his own description
of the state of Catalonia. at the time shows his
hupes rested more Oil v:lb>ue notions of the somatenes' entIlU-
siaslll, than on facts whidl a geueral (:ould oolculuw UIlOO.
Lord Wellington indeed said, he could sce no reason why the
plll.n he had recommended should not have been succcssful;
an observu.tion made however when he was angrily excited
by the prospect of having Suehet on his own ]l:lnds, and
probahI,r uuder some erroucous ilJfornmtioll. He had been
decci,'cd ahout the strength of the forts lit Salamllnca. IIlthough
close to them; nul! liS he had only just cstnblishcd 0. sure
channcl of intelligencc in Cntaloniu, he migllt .]lUWI been
dCeeived $!I to 'fll.l'll30nu, which if not strong in regular
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works was well provided, commanded by II very bold active
governor, aud offtlred very great re~ourees for interior retrench-
ments.
\Vellington's infOnlllltion liS to Bm strength of the Catalllus
came indeed chiefly from sir E. Pellcw, and his from Eroles,
who exaggcrntcd. Maitlnnd oould SCIlrccly be calle<l ll. com-
mander·in-chief, for lord Willinm forbade him to risk the losH
of his division lest Sicily should be endaugered; and to avoid
mischief from the wiuter season he was instructed to quit the
Spanish coast in t11e second week of September. Lord Wil-
liam and lord Welling-toll were therefore not agrccJ in the
object to be attained. The first considered the diversion 011
the Spanish coast liS secondary to the wantil of Sicily.
Wellington looked only to the Peninsula, and thonght Sicily
in no danger until the French should rl:iuforce their army in
Calabril\. Desiring vigorous combined efforts of military and
naval forces, his Illan was that Tllmgonll. should be attacked,
-if it fdl the warfure he said would be ouce more established
on n good batle in Catulouia,-if it Wall succoured by a (:011-
centrntion of Frcncb troollS Valcncio. would ncccssarily be
weak; the llrmament could thcn proceed to attaek that placc,
and if unsueccssful could return to assnil 'fl\Togona again.
1'his WlLS a shrewd plan, but Napoleon never lost sight of
that great principle of war so concisely cxpressed by &r-
torius, when he told Pompey 8 good general should look
behind him mther than before. Thc emperor, acting on the
llroverb tbat fortune favours the bl'll.ve,ofteu urged his lieu-
tcnants to dare despemtcly with a few men in frout, but he
iuvariably eovered their eOll1llluuieation8 witlL heavy llIaa~es,
aud there is no instancc of his plan of invasioll being shaken
by a flank or renr attack, f)xccpt where his instmetions wero
neglected. His a.rmies made what are called points, such l\90
Masscn8's invasion of Portugal, i\foncey's attack on Valencia,
Dupont's on Andalusia; but thc general plan of operation
was inyariably snpported by lIeO-yy masses protectiug the
communications. Had his instructions sent frow Dresden
been strictly obeyed, the walls of Leridlland 'farllgona would
have becu destroyed, and thc citadels of eadl occupied with
IiwuJI garrisollS easily provisioued for 11 10llg tiwe. The field
x3
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armr would thus have been increased by at least three thou-
BUild men, the moveable ooluWlls spareu man)' harassing
marches, and Cawlouia. lVould have olfcroo little tCllilltation
for l\ descent.
But notwithstanding this ~n'or of SUc1ICt, Maitland's troops
were too few and ill-composed to invest Taragon8. The
imjlCrill.l Illustl:l'-rolls give more thall eighty thousand men,
iue1uding Haille's divisions ut Zul'U{,'QSa, for tue armies of
Arllgon and Catalonia; twcnty-scvcn thOIlSltnd of tlul first,
thirty-seveu thousand of the second werc actually under arms
with the eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have
brought at ouce ten t,hOUSlllld Illell to the succour of Turagoua,
awl, by WeukClliug Lis gurrisons, us mUIlY Ulore in a very
llhort time is not to overrate his ]lower; fLnd this without
counting Paris' hrigaJe, three thousand strong, which belonged
to Heille's division and was disposllble. Suchet had just
before come to Reus witl! two thousand select men of all
anus, and as O'Donnel's arlllY had since Voou defeated llear
Alicnnt, he could IlfWC returned with n still grcntcr force to
oppog<l Maitlnnd. Now the English fleet was descried by
tbe French oil' Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July,
although it did not anchor before tlle 1st of August; Decaen
and Maurioo Mathieu witu some eight thousand disposable
men were then betwoon Montserrat and &rcdoua, that is to
say two marcllCs from Tamgona; Lfllnarquc with four or fivo
thousand was between Palamos and Mu6.ro, five marches
from Taragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Ocr·
daiia, seven marches off j Snehet and Paris could have arrived
in less thon eiglJt uoys, and from the gnrrisoll8 oud minor
posts smaller succours might have been drawn: Tortor,a. alono
could h(we furnished two thousand. Bnt Lacy's division was
at ViclJ, Sarsfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles' divided between
Montserrnt and Urgel, MiI.ans' in the Grao d'Olot; they re·
quired fivtl days to assemble, they would n()~ have exceeded
seven thouSlllid and with their disputing cnptious genernls
would lJave been llUfit to act vigorously: nor eould they have
easily joined the allies without fighting, when their defeat
would have been almost certain.
Sarsf1eld judged ten days necessary· to reduce Taragona,
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and said the army must be entirely feu from the fleet, as the
CQuntry could scarcely supply tllo Cll.tuloniall troops aloue.
Mai~lll.lld thcrefore would ho.vo had to land his mell, bnttering-
tmin and stores, /lnd form ilis investmont in tho f,tee of
De.::lIelt'S power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated
that general first. But Decaen's troops, numerically equal
without reckoning the garrison of Tarngona, were in composi-
tiOLL v!Ultly suptJrior to the allies, seeing that only the British
and GermlUl troops, three thoUl>/Uld, were to he uellellded
upon in bnttle: neither does it appear that platfonns, 8llnrl-
bIlgs, fascincs and otller mo.terials wcro on board the vessels.
Maithmd indeed would, if he had been able to resist Decaeu
at £llIt which seems doubtful, Iltwe eifeeted 0. great diversion
and Wellington's object would have been guined if e. re-
cllloorkatiou hud betJu secure; but the lllwul ol1i(,'Crs, huving'
reference to the Ull.ture of the eoust, declared that it II'lIS not
so. The soundness of this opinion has howcver been dis-
pute<! by man)' seamen well acquainted with tIle coast, who
maintain, that even in winter the CatAloniun shore is re-
markably safe snd tranquil; and that Cape Salon, a place
in otller respects Admirably Adallted for a camp, gives faci-
m), for re-embarkillg on onc or oUler of its sides in filly
weather. '1'0 MlIitlaud Lhe coast of Catalouia was repre-
sented us unsafe, and this view of the question is also sup-
ported by able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.
OI'ElUTION'S IN MURCIA.
,
The Angle-Sicilian annament arrived at Alicnnt at 110
critical moment; tIle Spanish C\!.liSe was there going to ruin.
Joseph O'Donllcl, brother to the regent, had with grcu.t diffi-
culty orgAnized A new lHurcian army after Blake's surrender
at ValenciA. Having Alicant and Carthagene. as a bll.'le he
was independent of a division under :Frcire, which always
hung on the frontier of Grenada, and communicated through
the AIllUxaras with tIle SCU-COW'it. Suehet and Scult were
paraIJ's(,'(\ in SOlll6 degree by the neighoow'hood of these
armies, whicll were supported by fortresses, supplied by sell.
from Gibraltar to COOiz, und lUll.! their existencc gnnrantecd
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by Wellington's march into Spain, by his victory nf Sa.la.
1ll1lUca, and by his general combinations. For the two
French communders were forced to watch his mOVCllwnts,
and to support at the SlLme time, the onc a blockade of the
Isln de Leon thl! other the fortresses in Cntalonia; hence
they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged opera-
tions ncccss:uy to destroy these Murciall nnnies, which were
moreover SUpllorted by the arrival of gCllcr;1! Boss with
British troops at Cnrllmgcnn.
O'Donncl had becn joined b}' Rocho in July, and Suchct,
nfter detaching Maupoint's brigade towards Madrid, departed
himself with two thousand m..n for Catalonia, leaving Harispe
witll four thousand men beyond tllo Xnear. Ross immedi-
ately advised O'Donne\ to attack him, ami to distrach Lis
attentioll u. largo Heet with troopil on boord, which had
origilll1lly sailcJ from Cadiz to su(Xour Ballcstcros at Malag~
IlOW appeared off the Vnlencian coast. At the same time
Bassewur and Villa Campa, being free to act in consequeuce
of Palombini's and :llaupoint's depurlure for Madrid
Plan 2. callW down from their haunts ill the mountaius
Vol. v. of Albaracin upon the right Hnnk Md renr of tho
French positions. Villa Campa penetrntcd to Liria, Basse.
(.'Our to Cofrcntcs on tbe Xucar; but ere this attack could
take place, Suehet with his usual celerity returned from Reus.
At first be detached men against Villa Cll.mpa, hnt when 1\0
saw the fleet, fearing it WllB the Sicilian armament, he re-
called tllCm ngain, and sent for Paris' brigade from Znrngozn,
to act by Tcrucl against Basseoour and Villa Campa. Then
he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove
the fleet off the coast and meanwhile O'Donnel's operations
brought on the
FlltsT llA'I'T'J.ll 01' OASTALLA.
Harispe's posts were established at Biar, Castalla and Oni!
un his right; at Ibi !lud Aleoy on his left. This line was
not more than ono march from AJicant. Colouel Meselop.
with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassicl"8 held Ihi,
and was supported by Hllrispe lltmself with a reserve at
Alcoy. General Delort was at Castalla with a regiment of
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infantry, baving some cuirassiers at Oni! on his len, ami a
regiment of dragoons with three companies of foot at Diar on
his right. In this exposeJ situation the French awaited
O'DOIIUel, who directed his principal foree, eousisting of;, six
thou&l.lld iufautry seven huudred cavah'y and eight guns,
against Delor!.; Roehe with three thousand mOll l'lan I.
WlI.S to move through the mountains of Xixona, Vol. v.
so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at
Castalla, O'Donncl hOpc!d thus to cut the French line, and
during these operations, Bassccour, with two thousand men,
was to come down frolll Cofrentes to Villcus 011
the right {lauk of Dolort. Roche Illurched the
night of the 10th, remllincd the 20th in the
mountains, llext night thrcuded a difficult pllSS eight miles
IOllg, reached Ibi at daybreak 011 the 21st, ulld sent notioo of
his arrival to O'Donnel; and when that gencral
appeared in frout of Dclort the latter aoonJollC<"1
Castnllu, which Wai> situated in tlle 8Il111e valley as
Iui auJ nuout five miles distuut from it But he ouly retired
skirmishing to a strong ridge behind tlllIt town,
Delon'.
which lllso extcnded behillll Ihi; this securcu bis n~port,
communication with Mesc1op, of whom he de. .li;:;.5.
manded succour, and lit tho same tinle he c.'dled in his own
cavalry and infantry from Dnll and Biar. Mesc1op, leaving
some infantry two guus and his cuirassiers to defend Ibi auct
Q. small fort on the hill bchind it, marched at onoo towards
Ddort, alld thus Roehe filldiug only II few JnCn bcfore him
got. [JossClision of the town after a lShaql skirmish, yet hll
could not tnko the fort.
O'Donnel, lId\'clllcing beyond Castalla, only skirmished with
the Freudl, for he hll.ll detached tlle Spnuish cavalry by the
plains of Villcna to turn their right and communicate with
Basseeour. While expecting the effects of this movement ILe
was astonished to sce the Frellcb dragoons come trotting
through the pass of Biar ou llis left f1auk; they were followed
by some companies of infantry and only separated from him
by a stream, over which W(lS (I narrow bridge without parnpcts,
(1,1111 at the same moment the euirllSSiel':'l appeared on the
other side coming from Onil Tho &ani.sll cavalry had not
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Aptlendlx 6. interrupted this mRfch from Billr, nor fonowed i~
Vol. v. through the defile, nor made an)' effort·, O'Donnel
turned two guns against the bridge, supporting them with a
balt;l1ion of infantry, hut tliC French dragoons observing this
battalion to be unstcndy brn"c{l the fire of the gUlls, Dnd
riding funouslyover the bridge 8ci?cd the battery and tllen
broke the infantry. Delort's line aJvan~d at the &IDle
moment, the cuirassiers cbarged into the town of Castalla
aod the wl101e Spanish arm)' lled outright. Several hundred
sought refuge in an old cnstle und tbCl"l;l surrendercU j of thtl
others throo thOUMUd wcrn killed wounded or tnken, yet the
victors had scareely fifteen hundred men engaged and did lIot
lose two hundred. O'Donuel attributed his defeat to tlle dis-
obedience imd inactivity of St. Estevan WllO commanded his
cavalry, but the grent fault was the Jllacing that cavalry
beyond the defile of Billf instead of keeping it in hand for the
battle.
This part of the action over, Mesclop, who 11ad not taken
flny share in it, was reinforced and returned to sneoour Ibi, to
wllich ll\ace IIlso Hllriijj>C was now Rpproachi1lg from Alooy;
but Roche fu.vourc4 by the strength of the passes escaped
and reached Alieant with little hurt, wl1ile the remains of
O'Donncl's divisions, pursued by the cavalry on the road of
Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcis.. Dassccour who had
nu\'anceU to Almanza. was then driven back to his mountain-
hauuts, where Villa CUlllllll rejoined llilll, It was at this
momcnt that :Maitland's f.lnnament disembarked and thc
remnants of the Spooisl} force rllllied. The king, then flying
from Madrid, in1mediately changed the direction of his march
from the :Morena, to Valencia, giviug one more l)foof tbat
England, not Spain, resisk..u the Frenchj for Alicant would
have fallcn, if not llS llil immediate oonsequenoo of this defeat
yet surely when the king's anny lmd joined Suchet, That
general, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the evaeu-
II.tion of Madrid, the Ilpproach of Joseph, 1I.1Id now saw a fresh
Ilrmy springing up in his (ront., hastened to concentrate IUs
disposable fOl'oo in the positiollll of San Felippe do Xativa llnd
1l[o,;:cnte, which he entrenched lIS well AA the rOlld to Alroall1A
with a view to secure his junction with. the king. At the
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same time he established a new bridge and bridge.head at
Alberique in addition to that at Alcira on the Xucar; and
having called up P:lris from Teruel tlutl Mllupoint from
Cuenca, resolved to tIobiJe tI buttle for which the slowJlcss of
his adversarios gave him full time te prepare.
Maitland arrived the 7th, and tllOugh bill. force was not all
landed before the 11th, the French were still scattcre(l on
various points, and a vigorous commander would llave found
the meall3 to drive them over t·11C Xucar and pcrllll.ps from
Valencia itself; but he llll.d scarcely set foot on shore when
the usual Spanish ve3.ations overwhelmed him. Three I)rin~ •
cipal roads led towarus the onemy. Que on the left passed
through Ycela and Fuente La Higucra, and by it the romnant
of O'Donncl's army Wll.'l coming up from Mureia; another
passed through Eldll, Sax, VilIena, and Fuente de la Rigtlern;
the third through Xixolla, A.1coy, and Albayda. O'Dollnel,
whose existence as a general was redeemed by tlle appetlrllnce
of :hbitlalld, iustantly demallded from the latter a pledge,
that he would draw nothing U)' purchase or requisition I:!l\ve
wino und straw [rom auyof thOS8 lillos, Ilor from the country
between them: the Eugli~h gencml o.sscutcd and iuStll11tly
Slink undcr tho diflicultie8 thus created. He Imd designed to
IIttnek Hurispe at Alcoy and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but be
was only able to get onc march from Alieant so late II.'l the
16th, and eould 110t attack before the 18th, but that day
Suehet bad eOllcentrnted his army at Xutiva. This delay !lad
been a neecssary conscquence of the agreement with O'Donllel.
For Maitland's commissaritlt being inefficient, and his field.
artillery 80 shalllcrully ill-propared in Sicily liS to be nearly
useless, he !Jad hired mules at a great expense for the trails.
port of his guns and provisions from Alicaut, but the owners
soon dcclnre<l they could not fulfil their contrllet unless they
were fed by the British, 1111<1 this was barred by Q'Donnc!'s
restrietions liS to the roads. MnllY of the lfiuleteeril nlso
after receiving' their money deserted with mules and provi.
sioll!l; and a convoy with six days' supply being attacked by a
partida. was plundered dispersed and lost.
Maitlaud having no hubitude of command and Buffering
from illness, disgusted and fearing for his troops, would have
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retired at once, perlmps have rc-embarked if Suchet had not
gone blLCk to XutiViloj then howover he advnnced to EIda.lIud
Roche entered Alooy, both apparently without an objedj for
there was no intention of fighting, and the IlO:.;t day Roche
retired to Xixona und r.I;~ittalld retreated to Alicant. To
cover this retl'(lll,t Donkin pushed forlVllrll Witll 11 detachment
of Spanish and English cavalry, through Sax, Ibi, and Aleoy,
and giving out thl!.t an ndvauced guard of £,-e thousand
British was close behind bim, coasted all the French line,
cllpturcd 11 convoy ut Ollcria, amI then rcturnoo througll
Alco}'. SUcllct kept his camp of Xntivn, but sent Rnrispc to
meet the king who was 1I0W near AlrnnllZ!\, Rnd on the 25th
the junction of the two armies was effected; at the samc time
Mll.upoillt, escaping Villa Campi>'s aSl;3Un, arrived froUl
Cucnm with the remnant of his brigade. Whcn Joscph
arrived Suchet pushed his outposts again to VilleM and
Aleoy; but, naturally a eourtier, he was so mueh occupied
wi~h royalty as to neglect the allies when lIe might have
seriously hurt tllCm. JIenntimc O'DonllCl lmving drown off
Freirc's division from Lorca ClIme to Yecln with five or six
thousand men, and Maitland, reinforced with detac11ment3
from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside AliClllltj
but his health was quite broken uud he earnestly desired to
te.sign, being till~l with am:iety at the Ilear approach of Soult.
That marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of
doiug so shall be set forth in tIle next chapter, for it was a
great e\·eut, leading to great results and worthy of deep con-
sideratiou by those who desire to know upon what the [o,te of
kingdoms may depend.
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CHAPTER 11.
Ol'ERATION:S IN A.,'iDALUSIA.
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SUClrET fOlmd resources in V nleneia to support the king's
cour~ and nrmy without nuglllCllting the Ilfessure on tbe
inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made
86'flinst the allies if the French commanders bad been of oue
minel nnd looked wcll to the state of affairs. Joseph, exas-
pel'llted by the llI'C\·jous opposition of the generals llnd lroubled
by the distress of numerous Spanish families atlac1lcd to him,
was only intent UjlOn t't'Coveriug Moorid IlS 6OO1l as he eould
collctt troops enough to give Wellington battle; he had in
this view demanded from the French n:iini~ter of war, money,
stores, and a reinforcement of forty thousnnd men, and im_
peratively commanded Soult to nblllldon Andnlusin. A d.
. ppeu 'x n.That clenr-slghted commander could not however
understand WIlY thc king, who lmd given him no accurate
dctnils of Marmont's misfortunes or ef his own operotions,
should yet orUel' him to a!muoon lit once all the results and
all the interests sJlringing from three years' possession of the
south of Spain. He thought it 1\ sreat question not to be
treated lightly, lIud {lll hill vast cupacityenabled him to em-
brace the wholc field of opemtiollll, ]lC concluded tlult rumour
har.! exnggerllwd the catastrojlhe at Snlmnnllcn, and to abandon
Andalusia would be thc ruin of the Frencll Ciluse.
'To march on Madrid,' lle saill, 'would jlrobllbly produce
llnother pitched battle, which should be carefully
avoided, seeing the whole frame-work of the
Freuch invasion was di!'joiuted tlnd no resonrce
woul~1 remain IIfter a defeat. Andalusia, hitherto a burtlten,
uow olt'ere<t meaus to remedy the present disastul'S, unt! to
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sacrifice that province wiMl all its resources for the sake of
regaining the capital of Spain appeared a folly: it WItS pur-
chll.Sillg a town lit the price of a kingdom. :Madrid was llotJ.tiug
in the emperor's policy though it might be something for a
killg of Spain; yet Philip the Fifth 11Sd thrice lost it and pre-
served his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value
upon that city1 Tile battle of the Arapiles was merely a
gnmu duel which might be fought again with a JilHneut
rCiiult; but to llbandon Andalusia with all its stOI'Cfl Ilnd
establishments,-to raise the blockade of Cndiz,-to sacrifice
t-he guns, the equipmcllts, the hos]Jitals and tIle magazines
and render null the labours of three years, would be to make
the battle of tlie Arapiles u IJrodigious historical event, the
effect of wJlicll would bo fclt all over Europe and evcn in the
}leW world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to be
safely effected' The' army of the south had been able to bold
ill check sixty thousand cUllIuies dil:lIJOSeu ou a circuit rouud
it; but the momont it commenced its retrent towuros Toledo
those sL-xty thousand men would unite to fvllo\\', and \l,Telling-"
ton himself would be fouml on the TllgUS in itg front. On
that lino the army of the south could not march, and a retreat
through Murdll. would be hmg aJJd difficult. But why
rotrcut at a1l1 Whero,' exclaimed this able warrior, 'where
is the harm though tbe allies should posses3 the centre of
Spain1'
'Your majel>tJ,' he continued, 'should collect tile army of
the centre, lhe army of Aragon, and if possible the army of
Purtugal, and you should ItlHrch upon Andalusia even though
to do so should illvoh'c tlle abandonment of Valencia. If
Marmont's army comes wilih you, one hundred and twenty
thousand mon will be close to Portugal; if it cunnot or will
not comc, let it remain, because while Burgos defends itself
that army ClIn keep on tbe right of the Ebm and the emperor
will take mCllSurcB for its fffiCCOur. Let Wellington theD
occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care
to provide magazincs, stores, and Jllaees of arms in Andalusia;
and the moment eigbt), tlwusand French are assembled in that
province the thentre of war is chauged! 1'ho EugliHh genernl
must fall back to save Lisbon, the IIJ'llly of PortugallllRY fol~
•
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low him to the 'fag'Us, the line of comnluuiCfltion with Fl'Ilnce
will be established by the custom coast, tbc fiual rC$ult of Gho
campaign turns in our fiLvollT, and 11. decisive bnttle may be
delivcred without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March dlCll
with the anny of the centre upon the Despefias Peros, unite
all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well 1 Abandon
that provincc and you lose Sp,lin I you will retire b<:llilld the
Ebro, and fll-miutl will drive you thence before the cllIlleror
can from distant Russia provide a remedy; his affilirs even
in that country will suf'l'er by the blow, and America dis_
mayed by our misfol'tunes will perhaps make peace with
England.'
1-hither the king's genius nor his passions would pcnnit
him 10 understand the g.'andcnl' and vigollr of this conception,
To change even simple lilies of ojlcratiolls 8uddcIIly is ut all
tilllcs 1\ nice uflilir, but thus to chunge the whole theatre of
operations llnd rCo"'llin the initial movements after n defcat
belongs only to mnster spirits in war, Now the emperor had
recommended a eonccntmti<m of force, and Joseph would not
understand this save as applied to the recovery of Madrid; he
was uueasy for the frontiers of Francc, us if Wellington could
possibly have invaded that couutry while a great anny menaced
Lisbon! ill fine he could see nothing but his lost cU}Jital 011
one side a disobedient lit'utcnunt on the other llud pt'remp·
torily rcrcuted his ordcrs, Then Soult, knowing his plan
c()uld only be effected by union and Tflpidity, and drcnding tlie
responsibility of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon
Andalusia; bUG mortified by thii!' blighting of hifJ fruitful
genius, and stuug with anger at such a terminntiou to all his
political aud military labours, his feelings overmast-ered llis
judgment. Instead of tn\ciug the king's rigid counteraction
of his scheme te the Jlurrowness of the mOllllrch's military
genius, he judged it llurt of a desib'll to securll his own fortunll
at the eXlleusll of his brolhel'. Joseph lmd uftor Ocui'm, whcn
irrirotetl at being' restricted in his plnn of governing Spain llS
a Sllaniard, indicated to Soult 11 vagne design of making him_
self independent, but to betnlY 11i8 brother dclibcrlltely WllS
quit-e foreign to his honest passionate nature. Soult gave
more weight to the watter, and making known his olliniou to
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IlLx generals sworn to secl'csy unles!i intcrroguted by the elll-
peror, c;o;prcsscd his doubts of the king's good faith
.Appendix 11.
to the minister of war, founding them on the
following facts.
I", That the extent of Marmont's defeat had been maUe
known to him only by the reports of the enemy, nud ~lle king,
after remaining for twenty-tlil...~e days without sending any
detailed information of the operations in tbe north of Spain
although the armies were actively engaged, had peremptorily
ordered him to n1.ll\lldon Andalusiu, wying it wus the Duly
resource remaining for the :l"rench. 1'0 this opinion Soult
SfIid he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to
disobey the mOllardl, he was going to make a movement which
must finally lend to the loss of all the French conquesle ill
Spain, seeing that it would then ue impossible to remain per-
uUlllcutly on thc Tngus, or even in the Cnstillro.
2°. 'l'his operation, ruinous in itself, was iusisted upon \vhen
the newspapers of Cadiz affim1ed that Josellh's ambas:ador nt
the court of Petersburgh had joined the Prussian army iu the
lield,-thut Joseph himself had made sooret overtures to the
governmcnt ill the Ishl de L:on,-that Bcruadottc, his brother-
in.law, had made II treaty with England and hnd Jemlwle<1 of
the Cortes a guard of Spauiards, a fact confirmed by informa-
tion obtained through an officer sent with a fiag of truce to
the English admiral; finally Morcuu and Blucllcr were at
Stockholm llnd the uide-de-cump of tht: former in LOlldoll.
lkflooting upon nil thcso circumstances he feared the object
of tIle king's false movements might he to force thc French
llrmy over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement
ifor Spain separate from Francej fears, which might he.chi-
merical, but in such a crisis belter be too fcarful tlm.n too
confident. This lettei' WI\.S sent by sell, but the ve5.>ollllJ.\·ing
touc1wl at Valencill at the moment of Joseph'e arrival there
the desputch was opened; it was tllen in the first burst of
llis anger the king despatched Dllsprez on that missiou to
Moscow, the re;;ult of wuidJ has becn already related. Soult's
IJroceOOlUbl1:l, offelU;ivc to the king and founded in error, bl:\-
omse Joscph's lettcrs, colltaining UIC information reqllircd,
were intercepted Jlot withheld, were prompted by zeal for hili
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master's service and cannot be justly condemned, yet Joscph's
indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration
of reflecting mCll must ever be tlxcited by the grcatness of
mind und calm sugucity witb which Napoteoll treated this
thorny uffair. Neither the complaints of his hrother, nor thtl
hints of his minister ofwll.r,-for the duke of Foltrc, u mUll of
mean capaeity and intriguing disposition, countc- A ,•
. pren, ut I?
nanced Joseph's suspicions thrtt Sonlt designed to
make 11im.self king of Andalusia,---couid disturb t·ll0 temper or
judgment of the emperor; and it was thr.n, stnlek witl) the
vigour of SouJt's plan, 11e called llim the only military head il'
Spain.
Wellington wllsuttentive to the effect of these tmnsactions.
Anxiously he watched Soult's reluctant motions in Andalusia,
Ilnd while seemingly enjoying his own triumph nmidst feast~
Ilnd rejoicings at Madrid his eyes wcre fixed on Seville: thc
balls and bull-fights of the capital cloaked both the skill and
appreheUllions of the consummate captain. Before the allies
crossed the Ouadarama, Hill had been Jircctod to keep close to
Drouet and be I'eally to mo\'c into tILe vulley of the 'fllb'llS
if that f,'lllleral should Imstell to tlJe succour of the king. Hut
when Joscph's retreat upon Vulencia wus known, Hilt received
orders to fight Drouet, llud evcn to follow him into Andalusia;
at tlle same time gcncrnl Cookc Wll.'! directed to prepare
an attack, C\'eu though it should be an 0lll':n llSSI~ult, on thc
French lines before Cadiz, while Ballesteros opcrntcd on the
flank from Oibrnltar. By these means WcllillgtOll hoped to
keep Soult from scnding uny succour to the king, aud evcn to
force him out of Andalusia without the lleccssity of marching
there himself; yet if these measures fuiled, be WIIS resolved to
take twenty thou:mnd mell from Mudrid, unite with Hill, aud
drive the french from that province.
Previous to these iustruetions being given, lAml Ilnd
VilIatte had, as before ll11rrntcd, pursued Ballcsteros to
Malaga, where he was in such danger of ClIpturc, that the
llliIritime e.'tpedition already noticeJ was detached from Cadit.
to carry him off. News of the battle of Salamanca then
arrested the French, the Spanish general regained Sail Roque,
the fleet went on to V~lenciu, aud Soult, hoping the king
•
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would transfer the scat of Wilt' to Andalu~ia caused Droue!; to
show a bold frout against Hill, sending scouting parties
towards McriulI.. Large magazines were also (ormed at Cor-
dolm, n central point, equally ~uileU for an UdVl!.llCC 10)' £Sere-
madurn a maTch to La Mflllcha or a rctrcllt by Grenada, lIud
Hill, who llad not then received his orders to advance, remained
Oil the defensive. Nor would Wellillgton stir frOIU Madrid,
although Ilia presence. was urgently called for on the Dul,ll'o,
until he WIIS satisfic-{} that Joscph did no!; mean to join Soult
and that the latter Illcsued to abandon Andalusia. The king
finally forced this unwise measure, but the execution required
extensive arrangements, for the qm:rtcrs were distant, the
convoys illllUcuse, the enemies numerous, ~he line of march
'rild, thcjourncy long. And it was iml)ortan~ to pre~cnt tho
imJlosing appearance of a grent Ilnll regular military movement
aud not the dis~raceful scene of s. confused flight.
All t1\e minor IJ08t8 in tho CondaJo de Nieula and other
IJ!:lecs were first ealle<! in, and tllou the lines beforo the Ish!.
were ahnndoncd; for Soult, in obedience to the king's fir~t
order, designcd to move upon lA Mallcha, and it was only by
accident a.nd indirectly that he beard of J oserh's retreat tf
Valencia. At the same time he discovere<! tllllt Drouet, wlJO
Ilud reeeiveU direct orders from the king, was going to Tolello,
Ilnd it was not without difficulty Ilnd only through the mcdiullI
of llis brother wlJO commanded Drouet's cumlry, thnt 110 could
prevent that destflletivc isolated movement. The :Mureian
line was then adopted, but everything was llUrricd, because
t}]O works at the Llla were already brokeu up in the "icw of
retreating towards La :Malleha, and the troops were ill march
for Seville when the safe assembling of tho army at Grcuadll
required another arrangement. However on the 25th of
August, a thousand guns, stores in proportion, and all the
immense works of Clticllllln, St. Maria, and the l'rocudero
lu\(1 been destroyt.'<.i; t.he IOllg blockade was thus broken when
the bombardment hml become serious aud tlle opposition to
English influence taking a dangerous direction ;-when the
French intrigues were nearly ripe, the Cortes alienated froll}
the cause of Ferdinand and the church-when the execu-
tivc government was weaker than ever, oocallSe Henry
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O'Donnel the ouly active regent 1100 resigned, disgusted that
1ti3 brother had been superse<.led by Elio aud censured in the
Cartes for the defeat at Cnstalla. This sieb'e or rather defence,
for Cadi~ was uever strictly speaking hesieged, was a curious
episode in the war. Whether Lhe Spaniards could hUNO
defended it without the aid of Brit.ish troops is a matter of
specnlntionj but it is eert<lin fllat notwithstanding Grnllflln's
glorious nction at Bnrosa Cndiz was always 0. hoovy burt-hen
upou Wellington; the fo~s there employed would have done
better service under his immediate command, and Inany severe
financial difficnlties to say nothing of political crosses would
have b~n spared.
In the night of tIle 2Gtl\ Soult quitted Seville, to commence
his mareh towards Greuado.; but uow Wellington's orders lUld
Bet aU the nllied troops of Andulusia. and Estremadurn. in
motion. Hill udl'aneed ngo.inst Drouet--Bnl1esteros moved
by the Ronda mOllntuins to ll/mg on the retiring enemy's
f1anks,-the sea. armament sent to sucrour him returned from
Valencill,-Skerrett and CrU1. Murgeon disembarked with four
thousand Englislland Spanish troop.'! at Huelva, and on the
24th drove the French from St. Lucar. The 27tb tbey fell upon
the rear-guard at Seville, when the suburb of Triana the
bridge and the streets beyond were carried by the English
guards and Downie's legion, and Lwo hUlJ(lred prisouers several
guns and man)' stores were captured. Downie, wounded and
taken, was treated hllrshl)', h('~lIuse the pOlluluee, rising in Ilid
of the allies, hut! mutilated the French soldicrs who fell into
their hands. Sco.reely was Ulis action over when seven thou.
l!IInd French infantry ClIllle up from Chiclana, :ret thinking all
Hill's troops wero before them hastily followed their own
army, leaving the allies IllAsters 01 the city. This enterprise
thougl1 successful was isolated and contrary to Wellington's
desire. A direct and vigorous assaul~ upon the lines of Chi.
clalll~ by the wllOle of the Anglo--SIlanish garrison was his plan,
and such an aSl!IIult when the French were abandoning their
works there would hlwe been a. far heavier blow to Soult, who
Wllll now too stroug to be meddled with.
Having issued eigM days' bread to his arlllY lIe marched
leisurely, picking up the gnrrisous and troops who cnme
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into llim from the Rondn nnu tIle 00IlSt. At Grenada he
baited eleven days for Dronet, who had quitted E'ltrcmadura.
,and was marching by Jaen to Huesear. Ballcsteros harassed
Soult's march, yet with an insig'uificaut loss t.he latter finally
unite<! seventy. two guns and forty-five thousand soldiers under
arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. He was bowevnr
still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank Wl\S Hill, on
bis right flank Ballesteros,-Wellington himself might come
dowu by the> DespefuJ.s Perros,-the Mnrcians were in his
front, Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon behind him; {md he was
clogged witb enormous convoys, for his sick and maimed men
nlone nmounted to nenrl)' nine thousand,-his Spnnish 1lOldierl:l
were deserting daily, and it WfIB nceeSSllry to provide for
several hundreds of Spanish families attached to the Frnneh
interests. To march upon tlie city of Murein was the direct
and the best route for Valencia, but the yellow fever n1ged
there II,nd at Carthngenn; moreover, S. Bracco, the English
consul at Murein, a resolute m:lll, declared his intention to
inundate the country if the French lHlvaDood. Wherefore he
marched by the moulItAin ways leading from Huesear to
Cehejin and Calasparra, and then moving by Rellin gained
Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank being covered
by a detaehmeot from Suehet'g army, which skirmished with
MlIitland's advanced posts at San Vicente close to Alicanf..
At Hellin he met the advaUl.:ed guard of the army of Aragon,
aud on the 3rd of October the military junction of all the
French forcell was effected.
Soult's difficult task was thus completed, and in a manner
worthy of so grellt a commander. For it must be recollected
that besides tlle drawing together of the different divisions
the IIIlIrch itself was three hundred mile." great part through
moulltllin rouds, lLnd the population everywhere hostile. Hill
h,iJ menaced bim with twenty-five thouSlInd men, including
Morillo and Penne Villcmnr's torccs,-Bnllesteros, reinforeed
from Cadiz aod by deserters, had nearly twenty thousand,
-there were fourteen thousand soldiers still in the Isla,-
Skerrett and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and the partidus
were in all parts lLumcrous: yet from the midst of these mul·
titudaJ he had carried off his army his couvoys and his sick
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wit.hout. 8Uy disasters. In this manner And'llulliu, whieh hOO
once been saved by the indirect influence of 0. single march
made by Moore from Salamanca, was now, after three )'cafS'
subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single battle
delivered by Wellington close to the same city.
Maitland's proceedings had been a source of uneasiness to
Welliugton; for t.hough the recovery of Andalusia was politi-
cally auu milit.arily Il. great. gain, the result he suow Illust ueces-
SlU'ily be hurtful to the ultimate success of llill ClImpaign by
bringing together such powerful forces. He still tbought
regular operations would not so effectually occupy Suebet as a
littoral warfare; yet he was content that Maitland should try
his own plan, and he advised him to march by the coast and
have eonstaut communication with the fleet;, referrUJg to his
own camllll.igu ag:lillst. JUDot in 1808 ~\lj all eXlulljlle to be
followed, But the eoast rouds were diflieult, the lWceg8 for
the fleet. uncertain; and though the llIlffie ollstllClcs, and the
latter in a greater degree, hud occurred in Portugal, the dif~
ferent constitution of the annics, still more that of the gene--
rals, was a bar to like proceedings in Valencia. Mu.it1and
desired to quit his command, and the time appointed by lord
William for the return of the troops to Sicily WW:I llpproach-
ing. The moment wall critiCllI, but Wellington forbude their
departure, ami evell asked the ministers to Illaee them under
his own command. And with gentleness and dclioJ!Jcy hc
showed to Maitland, who WIlS a man of high honour courage
And fceling although inexpcrienced in commil.nd, that hi"
situation Wll:l not dangerous i-that the entrenched camp of
Alicant might be sruely defcllded,-that. he was comparatively
better off than Wellington himself had been whell in the lines
of Torres Vedrns; and that it was even desirable the enemy
should attack him ou sucL strong grouud, because the Spaniards
wheu joineU with Ellglish sohhen; in a seeure position would
certainly tight. He also desired tllllt. Carthagenll should be
well looked to by Ross ICllt Soult should turn uside to sur_
prise it. Tllen taking o.dvantlige of Elio's fcar of Soult, he
drew him with the anny that had been O'Donnel's towards
Madrid, and so got some control over his operations.
If Wellington had been well furnished with money and the
y 2
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yellow fever had not ra","'(!d in Murein, it is probable he would
have followed Joseph rapidly, i\lld raJl)'jng all the scattered
Spanish forces and Sicilian armament on llis own anny, have
endeavoured to erllSh the king and Slichct before S<llllt 001l1d
arrive. Or lie might have formed a junction with Hill at
Despefias Pcrro9 and so have fallen ou Soult himself during
bis march, although SUdl all operaHon would have endangered
his line of communication un the Duero. But ilie fever and
wnnt of money induced him to avoid opcmtions in the south,
wllich would have involved Ilim in new Ilnd immense com-
binations, until he had secured his northern line of operations
by the capture of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army
united to attack the enemy in the south. He could not how_
ever stir from Madrid unless llssured that Soult would march
on Valeneiu and not on La Mancha; and thut wua not clear
until Cordobu was abandoned. Hence Bill was ordered to
advance on Zal80mea de la Berena., where he commanded the
passes leading to Cordoba in front, those leading to La )Ianclia
on the left, aud those leading hy Truxillo to the TllguS in
the rear; ill! could thns lit ploosuro either join Wellington,
follow Dronet towllrds Grenada, or interpose between Scult
and Madrid, if the latter turned towards the Despcnas Perros:
meanwhilt' Skerrett's troops were marching to join Ilim, and
tlle rest of the An,t;lo-Portugucse ~rrisou of Cadiz sailed to
Lisbon, with intent to join Welling-ton by the regular line of
operntious.
During thCl:!o transnetions the allies' alfuirs in Old Cnstille
had been greatly deranged, for where Wellington was uot t.he
French warfare gcnernlly assumed a severe and menacing
aspect.. ClIstaiios conducted tIle siege of Astorga with so
little vigour it awenred rtlther a blocknde thnn II siege; but
the forts nt Toro and Zamorll had been im'estcd, the first hy
the partidas, the second by Sih'eira's militia, who witb great
spirit lmd passed their own frontier, althongh well aware tht'y
could not be legally compelled to do so. Thns all the French
garrisons nballllolled by Clausel's retreat were endangered, and
though the slow progress of the Srmniards bcfore Astorga WIIS
infinitcly disgraceful to their military prowess final suceess
seemed certain. For Clinton was at Cuellar, Salltocildes OCX:U·
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pied Valladolid, Anson's clwalry WllS in the valley of the
Esquevl>, and the front looked fair enough. But in the rror
thc line of communicntion as far as tho frontier of Portugal
was in disorder, thc discipline of the arm)' was dctcrioTflting
rapidly, aud excesses were committed ou all the routes. A
detachment of Portuguese, not more than a thousand strollg,
eithcr instigated by want or by their hatred of the Spaniards,
had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinllel
to SalallllUlea, that as an example five were executed and
muny others sevorely punisiled hy stripes j yet oven this did
not ellcck the growing evil, the origin ofwhieh may be partly
traced to the licence at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and
13adajos, principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.
A.1l the hospitals in the rear were crowded. Salamanca, in
which there were six thousand sick and wounded besides
l!'rench prisor.ers, was the nbode of misery. The soldiers endured
mueh during the first two or three days after the buttle, unci
the inferior officers' sulferings wcre still more heavy and pro-
tracted. They had no money and many sold tlleir horses anel
other property to sustain life; some actually died of want, and
though Wellington, hearing of tbis, gave orders tbey should
be supplied from the purveyor's stores in the same manner as
the soldiers, tho relief came late. It is a common yet erro-
neous notion, that thc English system of hospitals in the !len_
insula. was admirable and the }'rcnc11 hospitals neglected.
Strenuous and unceasing exertions were made by Wellington
and the chiefs of the medical staff to form good hOSllitnl
establisllments, but the want of money, and stiU more the
want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now
there was no l)Oint of warfaro which more engaged Napoleon's
attention than the care of his sick and wounded; and he being
monnrch as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all
things requisite, even with luxuries. Uuder his fostering Cllre
also, Larrey, justly celebrated were it for this alone, organized
the establishment ealled the hospital 'Ambulance;' that is to
say, waggons of a peculiar construction, well horsed and served
by men trained und incorporated as soldiers, who being
rC\\'arded for their eourage and dovotion like oilier soldiers
were always at hand, and whether in action or on 0. Illllreb,
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ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry otT wounded men.
The astonishing rapidity with which the faUen Freuch soldiers
disappeared from a field of battle attested the excellence of
this institution.
In tIle British army, the carrying off the wounded depended
partly upon the casual assistance of a weak waggon train vcry
badly disciplined, furnishing only throo waggons to a divisiou
ami not originnllyapproprillted to t1l11t serrice; }llU"tly UpOll
the spare commissariat animAls, but principally :upon the
resources of the country whether of bullock carts., mules, or
(lonke,rs, and hence the most doleful scenes after a battle or
when an hospital was to be evu.cllated. The increasing num_
bers of the sick and wounded as the war enlarged pressed on
the limited !lumber of regular mediclII officertl, aud Welling-toll
colllJllained, tha.t when he demanded more the military medical
board in London neglected his demands and thwarted his
nrrangement.s. Shoals of hospital mates and student!! were
indeed scnt Ollt, and they arrived for the most part ignornnt
alike of war nnd their own profession; while a heterogeneous
mass of purveyors and their subordinates, actiug without any
militury orguuil'Jltion or em~etual sUI)Crintendeuce, baffied the
exertions of tllOse mediCllI officcrs, and they wcre mnny, whoso
exporienee, lIool and talent.s would, wit.h Il. good institution to
work upon, Imve rendered tllis brauch of tlle service most
distinguished. Nay, mauy even of the well·educated surgeons
sent out were for some time of little nse, for superior llrofcs-
sional skill is of little value in comparison of experience in
military organization; where one soldier dies from the waut
of Il. delieato operation hundreds perish from the absence of
militaryarrangement. Wllr tries tho strength of the military
frame·work; it is in peace the frame-work itself must bo
formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldicrlI of
the world. A perfect anny cau only bo made by civil institu-
tions, and those, rigMly considered, would tend to oollfille the
horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next
best thing to the perfection of civilization that would prevent
war altogctller.
Such was the state of affairs on the allies' liue of communi·
ClItiou, when, Oil the Hth of August, Clause! suddenly came
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clown the Pisuerga, Anson's cavalry immediately recrossed
the Duero at 'l'udela, &Iltocildes, following WelliugWl.l's
instructions, fell back to Torrclobaton, hut left behind four
hundred prisoners nnd nil the guns and mores which hlld been
captured ~bere by the allies, On the 18th the French assem-
bled at Valladolid to the number of twenty tllOU- C1ausel'. Cur.
sand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty ....~??"den~,
guns well provided with uUllllunitioll; lind five M,,:;.
thousand strugglers, \\"110 in the confusion of defeat had fled
to Burgos and Vitoria, were also collected nnd in lll11feh to
join. Clause!'s flesign was to be at hnnd when Joseph, rein-
forced from the soutb, shonld drive Wellington from Madrid,
for he thought tIle latter must then retire b,r Avila aud the
Valle de Ambles, lind he purpoll(ld to gain the mountains of
Aviltl. himself liud bnr<lSl:l the English general's flunk. While
awuiting this opportunity, I'oy proposed with two divisions of
inflllltry Ilnd sixtecn hundred cavalry to suC(:()ur FOy'<lCCr-
t.he garrisons of Toro, Zamofll, and Astorga; and Ksp<>ndcn«',
MSS.Clausel consented, though he was somewhat fear- '
ful of this dangerous experiment and did not believe Astorga
near its fall. His hesitation ruined the scheme, Foy wished
to mareh tho Hith by Plascucia, but was not deslmte]lOd until
the evening of the 17th and then by the line of Toro, tho
garrison of wllieh plnoo lie efllTicd off in passing. Tile 1Gth
he snbred some of the Spanish fear-guard at Castro GOI1-
:lalo on the EsJll.; the 20t11, at three o'clock in the evening, he
rellclled 1Al. B.~ueza, but WIIS mortified to learn that Castaiios
had by artful uegolilltion persuaded the garrison of Astorga,
twelve llUlH.lred good troopa, to surreuder although ~here WIIS
no lm,'ru.:h. Tlie Gallieillllll hOO then rotired to their mountains,
and fey marched 1lpon Qlrvnjales, lloping to enclose Silveim's
militifl between the Duero and the Esla., to swecll them off in
his course, and tllell relieving Zamora, to Ilenetrate to Sala-
manca Ilnd seize the trophies of tbe Arapilcs. And this would
infallibly have happened but for the judicious !lir H.
activity cl Douglas, who divining Foy's object no"ghu'I
:\1$$.
sent Silveil'3 with tillleful llOtice illto Portuglll;
)·et so critical was the movement thnt Foy's cavalry skirmilihod
with the Portuguese rear-guard nellr Constantin at daybreak
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on the 24th. The 25th the French entered Zamora, but
'Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clausel
recalled Foy at the moment when his infAntry was fLCtually in
march Dijon Salalllllllca to seize tho trophies, and his cavalry
was moving by Lcdesnm to brCilk up tho lino of comrnunioo-
tioD with Ciudarl Rodrigo.
That }.'oy was thus able to disturb the line of communication
was Clinton's error. Wellington left eighteen thousand men,
exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank
and rear, and he had a rigIlt to think it enough, because he
momentarilyexllected Astorga to fall and the French army,
f], booten onc, wns then in full rctrcnt.. It is tow nonc of tho
French garrisons yielded before Clau.:;c1 rctul'Ilcd, but Clinton
alone had eig11t thousand good troops, and might with the aid
of Santocildes and tbe pa.rtidas have baffled the French; he
might even have mcnaced Valladolid after Foy's departure,
which would have certainly brought that general back. And
if 110 dared not vcnlure so n\ueh, he 6110u]d, following his
instructions, have regulated his mevements along the left of
the Duero so as to be always in a. condition to protect Sala-
manca j that is, lIe should have gone to Olmedo when Clausel
first occupied Yalladelid, but he retired to AreVlllo, which
enabled Foy to advance. The mere escape of the garrisons,
from Toro aud ZUllIora was tllOugllt no misfortune. It would
IUlVO cost a long mlU'eh and two sieges in the llOtlest season
to have redueed them, which was morc than tlley were worth;
yct to use Wcllingtou's words, 'it WM'Ilot tJ(JT1J elUXi'Uragi7l{/ W
.find ellat the best Spanish army tIJa,j unable to stand before the
remains of 2lfarm.ont's beaten trooPIJ; that in more than. tu'Q
Mmlths, it l/GIJ been unable even f.o breacl~ AlJto1'gu, and that
aU imJX1rtant operali<ma must still be performed lnj tlle British
troops,' The Spaniard'!, now in the fift!l )'enr of the Wllr, were
still in the state described by sir John Mooro, 'wWuna an
army, witJUJut a government, witlwul. a generalf
While these events were passing in Castille Popham's
annamcnt remained on the Biscay COMt, and the partidllo8 thus
encouraged became so aclive, that with exception of Santon3
and Gueteriu. all the littoral posts were ablllldolled by Calfll-
relli. Porlicr, Rcnovalles, and Mendizabel, tbe nominal corn_
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manden of all the band9, immediately took possession of
Castro, Santander, and e'·en of Bill-.o. ltouget, who came
from Vitona to recover the last, was aner some &harp fighting
compelled to retin I~in to Durango; and Reille, deluded by
& rumour t.bat Wellington was marching through the centre
of Spain upon Zarago1.l, abandoned several important out.-
J>OIltl: Aragon, hitherto 80 tranquil, then beal.me unqui~ and
all the northern provinces were ripe for iwIurrection.
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WmLE the various military combinations described in fhe
foregoing chapter were thickening, Welliugton watched very
eagerly the rigllt moment for striking; the problem to ha
solved Wfl8 one of time, which to be turned to nc<Xlunt depended
upon the activity of the SpaJ:illrds in cutting olf all eorre-
spolI(lence bctlveen the French flrmies. The manner ill which
Suc11et and Caffarelli were paralysed by the Anglo-Sicilian
armies and by I'opham'll urllllllllent hal:l been I:lhowlI; but
Clnusel's force though rc-organized WlIS still little more
thcm a wreck, lmd to render it I~wcrless by taking Burgos
wag the English gencrlll's design. )feanwhila to oppose
Soult and the king required extcnsive arrangements. Hence
wllen it WlIS known that Andalusia was absolutely aban-
doned, Hill WIIS directcd upon Toledo by the bridge of
Almllraz; for Sturgeon's genius had rendered thllt stupendous
ruin, although more lofty than Alcautarn, also pllSStlble for
artillery. Elio WllS then induced to bring the :Mureinn army
to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was ordered to take post
on the mountain of Alcaraz and guard the neigllbouring
fortress of Chinchilla, which, being situated On the confines of
Murcia aud La Mallclia nnd pcrched Oil a rugged isolated
hill in a vw;t plain, was jleculiurl}' I:ltrong both from construc-
tion and sitc, and was the knot of all t1lC great lines of com-
munication. Bassecour, ViJh~ Campa, and the Empccinado
were desired to enter La Mancha with their bauds, Hill
could bring up twenty tllousand lllen, aud the third, fourth,
and liglJt divbious, two brig-,ldes of cllvalry and Carlos
d'EspnfJa'$ troops, wcre to remain near ::\fndrid while thc rest
of thc aMl'y mnrclJCd into Old Castille. Thus sixty thou511nd
mell, thirty thousnnd 'being excellent troops well commanded,
aud llRving the Chinchilla fortress in frout, would have been
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assembled before Soult could unite with the king. And
t,here Wll.!! still the "nny of EstrelllllUUra, eight thousand
strong, I)'iug about Baulljos in reserve.
The British troops at Carthagenu were directed, when
Soult should have pflSscd tlnl.t city, to leave small garrisons in
tlie forts there and join the army at Alicant, which with t1\0
reinforcements from Sicily 'would then he sixteen thousand
Iitrong, seven thousand being British troops; and while t·his
force was at Alicant Wdlington judged the French could not
brillg 1U0re than jifty thousunu ul}liust Madrid witllOut risk-
ing tho loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the
heterogeneous mass he had colloctcu to resist on ll. fair field
the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would
finally be opposed to them; bnt he calculated tllllt ere the
French generals oou1d act seriousl)·, the rivers would be full,
and Hill could then llOld his ground long enough for the
tlrlllY to como back from Burgos: ilIdecd he had little doubt
of reducing that 1)laoo and being ugaill ou the Taglls in time
to take the initial movements llilllSclf.
By these dispositiolls the allic3 Imd scyeral lines of opera-
tion. Ballesteros from the mountains of Alcaraz could harass
the flanks of thc advancing Frondl, and when they ptlSscd
could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet. IIill could
retire if pressed by 1bdrid or by Toledo, anu eould gain the
passcs of the GuadarulllU or the valley of the Tugus. Elio,
Villa Camrm, Basscoour, and the Empecilllulo could act lly
Cuenca. lInd RequClia against Suchet, or against :Madrid if tho
French followed aill obstinately; or tlley could join :&lles--
teres. And besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve
thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla waiting for clothing
and arms, which under the recent treaty were to come from
England. 'I'he English llliuisten Lad nominally confided the
distributiou of these succours to Wellington, but following
their usual vicious 1llllnnel' of doing business they ulso b'lwe
Mr. Stllart a control without Wellington's knowledge; henco
the stores, cxpected by the latwr at Lisbon or Cadiz, were
by Stuart unwittingly direcled to Coruiia, with which place
the English geneml had no secure eommuuicntion: moreover
there were very few Sllnllish levies there, and nO confidential
332 PENINSULA WAR. tAUGUST,1812.
lwrson to superintend tlle delivery of them. Other political
crossC.'l, which s11nl\ be noticed in due time, were also e.'pe-
ricnced, but it wiU suffice here to say the want of money Wag
now beeomc intolerable. The army was many months in
arrears, those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the
most cruel privntions, those who rcmoincd in Madrid, tempted
by the l,leasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at
all exorbitant premium from a money-broker; Bud it was
grievously suspected that his means resulted from the nefa-
rious proceedings of un under commissary; the soldiers,
equlIlly tempted and Luving no SUcll resource plundered the
stores of the Rctiro. In fine, discipline bcenmc relaxed
throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were
gloomy, em'Ying those who remained at :Madrid.
The eit)" exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation.
Wllen it was first entered a violent cruel and nnjust perseeu-
tion of those wuo were called' AfranccsaMs' was commenced,
and continued until the English genoml interfered, nnd us an
example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace
feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase tIle sufferiltgs of
the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provi-
siollS there was no money wherewitll to huy; aud thou;;h the
Louses were full of rich furniture there wero neituer purehasers
nor lenders, even noble f,\milies secretly sought charity that
they migllt livo. At night the grouns und stifled cries of
famishing people were heard, find every morning emaciated
dead bodies, cast into the streets, showed why those cries had
ceased. The ClIlm resignation with whieh these terrible
sufferings were borne was 11 distinctive mark of the national
eharncter, not many begged, lIono complained, tuere was no
violcnee, no reproaches, very few thefts; tllC allies lost a few
animals, nothing moro, and these were generally thotlght to be
taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient
endurance of calamity the JladrikiiOfl discovered a deep and
unalTeded gratitude for kindness received at the hands of t11e
British officers who oontnbuted, not lUuch for they Imd it not,
but enough of moncy to fonn soup charities by which huu-
dreds were suooou~d. It Wl'IS in the third divi.sion the example
was set, and by the forty-fifth regiment, and it was not the
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least of the many honourable distinctions those bm~emen have
earned.
Wellington desirous of shelrering his troops from t,he
extreme hent had early sent four divisions and the cavalry to
the Escurial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could joiu
Hill by the valley of the Ta!,'1J.s, or Cliutou by Arevlllo j but
when ho knew the king's retreat upon Valencia WIIS decided,
that Soult had abandoned Cilrdoba and Clinton was falling
hnek before Clansel, he ordered tIle first, fifth, and seventh
divisiollS, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, Pon.
sonby's ligllt horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to
move mllidly upon Are\'alo, and 011 the first of September
quittod Madrid himself to take the command. Yet llis anuy
had been 80 diminished by sickness that only twenty-one
thousand men, including three thousund cavalry, were assembled
in that town. He could scarcely feed the Portuguese soldiers,
who were nIso very ill equiPI~, and their government iustead
of trausmiLting mOlley aud stores eude:woured to throw off
tho burthell by all ingenious device. }'or having nlwnys a
ruuning Moonnt with the Spanish government, they llOW IDnde
a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese
troops and cheek off the expense on the national account,
wllich was then in favour of the Portuguese; that is, the
soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty,
booause the Spaniards could not feed their own men and
would not, if they could, IInve fed the Portub'1J.ese. Neither
could tl.Hl latter ulke provisions from the country, because
Wellington delllanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero
aud Pisuerga for the English soldiers, as l\ set-off against the
money advanced by sir Henry Wellesley to tIle Spanish
regency at Cadiz. To stop this shameful expedient he refused
payment of the subsidy from the chest of aids, whereupon the
old disoonwnts and disputes rc\'ived and acquired MW force,
tIle regency bCCllUlC intructuJ.,[e und the whole military system
of Portugal wus like to full to pieces.
On the 4th the allies quittcd ArevlIlo, the 6th they passed
the DucrQ by tile ford above Puente de Duero, tllc 7tII they
cntered Vll.lhldolid, and tIle Gallici:ms, wllO had returned to
the Esla when Foy retreated, were'ordered to join the Anglo~
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Portuguese army. Clausel abllndonC(1 Valladolid in the night
of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby's cavalry
crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed the bridge of Berecal on
tiIat river. The 8th the ullit:!> Imlted for rest und to await HIe
nrrival of Castonoo; but seldom dllring the Will' did a S}JIlllisb
general devinte into activity, and Wellington observed that
in his whole intercourse with that people he had not met
with an able man, while amongst the Portuguese he had found
several. The Gnllicinnll came 1I0t, Santoeildes even avoided a
junction, and the .i<'n.mch r..treated slowly up the beautiful
Pisuerga and ArlulW.tl.U "alleys, which, in denilJ of the storics
about Fl-eneh de,·astation, were carefully cultivated and filled
to repletion with oorn, wine, and oil. Nor were they deficient
in military strength. Off the high roaJ, on both sides, dikhee
and rivulets impeded the troops, wbile cross ridgcs continually
furuished strong pamllel positions flanked by tile lofty llills on
either side. In these valleys Clausel Lnllled his greut Mver-
AAry in the most surprising manner. :Efleh day he offered
battle, yet 011 ground which IVellington was unwilling to assail
in front, partly because he momentarily expeded the Oallicians
up, chiefly heeanse of the declining state of his own army from
sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations
in the 50uth, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank
movement.s he dislodged tile enemy, yet ellch day darkness
fell ere they were completed and the morning's sun always saw
Clausel agai.n in position. .At Cigales and Duelllls in the
Pisuerga "alley,-at Mngoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla,
Vallcjera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzall, the
:French general thus offeroo battle, alld finnlly covered Burgos
on the 16th by takillg the strollg position of Celln.du. del
Ctimino.
But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry,
amI ei:;llt guns llad now joined the allies, and Wellillgtoll
would bavc altucked frtlukly 011 tllll 17th, lmd not Cltlusel,
alike wary und skilful, observed the increased numbers Ulld
~etired in the night to Fmlldovinez j his rcur-guard WlIs how-
ever next day llUshed slu.rply baek to the hcights of Burgog,
aud in tIle following night he passed through that town lea\':llg
belJwd him large stores of grain. Caflilrelli who had oome
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down to place the ensUe of BIlrg09 in fI state of rldence now
joined him, and the two gcnerals retrCl\ted upon Bri\'icscn,
where they werc immcdiatelyreinforced by that reservc which,
with such an extraordinary foresjght., the emperor had
directed to be assemhled and exercised on the Prrenees
in anticipation of lIarmout's disaster. The allies entered
Durgos amidst grtat confusion, for the garrison of the castle
hud set fire to sollle housell impeJiug the dcfel}cc of the fortress,
the oonfllloOTlltioll sjJread widely, and the pilnidaa who wer(l
nlreo.dy gnthcred like wolves round ,\ ellrCflSS cnt,trcd the town
for mischief. Mr. S)'denham, an eye-witness and not unused
to scenes of war, thus describes their proceeJings,', What witll
the flames and the plundering of the guerillas, who are as bad
It!l Tartars nud CosslICks of the Kisehack or Zagatay hordes, I
was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was
at length restored by the manful exertiolls of· Don Miguel
Alllva.' . r •
C1nuscl's beautiful movement!! merit every praisc, but it
may be- questioned if the Euglish general's marches were in
the true direction, or made in good timc; for though Clintou's
retreat upon Are\'lllo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate
t1Hl line of operations. W'llJingtoll Ilad expected Clausers
advance to ValladoLid, it was therefore uo l>ur!Jrisc, und on
the 26th of August Foy was still lit Znmom. At that period
the English genernl might hllva had. llis army, Clintou',;; troop"
e'l;ccpted, at &govia; anJ ·as the distancc from thence to
Yalladolid is rather less than from VlI11lld:>lid to Zamorll, llo
rapid march upon the former, CliLloon advancing at tbe 1Ja1rl6
time, might have separated Clausel from Foy. Again, Wel.
lingtou might have marched upon Burgos by Arunda de
Duero and Lermll, that road wing sllOrt as b)' Valladolid;
he might also luwc brought forwuru the third und light divisions
by the Somosierrll from :\111JriJ, llUt! directed CLillton and the
Sprmillrda to closc UI)()1\ the French rear. He wonld tllllS.
llnve turned the vallers of the PislIergll find the 1J. rlan7.fln.
and could from Aranda or Lerma hav,," fallen upon C1ausel
wllile in mar<:h. That geneml, having ClillOOU nnd the Galli.
cians on his rear and Wellington reinforced by the divisions.
from Madrid Oil his front or flunk, would then have llad to
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fight 0, decisive battle under every di.sndvllntagc. In fine the
objeot was to orush Clausol, llnd this should have been eff'eckd
though Madrid had been entirelya.bandoned to secure success.
It is however probuble that want of money and mosns of
tranSjlort decided the line of operations, fur the route by the
&mosicrra wns savage and oorrcn, and the feeding of the
troops even by Vlllladolid was from hand to mouth, or pain-
fully SUllporkd by convoys from Portugal.
S!EGE OF THE CASTLE OF BunGOS.
Caffarclli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besidcsorlil-
lcrpuen in this place, and the governor Dubreton was of such
cOUlage aod skiU that he surpassed even the llOpes of his san-
guine and warlike countryman. Tht' castle and its works enclosed
II ruggcd hill, between whicll and the rh'er the city of Burgos
was situated. All old wall with a new PIlTU!lct Md f1nnks
CQn~trncted by the French offered the first line
of defence; the seoond line was earthen, of the
nature of a field retrenchment and well palisaded;
the third line was similarly oonstructed and ctmtained the two
most elevated points of the hill, on one of wllich was an
entrenched building called the Wllite Church, IInd Oil ~he
other the ancient keep of the caatltl: thi9 IllSt was the highest
point, entrenched and 8llITUounted with a hee.vy cll8emnted
work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were five sepa·
rate enclosures, and the Napoleon battery commauded every-
thing around it, save to the north, where at the distance of
three hundred yards there was a. second height scarcely less
elevated than that of the fortress. This point, culled the hill
of Sun lllichuel, WlIB defendcd by a large horn-work with {\
hard sloping SClIrp forty-five feet high, and a counterscarp
not less tha.n ten feet high; it WllS unfinished a.nd only closed
by strong paliSfldes, hut it Wl\.'l under the fire of the Napoleon
b&ttery, was well flanked by the castle defences, llnd covered
ill frout by slight entrcllchmcnts fOT the out piquets. Nine
heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzera
were mounted in the fortress, Clausel's rcserve artillery and
stores were also deposited there, and the armament could
t·herefore be increased.
SJ>I'T. 1812.] BOOK xrX.-CllAP. 3.
FIRST ASSAULT.
387
)[Clnolr
by oolonel.
lleid, ILK
All the bridges and foros over the Arlanzan were com-
manded by tll8 batteries, and two days elapsed ere the allies
could cros.sj but on tile 19th tll6 passage of the river being
effected above tbe toWll by the first division, major Sowers
Cocks, supported by P!lCk's Portuguc;;e, drove in tht" French
outposts on the hill of Sa11 :ilfiehllel J n. the night, the same
troops, reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed
that horn-work and the conflict WilS murderous.
Tb.:: highlanders who bore the ladders uuder the
commllond of the engi.lleer PiU, pluued them very
well, splicing them together to meet the grent height of the
llC3rp, ret the stonners were hCllWIl i),\Ck with gront loss,
nnd would have fuiled if tlle gallllnt Cocks had uot forced fin
entrance by tIle gorge with the seventy-nintb. 'rhe garri-
son was tliUs cut off, and must ha.ve surrendered if Cocks had
been well supported; but he was only followed by the second
battalion of the forty-8econd, and the French, boiug still five
hundred, loroke thrQugu und escaped. '1'he llflilir was censured,
the troops complained of each other, aud the loss was uloove
four hundred, whilst tlu~t of the eucmy did not exoocd onc
hundred aud fifty.
Wellingtoll was now enabled to examine the defences of the
castle. Rc found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his
meaus were so scant he relieu more upon the enemy's weak-
ness than his own power; for iL was said tbe garrison wanted
wat-er, and that tlleir Ilrovision IDHgllziues could bo burned.
Upon tbis information lie adopted tho following phm of
attack.
Twclve tbOUSllnd men OOlllposing the first and sixth clivi-
aioOfl and the two Portuguese brigades were to undertake tlie
works; the rcst of the troops, twenty thousaud exclusive of
the partidas, were to form the covering army. The trenches
were to be opened from tile suburb of San l)edro, and a
parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San
1l1icuael. A batlery for five gUllS was to 00 '
established close to the right of the captured Iwrn-
work. A sap Wi\S to be pushe(l from the parWlel as near the
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first wall as possible without being seen into from the uppCt
works, lInd from thence the engineer was to proceed by
gallery and mine.
When the first mine should be completed, the battery on
the hill 01' San Michael WllS to open against the second line of
defence, llnd the assault was to be given on the first line. If
It lodgment was fomloo the approacllcs were to be continued
aguiust the second line, and the battery on San Michael was
io be turned agniust Ule third liu" in front of the White
Church, because t]IO defences there were exceedingly weak.
Meanwhile a. trench for musketry was to be dug along the
brow of San ;\fichael, and a concealed battery was to be prc-
}Jnred within the !Iorn.work itself witb a view to the final
uttack of the Napoleon baUery. Head-quarleTs were fixed at
Villa 'foro, colonel Burgoync t.'ollductcd thc operations of the
('.n~inccrs, lwbe and Dickson those of the artillery, whieh
consisted of three eighteen.pounders lIDd the five iron twenty-
fonr-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca
forts; lInd it was with regard to these slender means, rnther
t,han the defecta of the fortress, that tlle line of attack WIIS
chosen.
When the horn-work fell, 110 lodgment W119 commenced in
the interior, IIlId continued vigorously, although under a.
Jestructive fire frolll the NlI.poloon battery, because tIle
besieglH"S feared the enemy would at daylight enJeavour to
retake the work 1))" the gorge: good cover was however
obtaiued ill the night, and the firllt l.mttery was also begun.
The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field.guns, Ilud
at night kept up a heavy fire of grape llnd sl1e119 on the
workmen who wefe digging the musketry trench in front of
the first battery. The 22nd the fire of the besieged WWl
redoubled, but tIle besiegers worked with little loss, and their
musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the first buttery
was armed with two eightccn·poundcrs and three howitr.crs,
and the secret battery within tIle horn-work was commenced.
Wellington, dcviating from his first plan, then resolved to try
liT! escalade against tIle first lillC of defence, and selected a
poiut half-way hetwecu the suburb of San POOro ami the
horn-work. At midnight four hundred mell provided with
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ladders marched from under the hill on which the horn-
work stood to the attack of the wall, which was from twellty.
three to twenty-five feet high but llaJ 110 flanks j this was the
malll column, and a Portug'uese battalion was also assellll>led
in the town of Burgos to wake 110 combiued flunk IIoLtuck 011
tlltl.t side.
SECOND ASSAULT.
It was commenced by the Portuguese, but tlley wcre
repelled by the fire of the eOllllllon gnUI'd nlonc; IInd thc
principal escalading party, composed of detnchmcnts from
different regiments under major Lilwrie, seventy.ninth regiA
ment, although acting witiJ great resolutit>ll got disordered in
passing a hollow way fifty yards from the wall and had 110
success. The ladderli were iudeed placed sud the troops
entered the ditch, ret confusedly, Luwrie was killed, tllo
hrovcst soldicrli WllO firlit mounted were met hand to hand ami
bayoneted, ami the lnddcrli were rcared snd ovcrturncd sevcrlll
timcs; oombustibles were also cast down in abundance aud
the British giving way left llalf their number behind. The
wounded were brought off next day under a truce, and it was
said the Frencll found on a dead officer II plan of the siege;
certain it is that this disustrous nUack augmented the enellly'l:l
courage alll! IlroJuwl Do buJ effect on the allies, some of
whom hud been nl80 greatly dispirited by the Ilt'{l\'ious IlSsuult
on the horn-work.
The hollow way whidl had disordered the escaladers, and
whidl at fifty yards' distance run along the front of defence,
Wall converted into llo parallel and connccted witli tlie suburb
of &n Pedro j the trenches were made deep and nanow to
secure tbem from t11e plunging shot of the castle, and
musketeers wcre plauted to keep down tlle enem.l"lI fire; but
heavy millS incommoded the troolls, ulld thougb the allied
marksmen got the rTUl.8wry oycr those of the :FrcllCh imme.
diaooly in their front, the latter, having a raised and pflli~
81lded work on their own right which in some measure
flanked the approaches, killed 80 many of the besiegcrli that
tile latter were finally withdrawn. In the night a fIying SlIp
WIlll commenced from the right of the parallel, and WIloS
,2
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pushed within twenty yards of the enemy's first line of
defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him
many men, for the French plied their mllskctry sharply and
rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head
of the sap was indeed so commanded as it approached the
wall, that a six-feet trench added to the height of the gabion
above soorcely protected the workmen: tl.te gallery of the
mine was therefore opened, and worked as rapidly as the
inexperience of tIle miners, who were merely volunteers from
the line, would permit.
A concealed battery within the horn-work of San Micbael
being now completed, tIro eighteen-pounders were removed
from the first bnttery to llrm it, and they were replaced by
two iron howib.crs, which opened upon tllC advanced palisade
below to drive the Freneh marksmen from that point; when
they had fire<l one hundred and forty rounds without success
tills project was ahandoned, for ammunition was so scarce the
soldiers were paid to collect the enemJ"s bullets. This day
also a 7.ig;o;ng was commcnoc,l in front of the first batter)'
down the fllce of San 'Miehael, to obtain footing for a
musketry trend\ to o~·erlook the enemy's defences below:
and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of
the castlo at the diswllce of two hundred yards, and were
knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.
On the 26t11 the gallery of the mine was advanced
eighteen feet and the soil was found favourable, Jet the mefl
in passing the sap were hit fast by the French marksmen,
and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the
parallel was prolonged on the right Witllill twenty yards of
tl]e enemy's ramparts, with a vicw to a set:ond gallery and
mine, and musketecI"fl were planted thcre to oppose the
cnemy's marksmen IInd to proteet the Bap; at the same time
tlle zig7.ag on the hill of San Miehacl was ())ntinued, and the
musket lreueh there was completed under cover of gabiollS,
lIud with little loss, although the whole fire of tlle castle was
concentrated on the spot.
On the 27th the Freneh were seen strengthening their
second line, and tbey had already cut a step along the edge
of the oountersca.rp for a ())vered way, and bad palisaded the
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. <,ommunirotion. The besiegers likewise finished the musketry
'trench OD the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery
for the second mine; but the first mine went on slowly, tIle
men in the sap were galled and disturbed by stone~, grenades,
and sm&1l shells which the French threw into the trenches by
hand: tIle artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the
musketry trench on San Miehael so f:lilt that tue troops Wtlre
withdrawn during the d1lY.
In the night 11 trench of communiCfltion, forming 0. second
parallel behind the first, WlI8 oogun and nearly completed from
tile 11ill of San ::Michael towards the suburb of S:illl Pedro, and
the musketry trench on the bill Wall deepened. Next day
an attempt was made to perfect tllis new parallel of com·
llIunicution, but the French fire becaule Ilellvy, ami the shells
which PlUlSed ovtlr came rolling down the bill again into the
trench, so the work was deferrcd until nigM and W/lS tllen
pcrfeeood. 'fhe back roll of the sllells continued to gall the
troops, yet t11e whole of this trendl, tllat in front of the horn-
work above, and that on the right of tlie parallel below were
filled with men wllOsc fire WaIl incessant j and as the first llIine
was now loaded with Illore than a thousand weight of powder,
tbe gallery strongly tamped for fifteeu fee~ with bags of clay
. and ull ready for explosion, Wellington ordered the
THIRD ASSAULT.
At midnigllt the hollow rOiId., fif~y yards from the mine,
was lined with troops to fire on the defences, a.nd three hun_
dred stormers were assembled there, attended by others who
carried tools alld materials to secure the lodgmen~when the
breacll should be carried: the miue was theu exploded, the
wall fell aud au oflicer with tweuty men rWlhed forward to
the assault. TIle explosion was not· so efficacious /lS it oug-ht
to have been, yet it brought tho wall down, the enemy W/lS
stupified, and the forlorn hope, consisting of Il. BcrgCllut a.nd
four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach and
tllere stood nntil the French, I"C<:overing, drove them down
pierced with baronet wounds. Meanwhile the oflicer and
twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of
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fifty nnd those by the remainder of the stormers, missed tlle
breac1l in the dark lInd finding the wnll unbroken retired
and reponed there was no breach; the main body imme-
diately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant lInd his
men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale the
enemy Will! reinforced. Scar<lity of llmmunition stopped the
llrtil1cry pmcticc l\frl\inst the breacll during the night and
the French raised l\ pampet behind it, placing obstacles suffi.
cient to deter the besiegers from renewing tbe assault at day-
light.
This failure arose from the darkness lInd the want of a
conducting engineer; out of four regular officers of that
bl'nllCh engnged in t1le siege onc had been killed, one bndly
wounded, and one WM sick j wherefore the remaining one was
necessarily reserved for the conduding of t11e works. The
aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed 8in~'e
the siege commenced, one assault had sUC<leeded, two had
failed j twelve hundred men had been killed or wounded,
little progress made, and the troops generally showed symp-
toms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed
t-o be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the
soldiers wasted ammunition, the work in tlle trenches was
avoided or lIeglect-ed both by officers and men, iDsubordiua~
tion was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued,
the guards only being noticed as preaenting an honourable
exception. In this state it was ('ssential to make some change
in the operations, and as the French Dlarksmen in the ad-
vanced pa1isndoetl work below were now BO expert as to hit
everything seen, the howitzer buttery on SAn :l\fiehacl WIlS
reinforced with" French eight-pounder, by the aid of which
this mischievous post was at last demolished. The gallery of
the second mine was also Jlushed forward, and a new breaeh-
ing-hattery for tllfM guns was constructed behind it, so closo
1-0 the enemy's defenoos 111>lt the lntoor screened the work
from the artillery fire of their upper fortress j but the parapet
of the battery was only made musket-proof, because the be-
sieged 11lId no guns on tile lower line of this front.
In t11e night the three eighteen-pounders were brought
from the hill of &n Michacl without bcing discovered, and at
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dayligbt, though a very galling fire of musketll thinned the
workmen, they persevered until nine o'clock, when the battery
was finished and armtJ. But at that mOlllent the watchful
Dubretou brought a howitzer dowl! from the upper works
and 1\·ith a low charge threw shells into tlle battery; then
making a hole through a lIunk wall he thrust out a light guu,
which sent itll bullets whi7.zing througll the thiu parapet at
every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their
shot so sharply the allies were driven from their pieces with.
out firing. More French caullon beiug now brought from
the upIJer work!; the defences of the battery werc quite
demolished, two of the gun..enrriages were diAAbled, 0. ~runnion
WIIS kuooked oil' onc of the eighteen.pounders, alld the lllu7.7.1e
of another was split. It was iu vain the besiegers' marksmen,
aided by some officers who considered themselves good sllOts,
endea.voured to quell the enemy's fire, the French being on a
height werc too well covered and remained masters of the
fight.
In the night a second and more solid buttery being formed
11 little to the left of tlm ruined onc, the French observed it
ut dnylight, und their fire plunging from nbo,'o 1l11lde the
parapet lIy off 80 rapidly that it was relinquished. Recourse
was then again had to the galleries and mine and to the breacll.
ing battery on the hill of San Miehael; the two guns 8till
serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery
to boot dowu a retrcuehmeut formed by the Freuch behind
the old breach. It WIIS intended to have placed them Oil. this
new llosition in the night of tho 3rd, but the weather was
very wet Md atonny, and the workmen, those of the glll'lrdS
only cxecllted, aoandoned the trenehes; hence at daylight the
gUM were still short of their destillation and notlilllg more
could be done until the following nigllt.
On the 4th, at uine o'clook in the morning, the two eigh.
teen.pounders and tIJree iron llOwitzers again opened from
San Micbael's, aud at four o'clock in the evening, the old
breach being cleared of all incumbraucea aud the secoud mine
strongly tamped for ex-plosion, lL double assault WI\8 ordered.
The second battalion of the twenty.fourth British regiment
nnder captain Heddcrwiek being selected, was formed in the
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hollow WS}', having onc advanced party under lieutenant
Bolmes pushed forward lIS close to the new mine as it was
safe to be, and a second ptlrt}' under lieutcllallt :Frawr ill like
manner pUllhcd towardg the old brench.
FOl/JITH ASSAULT.
At fin) o'clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect,
blowiug many of the French into the air and breaking down
one hUDt1roo feet of the wall; the next instant Holmes and hiB
bmve men went rushing through tllc smoke and crumbling
ruins, and Fra1.cr as quick llnd daring was already
fighting on the summit of the old breach j op-
posed with spears he was seen to tear onc from
the llsnds of an enemy and leap into tllE! miust of
the hostile lllasS followed by hill men. 'rhe supports followoo
closely and both breaches were carried with a loss to the
lSSsilants of thirty-seven killed and two blmdred wounded,
.even of the latter being officeril and amongst them the con-
ducting ellgi.lleer. During the night lodgmeuts were formed
in ad,'auoo of the old and on the ruins of the new breadl,
yet very imperfectly and under a destructive fire from the
upper dcfences. This happy attack revived tllc spirits of the
army, vessels with powder were coming coostwise from
Coruiia, a convoy was expected hy land from Ciudad Rodrigo,
a supply of amJnunit.ion sent by sir Home Popham reached
the camp, the howitzers coutinued to knock away the pali-
sades in the ditch, and the bllttery on Slln illichacl's Wllll
directed to open a tllird breach, at a point where the first line
of defence was joined to the second.
This {lromising state of affairil WIIS of short duration,
On the 5th, at five o'clock in tll(l ovening, while the work-
ing parties were extending the lodgments, three hundred
French came swiftly down the hill and sweeping awsy the
labourers and guards from the trenches killed or wounded a
hundred and fifty mell, got possession of the old breach,
4estroyed the works and carried off all the tools. In the
night the allies repaired the dam~"'e and pushed saps from
~ flank, to me('t in the centre near the second French line
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and serve as a parallel to check future sallies; the howit:rers
also continued their fire from San Michacl agaiust the
palisades, and the hreachiug ill the horn-work olJcned, but the
guns being unable to sce the 'llLUS sufficiently low SOOI1
cCMed to speak and the embrasures were mo.sked. On the
other hand the besieged were unable, from the steepness of
the ellStle-hill, to <lepress their guns sufficiently to bear on
the lodgment at the breaches in the first line, but their
musketry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells
to retard the approaches towards the se<:ond line.
Ou the 7th the besiegers got so close to the wall below
that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger
to the workmen, wherefore two }'reneh field-pieces takon in
the horn-work were substituted and did good acn'iee. Tho
breaching-battery on San Michac1's being altered also renewed
its fire, and at five o'clock had broken fifty feet off the }l<'\rapet
of the second line, )'et the enemy's return was heavy and
another eighteen pounder lost a trunnion. In the night bloek-
carriages wjth suppods for the broken trunniOllS were provided,
ami the disabled guus were enabled to recommellee their fire
with low charges. A constant rain now filled the trenches,
the communications were injured, the workmen negligent,
the aplJroaches to tl\c second linc wcnt on slowly, and again
Dubreton came thundering down from the tIpper ground
driving the guards aDd workmen from tIle new parallel at the
lodgments, levelling all the works, carrying off all the ~ools,
and killing or wonnding two hUlldred men. Colonel Cocks,
promoted for his gllllant conduct at the storming of San
Michuel, restored. the fight u.nd repulscd the Frcneh, but fell
dead 011 the ground he had recovered: he was a young man of
a modest rlclllCflnour, brave, thoughtful and enterprising, he
livcd and diCtlllS a. good soldicr.
After this scvere cJleck the approaches to the scoond line
were abuudoncd, and tile trenches were extended so as to
embrace the whole of thc fronts attacked. The battery on
San Michael had meantime fonned a practicable breach
twcntJ-live feet wide, and the parallelll.t the old breach of the
first line Wl1lI prolougcd by zigwgs on the left towards this
Dew breach, while a trench wus opened to euable Int\rksrncn to
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fire upon the latter at thirty yards distanee. Nevertheless
uuother assault could 1I0t be risked, bemuse tbe great expendi-
ture of powder Ilad again exhausted I,he Ulogazines j and without
Il new supply, the troops ~ight hal'e found themselves with.
out ammunition in front of the French army which was now
gathering head near Driviesca. Heated 8110t were however
thrown at the White CIJUreh with 110 "iew to burn the mllga-
zines j amI the miners wero dirceted to drive 0. go.llery on the
other side of the castle against the church of San Roman,
which was pus11ed out a little heyond the French externlllline
of defence on the side of the city.
On the 10th, when the besiegers' ammunition was nearly all
gone, a fresh supply arrived from Sautallder, but no elfed had
been produced UrOll the White Church lllld Dubroton had
strcngthened 11is wor]tS to meet tho assllult j he had also
isolated the new breach on one flank hy a strong stockade
el:tending at right angles from the second to the third line of
defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had compelled
the besiegers agaiu to withdraw ~heir batterillg-guuB within
the horn-work, aud tlle attempt to bum the White Church was
relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman wus continned.
In this state things remained for several days with little
change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from
the nearest zigzag trench, had 6Cllrped eight feet. at the top of
the new breach and formed II small trench at the back.
011. th6 Hjth the battery in the llonl_work was again armed,
and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon
battery; they were however overmatched and silenced in
three-quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were onoo more
altered that the guns might bear on trle breach in the second
lillo. Some slight works IllllI counter-works were also made
on dilt'crellt points, the besiegers bcing prillcipnllr occupied
repairing the mischief done by tile rain, and pushing the
gallery uuder San Roman, where the French were now dis-
tinctly heard talking in the ehnrcll: the mine WRS therefore
formed and loaded witll Iline hundred ponllds of powder.
On the 17th the battery of tlle horn-work was rcnewed, the
fire of the eighteen pounders clea.red away the enemy's teml)O-
raT)' defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged tlle TlImPl'Jrt
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on each sid~, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme
right of the lower !larallel, with a view to take possession of a
cavalier or mound which the Frcnch luw rai!>ell there, and
from which they had killed many rn£lU in the trenches; it WllS
successful and a lodgmcnt WM effected, yct the enemy
returned in force ilnd compelled the besiegers to abandon it
again. On the] 8th the uew breach WllS rendered practicable
and Wel\ington ordcred it to be stormed. The explosion of
the mine under San Itoman wa$ to be the siglMl, the church
was also to be assllulted, aud at the same time a third detach~
meut WllS to escuhuJe thc wnrk8 iu frout of the ancieut breach
and thus oounoot the attacks.
YJ)'TH ASSAULT.
At llalf.pMt four o'clock the springing of the mine at San
Thlman broke down fL terrace in front of that building, yet
with little injury to the church itself; the latter was however
resolutely attncked b.v oolonel Brownc at the head of SOlllO
Spllnish and Portuguese troo(1s, and though the encmy spruug
8 oountermino which brollght the building down, the aSSIlilllut8
lodged themselves in the ruins. Melluwhile two hundred of
t1le foot-gullrds, with atrong supports, poured through tho
old breaeh in the 6r~t line and escflladed the second line,
beyond which, in t]1e open ground betwecn tllC second and
third lilies, they were encountered by the French llnd II shnrp
musketry fight coln!lleneed. At the Sflme time a like llumber
of the German legioll under major Wunnb, similarly supported,
stormed the new breach on the left of the guards 60 vigorously
that it "'lIS Cllrried ill 0. moment, llnd some mell mounted the
hill above and llctulllly gaincd the third line. Unhllppily, at
neither of these flSSll.1lIt8 did the supports follow closely, tho
Gcrmans, crampcd on their left by the enemy's stockaile,
extended their right towards the gtuu'ds, and at that moment
Dubretou came daslling like a torrent from the upper ground
llnd in an mstant cleared the breaches. Wunnb and many
oUlCr brave men fell, and tlle French, gatllering ronnd tlle
gUllrds who were still UllSUPPOrleJ, forced them beyond the
outer IiM: more tlmn two hundred men und ofti~rs were
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killed or wounded in this combat, and the ncd night the
enemy recovered San Roman by a u.1I}"_
The siege was thu5 virtnally terminated. The French were
indeed beaten out of SI:.. Romau again. and a gallery lr&8
opened from that chUT('h against the l!eCOnd line; but these
were mere demonstrationB, and the contemporary cventa which
eompelled a victorious army to abandon the liege of a small for-
tress, rtrong in nothing but the skill and bravcry of the governor
and his gallant soldiers, shall noW' be related.
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AT Valencia J03eph obtained three millions of francs from
Suchet, but the pecuniary distress of the French gencrally
was so great that Wcllington at one time supposed it would
drive thcm from Spain. The Allglo-Portuguese soldiers had
not received pay for si~ months, the French armies of the
south, the centre, und Portugal, were a whole year behillllliand;
llnd the saluries of the mill.isters and civil 8{lrVBnta were two
ycars in arrears. Suchet's ann)', tho ollly ono which depended
entirely on tlle country, was however through his o,;cellcnt
management regularly paid; its discipline was conformable;
his troops refrained from plundcr tllcmselvcs and repressed
some excesses of Joscph's and &ltl1t's men so vigorously as to
come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. Soldicrs without
pay must become roboors. Napoloon knew the king's neces-
sity to be 6.'ttreme, but the Hussiun wur absorbed the resources
of }'rance: twenty thousand men, chiefly conscripts, and a
little money were all he could send to Spnin.
Clausel's army had during the sicge becn quartered at Pan-
corbo and along the Ebro as far as Logrofio, an advanced
guard only remaining at Briviesca; there they were re orgs..
nilled, and Masseua WllS appointed with full powers to COUlllllUld
all the norlllcrn provinces. A fine opportll1lity to avenge the
retreat from 'forres Vedms wns thus furnished to the old
warrior; but he, doubting the issue of affairs or tamed by
age, llleaded ilIncsg and sent Souham to com-
mand. Then arose contention, for UamlOnt
designated Clauscl as the fittest to lead, Masscno.
insisted that Souham was the abler genel'lll, and
the king desired to appoint Drouet. Clausel's
abilities were not inferior to those of any French general, 1I11d
to lllore perfect acqullintlwce with the tbeatre of war be added
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better knowledge of the enemy, WUll more knOWIl to the
1I01dicrs, and had gained their confidence by his recent opera_
tions, no mean considerations in such a matter. However,
SoUllanl was appointed.
Caifarelli, anxious to succour BUr<Jos which belonged to his
command, had at lo.st united ut Vitoriu II thousand cuvlllry,
sixteen guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three
thousand were of the young guard. The army of Portugal,
reiuforced from Fl'Rllce with twelve thousand men, hOO thirt,y-
five thousand' present under arms orgaui:t:ed ill six divisions,
and by Clauscrs vigour restored to its former excellent dis-
Souh.m'. cipline: forty-rom thousand good troops were
}!~po", therefore ready in the hC"'iuniu<l' of October to!\IS!:\. ~ eo
8uC(:our the castle; and the two generals were
eager to do so, but were forced to await Souhum'll arrival ami
news from the king, But Itcre Wellington's arrllngemcmt8
with the partidAA interfered; tIley had no direct tiding~ from
Valencia, because the 'eireuitous lines of corre-
spondence were so beset by the hands that the
most speedy and certain oommunication was
through the minister of war at Paris; and he obtained his
sure:,t infomlation from tne English newspapers!
For the lfitter, while deceiving the public with
stories of victories never gained, battles never
. fougllt, enthusiasm and vigour which Ilnd no
existence, did most lll;siduously cnlighteli the enem}' us to the
DUIll11Crs, sitlllltion, movements and reinforccmcntB of the
allies.
Souham arrived tne 3rd of October with the last reinforce·
rnents from France, but be imagined Wellington
Ilnd sixty thousand troops aronnd Bnrgos exelu-
siyc (If the partidm;, and that three di\,jsions were
marching from Madrid to his aid; whereas none
were coming from that capital, and little more than thil't-y
thousand were neur BurgO/;, eleven thousaud being GulliciulliJ
BClIrcely 80 good as the pnrtidl1l!. The Anglo.Portuguese were
not twenty thousand, and the sick were going to the rellr
faster than the reCQvered men came up. Some unattached regi-
ments and escorts were about Scgovia, and other points nOl'th
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of the Guadarama, allll a reinforcement of five thousand men
had beau sent from England in September; but the former
belonged to Hill's nrmy, and of the latter tlle life-guards and
blues had gone to Lisbon. Onc regimcnt of foot guards and
some detachments for the line, in all tlu"ce thousand, were the
only available f'lree in the I'ellr.
During the first part of the siege, tlle English general see-
ing the lcrench scattered along the Ebro and only reinforced
by oonscripts, did 1I0t fClIr uuy intcrrulltiou, and the less so
that POphlllll was again menacing the COl.lSt line. Even now,
when the French were heginning to concentrate, he cared little
for them and WllS resolved to give battle j for he thought
Popllam and the guerillas would keep Caffurelli employed and
felt himself a match for tIle anny of Portugal: nor did the
pnrtidas [ail to harllSS the enemy. lIlina hllving obtainell
tlm~e thousand staud of English arms domineered 011 the left
huuk of tho Ebro, Durun with four tlJousalld mon WU5 Ulleon-
trolled on the right bank. The EmptX:inll.do, Villa CaIDpa, Ilnd
Bnssceour descended from Cllenca against Requena and AJba.
<.:ete. The Frayle interrupted the communications betwecn
Valencia. and Tortoza. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others
were in La Mancha and Estrcmu,duf'.L, J nan Palllrea, .ealled
tIle Medioo, was near Seg-ovil\,; and though Marquinez llad
been murdered. by one of his own men, llis part,idu and that
of JuLiau Sauchcz acted tlS regular troops with Wellington's
army.
Sir Home Pophnm, in conjunction witll J\fcndi7Jl.bcl, PorHer
and Rcnovales, again assailed Cucteria, but they were driven
thence with tbe loss of some guns on the 30th of Se}licmber,
llnd the Empecinado WIlS also defeuted at lkqueiia.. DUflln
likewise WllS beaten at Calatayud by Severoli, who withdrew
the garrison of that 1)laoc; but the Splluish chief next attacked
Ahnunia one marc1.l frolu Zllragoza, and when again Uriven
Ilwuy by Severoli, who dislIlllntk-d. the ]JIllce, lle fell ou Borja
and took it. Zllragor.a Wll8 thus deprived of outposts on tho
rigllt of the Ebro; and on the Ion bank :Mina. bovercd close
to the gates, while his lieutenant, Chaplangam, flllling 00
three hundred Ita~ians, killed forty and would have destroyed
the whole hut for the timely succour of some mounted gens-
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<l'ames. Rcille, always thinking Wellington de~igned to
march upon Z'\T'llgoza, had suftered these enterprises to avoid
spreading llis troops; now, better informed, he restored his
outposts-but the whole chain of partidas was in activity,
lIlld Bassecour had united with Villa Call1pa to harass J oscph's
quarters ut Albacetc.
While Soult WM on the march to Valencia, Elio reduced a
small French post left at Consuegra. Hill, who had left
three Portuguese regiments of infantry and onc of cavalry at
Almclldrll.lejos and Truxillo to protect his line of supply, then
entered Toledo, spread his left to AnUljueez, and was joined
by the Courtll division, Victor Alten's cavalry, and the dctucll-
mcnts qUflrtered lIhout JldcfonS09 Bnd &govia. On the 8th,
hearing of 8oult'8 arrival at HeHin he pushed his cavalry to
Bclmonte on tIle San Clemente road, and found in La. Manehs.
as in Old Castille the stories of French devastation belied by
the abunUunoo of provisions. Bassecour, Villa Campa, nnd
tho Empecinnrlo thcn united on the rond lending from Cucnea.
to Valencia, while the Me<1ico and other chiefs gathered in the
Toledo mountllins, The allies were thus extended from
Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuenca, and Cnlatayud to
near Jaca ou the left, and wcre also in military communica-
tion with the coast; for Cnffarelli's foroo WlL'! concentrated to
relie\'e Bmgos and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabel,
Renovales and Popham.
Souham, overrating the allied foroo aDd dreading defeat lIS
beiug the ouly barrier between Wellington and l<'nmoo, far
from mooit41ting an o.dvancc e.xpeetcd nt first to be ait-fleked;
and as the want of provisions would not let him concentrate
his army permanently near Monssterio his dispositions were
made to flgM on the EIJro. The minisler of
wur 1111,(1 even desired him to detach 11 divisioD.
R,,"'ll.inst the pnrtidas. But wllcn by the English
newspapers and by information seut from
Paris, he knew that Soult was in march from Grenada,-that
the king inteuued to move ul10n Mauriu,-thll.t no English
&mham'l troops had left that capital,-that Wellington's
offieill1 army was not very numerous, snd the castle of
Report,
Mss' Burgos sorel}' pressed, he called up Calfarelli
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fMm Vitorin, concentrated his own troops at Brivicsca, and
resolved to mise the siege.
00 tllC 13th a. skinnish took place at a. stream beyond
Monasterio, where captain Persse of the sixteenth dragooll3
was twice forced from the bridge and twice recovered it iu the
most gallant manner, maintaining llis post until F. Ponsollby
who commanded the reserves llrri yed. POl18onby lIut! Pel't>So
were both wounded, and this demonstration was followed by
various others until the evening of the ] 8th, when the whole
French anny was united and tl\C advanced guard captured a
piquet of Brunswickers that hall remained in St. Ollalll. against
orders. This sudden movement prevented Wellington frolll
occupying the position of l'lIolla.,t-erio, and his outposts fell
buck the 19th to Quintlluapall1 IInd Olmo!:!, behind. which 1\0
drew up Ilis army in order of bnttIe,-the right at lbellS Oil
the Arla1ll':an,-his centre ilt Riobcna. and MnjarrnclM 01\ tho
main road behind Olmos,-his left thrown hack near Soto
PlIlllcio on a small river.
1'he 201ili, Maucune, having two divisions of infantry and
one of cavalry, drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olrnos
WIIS sueo::cssflllly defended by tbe Chusseurs Brittllniques, und
MauculIe, outflanked on tlle right, wus forced back to MonllS-
terio by two divisions uuder ~ir Edwanl PlI.get. There were
now in position, including Puck's Portuguese blockading
the castle, thirty.tllrce thousand men, namely, twenty-one
thOUllSlnd Anglo-Portuguesc infantry and cavalry, eleven thou.
sand Gallicians, and the llOr5ernen of Marqlline1. and Julian
Sanehez; of these fonr thousand troopers only two thousand
six hundred were British and German, aud the Spanish horse-
mell, regular or irregular, could scarcely be colmted ill the line
of battle. The number of guns and howitzers WIIS forty-two,
including twelve Spanish pieces in equipped and scant of
anulIunition; for tbough Welliugton, who h",l IOllg fclt the
want. of artillery, sent a memoir upon the subject to the
British govcmment in the beginning of the year, bis ornnn.llee
establishment had not been augmented. Hence llis sie.;o
difficulties, and instead of ninety British and Portuguese
field-pieces, which was tllC just complement for his arm)".
he had only fifty serviceable ,![I1IlS, of which twenty-four were-
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with Hill: snd all were Eritis!l, for the Portuguese artillery
lwtl from the abuses and the poverty of their government
entirely melted away. Souham had forty-four
thousond men, nearly five thoUimnd being csvahy,
and more than sixty guns; 11 matter of DO small
importance, for beside! tll6 actual power, soldiers
are excited when the noise is greatest on their
side. Wellington stood at dillUdvll.utage iu numbers compo-
sition position and rcul strength. In his rear Wi\8 Dubretou's
castle, whose guns commanded all the fords and bridges of
the Arlanzau; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were
not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat despond-
iug snd dcteriorllted in discipline. A \1ctory oouJU scarcely
be expected, a dofMt would have beeu destructive j he should
not have provoked u battle; nor would he hlloVO done so hOO
lIe known CAffarelli's troops were united to Sollham's.
On the othcr hand Souham should have forced on an action,
bc<:ause his ground was strong his retreat open his army
powerful and compact, his soldiers fuU of confidence; his lieu-
tena.nt, Clausel, Maucune, and Foy, were of distinguished
tulcnt, nble to scoond and o.blc to suecccd him in the chicf
cOlllmand. The cho.nces of victory and profit to be derived
wcre great" the chances of defeat and dangers to be incurred
comparatively small; and it was thus he judged the matter,
for !1aucune's advance was intended to be the
prelude to a greut battle. But gcnernls aro uot
absolute mastel'S of events, and as tho extraneous
influence whicll here restrained both sides, came from afar, it
is fitting to show how in war, movements distant and appa-
rently ullconuected with those immedilltely under a gcncrul's
eye will break his ffiCllSurCll, nnd nmko llim apll(',ar undccided
or foolillh whcn ill truth he is botll wise and finn,
While Wellington was still engaged with the siege the
Cortes made him commauder of all the Spanish armies, He
had before refused this responsible sitUlltioll, hut the cir<:uu\·
smuces wero DOW chllngcd; for tllCl Spaniards, haying lost
nenrly all their cavalry find gnns in tllo 00\11'80 of the wllr,
eould not safely act except in eonncxion with the Ang-lo-
l'ortnguese forces, and it was absolutely neCeSSllr}' that vue
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JleM should direct. He therefore demandcd leave of his own
govenlment to accept the offer, observing 110wcvcr, tllat the
SplUlislJ troops were not improved in discipline equipmenls
or milit:II'Y spirit; but he tllollght that conjoined with the
British they might behave well, and so escape more of thow
terrible disasters w11ich had heretofore overwhelmed tho
country and nearly brougllt the war to a couclusion, He WlIl:I
willing to 8llve the dignity of the Spanish governmcnt by
lroving it II ccrtl:lin body of mcn whcrcwitll to operntc nfter its
own plans; but t11nt !le might exercise his own powcr dli·
ciently lInd to the llrofit of the trooll3 under himself, he desired
the English government vigorously to insist Upoll the strict
application of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish
soldiers aetiug with tllll British lIrmy, otherwise the cure of
tile Spani;;h troops would ouly cramp his 011'11 optlratiolls.
'1'0 the Cortes hia llCtlCptunce of the offer was rcnuered
dep<mJent upon the llllSent of hia own governlueut; ulld he
WlUI cn.rcful to guard himself from a dnnger not unlikel}' to
arise, uamely, that the Corte8 when he shonld tinnIly Mecllt
tlle offer, would in virtue of thllt acceptance l\.S9ume the right
of directing the whole operations of the war, The interm~­
diate want of power to move the Spanish armies he judged of
little consequence, because hithel'to bis suggestiolls ha(l bcell
cheerfully Iltt.ended to by the Sp3nish chiefa and he expected
no chuuge: he WIlS grievously l!listakeu.
Previous to this offer the Spanish government bad, ut hig
desire, dirooted BallestcrOB to cross the Moreno. and plaoo
llilllsclf lit Alcaf3z in support of the Chinchilla. fort, wllere
joined b:r CrU7. Murgaon, by Elio, llDd by tlle partidllS, he
would have had a corlls of thirty thonsand men: froUl thence,
wllile supported by Hill and haviug the mountains behind
him for a. retreat, lIe could bl),Vc safely menaced the enemy's
flank and delllyed the mareh against MllUriU, or at lellst havll
cOlUpelled the king to leave llo strong corps of obscrvulion to
watell Ilim. But Ballestcl'oo, swelling with arrogll.llt foil}",
\lcver moved from Grenada; alld whcu he found Wellington
was crcnte<1 l,'Oncnllissimo, published l~ manifesto Ilppeulillg to
the SJllIllish llridc llgaiust tile degradlltioll of serving under a
loreigner; he thus saerificc<l to lJi~ own spleen lhe wc1fnre of
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his country, but with n. result he little expccted,-for while
he judged himself 0, mllll to sway tho destinies of Spain he
suddenly fOlmd himself n. criminal and nothing more. 1'he
Cortes caused him to be arrested in the midst of his soLdiers,
who, indifferent to his fate, suffered. him to be sent a prisoner
to Ceut.a, .!.bisbal was then declared. captain-general of Anda-
lusia, and Del Po.rque WM aPIJoillted to ooUlllluud Balles--
teros' army, which geneml Verues immediately led by Jnen
towal"ds La Maneba, but the campaign was over then and
Soult was on the 'l'onnes.
That marshal had joined tlle king on the 3rd of October.
Ris troops required rest, his numeroUll sick were to be sent to
the Valeneiall hospitals, and his first inten'isw with Joseph
was of 0. warm natnre, for each had gricfs and passions to
exhale. Finally the monarch yielded to the mental power of
Ilis opponent and resolved to profit from his great military
capacity, yet reluctantly a.nd more from prudence than liking;
for Clarke the French minister of war, though
secretly Soult's enemy lUld believing, or pretend.
ing to believe the foolish c1lll.rgcs of disorderly
ambition made against him, was }'et opposed to a decided
exercise of the king's autbority until the emperor's will was
known: Hlis however would not llave restrained the king if
JourdrlD und Suchet uad 1I0t each dedi.lled aecepling l,ihief
command when JOHeph olt'cred it to them,
JOS<'ph" Cot- Soult'8 first operation w~ to r:au~ Chineh~l1a,
re3JXllldence, a \\'cll--constrncted fort, which bemg m the midst
}ISS. of bis quarters commanded the great roads so as
to compol Jlia army to move under its fire, or avoid it by eir·
cuitous rouWs. A vigorous defence was expcdorl, but on tJle
6th it fell after a few hours' attack; for a thundeNtorm sud·
dcnly arising in a clear sky and discharging itself Upoll tlll~
fort killed the governor and mauy other persoM, whereupon
the gurrisoll, inllucnced it is said by superstitious fear, eurrcu·
dered. This wus the first fruit of Ballcsteros' disobedience.
For neither could &ult Imve tukcn Chinchilla, nor scattered his
troops as he did, at Albacetc, Almanza, Yecla, and IIcllill, if
thirty t\lousalld Spuniw"Js had been posh,-d hetw(.'Cll Alcaraz
and Chinchilla., supported L}' thirty thom;aud ,Auglo-Por·
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tuguese at Toledo under Hill. Those scattered quarters were
required to feed the army of the south, which undcr covcr of
Chinchilla was thus sofely co.ntoned while the great convoys
of sick, of maimed men and Spanish families, proceeded
leisurely to Valencia. The cavalry then scoured Lo. Maneha
and drove Bassecour and Villa Campa to Cuenca, but the
great operations which succeeded belong to another place; it
Illust he1'\1 suffice to say that J oseph, Laving now seventy thou-
SIlnd men, was able to hold Valencia while lIe advanced towards
the Ta.,,"Us, and that he scnt Soubam ll~ent orders to act ill
concert without risking a battle. Hill also, being thus
menaced and reduced by Ballesteros' defection to defend the
Ta.,,"'Us when it was becoming fordable in all placcs, gave notice
of the danger to Wellington. JoseplJ's letter WIIS desjlutclJetl
on the 1st of October, llllU six others followed in 8UCCC8Sioll
day by duy, yet the IMt carried by colonel Lucotte first reached
&mham; the advantages of tIle allies' central position and
the value of the pllrtidss were here mude manifest. Hill's
letter, only despatched the 17th, reached Wellillgoon at the
saIDe moment that Joseph's reached Souham. The latter
genortll was thus forced to relinquish his design
of fighting on tIle 20th; nevertheless, having but
four da.rs' provisionB left, he designed when those
should be consumed to attack notwithstanding the king's pro-
hibition, if Wellington should still confront him. But the
English geueral eOllsidelwg that his own anny, already in a .
verr tTitical situation, would be quite isolated if the king
8Iloul<l, liS was prllbllble, force the o.tlics from the Tagns,
resolveJ, though with a. bitter pang, to raise the siege and
retreat so far aa wonld enable him to secure hill junction with
Hill.
While the armies were in presence some figMing had
place at Burgos, Dnbretoll again obtained possession of tlle
Sun ROIlUUl cllUrch but WllS driven away llext morning j llntl
then, the retreat beiug decided, mincs of destruction were
formed in the horn-work by the besiegers, and the guns and
stores were removed from the batteries to the p,lre at Villa
Toro. But the grcatest part of the draught animals had
been sent to ReyDOsa. to meet the powder and artillery
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coming from &mtander, and hence the eighteen-pounders
eould not be carried off, nor from some error were the
miues of destnlctiou exploded. The rest of the stores and
llOwitzers were sent by ViIlatou and Frandovinez to Celada
del Camino, and the siege was raised after five assaults
severnl sullies and thirty-tbree days' investment, during whieh
the besiegers lost more thfin two tbousnnd mell and the
besieged six hundred in killed or wounded: t11e French also
suffered severely from continual labonr want of water and
bad wenther, for the fortress was too small to sllclter the
garrison and the greater Imrt bivollll.eked between the lines of
defence.
RETREAT FROM BURQOS.
This cnforced nnd remarkable opcrntion Will! commcnced
on the nigllt of the 21st by a measure of great nicety aud
boldness; for the road, divarieating at Oamolll\l, led to tbe
bridge of Villaton all the onc hand and the bridge of llurgos
on the other, and Wellington ehose the Iatter,8s bei.ng tbe
shor~est, though it jmsseU tho Arlauzan river close under the
guns of thc eMtlc. Tho army quitted tho position after dark,
. the artillery-wheels were mnllled with stroll', oud defiled
ovcr tile britlge of Burgos with sueh silence and celerity that
Duhreton, watchful and suspicions as he was, knew not.lling
of their march until the partidas failing in nerye commenced
galloping; then he poured a tlcstruetive fire tlown, but soon
lost the rouge. By this delicate opcrutiou the infantry guined
Celladllo dol Camino oud Honnillns that night, hut the light
clIvalry hflltetl at Estepar (mel the bridge of Villa Banie\.
Souham did not discover the retrcat until the eveniIlg of the
22nd, and was fain to follow and by a forcro march overtake
the allies, whereas, if Wellingtoll to avoid the fire of the castle
hml gone by Villuton unu }'r:mtlovincz t·he }'rench might
Illlve forestalled him at Celloda del CamillO.
On t11e 23rt"! the infantry crossed the Pisucrga at Cm·do-
villas aud Torquemada, above and below its junction with tho
Arlam.an; but wbile the maill body made this long marc1l,
the French, having Imssed Burgos in the night of the 22nd,
\·igorously attaeketl the rear-guard eommantlcd by sir Staple.
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ton Cotton. It wns strongly composed of 011 the cavalry,
two troops of horse artillery under NonUlm Rnmsa.y and
Downman, two German battalions under Colin Halket, and
the partldas of Mnrquinez and Sancbez who were beyond the
Arlanzan. The cavalry piquets were first yigorously driven
from the bridge of Baniel as early as seven o'clock, but they
rallied ou their reseryetl aud disputed the Horm:l~ stream,
where cnptflin Fersse of the sixteenth dmgoons made 0. charge
of distinguished bravery: finally however the pa6SIlg'e WIIS
forced and the British took post in a plain bellind Cellada.
Camino. On their left a range of hills was occupied by tlle
partida of Marquinez, on their right was the Arlanzan,
beyoud whicll J ulian Sanchez was placed. Across llLe middle
of the Illain run a marshy rivulet, cutting the main rood and
only passable by Ilo little bridge near ll. house called the Vent1lo
de Pozo; and half wo.y between this streo.m find Cellada there
was a broad ditch with a second bridge in front of a small
village. Cotton retired over the marshy rivulet, leaving
Allsoll's horseluen und Halket's illfautry ns a rear-guRrd
beyond tllO ditclJ; and Anaon, to CO\'er his own pliI>suge of
that obstacle, left the chwentll dragoons Ilond the guug at
Cellada Camino, which was situated on a gentle eminence.
Whell the French approached Cellada, major Money of the
eleventh, galloping from ilie left. of the village at the head of
two squadrons overturned their lending llOrsemen, aud l·he
artillery plied them briskly with shot; but tlle main body
advancing at 11 trot along the road outflanked the British,
eompellillg Money to fall back white the guns retired over the
bridge of Venin de Pozo. Meantime tile French general
Curto, ascending the lliH on his right with a brigade of
lIussars followed by Boyer's dragoous, put Marquinez' partidll
to flight. A deep ravino run along the foot of these hillb,
it could only be passed at certain places, and towards the first
of them the pnrtidns gallopcd at the moment wllcn t1le lend·
ing Freneh squadrons on the plain were forming in front of
Cellada to attack the ele\'enth regiment. 'Ibe latter charged
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and drove the first line upon the 6etond, but then both linos
coming forward together the eleventh wefe pushed preci.
pitately over the ditch in confusion, yd with small lOBs, being
covered by the fire of Hnlkct's (krmnns 'who were in the
village behind tIle bridge. The ditch was IlOW turned by
Curta'n cavalry all the llilla apd Anson fell back, designing to
cross the bridge of Venta. de rozo; but then llIarquinez' I,ar.
t.ida came pouring from the hills in flight pursued by the
Frencl1 hussars, wllO mixed with the fugitives aud the whole
mass dashed all tlle flank of the sixtecll'th drugaons then
covering AnSOll's movements j and at the same moment the
enemy's squadrons, who had meanwhile crossed the ditch,
1.:hargeJ. The partida chief was wounded, colonel Pelly uod
auotuer officer were takell with thirty of the e!eventll, llllU
the regiment was uriveu in disorder on tbe reserve3. Whilo
the }'reneh were reforming after this eharge Anson got over
the rivulet and drew up beyond it on the left of the road,
whieh was defended b)' Halket's iufantry aud the guns, whidl
being supported by the German heavy cavalry presented an
imposing mass.
Hitherto the action had been sustained by (Jlauscl's cavalry,
but now Cll.lfarelli's horllCmen, namely, thc Illneers of Berg
the fifteenth dragoons and some squadrons of 'gens.d'armea,·
all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet, finding it im~
passable, with a quick and daring decision they wheeleJ to their
right uml despite of the hell.\'y pounding of the lU'tillcry
trotted over the bridgo und formed line in ol'Position to tbe
German drngoons. Their !)osition was dangerous, but they
were fun of mettle nlld thouglt the Germans, who had let too
mnny come over, charged with a rongh shock and broke the
right, the French left had the advantage and the others
rallied j then begall a dose and fUl'ious sword contest;, yet
the [lfJIUJ-d'armei! fought so ficrecl>' tlmt tho Gnmans, mallgrB
their si7.e find collrnge, lost ground ll!ul finnlly gave way ill
disorder. The Frendl followed on the spur with sllrill lllUI
eager cries, and Auson's brigade, ouHlanketi and threatened
on both sides, fell back also, but not happily, for Boyer's
drngoolls having coutinued tllcir murch by the hills to ,the
vilh1ge of lLl.1lmCCll Imd there o.;roBscd the ravine aud 11011'
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Came thundering in on the left: then the British ranks were
broken, the regiments got intermixed and all wont to tbe
rear in confusion: finally however the Germans extricated
themselves and formed a fresh line to the left of the road
upon which the otbers mllicd.
The gens-d'a1'TtW8 IUld lanoors having Buffered severely
from the artillery and in the Bword-fight now halted, but
Boyer'a dragoons, ten sqnadrons, again came to the charge,
and though the German officers rode gullnntly forward and
their men followed a short way the enemy was too powerful
and the swift.nes8 of the English horses Illone llrevculed a.
terriblo ffitastrophc. Somo favourable ground enabled the
line to re-form once more, yet it WlLS only to be ngain broken,
and Wellington, who was present, lllaced Halket's infantry
and all the gnns in a position to covcr the disordered masses.
These troops remained tranquil until the cnemy came gallop-
iug down, when the power of tbe muskllt was quickly mado
manifest; a tempest of bullets Cllllltied the French saddles by
scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen, after three
fruitless' attempts to charge, each weaker than the other,
reined up and drew off to the hills. The British cavalry
covered by the infllulry l!len retrcated to Qo.int.alla la Pucnte
near the Pisucrgn., and the bivouaes of thc enemy wcre esta-
blished at Villadiego. The loss was considerable on both
sides; the French suffered most j but they took a colonel and
seventy other prisoners, and before the fight captured a small
commissariat store near Burgos.
While the rear-guard was thus cngaged, drunkenncss and
insubordination the usual concomitants of an English rctrcat
were exhibited at Torqucmada, where the grcat wine-vltults
were invnded and it is said twelve thousand men were at one
time in a state of helpless inebriety. In this crisis the
English gencral, who had 1I0W retreated some fifty miles,
seeing the ellemy so hot llud mellllcing in llursllit resolved
to check his course, because the means of trausport being
BCllDty and tllC weather bad, the con"oys of sick and wounded
""'ere sWl on the wrong aide of t11e Duero. Wherefore,
having by a short march crossed the Carrion at its conflu-
ence with the PisuCl"ga, he h.Jted behind it, aud Will> there for.
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tuuately joined by a regiment of the guards, nnd by detach·
Jllents coming froUl Coruiia. HiB IJositioll, extending from
Villa Muricl to Duellus below the meding of the waters, was
strong, being along a rimge of hills, lofty yet descending with
an easy sweep to the Carrion which covered his left, while
the Pisuerf,'a secured his right willg. A detachment was em·
pJoyed to destroy the bridge of Bmios on the PiBuergn, a hat-
talion of the roynls WIlS sent to aid tho Spaniards in destro)'-
illg the bridgca at Paleneia; and some houses and convents
beyond t11e rivers furllisJlCd good posts, behind whieh the
bridges of Muriel and San Isidro 011 the Carrion and that of
Dueiills Oil the Pisuerga could be broken.
Souham excited by bis success canllonaded the rear-guard
at 'forquelll.lU1a, passed the Pisuerga, directed l'oy's division
upon Palencia, llud sent Maucunc with an advanced-gunrd
I\gninst the bridges of Billl08, Tsidro, and :M:uriel; bllt he
luutcd himself at Magoz; and if fame d~s not lie, because the
number of Frendl drunkards at Torquemada were even more
numerous than those of O\e British arm)'.
COllnAT ON THE CAlillION.
Before tho enemy appeared the hills wcre crowned by tIle
allies, the bridges nlined and tlwt of San Isidro protected by a
convent filled with troops. But in the divisional aTTilngements
the advantage of a dry canal with high banks and parallel to
the river was not sufficiently considered, nor was the village of
Muriel oooullied in suflicient strength. Foy soon reached
Palelleia, where, according to SOllle :French writers, under
}ll'lJtenoo of 0. parley a treacherous attempt was mnde to kill
him; but he drove the allies from the town so hastily that
aIL the bridges were abandoned mulamaged, and tlle French
ca.va.lry crossing gllthered np baggage and prisoners. Tbis
untoward event cQlupeUed Wellington to throw back his left,
composed of the fifth division Ilnd Spaniards ut Muriel, tbus
offcring two fronts, one facing PlIlencia tho other the Carrion.
Meanwhile Maucune, first dispersing the 8th CIlol;Morcs lit a
ford between San Isidro IInd Muricl, came with a strong body
of infantry and guns ullon the latter place just as a mine
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was fired to destroy the bridge. The exp1osion chocked the
French, but suddenly u. horsellltJu dartiug out ut fuU speed.
rode down under a flight of bullel-s calling out that he was II
d~rter; he reached the edge of the chasm, violently checked
his foaming horse, held up his bands, and exclaiming tllat he
was a lost man with hurried accents asked if there was no
fonl. The good-natured soldiers llointetl to one and the
gallant fellow looked cnrnestly for u few 1l10menta as if to fix
the exact point, but then wheeling 11ill horse, kissed his lumd
in derision and hending over his SIIddle-bowdashed back to his
own oomrades amidst showers of shot and shouts of laughter
on both sides. The next moment Maucnne protected by a
concentrated fire of guus passed the river at the ford thus
discovered, uud lit the bridgo by mcnus of Inddcrs; he nlso
made some prisoners in the village llnd lined the dry hed
of the canul.
But just then Wcllington eoming up turned some guns on
the enemr, aod desired geneml Oswllld commanding the 5th
division to retake the villlLh"e and CIInal. Osww.d expressed
0. doubt if they oould be held when retaken. Wellington
whose retreat was endangered by the enemy's presence was
peremptory; he directed general BRrnes with one brigade
against the main body, and unotller nnder general Pringle. to
clear the canal. The first body was reillforeed with Spauiards
and HnlDswickers and a sharp fire of artillery and mUllketry
ensued, but the cannon· shot from the other side of the river
plumped heavily into tIle reserves, the Sp$lnillrds got into oonfu-
sion and were falling back, when their fiery countryman, Mil\uel
Alavll, with exhortation and example, for though wounded he
would not retire, urged them forward to the fight. Finally the
eucln,. was driven oyer the river, the village was rc-oceupied
iu feree aud the ~mlll was strongly liued. Other troops
had Ilttcmptcd without snccess to soi7.e the bridge of San
Isidro; there the mine WfIS exploded; bllt Ilt the bridge of
Banos on the Pisnerga the mine failed, Ilnd tIle French cavalry
galloping over made both tIle working and oovering party
prisoners. This sapped the strength of the position. Souhsm
could nsoomhle his urlllY on the allies' left by Puleucia and
force them to action with their back upon the Pisuergu, or he
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could pass that river by Ilia own left and forestall them on the
Duero at Tudl.\la. If Wellingtoll passed the Pisuerga by the
llridgc of Ducnas, Souham having the initial mOVll might be
first on the ground in front while Foy's division came down
on the rear. If by a. rapid rnoyement along the right hank or
!J1C Pisuerga he sougllt to gain the Duero by Cabezon, which
was the next bridge on his rear, Souham, moving along the
left hank of the fanner river, might fflll upon him in march
and while hampered bctwecll the Ducro the IJisuerga and the
Esquevilla: and once cut off from the Ducro he must have
retired tllro\lgh Valladolid and Simancas to 'J.'oruesillas or
Toro, giviug up llis communications with Hill In this
critiClll state of afli:lirs, keeping good watch upon the left of the
Pisuergn, and knowing the ground there was rugged the roads
narrow and b.'1d, whil~ on the right bank tlley wcre good and
wide, be sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, aud with.
dmwing the troops before dayhreak on the 2Gth made a
clean Tllllrch of sixteen miles to ClIuezou, pnssed to the left of
the Pisllergn and oolTicaded and mined the bridge. Thell
sending a detachment to llOld the bridge of Tndcla on the
Duero behind him, he caused the sc\·enth division nnder lord
Dalhousie to scenrc the bridgea of Yalladolid, Simaneas, und
To.rdesillU!>. 'rhe Duero was in full water, and being thus
lISsurcd of 0. rctrcut he Uocrniu lmltcd, pnrtl)· because the ground
was favourable, pnrtly to give the eommisSlIry.generul Rellnedy
time for indispensable arrangements.
This fuuctionary had gone to England sick in the latter
end of 1811 and returned to the army only the day hefore
tile siege of Durgos WllS raised. On his wa)' from Lisbon he
found the inexperience of the gentlelllllll ac~ing during !tis
absencc had caused serions mischief. The mUo"'UZin(ls cstab-
JisJloo between Lisbon and Badajos and from thence by
AIllluraz to the valley of the TUo"lls, for the supply of the
anny in lIadrid, had not been rellloved when the retreat
colllmeneed, and Sonlt would have found them full if his
mllreh hud been made rapidly on that siJ.e; on the oUler huud
the ll\!Igazincs ou the line of opcrntiol1J> betweeu Lisbon and
&lllmllllcn were nearly erupt,y. Hc had thercfo:-e to remove
the magnllncs south of the 'l'lIgns and bring up stores upon
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the line of the present retreut. His dispositions were not
completed when Wellington desired him to remove the sick
and wounded and every other ineumbmlloo from Salamanca.,
promising to hold his position until the operal.ion was effected.
The means were indeed suffieicI\t, but the negligence of
many medicnl and escorting officers CQndueting the convoys
of sick to the rear, and the cOllsequcllt bad conduct of
the soldiers, for where the ofliccrs are cureless the soldiers will
be licentious, produced the worst effects. OutrageA were
perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march,
terror was everywhere predominant, the ill-used drivers and
mulcteers deserted, some with some witllout their cnttle,
uud Kenuedy's opemlion was disastrous. The CQlluuissariat
lost llWrly all the animuls nud currillgcs employed, the vil·
lages were udaudoncd, and the under CQmmissarics were
bewildered or Jlaralysed by the terrible disorder thus spread
along the line.
Souham repaired the bridges and resumed pursuit tlle 26th
by the right of the Pisuergu, detcrred proba'.oly from taking
the left bank by the rugged Mture of the grouud nnd the king's
orders not to risk a. serious action. Early on the 2itli he
was ia front of Cabezon, but contented himself with a cannonade
and displlly of his force. The first cost the allies colonel
Robe of the artillery, a pruetised officer and a worthy man;
the second eualllml the EugliJ;h geneml, fOI' the first time. to
count the. numhers he had to contcnd with and to discover that
he could hold neither the Pisuergn nor the Duero permanently.
However, his object being to gain time, he still held his position,
and when the lheneh, leaving a divisiou in front of Cabczon
ex;tended their right by Cigales and Valladolid to Simaneas, lie
caused the briJgCI:I ut the two Illtter lJlaccs to be destroyed
in succession. Harpr that he had not fought in front of
Burgos with 80 powerful an army he now resolved to go
behind tlle Duero and fiuully over the Tormes; but as Hill
would then be exposed to a. flank attack and the more
eutainly if ill.fortune befell the troops ou the Ducro, he
ordered him to retreat, giving a discretion as to the line hut
desiring him if possilJlc to come by the GUlldlll"'Jlllll pusses;
for he designed to unite 011 the AJaju. river, and from thut
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central positioll, if occasion offered, to keep Souham in cheek
with a part of his army and with the remainder fall upon
&wlt.
011 the 28th Soubam, nlwaya illtent to disloclge the lI11ies
from their p!Jsition by turning their left, cudcavoured to force
the bridges at Val111dolid find Simancas on the Pisllcrga, ami
that of 'l'ordesillas ou the Duero. The first was defended by
lord Dnlhousie, but colonel Halket finding the French
strong and eager at the second destroyed it, and detached
the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin thut of TordesillllS,
which was done aud it. tower behind the ruins occupied. 'l'ho
remainder of the Brunswiekcrs entered a pine wood some
distnnce off, and when the French arrived, sixty offioof$
and snb-officus headed by captain Guingrot, a daring mall,
formed a snwJl raft to hold their arms and clothes lmd
plunged iute the water, holding- their swords with their
teeth, swillllUing and pushing their mft before them, Umler
JlfotcctiOll of a call1lonatle they crossed thiB great river,
though it was in full and strong water and the weather
very cold, and ho.\-1ng reached tlle other side naked as
th"y were slormeu tlle tower: the Bruuswick rugimeut then
abandoned the wood und the gallaut Freuchmeu remained
lllasters of the bridge.
When Wellingtou heard of the attack at Simancas, and had
seen the whole French army in march by its right along the
hills beyond the Pisuerga the evening of the 28th, he dCRtroyeJ
tile bridges at Vulladolid anJ Cabef;on und crOSilCd the Duero
ut 'l'udela and Pucuto de Duero 011 the 2!)tIJ, But scorccly
ha.d he effected this operntion when intelligence of Guingret's
splendid action at Tordesillas reached him, and with the
decision of a great eaptain he instantly marched by his left
until he reached the heigllts between Hueda. and Tordesillas;
there Oil the 30th he frouted the enemy, forviddiug furlher
Jlfogt"C!l!l; for though the bridge had been alrcndy rellllircd
by the Frenell, Souham's main body IlIl.d 1I0t arrived, and
Wellington's menacing position was too signiticant to be
Illcmnderstood. 'l'he bridges of Toro and Zumora were now
destroyed by detachment!!, and though the Fc'cneh comlllclleed
fCl)luriug the former tb\: jUlletiull WiUl Hill';; llrmy W~
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insured. The English general, thinking t-he bridge of 'l'oro
could no~ be restored for flCveral days. even bOlKld to maintain
the line of the Duero pttnWlently, Upect.illg tha~ Hill, of
'l'rhoee operatiolU i~ is no'l'r time io speak, w<v.l.!d ~ on t.he
Adaja by &he 8rd of No,oembcr.
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FRENClt PAS!lAGF, OF TUR TAGUS,-RETR£AT FOOM ltAUnm.
JOSEPH designed to unite gTcat part of Suc11ct's forces to his
own, and Soul!., probably influenced by a false report that
Balletltcr08 lllld actually reached La MlIuclm, urged tbis
measure. Suclwt resisted He suid Valencia must be well
defended ~inst the increasing power of the Anglo-SieiJian
and Spanish armies at AHeaDt, because until the French army
could open a new line of communication with Zaragoza
Valencia would be the only base. Josepll then resoh·ed to
incorporato part of Soult's army with his own and give the
command to Drom.'t, who was to move by the l'Ql~d of Cucnca
and TnT/lOeon towards the Tagus. This armngement dic-
tated by a desire to advance Drouet's authority was displeas·
ing to Soult; he urged that his army, so constituted physi_
cally and morally as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed
its excellence to its peculiar org~lIizatioll awl it would be
dQngerou~ to brcuk thot 11p. Nor was thore good reason fur
the change; for if Joseph only wished to be strong on tho
Cuenca. road, his own army could be reinforced with one or
two divisions, and the whole nnite again on the Tagus with-
out injury to the army of tIle south. Better he said to
incorporate the king'l; army with hia und march aLtogether
by the rood of Sun Clomonre, leaving 0. few troops on the-
Cuenca. rood, who might }lC reinforeed by Sllehet. But if tho
king's desire was to march in person Voi.th a large body he
could do so witb. greater dignity by joining the army of the
south on the main line of operations. Joscph's reply was a
peremptory order to obey or retire to }'mnee, and Droue!
marched to Cncncn.
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Soult had thirty-five thousand infautry, six thousand excellent
Cllvlllr}' and sevcnty-two guns, making witll the Imp<!rlal
llrtiller}'men a total of forty-si.x: thous:~ud veterau :UU61tr roIl1,
combatMM. The king's llrmy including thc MSl'!.
guards was twelve thousand, two thousand being ea"alry
with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eight thousaud T ~, ".
. . . . ~«l(:P" & v.or-fightmg men and elghty-four PieceS of artlllcl)' N!l1100ndeau,
were in motiou to drive Hill from the Tagus. Ml'!S.
Joeeph designed to pasa that river Dud opcl"'oile agail18t Wel-
lington's rellr if he should continue the siege of Burg05; but
if he concentrated on tIle Tagus, Souharn was to
menace llis rear by Arllnda de Duero Md tbe
Somosierra; sending detachments towards Guada--
Isxlll'3, to be met by other detachments coming
from thll king through Sacedon. :Fillally if Wel-
lington, lIS indeed happened, should abundon both Burgos
and Madrid the united Frcneh forces were to drive him into
Pcrtugal.
The march of Soult's sick convoys to Valencia, and other
difficulties, retarded the movement and the kiug became
uneasy for his supplies; becaU8C the !,eoplc of La. Mancha,
still remembering Montbrnn's deVllStlltions, were again flying
with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition
were beoome exceedingly expert in evading the resea.rehes of
the foragers. Such however is the great advantage of disci.
Illino and order, that wllile La 1llllucha was thus desolate
fMm fcar, confidence and tranquillity rcigne<l in Valencia.
Joseph milrched on the 18th upon Cuenca, where be found
Drouet with a division of Soult's infantry und some cavalry.
lie then proceeded by Tarancon, the only artillery road on
that side lelliliug to the Tagus, while Soult moved by SaIl
Clemente upon Ocann and Amnjuez. Hill immediately Beut
that lIotiec to Wellington whieb caused the rctrcut fMm
Burgos, and conccntrated his own forees OD the Tagus; his
right was at Toledo his left at Fuellte Duefias; aDd there
were Spanish Md Portuguese troops in the valley of the
Tag-us lIS fur BB Taluvem. TIle Tllgus was however fOr,lllble
from its juuction with the Jarnma llcur ArUlljucz upwards;
and this line could uot ellJJily be supported, lIS the troops
\'or.. I\'. n II
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would have been too dialrUlt from the Iloint of actioll if the
French 0llcratcd against Toledo. Hill t.herefore drew llis left
behind thr, TD.jUUll, whicll is a br~nch of the JarnmfL running
nearly parallel to the Tagus; his right occullied strong ground
from Aiiover to Toledo, he destroyed t.he bridges at Aranjuez,
and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and
HeulU'cs, called the Puenle Lo.rga, threw one of boats over
the former rivcr a little above &yOllll. The light divisiou
and Elio's troop5, on the extreme left, then mUlched upon
Arganda, Skerrett's brigade arrived from CHdiz, and including
the Spanisb regulars forty thousand men were in line, while
a multitude of partidas hovered aOOut. 'I'he lateral commu-
nications werf! eas~', the scouts, passing over the bridge of
Toledo, covered all the country beyond the 'l'ogus, and the
bridges fit each cnd of the line furnished means to sally upon
the flanks of a foroo attacking the front: it required several
marches to force the right, and on the left the Jarnma with
its marshy banks and lllany confluents olTered positiolls for
interposing between tbe euelllY IInd Madrid.
Dronet pllAAed t11e Tagtls the 29th at the nbundonctl fords
of Puente Duciias and Villa Maurique; the king went with
his guards to Zllrza de la Cruz j and Soult, whose divisioWl
w~re coming fast up to Ocaiin, restored the bridge of Aran-
jucz, Iiud passed witb his advanced guard. On the 30th he
attacked Cole at the Puente Lnrgli; the mines fuiled und tue
French nttemptcd to Cllrry the bridge with tile bayonet but
were vigorously repulsed by the forty.seventh under Skerrett;
after a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost
tho allies sixty meu the attempt was relinquished. Had thc
Puente Larga been forced the fourtll division
which was at Anover would have been cut oft'
from Madridj but tbe weatber bei.ng thick and
rainy Soult could not discover what supporting
force was on the high land of Valdcllloro behind the bridge,
nud was "fmid io lJUsh fOflHml too fas~. Disconteuted with
this Mution JosCJlh designed to operote by Toledo, but
during the night tbe Puente Lnrga Wag abandoned, ami Soult,
still in doubt of Hill's real object, advised Joseph to unite the
amlY of the centre at Arganda. and ChinellOll, throwing
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bridges for retreat at Villa ~Iaurique and Fuente Duefia.s as So
precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill's move-
ment was however 1I. dedded retreat, which would have
commcnccd twenty-four hours sooner but for the fnilure of tho
mincs and the combat at the Pucnte Larga, for the ordcr to
retreat had reached him when 8ou1t first appeared on the
'f!lo"1ls; and the affair was so sudden, that the light division
which had just come from Alcala to Argandn to close the
left, was compelled to return again witllout hulttng in tllC
night, a march of forty miles.
Hill had lI. discretionnry power to retire by the valley of
the Tagus or the Ouadarama; /l. position in the former taken
Oil the flank of the enemy would have llrevented the king
from passing the Guado.rl.lrnn and at the same time ha.v"
covered Lisbon; n retreut by the Oundaromu exposed Lislx)1\j
but thinking the valley of the Tngus in that adwmeed season
would not support the French anny, alld knowing Welling_
ton to be preS!led by superior forces, he chosc the Guadarama.
Wherefore, burning his pontoons and causing La China and
the stores f1lmuining there to be b10wed up in the night of
the 30UI, he retreated by different roads and lmitcd Ilis army
the 31st nellJ' MlIjlldahonda. This movement uncovered the
magazines, so negligently left along the line of commwli-
c~tion to J3aclajosj the enemy could have scnt men to seize
them; nor were the removal and destruction of the stores in
Undrid effected without disorders of 11 singular nature. The
mnnieipality demanded an the provis.ioll remaining there, Wl
if for the enemy, and when refuse<! excited a mob to attack
t·he mllgnzines; firing evcn took place and the fourth dh'ision
was called in to restore order. Some w11eat being finally givell
to the poorest of the poojlle Madrid was abaudoned, aud
it was ufi'ceting to see the earnest aud true friendship of the
!)()llU[ation. Men women and children, crowding around the
troops bewailed tlleir departure, and moving with them in
oue vast mass for more than two miles left their houses empty
when the French eavalry SCOllts were at the gates on the
other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling,
because there was a very btrong French party ill )fudrid, llnd
among the eauSCll of wailing, tbe return of the plullderim; ulld
""2
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cruel partidas: unchecked by the pr.:sence of the British was
vcr)' loudl)' procluimed. The Mudrileiios have been stigma_
tized as fL snvoge and faithless people, tile British army found
them patient, gentle, generous and loyaL Nor is this fact 00
be disputed because of the riot which OC'Curred in the destruc_
tion of the magazines; for the provisions had been obtained
by requisition from the country around MalIrid, under an
agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the end of
the wlIr; aud it was natural for the people, e:x:cited as: they
were by the authorities, to endeavour to get tlleir own
flour back rather than ha.ve it destroyed when tlley were
starving.
With the Allglo-Portuguese troops' marched Penne Ville-
mur, Alorillo and CarlQS d'Espai'lB; and it WillI Wellington's
wish that Elio, Bassecour llnd Villa Campa. should throw
themselves inw the valley of the Tagus, cross tile bridge
of Arzobispo and join Ballesteros's army under Virues. A
great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left
U)' Hill in Estremudum, would tllus have heen pluced ou tIll;!
flank of an)' :French army mnrching upon Lisbon; and if the
enemy neglected this line the Spaniards could operate agaiU!t
Madrid or against Suchet at plcasure, Elio however, being
cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the
bridge of Auiiion near SaCedou and was there joined by Villa
GIUUpa lInd the Empecinado. Soult meauwhile brou;;bt up
his army as quickly as possible to VllldlJffiOro, and his infor-
mation Ill! 00 Hill's real force WIlS becoming more distinct; but
there was also Il. rumour tllllt Wellington was close at band with
three British divisions, and the Freneh marshal's movements
were CQnsequently cautious, lest lle should find himself suddenly
engaged in bllttle before his whole foroo was eollected; for his
reor WllJl still at Oeafia and the amy of the centre hnd not
yet passed the Tnjuiln. This disllosition of his trooj)S IYftS
probably intentional to prevent the king from fightiug; for
Soult did not think this a fitting time to fight a battle unless
upon great advantage, In tile disjointed state of their affair:;
l\ tlefout would llUve been morc illjurioU!. to the }~rellcll thau
a vir-tory would have been beneficial; the former would have
lost Spain, the latter would not have gained Portugal.
No,", 1812.] BOOK XIX,-CnAP. O. 373
November.
On the 1st of November, U1C bulk of thellormr being assem-
b}C(1 at Gctafr., Soult scnt scouting parties in 11.11
directions to feel for the allies and to ascertain
the dircetion of their march; the next day the anny of the
centre joined him not far from Madrid, but Hill was then in
full retreat for the Guadarama, covered by a l>owerful rear-
guard under Cole, Sou[t pursued ou the 3rd, uud the king
entering Madrid placed a garri~on III the Hctiro for the pro-
tection of his court find of tlle Spanish families nttllched to his
cause: hitherto moving in onc great convo)' they had im_
peded all the movements of the army of the centre, but being
now disposed of Joseph rejoined Soult at tlle Guadarama with
his guards, "'hieh always moved as a separale body. He had
left Palombini beyond the 'l'ngus ncor Tnrnnoon to SCOur the
ro"ds on the side of Cnenes, but some dragoons sent toward9
Buete were surprised by the partidas and lost forty men,
whereupon Palombini rejoined the flrmy.
Hill was moving upon Arevalo, when fresh orders founded
on new combinations ch311ged the direction of his march.
Soubam had repaired the bridge of Toro the 4th, several days
sooner than was expected, and tlllls Wellington, wllile watch-
ing to join Hill on the AlIll.ja, was again baffled; that move-
ment could not then be made lest Soubam should from
Toro and Torllesillas foUow the rear. Nor, if Hill came up,
could Souham be attacked for want of meaus to IA'ss the
Duero, llnd Soult wonld then reach the Tormes. In fine, the
allies' centml position being no longer available, general Hill
was ordered to gain Alba de Tonnes at once by the way of
Fontiveros,. and on the 6th Welli~«ton also fell back to San
Christo"al in front of Salamanca.
Joseph, thinkiug to prevent the junction of tlle allies, had
gained Arevalo by the Scgovia road the lith, Soullllm's scouts
were met with at Medina del Cnmpo the 8th, and for the first
time since he had quitted Valencia the king obtained news ofthe
army of Portugal. One hnndred thousand combatants, twelve
thousnnd being ca.vnlry with a. hundred and thirty pieces of
artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which,
three months before Marmont had marclled with so much
confidence to his own destruction. Soult, then cx!lelled from
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Andalusia by 'Marmont's defeat, was now, after having made
half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal
tlmt very llrmy whose victory had driven him from the south;
IInd as Wellington had fOfCSe<:1l Ilnd foretold, the recovery of
Andalusia, llOliticIll1y important and useful AA it WM, proved
injurious to himself; it had concentrated a mighty power to
escape from which both skill Ilnd fortune were necessary;
and the Spnnish armies, let loose by this uniou of all the
French troops, kept nloof, or coming to aid were found a
burtLen.
On the 7th Hill passed the Tormes at Alba Md mined the
bridge, the light division and Long's cavalry remaining on the
right bllOk during the night. Wellington held San Christovllt,
, ,
. ,,__ and the king, even at this late period, was douht-
.oatp,! ......,.
rcIlX'''deQC'', ful if Ballesteros's troops Ilad or had not joined the
MS8. allied army at Avila. WdlillgWu also was uncer-
tain of the king's uumoorll, uut designed to maintain the
TomlCs pCTTTlnnently fmd give his troops repose. Ho had
retreated two hundred miles, and Hill had retired the same
distance besides his marcll from Estremadurn. Skcrrett had
COllle from Cadiz, lIUU all required rest, for the soldiers,
especially thoso who besieged Burgos, had been in the field
with scarcely an interval of repose since January; the infantry
were barefooted, tILeir equipments spoiled, the cavalry weak,
t11e horses out of condition, the discipline of all failing, The
excesses committed on the Burgos lino hav'c been shown, and
during the first dny's rnlll'eh from the Tagus, five hundred
of tlle rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one regiment., finding
the inllllbitants had fled according to custom whichever side
was llpprooclling, broke open the houses plundered and got
drunk: a multitude were left in the ccllara of Vll.ldemoro and
two Inmdred and fifty (ell into the hands o( the enemy. The
rt'llt of the retr,eat being unmolested was made with more
rcgularit.r. but the excesses still eOlllmitted furuished glariug
evidence that tho moral conduct of a general cannot bo fairly
judged by following in the wake of 0. retreating nnny, There
was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the
men, and yet the author of this history oounted on the first
day's mllrch from Madrid seventeen bodieti of murdered
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peasanb; by whonl killed, or for what, whether by English
or Germans, by Spaniards or Portuguese, in dispute, in rob-
bery or in wanton villany was unknown j but their bodies
were in tho ditches, and a shallow observer might thence havo
drawn foul and false conclusions against the English general
Bnd nation.
.Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran
troops with the stafi' officers. The assembling of the sil.:k Ulell
at the place and time preseribed to form the eonvors was
punctually attended to 'by the regimental officcrs,-not so by
the others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide
the means of transport,-hcnee delay and greut suffering to
tIle sick, ami the wearing out of healthy men's strength by
wniting with their knnpMCks on for the negligent. '''ben
the light division was left on the right bank of the Tormes to
cover the passage lit Alba, a prudent order that all baggage or
other impediments should pass rapidly oYer tile narrow bridge
at that plflcc without halting on tnc enemy's side, WM, by
those charged with the execution, so rigorously interpreted as
to deprive the troops of tlleir ration bullocks and flour mules
at the very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers,
thus absurdly denied food, had the further mortification to see
a string of commisslLriat carts deliberately pMsing tlleir post
many bonrs afterwflrlh. All regimental officers know that
diScontent tbus created is most hurtful to discipline, and it is
in tllese par~icuw.rs the va.lue of a good and experienced staff
is found.
Wellington's position extended from Christovfl.l to Aides
Longus on the right bank of the Tormes, aud on the left of
that river to the bridge of Alba, where tbe castle whieh was
on the right bank was garrisoned by Roward's brigade of the
&6Cond division. Hamilton's Portuguese were on the left
bank lIS a reserve for Roward j tile remainder of the secoud
division watched the fords of Hnerta and Encii'ia, and behind
them the third and fourth di"isions occupied the heights of
Calva:ri~a de .Ariba. The light division and the Sll(l,uish in-
fantry entered Salamanca, the cava.lry were disposed beyond
the Tormes, covering all the front. The heights of Christova
were strong and compMt, the position of the Arapiles on the
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other side of the Tormes glorious llIl well as strong; and the
bridge of SalalllllUC!l. lUU] the fords furnislled the power of
COllccntrnting on either side of that river by Il. shorter line
than the enemy could move np<>n.
However, while desirous to figllt the English gencral100ked
also to retreat; he sending !Lis sick to the rear, broug1lt UI)
small I)Il1gazinu from Rodrigo to illwnneuiute poiuts, C3used
the surplus ammunition at Salllmtmco. to be destroyed by
small explosions, and delivered large stores of clothing nnns
and equipmcnts to the Spaninrds, who wefe thus completely
furnished j but in an bour after thcJ were s~llillg their I\CC(lU4
tremCllt lWder his own windows! Salamanca presented
indeed an cxtroordinnry scene, llnd the Sp.'Iuim'(ls, civilo.nd
military, evinced hatred of the British. Daily did they
attempt or perpetrate murder, and one act. of peculiar atrocity
merits notice. A horse led by an English soldier being
frightened backed a&millllt a Spanish officer commanding at II
gate, be caused the soldier to 00 dnlo"gcd into his gUllrd-houSll
find there bayoneted him in cold blood; find no redress could
be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence
whieh was not IOllg withheld. A SpAnish officer while wall-
t-ollly stnbbi.ng at 11 riJlcmlln was shot dead by the latter; and
a 13ritish volunteer slew n Spflnish officer at the llClUI of his
own regiment in a. sword-fight, the troops of both natioll!!
looking on.
The eivil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent
thau tin: military, treating every Euglish person with nil illto-
lemble urroguIlL~. Even tbe prince of OrJ.uge was like to
have lost llis life; for upon remonstrating allont quarters with
the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to kill him;
and he wonld have bC(l1l killed had not lieutenant Stecle of
the fort)·-tllird, a. boltl athletic perl;On, felled the lllllll before
he could stab; yet both thc Ilrincc and his defender were
forced to fly from the soldier's comrades. 'fhe eXllSperation
caused by these things was leading to wrious mischief when
the enemy's movements gave aU\,Jlher dir~tiOll to the 6oldiers'
passio1l6.
On the 9th J",ong'~ cnvnlry hnd heen driven in upon Alba,
'-lld next da.y Soult sent some akirmishers f?rward and opened
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eighteen guns agaiust that plaoo. The castle, crowning a
bare rocky knoll hastily entrenched, scarcely gave shelter
from this t~mpest, and for two hours the garrison could only
reply with musketry; but fiually it was aided by four pieces
from tIle left bank of the river, and the post was defended
with such vigour the enemy do.reu not o.SSfmlt. During the
night Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the clnffiaged
walls and formed barricades, and in the morning after a short
cannonade the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies
a llUndrcd men.
On the 11th tlle king re-urguni7.ed the army, giving Sou(t
command of the whole nnd removing &mhnm to make way
for Drollct. Caffnrelli then returued to Burgos with his
divisions and guus, and as Souham had left garrisons in
Toro, TordesiHas, Zamora, and Valladolid, and tile king one
in the Retiro, only niuety thousand combatttuts remained on
tbe Tonnes; but twelve thousand were Cllvalry, nearly all were
veteran troops, and tlley had onc htmdrcd and twenty pieecil
of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idling.
The country was cX]laustcd, the soldiers wanted bread, and
Jose]lh, eager to fight for he was of a bravo spirit aud had
something of his brother's greutness of soul, sought counsel
how to deliver battle with most ndvantn.gc. ,fourdlln with l\
martial fire nnquenehed by age WM for bringing affairs to a
el1sis by the boldest and shortest mode. He ob- A ill
d · ,"n' ,.. _.~ ppeIlx16.serve that "e Ulgtoll s lJOSltlOll was compo>reU
of turoo parts, the right ut Alha, the eentre at Calvariza
Ariba, tho left separated by the 'formes from the centre nt San
Christoval. The whole distance wus about fifteen miles, and
the Tormes WM for<lable in many places above Salamanca;
wherefore he proposed to assemble the French army in the
night, pass the river at daybreak, by the fords between Villa
GOllzalo and Huerta, llnd make a concentrated attack uIJOU
Ci1lvaril'.a de Aril.m, which would force on a decisive mlttte.
SOnlt objected to attack Wellington in R position ho WM 00
weU acquainted \vith, wllich he might lmve for-
tified, and where the army must fight its way
c\'en from the fords to gain rOOln for all order
of battle. He prollosed instead. to move by the
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left to certain fords, three in number, between Ex6me and
GaliStlllCbo, some seven or eight miles aIJove Alba do Tonnes;
('AAy in thelllselves, they wel'C suited from the confonnntion of
the bauks for forcing a passage if it should be disputed, and
by a slight circuit the troops in march could not be seen b)"
the enemy. PlUIsing there the French army would guin two
marcl}llS upon the nllies, be placed on their flank. Bnd rem, nnd
could fight on ground chosen by its own generals instead of
delivering battle on ground chosen by the enemy; or it
could force on an action in a new position whellee the allies
could with difficulty retire in the event of di'sustcr. Welling-
ron must thcll fight to disadvantage, or retire llastily, MCri-
ficing part of his army to save the rest; aud the effect,
militaryaud political, would be the same as if he was beateu
b), 0. front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was prudent and
might be successful if Wcllingkm accepted battlc, but he
could not thereby be forced to fight, which WIIS the great
object; be would have time to retreat before tlle French could
reach the line of his commuuications with Ciudlld Hodrigo;
and it was supposed by some of thc generals he woul~ retreat
to Almeida. at once by &n FeJieeg and Barba. de Puerco.
Neither Soutt nor Jouronn knew the position of the Axa-
piles in detail, and the former, though lie urged Lis
Letter to th~ own plan offcred to yield if t11ll kin'" 'was 60
Irdng.MS.' <:>
inclined. Jourdan's proposition was supported
by all the generals of the arm)' of Portugal except Clausel
w1l0 leaned to SouIt's opinion; but as that marshal com-
manded two-tLinJs of the anny while J ourdan hnd no osten-
sible command the question WAA finally decided l\,,,.,.ccably to
his counsel. Nor is it easy to determine which was right,
for though Jourdan's reasons were strong and the result was
eoufonuuble to his views aud ooutrudietory of Soult's, the
fnilure W/LS in the exccution. Nevertheless it wOllld seem
that so great an arm)' and so confident, for the French sol·
diers eagerly demanded battle, should have grappled in the
shortest way: a rapid development of Jourdall's plan would
probably have cut oft' Hamilton's Portuguese und the bri-
gade in the cnstle of Albu from Calvarizn Ariba. On tho
otber hand, Wellington desired a battle on either side of the
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Tonnes. His hope was indeed to prevent tlle passage of
that river until tho rIlins rendered it unforullL!c, Ilwl thus
force the French to retire from want of provisions, or to ell"
g8.eO"(l him on the position of Chrisl-oval j )'et he also courted
a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of Ills for-
mer victor)". He had sixty-eight thou8Ilolld com· T~ltet 10 loril
hlllants, fifty-two tholL'>l!.nd of wlJich, including Liverpool.
four thousand British Cft,vnlry, were Anglo.-Por. lIS.
tuguese, and he had nearly seventy gUIl3. Thig forte was
so disposed, that besides Hamilton'g Portuguese, three divi-
8ioll3 guarded the fords which were also defended by entreueh-
ments, and thewholollnnymight have bccn unit-ed in, good time
upon the ridges of Calvariza Ariba and the two Arapiles,
where the superiority of fifteen thousand men would not
have availed the French much. A defeat would onl)' have
sent the British to Portuglll, a victory would 11:WO taken
them ODce more to Madrid. '1'0 draw in Hamiltou's Portu-
guese and the troops from tIle Alba. in time would have been
the vital point j but as tlle French, if they did not surprise the
allies, must have fought up from tile river this danger n~ight
Imvc IJroved les8 tho.u it liOOIOeU. In fwe the general WM
Wellington and he know his ground.
FRE!\"CII PA$MQF, OF TIlE TORMFll.-RETREAT TO CIUDAD
RODRIGO.
Soult'g plan being adopted, the army of Portugfll WAS
directed to make frequent demonstrations against Christoval,
Aldea Lengua, find the fords between Huerta and Alba j the
road over the hills to the Galisnucho fords was repaired, and
two trest16--bridgea were cOllstructed for the PUS8Ilge of tJLe
nrtillery. The united llrmiea of thc south and centre wefC to
1JMS nt Galisaneho, and if the allies withdrew from Alba do
Tonnes, Drouet. was to pass there by the bridge and by the
fords, and assail their rear j but if they maintained Alba he
was to follow Bonlt's movement.
At daybreak on the 14th tho bridgM were thrown, the
co.vnlry and infantry passed by the fords, the allies' outposts
were driven back and Soult took 0. position at Mozarbcs,
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]lRl'ing the road from Alba to Tamames under his left flank,
Wellington remained too confidently in Salamanca, and when
the first report said the enemy Wllfe over the Tormes made
the caustic observation, tlmt he would not recommend it to
some of them. Soon however other reports cominced him
of bis mistake, be galloped to the Arapiles and .lmving aseer-
(:lined the direction of 8oult's march drew off the second
division, the cavalry, and some gUllS to attuck the head of the
French column. The fourth division and Hamilton's Portu-
guese remained ut Alba. to proteet this movement; the third
division se(:ure<! the Arllpiles rocks until the troops from Sun
Christova.l should arrive,-and he WlI$ still so conlident to
drive the French back over the Tormcs, that tllC bulk of the
troops did not quit San Christoval that day. But when he
reached Mozarbcs the :French were already too strong to be
seriously meddled with; and when under cover of a can-
nonade he examined their posit.ioll, exteuding fromMozaroes to
the heig1lts of Nuestra SCliora de Utiero, he fOlmd it so good
there WlI8 no remedy; wherefore drowiug off the troops from
Alba and destroying the oridge, he left three bundred
Spaniards ill the castle with orders if the army retired the
next day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they
best could.
During the night and following morning the allied anny
was united in the position of the Arupiles, and it was still
hoped the Freucll would give battle theM); but tllo first divi-
sion WlIS placed at Alden Tcjudll. on the Junguen st1"Cllm, to
secure that passage ill ·case of retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo.
Drone! finding the bridge of Alba. broken and the castle occu-
pied had meantime crossed at Galisancho aud taken post on
the ridge of Sciloro de Utiern; and 8oult, who lu:ul commenced
fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the same time to tlle
height of Seliora de la Buena ncartbe Rodrigo road; yet slowly,
fOI" the ground was heavy and the mauy sources of the Jun·
guen and VolmUlla being filled by rain impeded his march.
This evolution W!lS near!,. the same as thnt practi~cd b,}' Mor-
mont, but it was on a. wider circle, by a second range of
heights enclosing as it were those by which the duke (If
l~uguss. moved and be~·ond the reach of such s. sudden attack
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and Cl\t-Mtrophe. The result in each rose WI\S remarkable.
Marffiont closing with a short quiek turn, "falcon striking at
an eagle, received a buffet that broke his pinions o.nd spoiled
his flight. Soult, u. wury kitll, sailing slowly aud witll a wide
wllCcl to seize a helpless prey lost it altogether.
Ab..out two o'clock Wellington, too weak to attack and
seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo
road, thought the king wished to establish a fortified head of
cantonments at Mozarbcs, and then openlte against the allies'
communicution with RoJrigo; wherefore suddenly CBIIting his
army into three columns lie crossed the Junguen, and then
covering hig left flank with bis cavalry and guns, defiled in
order of battle before the enemy ut little more t11an cannon-
shot. With l\ wonderful boldlle.~s ami facility, and good for-
tune also, for there was n thick fog nnd Il hMvy rain which
renqered the bye-wllYs ami fields by which the enemy moved
nearly impassable while the allies llad the use of the high
roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the
Freudl left: thus he b'UillcU thll Vulmusa river und halted lit
night in rear of those who hud been threatening Ilim in front
a few bour3 before. This exploit, foretold by Jourtlnn, WM
certainly surprising, but it was not creditable to the general-
ship on either side; for first it may be asked why tile Ellglish
~"Olllmallder, lluving somewhat carelessly suffered Suult to !JU8S
the 'formes Ilnd turn his Ik>sition, waited so long Oil the Am-
piles ll.S to render this dAngerou9 movement ncocSSlll'Y,-f1
mO~'ement which bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour
on the ot11er side rendered possible and no more.
It has been said the drawback to 8oult's l;(lnius is want of
promptness iu seizing the deciaive lllomeut. It is u great
thing to light a great buttle, aud llgainst 8UCb. Ilo geuero.ll !la
Wcllingtoll and such troops liS the British, a mun muy well
be excused if he thinks twice ere he puts his life IInd fllme,
and the lh'es and fame of thousands of hi9 countrymen, the
weal or woe of nations, upon the hazard of an event wbieh
may be decided by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or
the si.ngle blunder of tl siugle fool, or the cOllfusiou of a. coward,
or by llny other circumstance however triviaL It is 110 menu
consideration, t1mt the praise or the hatred of n.o.tions, univer
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sal glory, or universal, perhaps eternal contempt waits on an
action the object of which way be wore eafely gained by other
means, for in war there is infinito '..sriety. And here 80ult
certainly ,'aeil1ated after passing the Tormes, purposely per-
Imps to avoid au IIction; holding it unwise in the disjointed
slate of French nffairs and WllCIl without any fixed base Ot
reserves in case of defeat to light a decisive battle. Nor is
this )lfUdcnce blameable, for though he who would be great in
war must be during, to set all upon onc throw belongs only to
an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant wuose task is I"ut a
]>ortion of the genom! plan j ncit,her is it wise in monarch or
gCllCrol to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless 1111 may
be won by victory. The king, more unfettered than Sonlt,
desired ll. battle, tuld wit!l au army 80 good and numerous the
latter's llrudenee seems misplut'Cd; he should have grappled
with his ellemy, for once engnged at any point the 1I11ica could
not have retreated, and there were ninety thousand good men
to fight less than seventy thousand.
On the 16th the allies retin..'I1 uy the three roadll wllich leaJ
across the Matilla stream through 'l'UlllllffiCS, San MUlJos,
und Martin del Rio; the light division and the cavalry close<!
the rear, and the country was 11 forest penetrable ill all direc-
tions. The troops bivouacked in the evening behind the
Mlltilla t>treum nnd the march 'I'M only twelve miles, yet the
stragglers were numerons; for the soldiers meeting with vMt
llCrds of swine quitted tlleir colours by hundreds to shoot
them, and such a rolling musketry echoed througl) thl' forest
it was thought tlle Froneh wore llttacking. It was n vaill
the stafr offiecrs endeavoured to stop this disgmceful pOUltioo,
which l\ad indeed commenced the evening before; in vain tl)at
two offenders were hanged, the hungry soldiers still broke
from the eolullllls, the property of whole uistricts Wll8 swept
away in a fow hours, and tho anny WfLS in somo degree plllced
ll~ the lllcrey of the enemy. The latter however were con-
tented to glean the strngglers, of whom they Cllptured two
thousand j they did not press the rear until netU' Matilla, where
their luncers fell Oil but were eheoked by the light COWJlllllies
of the twenty-eighth, and afterwards charged b,Y the fourtecnt·h
omgoollS.
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On the 17th Il different yet a not less curious scene occurred.
During the night the cavalry in front of the light division
had, for some unknown reason, film! off by the flanks to the
rear withont giving any intimation to the infantry, W11O, tnlst·
ing to the horsemen, had tllrown out their piqucts at a very
short distance in front.. At daybreak the soldiers wcre put-
ting on their accoutrements wllen sowe strange horsemen being
s~n in tho rear of the bivouac werc mistaken for Spllniurds;
but very soon their cautious movcmcnts and "i''1l.city of geg.
tures, showed them to be French; t-he troops then mn to arms,
and in good time, for five hundred yards in front the wood
opened on to a large plain where, in place of the Britisll
cIO"lIlry, eight thousand French horsemen were discovered
advancing in one solid mllSS, yet carelessly IInd without froS·
pecting the vicinity of the allies. The division was imme-
diately formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth Ura-
gooml !lnd ouo of the Gerlnau hussars ClImo Lustily up from
the rear, Julian Sanehez' cavalry appeared ill slllall parties on
• the right flank, and eYery precaution Will.! taken to secure the
retreat. This checked the enemy, hut as the infantry fell
haek the Freudl, tllough fearing £0 uppro-<iCla them in the
wood, sont squadrous to the right and left, some of whieh rode
on the flanks near enough to bandy wit in the Spanish tongue
with the Euglish sollliers, who marched without firing. Very
soon however the sigus of mischief appeared, the road ww;
strewed with baggo{,'C, the biLl-men came running in for pru-
tection, some wounded, some without erms, and all breathless
as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the forest
had enabled the FreJlch to pllS9 along unperceived on the
Hanks of the line of march; and Ill.! opportunity offered they
galloped from side to side sweeping away tho baggage and
snoring the conductors and guards; they cvcn mcnaccd onc of
the columns but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In
one of these charges gencml Pagct WIIS carricd off from the
midst of his owu mell, aud it might llave been Wellington's
fortune, (or h~ also was contiuually riding bel<ween the COlUlllllS
and without an escort.
Soon however the main body passed the H uebra and took
position, the right at Tamames, the left lle.'lr Boadilla., the
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centre at San Munoz, Buena. Barba, and Gallego de Hucbra.
But when the light division arrived ut the edge of the table-
land which overhangs the fords at the last-named place, the
French cava.lr.r suddenly thickened and the sharp whistle of
musket-bullets with the splintering of branches on the left
showed that their infantry WllS also up. 8ou1t ill the hOlle of
forestalling the aJlics at Tamnmcs, had pushed his columns
towards that place by a road leading from &lamanca through
Vecinosj hut finding Hill's troops in his front he turned short
to his right in hopes to cut olfWelliugtoll's rear-guard, which
led to tIle
CO:V:!lA'l' OF THE lIUEaRA.
Warned by the musketry the cavalry crossed the fords in
time, and the light division should have followed without
delay, because Ule forest enued on the edge of the tAble-land
and tile descent from thence to the river, eigllt hundred
yards, was open and the fords of the Huebra deep. Instead
of this an order was given to form squares, and the offioers
lookoo at eaeh other in allH\zemeut i but at that moment
Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the
battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving fOllr com-
panies of the forty-third and one of the riflemen to cover the
)Jassa.ge. These companies, spreading as skirmishC11l, were
. assaited in front and both flanks with a fire abowing that llo
large foI'C6 was before tbem; morcover a driving rain und
mist prevented them from aeeing their adversaries, and being
!lrE'SSed closer each moment they gathered by degrees at the
edge of the wood, where they maintained their ground for a
quarter of nn hour; then seeing tho division WilS beyond the
river they swiftly cleared the open &lope of the hill and
passed the fords under a sharp musketry. Only twenty·seven
soldiers fell, for the tempest beating in the Frenchmen's
fu.ccs hallled their aim, snd Rosa's guns playing from the low
ground with grope checked the pursuit; but the deep bellow-
iug of thirty pieces of he&.vy French artillery showed how
critically timed was the passage.
Steep and broken were the bnnks of tho Huebro, and the
enemy 8prcad his infantry w the right and left along the
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edge of the forest making dcmollStrations on every side, and
there were severnl fords to be guarded; the JiftY-Getond and
the Portuguese defended those below, lWss's guns supported
by the riflemen and forty-third defended those above, and
behind the right on higher ground was the seventh division.
The seeond division, Hamilton's Portuguese and a brignde of
ca.ntlry, were in frout of TUIllamei; uud thus tile bulk of the
army WIlS lllassOO on the righ~ hugging the PeDa de }'ralleillo
and covering the roads leading to Ciudad as well as those
leading to the passes of the Gata hills. In this situation an
attempt to force the fords guarded by the Jifty-setond was
vigorously repulsed, )'et the skinnishing and eimnonauo con-
tinued until dark, nod hoovily the Freneh guns played upon
the light and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep
Dear the fords in column lest a sudden rush of cavalry should
take the gullS on the flat ground, were plunged into at every
round, )'et suffered little loss, because the sllturntcd clayey
lJOil swallowed the shot lInd gmothcrcd the shells; but it
Wll8 a matter of astonishment to see the seventh division
kept in one huge mll8S by lord Dalhousie on open and hard
ground, thus tempting havoc for several hours, when, only a
hundred yards in its rear, the rise of the llill and the thiek
forest would have sheltered it witllout at alt weakening the
position.
On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before day-
light, and the Euglish general was disquieted, because the
position though good for defence WIIS difficnlt to remove from
at that scll8On. The roads, hollow and narrow, Icd up a steep
bauk to a table-land which was open flat marshy and seored
with water-gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the
strealllll tILe principal road was impassable a wile in rear of
the jlositioll j hellce to brillg the columns off' in timll without
jostling, IInd without being attacked, required niee manage-
ment. AI! the baggage and stores Jilld marcbed in the night,
with orders Dot to halt until they reached the high lands
near Ciudad Rodrigo; but if the preceding days had pro:-
duced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less fertile
iu them.
In a former part of this work it has been stated toot even
"'OL. IV. ( ..
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the lmccessC!l and long coufirmed reputation of WeIJiugton
could not prated him from the vanity nud presumption
of subordinate officers. The allusion fixes here. Knowing
t110 direct road was impassable, he ordered the movemen~
by another ro;W longer and apparently more difficult; this
scemed so extraordinary to some general officers, tl\llt, after
consulting together, tlley deemed their commander unnt to
conduct the army and led their troops by what appeared to
them the fittest line of retreat! He had before dU}'Jight
plllceu himself a.t an ilUI'Orlllut point on his own road, and
waited impotiently for the arrival of the leading division wltil
dawn j then SUSIJccting what bo.d happened he galloped to
the other rood and found the would-be commanders stopped
by water. The insubordination and the danger to the army
were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and
well timed, the humiliatiou so comlllete and so deelJly felt,.
that with one proud aarcastie observation, indicating con·
tempt more than finger, be led back the troops and drew off
all hia foreea safely. Some confusion and great danger still
attended the operation, for eyen on his road one water-gully
was so deel) tlmt the ligM division, bringing UI) the rear,
could only puss it mnD by man over a felled tree, and it was
fortunate that Soult, unable to feed his troops, stopped on
the Huebra and only scut some cavalry to Tamames. The
retreat was unmolested, hut whetller from necessity or neg-
ligence in tLe Bubordinates nllWY wouudcd men, most of
them hurt by cannon-ghat, were left behind, the enemy
never passed the Euebra and the miserable creatures perished
by a horrible and lingering tleath.
The marshy plaing now to be passed exhl\u~tcd the strength
of the tired soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations on
the herds of swine were repeated, and tbe temper of the
anny generally prognosticated tlle greatest misfortunes if tbe
retreat should be continued. This was however the last day
of triul, the wcnther cleared up, SOIllC LiJls nffol'uoo ury
bi"ouncs auu fucl, the distribution of good rations rcstor~l
the strength and spirits of thc men, and thc next day Rodrigo
aDd the neighbouring villages were occupied in trnnquillity.
The cavalry Wll3 then scut out to lhe forest, und being aided
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by Juliau &mchez' partiuas, brought in from a thousand 'to
fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished.
During these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, hut colonel
Miranda, the Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held
that place until the 2ith llllU then oorried olf his garrison in
the nigllt.
Thus ended the retreat from Burgog. The French gathered
a good spoil of baggage but the loss of the allies ill men
c:\lIuot be exactly detennined, beeuuse llO Spunisb returns
were ever s~n. An approximation may however be Cll.9ily
made. According to tlle muster-rolls, about a thousand
Auglo-Portuguese were killed wounded and missing between
the 21st and 29th of October, the period of their crossing the
'Duero, but this only refers to loss in ootioll; Hill's loss
betwcen the Tagus. Ilnd the Tonnes was, including stragglers,
four hundred, and the defence of Alba de Tonnes cost one
hundred. If the Spanisll regulars and partidAs marching
wit-b. the two annies be ret:kolled to bave lost II thousuwl,
which considering their want of discipline is not extlggerflted,
tbe whole loss previous to the French passage of the 'l'onnes
will amount perhaps to three thousand meu. But the
loss between the Tormes and the Ague<la was certainly
greater, for nearly three hundred were killed and wouuded at
the Huebra; many st.mgglers died in the ,,,oods, A ,_ ,.
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and Jourdan srod the prISoners, Spamsh Portu-
guese and English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th
November were three thousand five hundred and tweuty.
'1'he whole loss of the double retreat cannot therefore bel set
down at less then nine thousand, including the loss in tllt)
siege.
Some Frcuch writers have spoken of ten thousand being
taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, aud Souham
estimated the previous IQss, including the siege of BurgQl>,
at seven thousand. Hut the king in his dcsput.chcs called
the whole loss twclve thouSllnd, including therein the gar-
rison of Chincllilla; and he observed that if the cavalry
generals, Soult and TiHey, had foHowed the allies vigorously
frO/ll Salamanca the loss would have been mueh greater.
Certainly the anny was so little prCllsed that noue would Illn'a
co2
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supposed the French horsemen were numerous. On the
other hand EllglisJl uuthors have most un~onnto.hly reduced
the British loss to aB many hundreds.
Although the French halted on the Huebra the English troops
were kept together behind the Agueda, because Smut retired
with the troops under his immediate command to Los Suntos
on tllC upper Tonnes, thus pointing towards the pass of
Baiios; and it was rumoure<l he designed to march that way
with a view to invade Portugal by the yalley of the Tagus.
Welliugton disbelieved this rumour but could not di.llreganl
it, oocnuso nenrly all his channels of intclligence had been
suddenly dricd lip by a tyrannical and foolisll decree of tIle
Corws, which compelled every man to jUlltify himself for
having remained in a district occupied by the enemy;
henee to avoid persecntion those who used to transmit
information had fled from their homes. Hill's division WllS
therefore moved to the right as far as Robledo to CO\'er the
pass of Penles, the rest of the troops were ready to follow
:llld the fifth Spani~h arm)' occupied Coria,
Josc(lh, nfwr llcsitatiug whether he should ICllve the llnny
of the south or the army of Portugal in Castille, finally
....rdered the head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Yalla_
dolid 'and the former ut Toledo; the onc to maintain the
<,'OUlltry betwecm the 'l'oriUc8 and the Esla; the other to
occupy La Maneha with its lcft, the "alley of the Tag-us as
far as the Tietar with its centre, Avila with its right. The
llrmy of the centre went to Segovia, where the king joined it
with bis guards, aud when these movements were known the
allies took the following winter quarters. The fifth Spnnish
army, crossing the Tagus at Aleanta,rn, elltered Estremadufll..
Hill occupied Coria and Placentia, holding the town of Dejar
by a detachment. Two divisions were quartered bellind Hill
about Castello Braneo and in the u(l)lCr Beim. '£he light
dh,ision remained on the Agueda, the rest of the infantry was
distributed along the Douro from Lamego downwards. The
Portuguese cavalry quartered in :Moncorvo, and the British
cavalry, witl, exception of Victor Alwu's brigllde which was
attached to the light division, occupied the vnllcy of the
MOlldego. Carlos d'Espaiia's troops garrisoned Ciudnd
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Rodrigo. The Gallicians marched through the Trns os Montes
to their OWIl oountry.
In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed,
booluse the improved navigatioll of the 'rngus the Douro
and the Mondngo, furnished wntcr-carriagc close to all thei,
cantonments; moreover the army oould be quickly oollected
on either frontlt-T, for the front line of oommunication from
Estrtlmadura passed by the bridge of Alcautarn to Coria, and
from thence through the pass of Perules to the Agueda; the
second line run by Pennmacor and Guinnldo ond both were
direct, but the post of Bejar, although necessary' to secure
Hill's quarters from a 8urprise, was itself exposed. A
double and direct coUilllUnicatiou across the Gredos mouu-
tain was MW made by the French. On their first line they
11ad now completely restored the Roman road, leading from
Horcajada ou the upper Tonnes by tIle Puerto de Pioo to
Monbeltran and 'ralavcrll. '1'0 ease their second line they
finished a road, begun the year before by Marmont, leading
from Avila by tho convent of Guisnndo and Esoolonn to
Toledo. But these communications were in winter lIO diffi.
cult, that Laval in crossing the mountains from Avila was
forcOO to harness forty horses to a carriage; moreover the
allies having the interior QUO shorter liues hau a more mellliC-
iog p05ition, and a moro easy one for defeuce. Wellington
had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo.
and other point-s where the great roads came down to tile
Tagus, aud the Freueh, as RlIxious to prevent him from passing
thut river as he was to Ill'event them, sent part.ies to destroy
what had been ovcrlookccl. Each fcared the other would
move, yet thero was no desire to continue the campnign; tIle
allies wanted rest and more than one-third were in the hos.
pitals! the French could not feed, and had to refix their
general base of operations, which had. been broken up by the
guerillas.
Wcllingf()n was however most at CAse, He knew the bcst
French officers tllOugllt it useleas to continue the contest in
Bp-din unless the British army was first mastered; Soult'/l
intercepted letters showed iudeed how that marshal desired to
fix the Wllr in Portugul, IInd there was now a most powerful
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force on the frontier j hut BadajoS) llodrigo and Almcida
blocked the principal cntrnnccs; and thoug'h the t",'o former
were ill provided they were in little danger, because the Isst
campaign bad deprived the French of all their ordnance,
arsenals, and magazines in Auds.lusia, Almaraz, :Madrid,
SalamlUlCG, lLnd Vallndolid, and it WIl!l ncorly impossible for
them to make any impression upon Portugal until new
establishments were formed. The Anglo.Portuguese could
tllerefore take tranquil quarters to receive reinforcements,
restore their cquipments and recover strength. n Wll.'I not
80 with tllc French. Their secondary warfflrc now to be
again noticed, would have made the military reputation of
any nation before Napoloon had enlarged the measure of
glory j for when quit of their most formidable enemy, they
had t-o chase the pnrt.idas, to form sicgcs, recovcr posts lost by
concentration, and to scneI moveable oolumns by long winter
marches over 3 vast extent, seeking food, fighting for what
they got, and living hard because the magazines were reserved
for operations %,tUinst the Allglo-PorLuguese. Cerlaiuly it
Wtlil a grent and terriblo wilr for them, ilnd formidablo soldiel'8
they were to sustain it 80 manfully amidst the many erroril of
their generals.
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CHAPTER VI.
connmATIOX OF TDE PARTISAN WARFARE.
. SOl
IN the north, while Soullam was gathering in front of Burgos,
Ilome of Mendizauel's bmll]S had ulockaded Santoua by laud,
Md Popham after his failure ut. Gueterio. blocko.dod it by seu.
It WllS not welt provisi~ncd, but Nnpoleon hao.l sent an espe-
dal governor, Lamefh, and a chosen engineer, D'Abadie,
from Paris to complete the works. By their activity a llUll-
ured anti twcllty lli~ of caUIIQIl were 80011 mouuted, aud,
including the crew of 0. corvette, the garrison Wll9 eighteen
Imndred strong. Lameth had to fight Ilis way into the place
ill September, but he BOOIl formed an armed flotilla, with
which, when the English squadron was drivcn off the port by
gales of wind, he made frequeut captures. Meanwhile Melllli-
Ulbel surprised the gurrison of Briviooea., Longll captured II
large col1voy with its escort I1car BllrgOO, Rnd all thc bands
increased in numbers and boldness.
Wllen Caffarelli returned frolD the Duero, neille took
commaud of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumcd lllat of
the army of the centre, and Souham returned to }'mnee.
Rei1le then spread his troops over the country, Avila was
occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands 01
Marquincz Md Salazar were beaten, llnd Foy marching to
seize Astorga surprised and captured ninety men employed
to dismant,le that fortress; out tweuty urcaches had bee.u
opened and the plaee censed to be of imporlnuoo. CalfllreUi,
trol1bled by the care of fl. number of convoys, one of whieh
under general Frimont although strongly escorted and having
tlYO pieces of cannon fell iuto Longa's hands the 30th of
November, was unable to commence active olleraf.ions until
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the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the
hands from Bilbao, wllile he marched himself to sucoour Bnd
Jlroviaion Snntonn. and Guetcria and to re-establish llis other
posts along the coasts; but while near Salltona the Spaniards
attacked St. Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logrono.
Pophnm had however quilted the Bay of Biscny with his
squadron, leaving a few veSllCls to continne the littoral war·
fare, which enabled Caff..'\relli to succour Snntona and impor_
tant events followed, hut the relation must be deferred as
belonging to the transactions of 1813.
Tracing the chain of guerilla opel"'J.tions from Biscay to the
other parts, wc find Abbe who commanded in Pampelunn,
Sevcroli who guarded the right of the Ebro, and Paris who
had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and at
times Buceessfully attacked in the latt~r end of 1812; for
aftcr Chaplllollf,'1Irra.'s exploit near JtlC3, Mina intercepted all
communiention with France, and on tllo 22nd of November
sUfJlriged and drove back to Zaragoza with loss a very large
convoy. Thon he besieged the castle of IIucsca, and wben
a cousiderable force cowing from ZarngozlI forced llllll to
desist he rc--appcllred at Bllrlmstro. :I"inlllly iu Q. Bevere actiun
fought on the lleights of Senora. del Poya, towards the end of
DcCtllllber, his troops were dispersed by colonel Colbert; yet
the French lost seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took
the field again with forellS more llumerous thllU he had ever
before commanded.
About thig time Villa Campa, who had entrenc11ed himself
near SegorM to harass Suchet's rear, was driven from thence
~y Pll1leticr, but being afterwards joined by Gayllll inve:ted
the castle of Durocu with tllret: thousand men. Severoli suG-
eoured the place, hut Villa Campa re-a.asembled near Carineila
behind Severoli, who was for<:ed to figbt his way back to Zara-
goza. The Spaniards rc-appeared at Almullia, aut! ou the 22nd
of December another battle W(\9 fought, wheu Vipa Campn,
defeated with considerable slaughter, retirctl to New Casti\lc
and there soon repaired his losses. In the centre of Spain,
Elio, Bassecour, and EmpecinaJo, having waited until the
great ~'rcneh Ilrmies passed ill Jlursuit of Hill, came doWll
upon Madrid. Wellington, when at Salamanca., expected till!
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would draw troops from the Tonnes, but the only effed was
to cause the garrison left by Joseph to follow the great army,
which it rejoined between tho DlIero and the Tormes with a
great enenmbmlloo of civil servants nud fnmilies: the partidns
then entered Mndrid and committed great excesscs, treating
tlle people as enemies.
Soult aud JOSCllh had been earnest with Suehet to send a
strong di\"iBion by CuellCll. a3 a protection for Madrid, and
Ihat marshnl did move in Jlcrson with 11. eonsidcl'llblc body of
troops as far as Requci'in. on the 28th of November; but being
in fear for his line towards Alicant sonn returned to Valencia
i.ll a slate of indecision, leaving ouly one brihradc at Requeiia.
He had been reinforced by three thousand fresll men from
Clltlllonia, yet he woulrl not undertake any operntion nntil ho
knew something of the king's progress, and at Requena he
had gained no intelligence eveu of the passage of the Tag-us.
The Spauiards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all direc-
tions.
Dd PRrqlle advanced witll Ballesteros' anny to Villa Nueva
de los Infantes Oil the La Maneha side of the Sierra Morenll,
his cavalry entered the plains and some new levies from Gre-
oada. oome to Alcaru.z 011 his right. Elio and Bassecour,
lCl\ving Madrid to the pnrticlns, mn.rohed to Albocete without
bindrancc from Suehet, and rc-opened the communic>\tion
with .AJieant; hence, exclusive of the Sicilian anny, nearly
thirty thousand regular Spanish troops were said to be assom-
bled on tlio lJordcl'i! of Mureia, am! six thousund uew levie~
Clime to Cordoba as 0. reserve. Howevcr, on the Srd of De-
cember JOflCph drove the partidas from the capitnl, and
re-oocupied Guadalaxarn nnd the neighbouring posts; Soult
then entered Toledo and Ilis cavalry advanced towards Del
Parque who immediately reerossed the Morena, whereupon the
Frencll horsemen swept La MUllClta to gathel' coutrilJutions
and fill the lIl.llgal'.ines at Tolcdo.
By these operations Dcl Pllrqllc, now joined by the Grenadrlll
troops from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio; Suchet was thllil
relieved from a danger whicll lie had dreaded too mueh and
by his own inaction contributed to increase. It is true he
hlld I.LL the sick men belonging to the kiug'j aud to Soult's
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IIrmy on his hands, hut be had also many effective men of
those armies. The yellow fever 1100 sllown itself in some of
his hospitals, and he \I'ns also uucaay for tho security of his
base in Arngon wllere the pll.rtida warfare W>lS reviving; yet
with fifteen thousand infantry lllld a fine division of cavalry
disposable lie should Dot have pennitted Elio to pass his
flnuk. He WIlS ofmid of the Sicilian army. amI it had a great
influcnee on all the preecding opernti,mB; for it ill certain
Suchet would otherwise have demched troops to Madrid by
the Cuenca road, lLnd then Soult would probably ha\'e sought
u buttle !retweeD the TaguB IIllU the Guadarnma mouutains;
but thifl influcnce arose entirely from the position of the
Alicant army, not from its operations which were feeble and
vllcillating,
Maitland bad resigned in the beginning of October. BiB
succ~sor, Mackenzie, pUBhed some troops to tbe front and
there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy; but there
was no plan or object, the only signs of vitality !reing a fruit-
less demonstration against ti,e caatle of Dellia, where Doukin
discmbnrlwd on tho ,lth of October with a detachment of tho
eighty.lirst regimcnt. The walls had been represented M
weak, they were found high and strong, the garrison bad
been unexpectedly doubled tllat moming and in the evening
a. setiond reinfurcement arrived, whercuJlon the British re..em-
harked, '1'ho water was bowcvcr full of pointed rocks and
it was by great exertions lieutenant Penruddoekc of the Famo
got the boat-s in, whe~ tIle soldiers, wading and lighting, got
on board with litUe loss but in confusion.
Soon after this general WiIliam Clinton came from Sicily
to take tllO command, nnd Wellington who was then befOrtl
Durg08, thinking Suc1let would weaken his army to help the
king, recommended an attempt upon the city of Valencia
either by a COlIst attack or, by a laud operation, warniog
Clinton however to a\'oid an action in ll. cavalry conntry.
This was not very difficult because t,he land was generally
rocky and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without
first having possession of the citadel of Aliean!., and thus all
things fell into disorder and WcnknesB. }'or the Sjlllnish
gO\'ernOr 11.\·owing that be hated the English more than the
French, would not suffer them to hold evcn a gate; and he
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sent Elio fl lflrge convoy of clothing and other stores with an
escort of only twenty men, tha.t he might retain two batta.-
lions to resist tlle attempt wIDeh he pretended to believe
Clinton would llluko on the eitadd. The latter, leaving" Whit-
tingharn !lnd Roehe at Alcoy !llld Xixolla, drew in his other
troops from the post-s previously O<!enpied in front by Mac-
kenzie; he feared Sllcllet's cavulry, but the mar· , , , ~
ue le ·II ......r-
shal, estimating the allied armies at more tlJan ...,.poudene..
31"fift}" thousand men, would undertake no serious ".
enterprise while ignorant of tlle king's progress in the north.
He howcver diligently strengthened his camp nt St.. Felippe
de Xativa, threw allother bridge over the Xucur, entrenched
the passes in his front, ooveretl Deuia with a. dctu.chmenL,
cumpclled Whittingllllffi to abandon Alcoy, dismantled the
extensive walls of Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.
In this state Elio came down to Albacete, and priding him-
self upon the dexterity with which 110 had a.voided the Freudl
armies, proposed to Clinton I\. combined attack npoll Suchet.
But he exaggerated his own numbers, and giying out that
Del Parque's force was under his command, pretended he
could bring forty thousand men into the field, four thousand
beiu~ cavalry. The two Spanish armies united~ Gmcral
'Would however scarcely have produced twenty lkmk;n.
thousand effective infantry; moreover Del Parque, )[$.
1\ sickly unwieldy incapable person with mutinous soldiers,
Lad no intention of moving beyond Alearaz. With such
allies it wus difficult for Ule English general to co-operate, yet
something might have been el!ccted while Suehet was at
RcqueJ1a before Elio arri 1'00, and more surely after he had
reached Albneete. Clinton had twelve thousand men, five
thoullllud being British, there was a fleet to aid and Elio h$d
ten thousand infulltry. Nothing was attempted,
and NajlOlcon fISSured Buchet, tUat lloweyer diffi.
cult his position was from the extent of country
the enemy in his front was not really formidable. E"ent!J
justified this observation. The Freueh works were soon corn·
plcted and the British army fell into such disrepute, that the
Bpaninrds with sarrnstic malice affirmed it was to be Ilut under
Elio to make it useful.
Rocbe's and Wltittingbam's diviaion continuod to excite tho
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utmost jealousy in tlle other Spaui~ll lroops, who askeu ycry
reasonably, what they did to merit such advantages? England
.Appendjx 8. paid and clothed them, the Spaniards were hound
Vol. v. to feed them; they did not do so, and Cauga
ArgueJ1cs, the intenuallt of the provincc, said lie had twicc
provided magazines for tlH!rn ill Alicant, which were twice
plundered by the governor: yet the other SJlsnish troops
were worse off. But on every side intrigues, disoonten~ vacil-
lation, weakness were visible, !lud if Euglnlld WII8 the &ay
of the Peninsula Wellington alone 811pportcd the war.
On the 2211d of November the obstinacy of tIle governor
being overoome he gave up the citadel to the British, yet no
offensive operations followed, though Suchet 011 the 2Glh
drove Rochll'S troops out of Aleo.r with 1088 llnd defeated
the Spanish cavalry at Yeela. On the 2nd of Docember
general Campbell came from Sicily with four thousand men,
principally British, and assumed the command, making the
fourth gelleral-iu-ehief in the S3me number of Illouths. Hi~
presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intel-
ligence that lord WilJiam was to follow with another rein-
forcement, again raised the public expeetat;ion, and Elio
dlltlired the British tu oc<:upy the euemy 011 the lower XUCl\r
while he attacked Rcqllcnn; but Cflmpbcll after some feeble
demonstrations declared he would await lord Willinm's arrh·al.
Then Elio, who had hitherto abstained from disputes with the
British, became discontented and dispersed his llnuy for
subsistencc, lJnd Cllmpbell complained that he was aban-
doned.
Suchet expecting an attack llad withdrawn bis outposts to
concentrate at Xativa; but when he found Campbell as inacti"e
as llis predecessors lOud allw the Spllni~h troops scattered, h~
surpriscU one Spallish Jlost ut Ontcllicllte, !mother in Ihi, luul
Te.()Ccupied all his former' oftellsive positions in front of
Alicant. Soult's detachments were now also feh in La
Mallcha, whercfore Elio retircd into !1urcia, aud Del Pl1.rque
went over the Morellu. 'l'Ims the storm mCllueiug the :French
was dissipated, for Cam)lbell, following his instrlle·
AppendixeI tion, refused rations to Whittingllam's corps snd
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desired it to separate for subsistence; and as the
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rest of the Spanish troop~ were actually starving no danger
was to be apprehended from them: Habert eve]\ lllilrehed up
to Alicant, killing and wounding men almost under the
waliB, and the Anglo-ltaliall l!Oldicl"8 delierted to him by whole
oompaniC8 when oppurtunity offered.
Suchet feared nothing in front, but was unquiet for his rear,
where, besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Dllrall
and Mina iu Aragon, the Frayle and other partida chiefs
~'Ontillually vexoo his eommullielltioll.s with TortOZl\. lifty
men hod been surprised near Scgorbe thl) 22nd of November
by Villa Campa, and Panetier though he destroyed that cJlief's
entrenched Cllmp could not hindcr him attacking Daroca as
before shown. The Frayle lIul'}lrised au OrdlillllCO COllVOY,
tMk severnl guns tlnll four hllndred hOrBCil, and killed in cold
blood after the action a hundred artillerymen aud officers.
A moveable column destroyed his depats aud many of his
men, hut the Frayle himself e~caped and soon reappeared upon
the communicatiollll. 'fhe loss of this eouvoy WllS the first
disgrace of the kind which had hefallen the anny
of .!rllgou,and to use Sudlet'e expression a battle
would have cost him less.
Nor were the Spalliards quite inactive in Catalonia, although
thedopart.ure of l'llaitlll.nd had so dispirited them that the regular
warfare was llpon the point of ceasing altogether.
The anny was indeed called twenty thousand,
and the tercios of rcsen>e forty~fiYe thousand; )"et
a column of nine hundred French controlled the sea-line ami
cut off all 6uPJllie8 lanued for the interior. Lacy being about
Vieh with scven thOllsnnd men affirmed that be could not feed
his army on the COllst; Codrington said that ninet,e(!.u feluccas
laden with flour had, in two nights, landed their cargoes
between MllttarO and Barcelona. for the sUPlJly of the h.tter
city, lInd these !lud Ulany olhe: veulures of the Sllme kiud
might have been captured without difliculty,~that CJnro~ and
~mans continued eorruptl)" to COlluive at the passage of French
collvoys,~that the rich merchants of Matt.aro and Arens
invited the enemy to protect their contraband conNyS going
to France, and yet accused him publicly of interrnptillg their
lawful trude, when he was only disturbing 8, treasonable com~
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merce so openly followed that he had to declare a blockade of
the whole roast.
A plot to ueliver the MedllS islands was also discovered, find
Lacy, when pressed to call out tho aomatencs, a favourite pro-
iect with the English naval officers, said be could scarcely
feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also
obsel'ved thnt the efforts of tlmt nature hitherto made (lntl
under more favourable circumstanccs, had produced only a
waste of life, of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition and of
arms, and now the French possessed all the strong places.
But so bitter were party tliSSCllBiollS that sir EdWllrtl Pellew
anticipated the ruin of the principality from tlu~t cause
wone. Lacy, Snrsfield, Emits and Codtingum continued
their old disputes, aud Sarsficld, then in Aragon, had also
quarrelled with Mina,-Laey deullwded Cool'iugl;on's rocal,
nnd tho junta demanded Lacy's removw,-lllld such WAS the
misery of the soldiers, the officers of one regiment actuallr
begged at the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing
for their mell aud were denied l A few isolated efforts by
some of the IlRrtisuns were the only signs of war when the
'\i.ct<Jry of Salamanca again raised the puhlic spirit. Then for
tlle first time the new constitution was proclaimed in Cata·
lonia, the junta WII8 suppressed, Erolcs obtained greater llowers
nnd had hope of becoming Cflptain-genernl, for the rcgcucy
agreed to rreal Lacy. Many thousand English muskets and
other weapons were by sir Edward Pellew then given to the
partisans as wen as to the regular troops, which enabled thelll
tn receivc cartridges from thc ships, instead of the loose powder
fnnncrly demanded on account of the difference in the bore of
the Spanish muskets.
'rhe effect of these llUppy coincidenccs was soon di8fJlnyed.
Eroles who had rnised a new division of three thousand men,
contrh·ed in concert with Codrington a combined movement
ill September agaillSt Tarllgollll. Marc1ling ill the lliAiJt of
thc 27th frDm Reus to tho mouth of tho Ji'nllwoli he Wll3 Illet
by tllC boat.s of the squadron, Md repulsing a 8Il.lly frcm tllC fDr·
tress, drove some Catalans in tbe French service from the Mru;:
of the Olivo, wllile the boats swept the mole taking five
vessels. Mter this uffidl" he cucumped on the; hills separating
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Lerida, Tnnlgonn., o.nd Torloza, menning to intercept the com-
muniCAtion between tbose plaecs and keep up an intercourse
with the £eet; the more neoossary becnuse Lacy had lost this
advantage eastward of Baroelona. While thus posted he heard
that 11 French detachment had come from Leridll to Arbeca,
upon which, making a forced march o"er the mountains lie
destroyed the greatest part ou the 2nd of October and the]\
returned to his former quarters. Meanwbile Lacy, embarking
scilling-ladders nnd battering-guns on board the English ships,
made a pompous movcmcnt against Mattaro with his whole
force, yet at the moment of exccution changed his pInn 'and
attempted to surprise Hostalrich; but he kept no secresy
the enemy obtained succour aud he returned to Viel!. Manso
defCAted two hundred French ncar Molino del Rcy, gllinell
some advantages over one Pelligri, a Frcnch miguelete partiSlln,
and ea.ptured some French boats at Mattaro aftcr Lacy's
departure; but Sursfield's mission to raise all arm)' in Aragon
failed, and Deca.en, desiring to eheck the reviving spirit of the
ClItaluns, made a combined movement ~"'fIinst Vich in the
latter end of October. Lac)' immediately drew Erolc.s, Manso,
and Milans towanliil that )loint, and thus the fertile country
CllJout lkuB wus again resigned to the Freuch, the intereoul'tie
with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of 'l'!l.~"'Ona, whieh
had becll grClltly straitened by tl\e previous operations of
Eroles, was relieved. Yet the defence of Vicll was llot sceurc<l,
for on the 3rd of November onc division of the French forced
the main body of the Sprmiurds under Lacy find Milans, at
the pllSSCS of Puig Ol'fl,(;i090 nnd Congosto; nnd though the
othe\" divisions were less successful against ErolC3 and Manso
at St. Filleu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich the 4th. 1'he
Catalaus, who had lost altogether above five ]lumlrcd Illell,
then separated; lacy went to the hills llCar MomhlauclJ,
Milnns and Hoviru townros Olot, :Mnnso to .\lolltscrrot.
Eroles retunlCd to Reus find was like to hIVe surprised the
Col de Balnguer; fUI" he sent a detuchment undcr Villulllil,
dressed in Italian uniforms whieh had been taken by llovira.
in Figuerns, and his men were actuaUyadmitted within the
palisade of the fort before the garrisoll perceh'ed the deceit.
A lieutenunt with Su.tcelllllen 1113ced outaide were taken,and
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tMs loss was magnified so much to Eroles that he ordered
Villamil to mako ll. more regular attack. '1'0 aid him Cou.
ringtoll brought up the Blake and landed 80me marines; }'et
no impression W!IS made on the garrison, and the allies retired
on the 17th at the approach of two thousand mell llCnt from
1'Ort07.tl. Erolcs lInd Manso then vainly united neaT Manresa
to oppose Deeaen, who, coming down from Vich, forced llis
way to Reus, seized a vast quantity of corn, sUjlplied Taragona
and then marcJlOO to Barcelona.
Thew opcmtiollll indisputably )Jrovcd tlmt there was no real
power of ~istuncc in the Catalan army. But an absurd
notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet aud Josepb, were retiring
with their armies in onc body to France by Cata-
lonia; and Lacy to cover his iunctivity pretended a
design to mise Q, lnrge foroo in Amgon, with whieh
to watch this retreat and act as l\ flanking corps to Wel.
lington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoz:\.
Such rumours served to Ilmuse the Clltalans for a short time,
but the sense of t11cir real weAkness soon returned. In
December Bertoletti, the governor of Tarngona, marched upon
Reus and defeated some hundred men who had re--assembled
tllere; and at the same time a French CQllVOy for Barcelona,
escorted by three thOUBllnd men, pnssccl safely in the face of
six thousand Clltalan soldiers desirous to nttaek, yet prevented
by Lacr. On this occllSion the anger of the people and of the
troops was loudly e.xpressed, lie was Q«used of treachery and
soon after recalled. Erole3 who had come to Cape Salou to
obtain succour from tlu~ squadron for his suffering soldiers,
uow acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia were worn
out, the spirit of the people broken by Lacy's misCQllduct, and
the anny, reduced to less than seven tLoUBllnd lIltlll, w!\lIllaked
and famishing. AJl'lIirs were indeed /10 bad that he was
reluctant to accept the office of captain-general, and the regular
warfare was in fuet extinguished, for Sursficld wus now acting
as a pllrtisnll on the Ebro. But at this time tho Freneh wore
greatly dismayed at the disasters ill Russia j their force was
weakened by drafts to fill up the ranks of Nalloleon's new
IIrlIl)·, and the Jlartida wnrfare oolltillUOOj especially along the
banks of tllO Ebro, wlu:re Snrsficld at the head of Erolu
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ancient division acted in concert with Mina, Duran, Villa
Campa, the Fraylc, Pendclncia and other chiefs, who were
busy upon Suehet's communication between Tortoza and
Valencit\,
Ail Aragon was now unquiet, NavarT'C and Bil3Cl1y in a state
of insurrection, the :Frellch in the interior of Spaiu were
absolntely invested. Their front was opposed by regular
annies, their jlnnks annoyed b)· the British squadrons, their
rear, from the B.'1Y of Biscay to thc Mediterranean, lllngued
and stung by partidas and insurrections. And England was
the Cltuse of all this. England was the real deliverer of tIle
Peninsula. n wus hcr succonrs thrown into Biscay that Imd
excited the new insurrection in tile northern provinces, llnd
enabled Mina and the otller cbiefil to cutcr Aragon while
Wellington drew liJe great Iliasscs of thc :Frcnch toward:;
Portugal. It was tiJat insurrection, BO forced on, which, not-
\\-;thstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Cnt.alonia.
save life and acti\'ity to the IJartiJas of the Bouth. It was the
army from Sicily which indueed Suchcb to keep Lis fOI"L'Ci
together illsteud of Illllltillg duwn tl..te Lalllla on his cOlllmuni·
cations. III fine, it was tlle troops of England WllO had
shocked the enemy's front of battle, the fleets of England
which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, thc money
and stores of Enghmd which had lmpported the pllrtidas.
}<~very part of the Peninsula wns permded br llcr influence or
her w;ln-ioTS, and a trembling sense of insceurity was corn·
municutecl to the French wherevcr their armies were not
united ill masscs.
Such thcn wcre the "arious militury events of the rcur
1812, llnd t11c English gencral tnking a vicw of the whole,
judged tbat however anxious the Frcnch might be to invnde
Portugal, they would be content during the winter to gather
provisions and wait for reiuforcemenlil from France wlH~rcwilh
to strikc n decisivo blow at Ilis army. But t.hose reinforce-
ments never Clime. Napoleon, unconquered of man lUld heen
vlInquished by the elements. The fires and the SIlO\1'lI of
1I0soow combined llad shattered his st.rcngtb, and iu confessed
nuulness, ualiotll; aud rulcnl rcjoiced that all enterprise, at ouce
the grandest the most provident the most bell.eficial llVef
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attempted by a wamor-lStateIlJllM, had been foiled_th
rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to rHstablish unhapi
Poland a:' ~ barrier against the most formidable and brutal, th~
most 'WiDISh tp'aDUy thA~ has ever menaced and Wsgraeed
European civilization.
<02
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WD.&.~ the campaign terminated, Wellington, exasperated by
the conduct of the llmty and till! mauy crossillge he had expe-
rienced during the campaign, ga"c vcnt to his indignation in
a circular letter addreescd to the superior officers, which.
being ill-received by the army at the time has been frequently
referred W since with angry denunci!l~ionB of its injustice.
In substance it declared, 'that discipline had deteriorated
during the campaign in (J, greater degm than he !wd ever wU-
tlU8ed QT' ever read of ilt any a"rmy, and this without any
disaster, any unusual privation or hardship save that of incle-
ment weather,-that the officcn lm.d lost all comllland over
their men, and cx~ecs outrages of all kinds and inexcusable
losses had occurred,-that no army bad ever made shorter
marches in retreat or had longer rests,-no army had ever
bet!n so little pressed by a pursuing enelllY, and this unhappy
state of nft"llirs was to be traced to the habitua.l neglect of duty
by the regimental officers.'
Tbese severe reproM:hes were part.ially unjust., and the
statemcnts 011 which they were founded were in some plU'ti-
eulars inaccurate, especially as regarded the retreat from Sala-
manca. The marches, tllOugh short aB to distance after quit.
ting the Tormcs were long as to time; and it is the timc an
English soldier bears his burthen, for like the anciellt Roman
he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some
regimcllUl bad come from Cadiz without baIting, and as loog
garrisOll duty had weakened their bodies their constitutioll1l
and incxpericlloo were too heavily to.xoo. 'l'hc line of marc]1
from Salamanca was through a flooded c1a)'cy country, no,
much easier to the allies t·han the marshes of tlle Arnue weN
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to Hannibal's army; and mounted officers, as tlmt great man
well knew when he placcd the Carthaginian cavalry to kecpup
the GaHic renr, nerer judge correctly of a foot-soldier's exer-
tions; they measure !lis strengtll by their horses' powers. On
this oecasioll the troops, stepping nukle-deep ill clay, mill-leg
in water, lost their shoes and with atrained sinews hCllvily
made their way, and witlull they had but two rations in five
days. Their gen€ral thought otherwise. He knew not that
the commissariat stores which he had ordered up did not
arrive regularly, because of the extreme fatigue of the animals
WllO carried them; and those that did arrive were not avail-
able for t11e troops, bec"'lUse, as the rear of an army and espe-
cially a retreating anny is at once the birth-place and the
rccillieut of false reports, the subordinate CQmmissarit'5 aud
conductors of the temporary depots were alarmed with
rumours that the enemy's cavalry had carried off or destroyed
the field-storcs: the soldiers were actually feeding on acoms
when SIlIJposed to ha.ve good rations!
The destruction of the swine may be tllUS in some mC&SUro
palliated, but there i'l neither palliation nor excuse to be
offered for tbe excesses and outrages committed on the inha-
bitants, nor for wallY officers' habituol .iuatteution to their
dut),. Intolerable <lillOrdel'9 hnd marked the retrcat, and
great part of the sulfcrings arose from f,hcse and previous
disorders; for it is too common witb soldiers to break up
the arnmgements of their general b)' want of discipline, and
then complain of the misery whieh those arrangements wC\ro
designC\d to obviate. Nevertheless tllis circular was not
.trictly just, because it excepted none (rom blame, tllollgh in
conversation Wellington admitted tIle reproach did Dot 81lply to
I.he light division nor to the guards. Witll respect to the
i'ormer indee<l the IlToof of its discipline was easy, thongll so
much had not been said; for how could those troops be up-
braided. who held together so closely with Uleir colours that,
exclusive of the killed in acHon flley did not leave thirty
men behind. Never did the extraordinary vigour and excel·
lence of their discipline merit praise more than in this retreat.
Rut it SOOmll to be 0. drawback to the greatness of lord Wel-
lington's clmracter, that while capable of rcpressiug ill5uoordi·
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natiou by firmness or de.:o;terity as the case mo.y require;
CIIpuble also of mIl.6'1J.llililllOUS[y disregarding or dll.ngtlrously
resenting injuries, 11is pl'flises and his censures are yet
bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire pllr-
tisallS a.n(I personal friends ra.tller than the attaellllient of the
multitUtIc. He did uot make the hard-workiug military
crowd feel tbat their honest unobtrush'e exertions were
arllreciated. In this he differs not from many otber great
ge!lerals and statesmen, but he thereby failed to influence
JrlllSSell, anu his gcnius falls short of tbat sublime flight by
which IIannibal in ancient and Napoleon in modern times
commanded the admiration of the world. But it is only by
such great mCll that he can he measured, nor will any slight
exumillulion of his exploits suflicc to eonvcy a true notion of
his intellectual power and rcsources. Let this campaign be
takcu as nll example.
It has ~n by Euglish writers Clllled his easy and trium-
plUlut lD.lU:ch to Madrid, yet /.lathing happened according to
the original plan; the ollerations were onc continual stnlgglo
to overcome obstacles occasioned by tlle enemy's numbers,
the insubordination of the troops, the slowness, incapacity,
and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, tile want
(If mone.r, ami the active folly of the different governments.
For first the design WliS to mellacc tho French in Spain so lIB
to bring their forces from other parts, and then retire into
Portugal, again to issue forth when want should cause them
to wSIlCrse. Wellington WaB not wilhout hope indood to
strike a decisive blow, yet he Will> coutellt if the occasion
Cflme not w wear out thc Frendl by continual mnrching, find
trusted the frequent opportunilies thus given to the Spaniards
would filifllly urge them to a general effort. But he fouad
his enemy from the first too powerful for him, even without
drnwiog succour from distant pllrts, and he would have fallen
hack at onco were it not for Marmont"s rashness. Nor would
t,he victory of tllC Ampilcs itllelf have produced tiny propor-
tionate effect but for the errors of the king, and his rejection
of Soult's advice. Those errors caused the eVlleuation of Anda.
lusia, bnt only to eOlleeutrate an overwhelming force with
which the Frcuch fiuully drove the viclors lmck to Portugal.
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Wellington designed to fmish his campaign in the southern
provinces, and circumstances compelled him to rcmnin in the
northern provinces. He would have taken Burgos and be
could not i he would have rested longer on the Carrion and
his flunks were turned by the bridges of Palellcill and Banos j
Ile would IllWC Tested behind the Dnaro to profit of his central
position, hut the bridge at Tordesillas was ravished from him,
Bnd the eudden reparation of that at Toro {orool him to
retire. He would have united with Hill 011 the Adaja and
he could only unite with him behind the Tormcs; and on this
last fiver also he desired either to take his winter quarters
or to deliver a great battle with a view to regain Madrid, Bnd
he could do neither. Finally lie endeavoured to make aD
orderly and Im easy retreat to Rodrigo, but llill army was
like to have dissolved alwgether. And yet in all these varying
circumstances, his sagacity as to the general course of the
war, his promptness in taking advanwge of Ilarticular oppor-
tunities wcre conspicuous: these arc the distinguishing charno-
teristics of real genius.
Passing o'"er that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca,
the reader would do well to mark how this great commander
nfter thnt event separated the king's army from Marmont's,
forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos and driving the other
from Madrid,-how he thus broke up the French combina.-
tions, which it required many weeks to restore,-how he
posted Clinwn's division and tho Gallicians to repress any
light excursion by the beaten anny of Portugal,-how, fore-
seeing Soult's plan to establish a new base of operations in
Andalusia, be was prepared to drive Soult llimsclf from that
province,-how promptly, when the Riege of Burges failed
and his combinations were mined by the fault of others, he
commenced his retreat, sacrificing an his high-wrought expec-
tation of triumph in a campaign which he burned to finish,
and otherwise would have finiahcd even with more splendour
t,han it had commenced.
If Burges, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen
early the world would have seen a noble stroke. For the
Gallicinus, aided by a weak English division and the rew·
forccmcnts making up from Coruua, would, covered by
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Burgos, hnve sufficed to keep the army of Portugal in check,
and Popham's armament would have fomented a general
insurrection of the northern provinces. Meanwhile Welling.
ton, gathering forty-fi'"o thousand ~\nglo-Portnguesc and
fifteen thousand Spaniards on the Tngus, would have marched
towards Murciaj Ballesteros' anny and the sixteen thousand
lllell composing tho AliCllnt army could there have jOilled
him; and then with a hundred thousand soldiers he wouhl
have given such battle to the united Frendl annies, if indeed
they could have united, as would have shaken all Europe with
the martial clangor. To exchange this glorious vision for the
cold desolnte reality of a dangerous winter retroot WllS for
Wellington but 8 momentary mental struggle; and it was
simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the
bridge of Burgos under tile fire of the castle.
Let him be traced then in retreat. PUNued by a superior
army and Becing llis cavalry defeated he turned as EL savage
lion at the Carrion; nor would be have removed so quiekly
from that lair, if the bridges at Palencis. and Banos had been
destroyed according to his order. Neither is his 0001 self-
pos90ssion to be overlooked; for when both his tlanks wero
thus exposed, instead of falling haek in a llUrried lllanner to
the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the rugged ground
On the left bank of tlie Pisuerga, in opposition to the double
ndvanl:aoo-e obtained by the enemy at Pllolencia nnd Baiios,-
nor did the difficulty whicl} Souhnm nnd Calfarclli, indepen-
dent commanders and neither of them accustomed to move
large armies, would find in suddenly changing their line of
operations escape him. His march to Cabe~on and his posi~
tion Oll the left of the Pisnerga was not a retreat, it was the
ahift of a prootised eaptain.
When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he on the
instant formed a Dew combinatioD to fight that great battle
on the Adaja which he had intended to deliver near the
Guadalaviar j and though the s}llendid exploit of captain
GWlIgret at Tordesillas hamed this intent, he in return
baftled Soullllm by that ready stroke of gencralship, tbe post·
iug of his whole arm)' ill front of Rucda, thlls forbidding a
passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could not
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maintain the line of the Duero nOr 11\nt of tlle TormCll, it was
because rivers cau never be permanently ueftJluled against
superior forces; !lnd yet he did not quit the lnst without a
splendid tactical illustration, namely, the movement from
the Arapiles to the Valmusll. A mOl'cment made not in con·
fusion ami h::llf flight but ill close order of battlc, the OO]UIlIUS
rend)' fOf action, the artillery and clwalry skinnishing, p!lSSing
the J nuguen without disorder, filing along the front of and
winding into the rear of a Freud\ force the largest C\'cr 001-
lccte<] ill onc IDI\SS in the Peninsula, all army having twioo
as mUIlY gUllS as the allies !lnd twelvo, thousand nble horse-
men to boot! And all these great and skilful actions were
executed with nn army composed of different nations j soldiers,
fierce indeed and valiant, terrible ill blittle, but cllarncteri.OO
by himself us more deficient in good discipline than any
llrmy of w11ich lle had ever read!
Men engaged only in civil affairs, espe<:ially book-men,
Itre apt to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple
brnvery were the 11igllCst qualification of a general; llnd
they have Imother mode of appeasing an inward sellse Cif
inferiority, namely, to attribute the successes of a great cap-
t.'1in to 111e prudence of some discreet adviser, wl\o in secret
rules the genem1, amends his crrors, IInd ICflyes him /lU the
glory_ Thus Napoleon had Bcrthier, Wellington sir Ocorgo
Murrayl but in tlliB, the most skilful if not the most glorious
of Wellington's Cil.mpuigns, MurruJ was not present, and tbe
stuff of the army was govet'llCd by three Joung lieutenaut
colonels, namely, lord }'itzroy Somerset, Walers, andDelllnccy;
for thoug!l sir WilIoughby Gordon joined the army as quarter.
master-general after tbe battle of &Iamllllca, he was inex-
llcricnccd, and Bomo bodily sullcring impeded his pcrsonul
excrtions_
Such tllen were the principal points of skill displayed; yet
so Vast and intricate lID llrt is war, that the apophthegm of
'l'urenne will always lie fOlllld applicable: 'he wllo !uJsU~
no mistakes in war, lw./J addmn ffla& war.' Some militar}-
writers, amongst them the celebrated Jomini, blame the
Ellglish geueral, thllt with Q conquering anlly and llll insur-
gill!t llatipn at his buck he llhould in three monthll arter hill
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victor)' have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful
siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely unfounded, the
king certainly earoped very cusily from MnJritl; yet there ura
many points to be nrgued ere the que,tion can be dccidetl.
The want of money, progressively increasing, had become
almost intolerable. The army was lmrtly fcd from Rodrigo,
partly from the vulley or the Pi.\luep,;a.; Hill's trooJls were
fed from Lisbon; tlu~ Portugucse in their own country the
Spaniards always, lived like the French by requisition; the
British professed to avoitl. that mode and made it a national
boast; tue movements were therefore subservicut to this
principle and must be judgcd accordingly: want of money
was want of motion.
Now four modes of operation were open.
1°. .After ti,e "icl.w!J of Salalll«nca to follow t!~ king to
Valencia, and unite wiJ)~ tlte Alicam army, tlten, having
separaud SouiJ, from J(J$epl. and Sueltee to act aewrding
to ettlus.
To have thus moved without money into Valencia or
Mureia, new eountries where ho had no assured conuexiollS
Rud whieh wero senrcely nble to feed the French nrmics,
would have exposed him to great difficulties; and he must
}lave made extensive arrangements with the fleet ere he could
h1we acted vigorously, if, as was proba!J}e, tlle FrellCh COlleen·
trotcd all their forces behind the Guadalavifll'. 'I'hen the
distance between Ilim and the troops left in the north being
considered, the latter must have beon strengthened at the
expense of those in the south unless the army of Portugal
joined the king, whereby the allies would have beeu over-
mutched ill Vll.lcnein: that is, if Soult aloo joined tho king,
fiud if Dot lIe would have placed tIle anny between two fires.
If a force was not left in the north, the army of Portugal
could march to the king's assl!;tance by Zaragozll, or relieve
Astorga, seize Salamanca, recover the prisoners aud tropllies
of the Arllpiles, and destroy all tho grcut line!! of magazines
nnd J6p3ts even to the 'l'agus. Moreover the yellow fevcr
raged in Murein, find this would 11(1ve compelled the English
general to depend upon the contracted bflSe of 0llerations
offered by Alieant; becaU5~ Clausel could have reudered it
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impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time therefore was
required to arrange the means of operating in this manner,
llntl meallwllile the urm)' waa not unwisel}' t,urued another
way.
2°, To marcll directly against Sou/,(, in A1Ulal1Uia.
Thi>.l project Welliugtoll Wag ]lrepared to e,.ecute when the
king's orilcrs rendered it ll1l11CceB&lry; but if Joscpb had
ndopted Soult's )11an a. gt'and field for the display of milil:8ry
IIrt would lmve been o}lcned. The king going by the Des-
pciill8 Perros emd luwlllg the advalltuge of time in the march,
could have joined Soult wiUI the anny of the centre before
the English general could have joined HilL The aidy thou-
Mud combatants tllUS united could have kept the field nng,
Sucuet Imd also joined; but they could scurwly have main-
roined the bJockQlle of Cndir. also j Ilnd hence the cmr of
Welli.ngton seems to have been, that he did not make an
effort to overtake the king eitlJer upon or beyond tIle Tagus-
for the army of the centre would certainly have joined Soult
hy the DcspcfillS Pcrr09 if Mnitland hacl not at the moment
landed at Alieant.
3°, To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of
Salamanca,
The reasons for moving upon Mndrid instr,a(l of adopting
tllis line of operations need not be here repeated; yet it may
00 added, that the destruction of the great arsenal and dliptot
of the lWtiro was no slllall object with reference to the safety
of Portugal.
4°, TlwplanrutuollyfollCllCed.
The English general's stay in the capital was unavoidable,
l;CCing tlmt to observe the development of the :Frencll opera-
tions in the south was of such' importancc. It only remains
therefore to trace him after he qnitted Madrid, The choice of
the line by Valladolid appears common-place and deficient in
vigour, but was probably decided by the want of money and
menns of tmnsportj to wllich may be added the desire'te
bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only attain by
puttwg himself in actual military communication with them
und covering their advance. Yet this will not excuse the
feeble pursuit of CllI.uscl's retreating Drmy up the valley of
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the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less have come
up if that general had ~n defeated, nor would the want
of their IlSsistWlCC have been much felt in the action. Con-
siderahle 108!l would no douht have been suffered by the
Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill bear it, but the result of
a "ietory would have amply repaid the damage received; for
the time gaincd by Clausel WOB employed b}' Caffarclli to
strengthen the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest
French MpOt in this part of Spain. A victory therefore
would have entirely disarranged. tbe enemy's means of defence
in the north, nnd would have sent the twice-broken nnd
defeated army of Portugal behind the Ebro; then neither
the COIlllCript reinforcements nor the junction of Caffarelli'a
troops would ha,'e enabled Clausel to I'e-allpear in. the field
before Burgos would have fa.llen. But that fortress would
probably have yielded at once, and the English general might
have retnrned to the Ts,,"Ils, perhaps in time to meet Soult
as he issued forth from the mountains in his march from
AndAlusia..
It moy he objected, tlll~t l'lS Burgos did not yield it would
not have yielded under any cireumstances without a vigorous
defence. '£his is not so certain, the effect of a defeat would
have been very different from the effect of such a splendid
operation lIS ClamK:l's retreat; nnd the prolonged defence of
the castle was due to some errors of detail in the attack as
well as to want of sufficient artillery means. In respect of
the great features of the campaign, it may be assumed that
Wellington's judgmeut on the spot aud with a full know~
ledgtl both of hill own and h.is adversaries' situation, is of
more weight than Jomini's, however able and acute, for be
knew nothing of the difficulties.
In the details of the siege there was something of error
exceedingly strange. It is said sir Roward Douglas on being
eOllBulted. objected to the proceeding by gallery and mine
against an outward a middle and an inward line of defence,
l'lJj likely to involvo n sUccalsion of tedions and difficult
enterprises, which even if successful would still leave the
'White Church Wld the upper castle to be carried ;-that this
castle, besides other artillery armament, was surmounted by a
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powerful bnttery of IICllY)' guns, bCllring flirectly upon th~
face of tIle born.·work of San lllichncl, the only point {rort
which it could be bl'cached; and until it WM breac1Hxl tilt
govcruof, tl gullfllJt mun, woulJ certainly not surrender. It
could not iJowevcr be breached without n lnrgcr tJnttcring"
train than the allies possessed, and would not lIS he suppose<\
be effCi;teJ by mines; wlJcrt:fore proposing to take the guIlli
from two frigates then lying at &mtallder he proffered to
bring them up in time. In this rcnsoning Wellington partly
acquiesced, but he expected SUCCCS8 from tbe scarcity of water
in the castle, and the facility of burnillg the provision DlUga-
zillcs; nor was he without hope from his fortune. Towards
the cuu of the siege he too latc got the gUllS from Santander;
but while DougllUl counsclled him on tlle spot sir Edward
Pakenham, theu in Madrid, assured t11e author of this history
that he also, foreseeing the nrtillery means were too scantJ,
lmd prollosed to 8CIHl bJ the Somosicrrn twelve fino RussillU
bnttcring.guns from the Rctiro, pledging himself to procure
by an appeal to the oi1icers in the capital, animals sufficient
to transport them and tiJeir ammunition to Burgos in a few
days. 'I.'he alTer was not accepted.
Something also mn.y be ohjected to the field operationsj
for it is the rule, although not till absolute onc, that the
cnemy's active army sho\lld first he beaten or drivell heyond
some strong line, such as a river or chain of mountains,
before a siege is commenced. Now if 'Yellington had
masked the castle after the horn-work WilS carried
on the ] 9th, and 1111<1 then followed Clause], tllo
French generals admitted they woul(l have gone
over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluua and St. &>bastiall.
'fhen all the millor d611uls lIlust llllve been broken up, and
the rc-organization of the lIrmy of l'ortugul retarded ut least a
montll, during which the guns from Sanwnder would have
llrrived and the castle of B\lrgos have fallen. In Sonbam's
secret despatches, it is 5aid, of conrse on the anthority of
spies, that Cw;tuiios urged un advance bc)'oud Burgos inst~d
of a siegc; and it is not unlikely, because to advance con-
tltl\laily and sUITound an enemy constituted with Spanish
gencrals the wbole art of war. Howbeit on this occasion
ISlt.J nOOK X!X.-CHAP. 1, 413
the advice if given was not. unreuonable; and it needed
llC:U'cely even to delay the siege while the covering anny
advanced, bet'suse one divisiou of iufantry might have come
tlp from lIadrid; stin leaving two of the fiuCit in the army
aDd. brigade of cavalry at. that capital, wbich was sufficient,
blall5e Hill W83 coming to Toledo, llallesteros' disobedience
WIll unknown, and tbe king in no oonditiOll to advance before
Soult anil"ed
.! last error was stopping too long on the Tormes in bOllell
of lighting in tbe position of the Ampiles. It. was 8. 8tirring
thought indeed for a great mind, and the error was briUiantly
'redeemed; but the remedy d0e3 not efface the original fault;
and this subject loods to n consideration of some speculative
inwrest, nlmely, wb}' Wellington, desirous as he WM to keep
the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what tlifficulty the
French fed their large army, tlitl not order everything in his
rear to take refuge ill Rodrigo and Almeida nnd entrendl
himself on St, Christoval and in Salamanca, 'l'bus posted
sad baving a bril1ge-heaU. on the left ballk by which to opcrntc
on either side, ho might havc waited until famino compelled
the enemy to separate, which would have been in a very few
days: perlJa(ls the IUlSwer would be that tho Sl'lIouiards had
left Uodrigo in a dcrenedcss state.
Turning now to the French side they al.!lO will be found in
""',.
Souham's pursuit after tho ca\'lllry oomoot at Venta do
POM W'8lI feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army,
said, •no troops were ever less pressed by an enemy,' The
king'. onlera were howevt!r positive not to figh~ anl! as the
English general continually offered oouham baUle ill stroug
poilitioD8 the man bad no power to do mischief. Soult's
too ClIlIUOUS punmit of Hill llad other moti,'es. He was not
desirous of a battle, and uutil the Guadanuna T(&S passed
Dill had the larger force, for then only was the wbole French
arm)· united. Soult WisJled to Illan:h iu one b-rellt mass
tllrougb La MUllchu, leaving ouly a smlll! corps or 11 dctacb.
mcnt of Suchet's nnny on the CuCIH~ rond; but the king
united the whole of the army of the centre, his own guardil
Illld sc\'Cn thousand men of the army of the south on the
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Cueocn. line, and there were no good cross communications
except by Taranoon. Soult therefore advanced wwards the
Tagus with only thirty-five thousand men, and from commis-
sariat difficulties and other obstacles was compelled to move
by successive divisions, at OOllsidcrnble distances; when bis
a.dvanccd guard was at Valdemoro his rear-guard was two
marches distant. Hill might then have tumed and driven
him over the Tag-us j or, after leaving a small corps on the
upper Tagus to watch the king, have passed that river at
Toledo, and without ahandoning his lino by the valley of the
Tagua have attacked Soult while on the march toWards,
Ocaiia: the latter, in despite of llis nwnerous cavalry must
then bave fallen back to concentrate his fOfi:es, and this would
have deranged the w1101e campaign.
Sonlt thinking BlIollesterOB Wlll:l with Hill, naturally feared to
press his adversary under such a vicious disposition of the
French army; neither could that disposition be changed
during the operation, because of the want of good cross roads,
and liecause Souham had boen told that the king would meet
him on the side of Guadalaxara. In tine Soult had learned
to respect his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man
whose meutal grlll:lp embraced all the machi.neryof the war,
he It''oided a doubtful buttle when a defeat would from the
Ullilettlcd state of the French Il.fluira hll.ve lost the whole
Peuinsula. The allies bad Portugal to fall back upon, the
French armics must wwe gone behind the Ebro.
These seem to be the leading points of interest in this cam-
paign, but it will not be uninteresting to mark the close
nffinitiell betwccn Wellington's retreat and that of sir John
Moore. This last-named. general marched to the north of
Spain with the political object of saving Andalusia by drawing
on himself the French power; having beforehand declared that
he U)Jccted to be overwhelmed. Wellington moved iuto the
Silme country to deliver Andalusia and thus drew on himself
the whole power of the enemy; like Moore declaring also
beforehand that the political ohject being gained his own
military position would be endangered. Both succeeded, and
both were, aB they had foret.old, overwhelmed by superior
forces. Mooro was to have been aided b,r Romana's Spanish
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army and he fonnd it a burtheu; Wellington was impeded,
not assisted by the GaJlieians, and both generals were without
money.
Moore having approached 80ult and menaced Burgos was
foreed to retreat, beeaUSIl Napoleon moved from Madrid on
his right flank and towlOrds his rear. Wellington having
actually besieged Burg05 was compelled to raise the siege and
retire, lest the king, coming through Madrid, should pass Jlis
right flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed
by Soult to the Es~ Wellington was only followed by
Souham to the Duero. Tile first general looked to the moun-
!.\lins of Gallicia for positioUB whicll he could maintain; but
the apathy of the Spanish people in the south permitted
Nspoleon to bring up an overwhelming force so rapidly
that this plan could not be sustained. Wellington had tbe
same notion with respect to the Duero, lUl(l the defectiou of
Ballesreros enabled tho king W bring up such a power that
further retreat became necessary.
Monre's soldiers at the commencement of the operation
evinced want of discipline, they committed great excellSell lit
Valderss and disgraced themselves by their inebriety at Bern-
bibre IInd Villa Franca. In like manner Wellington's soldiers
broke the bonds of discipline, disgraced themselves by drunk·
enness at Torquemada and on the retreat from the Pueutll
lIIrga to Mn.drid, and committed exccsses everywhere. Moore
stopped behind the Esla. to check the enemy, restore order,
and enable his commissariat to remove the stores; Wellington
stopptld behiud the Carrion for exactly the same purposes.
The one general was immediately turned on his left because
the bridge of Malleilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceselli;
the other general was also turned on his left booause the
bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy. Moore's
retreat wa.s little short of three hUlJdred wiles; Wellingtoll's
was nearly BS long, Il.m\ both were in the winter 8ClISOll. The
liNt halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the
last halted at Duenas, at Cah~oD,Tordesillas, and Salamanca.
The principal loss sustained by the one was in the last
UUlrehcs between Lugo lInd Cornua; so also the principaJ. IO!13
sustAined by the other was in the last marcLc,s bctW<X1n the
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Tormes and t11c Aguecla. Some of Moore's genel'ltls mur_
mured ag:linst his proceedings, some of Wellington's generais,
8l:l we have geen, weut further; the first were chel::ked by a
reprimand, the second were humbled by 5 sarcasm. Finally
both generals reproached tllciT armies witll want of discipline,
botll attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally,
and in oolh cases the justice of tllo reproaches was IJrovOO by
the exceptions. The reserve and t11c foot-gunrds in Moore's
campaign, the ligllt division and the foot-guards in Welling-
oon's, gave signul proof that it was negligence of disci}lline,
not bo.r(Mlips, though the Itlltcr were severe in both llrmici!,
that caused the lollScs. Not that it cun be said, only those
regiment$ preserved order; milny others were eminently well
conducted, but those were the troopg named as eXlXlptions at
tile time, and two regiments of tile light divisiou had been of
Moore's reserve.
Such were the resemblanlXls of these two rctrCflts. The
dilfer€llCCS were, that Moore hurl only twenty-three thousand
men in the first part of his retreat, and ninctcen tllousand in
the latter part, haying detuclled four lllOUMnd to Vigo. Wel-
lington had thirty-three thousand in the first part of hiB
rctreat, sixty-eight thOUSUlld in the latter part. l\foore's army
were all of onc nation and young soldiers, Wellington's were
of different nations but veterans. The first marched through
mountains, where the wcather was infinitely more inclement
t111l11 in tlie plains ovcr which the second moved; rmd untiL
he reached tIle Bsla Moore's flank was quite exposed, whereas
Wellington's flank WM ooyerod by Hill's amly until he gained
t1l0'I'ormes. Wellington with veteran troops wus opposed to
Souham, to Soult, to the king, and to Jourdan, men not
agreeing in their views; and their whole army wllCn united
did not exceed tIle allies by more than twenty thousand men.
M"oore Witll }'oung soh.iiers was at first opposed to four timeB.
und lutterl}' to three times his own numbers j for it is remark-
ablc, that tIle Froncll llrmy nsscmbled at Astorga W/1.'I abovc
eighty thousund, including tcn tllOus:md cavalry; which iB
nearl)' the same as the number assembled against Welliugtoa
011 tlle Torm€S; but Mooro had little more than twenty tLOll-
enud men to oppose to this o"erwhelming mass and Wclliugton
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bad nearly seventy thouSo'md The partidll!J, abounding at
the time of Wellington'8 retreat, were unknown in the time of
liloorej and tbis geuernl WlIS eonfronh.od by ~apoleoD, who,
despotic in command, WlL'l also unrivalled in akill in genius
and in vigour. Wellington was not preued by the enemy
and he wade short marches; yet he lost lllore stl'""S£'lers than
){oort, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches and
roald only &eeUre an embarkation br deIi\'ering a battle in
.hieb he died most honouT"oIbly. His character "as·imme-
diately,ilified. Wellin.,<>ton was relieved from his pursuers
by the operation of (amine, and b.a.d therefore no occa..<tion to
deliver a battle i but he also was vilified at the time 1\;th
eqllal injustice; and if he IIad tlIan died it would Iun-a been
with equal malice.. His subsequent suooc.s!ICa, Ilis great nBme
and power, have imposed silence upon his detractors or COD·
verted censure into praise, for it is the UlItUrc of Illankind,
c-spedall)' of tlJll ignorant" to eling to fortune.
Moore attributed his difl1eulties to the apntIlY of the Spa-
niards, his friends c11Urged tllcm on the iUC!l.pncity of the
English go\·erllmcllt. Wcllington oHributl.. J Ilia ultimate
f&ilure to the defection of Ballesteros; his brother, in the
House of Lords, eharged it on the previous eonlrrteted policy
of Perceval'a government, which had erippled the general'5
means: and certainl)' Wellin..,<YtoIl's reasoning relative to BaI-
ifsteros 1rnS not quite sound. 'rha' ~ncral he said, might
bal"C (oreed Soult to take the (ireuitous route of Yalenda,
Rec(uei1a and Cuenea, or lea\'e a strong corps in obsen'8tion,
and then Hill might IUl\'e detached llleD to the north. He
even calculatro upon :&l1c:>I.CJ'OlI being ablo to stop bot~
ooult and Souho.m altogether; for as the latter'a opcrationa
"..ere prescribed by the king and dependent. upon his proceed.
iags, Wellington thought he would have remained tranquil
if J08Cpb bad not advlluced This was the error. Sou-
ham's dCliputoehe:s dearly allOW, thflt tho king's
instroetions checked instead of fonvarding his
movements; that it was his inwntion to have
delivered battle at the end of four da)'s without regard to
JOIlCph'8 onlora; unu 60 grcat was his roroe Wellington
o.dmitteu hia own inability to keep the field. Do.l1cstcrolil'
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defection therefore cannot be pleaded in bar of all further
inveatigation. But whatever failUte8 there were, and hOWCTel
imposing the height to which the English general's reputation
blUl l!inoo attAined, this campaign, including the sieges of
llOOrigo, Badaj08, the forU of Salamanca and of Burgoe., the
assault ofAlmaraz and the fight. of Salamanca, will probably be
eonsidcred his fine,,'t illustration of the art. of war. Waterloo
may be called a more glorioos exploit becsUge of the great
man who was there vanquished; Auye may be deemed &
more wonderful action, ODC indeed to be compared with the
victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes j but Salamanca
will o.iwaJs be referred to as the most skilful of Wellingwn',
batt1eB.
•
APPENDIX.
No. I.
SEOTLOR I.
CONDUCT OF TilE ENGLISH GOVERN)tENT.
nTllACl rROliI IIR. CAIININO'S niSl'RUCTIONl:l TO 1l..II.. STUAkT .l.SD
:llR. DlIl'l', 1808.
'lb Mr. Stum·t.
'You lire to enter into no political engn~emcnt8.'
•Jul!J 26, lOOS.
'You will embark on board his majesty's ~hip. Stately; 011
board of that ship are embarked to the amount of ono million of
Spanish dollars, three fourths in dollars aud one fourth in bnr;;.
which sum is consi~ncd to your eare, and is destined by his fin-
jes!y for the use of tlte kingdom of Andalusia and tlte provinces
of Spniu corlDeeted with them.
'His lUajesty hu no desire to anllex: any conditions to the
pecuniary a~i8tance which he furnishes to Spain.'
'Military stores to a considerable amount are now achJal1y
shipping for Cadiz, and the articles required for the clothing of
the Audalusian anny will follow.'
'It WllIl onl.v by a direct but seeret nnderllmnding with the
government of Spain, under the connivance of France. that any
considerable amount of dollars has been oolleeted in England. '-
'Eacllr.rovinee of Spain made its own application with reference
to the Ull amount of its OWD immediate necessities, and to the
full mellSUre of its own intended exertions, but without taking
into eonaideration that similar Decessitie~ Rnd similar exertions
lead to similar demands from o!Jl('r pllrt!, IInd that though each
Mpllrll.te demllnd mil\"ht in itself be TC'lI8onably supposed to come
within the limit., ,,, the meang of Gl"{!st Britain, yet that the
whole together oecaaion a eall for 8Jlfeif. such as ne'·er before was
mado upon this country at any period of its existence,'
'In tho OOUl'110 of the prescnt yca1' it is publicly notorious
that a subsidy is paid by Grcnt Britain to Sweden of ono million
two 111111drcd thousand pounds, the wholo of whieli. or nearly
the whole. must 00 remitted in specio, lllllouuting to at It'as! soven.
Er.2
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million dollars. One million of dollars hJl~ already been sent to
GihoD, another to Corw"ut, in part of the respective demands of
thl'l principality of AilturillS !lud the kingdom of Gallicia, and the
remainder of these demands ne already brought forwnrJ would
require lIot le88 than eight million dollars more to satisfy them.'-
• An application from Porluglll has :iliJo heen roceil'cd lot an !rid,
which will amouIl~ to aoout twclv(l or thirteen huudred thousand
dollar8; ouc million, as hltll boon stated, g'OC8 ill the sllip with you.
to ClIdiz, and thl:! remainder of lhe Andalu.ian dellland would re·
quire between three Ilnd four millions of dollar!! more. Here,
Olero(oro, there are notices [ll/Ill tlire.. aud twonty millions of dol.
lal.'1l, of "'hieh near sixteen milliolls for Spain and Portugal re-
quired to be suddcnly drawn from the Dritish treasury.'
'In addition to tlus drain it is a]80 to be cousidered that th(l
British armies arc at the same moment sent forth in aid of the
same cause, and that every article of expense to be incurred by
tllcm on foreign service tu whatever couutry they may be em·.
ployed, must tie defraycd by remittances in sih·er:·-' You will
be particularly careful in entolring upou the explanation with the
junta in Seville, to avoid any appearuncc of a dcsire to orerra.te
the merit and value of the'exertious noW" making by Great
Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay the ground for
restraining or limiting- those exertiolls within any otller bounds
than those which are prescribed by the limits of the actual means
of the country:
Mr. Oanning to Mr. StuQrt.
'July27,180B.
, Already the deputy from CQruiia has added to his ori"ulaf
dl'ffiand for t\\"O DllJliollS of dollars, a further demand fOl' iliee
millions on learning from the Asturian deputies that the demand
from Asturias had amounled to 6\'e millioO.'l in the first instance.
Both profess in conversation to include a provision for the in.
terests of Leon and of Old Castille in the demand. Dut this has
not prevented a direct application from Leon.'
'It is besid"s of 00 small disadvantage that the deputies from
the Asturias and Gallicia ha\-iuA' left Spain at 80 early a period
lire really not competent to furnish information or advice upon the
more M\'allood state of !.hings in that COlWtry.'-' I have already
• Note by Editor.-Ne,"ertbelcss Bir John MOOn! had only £25,000 in
biB milita.ry chest, and sir Dllvid lliird only £8000, which wer.. giVell
him br Bir Jobn Mool'O.
AdmimJ.De C()U.TCy to blr. &lIQ.rl, Oclobtr 21, 1808.
'Mr. }'rere will hllve told you that the Eemiramis h"s brought a miUioo
of dOn..TS in order to lie at hill di!lposnl, besirics £~O,Q{lO in dollars, which
lLro to be pr(lll(lllted to the army of the m~"luie of Romllnll.'~' In the
meantime the Ilritieh troops fCmain in their transporl.e at Coru;,a, un·
eertai" whether the)' shall be in\ited to the war, and without & sllilling
to defrl\)' their eXJX:llllfia."
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llatoo. toyon that in applications Cor 8UCC(lU", there ilIlUl wider-
ground .ppearance oCnnlry, whi(·IJ 'll"i~h el'ery diilpollilioD to do
everytbing th.t C.II be dODe for Spllin, imposes a neeessit}, of
perpetual. caution with resped to the I!ariicuhr dema.ud.l of each
province. The A.sturians baviD!! been rebuked by their conati-
tuentt for not ha"ing applied for pecuniary aid u quickl)" as the
Gallicia.0.5 are bent upon repairing lhiil CIWIt, and the GallicUw
hning been commended for ~romplitude, is aDlbitious of ac·
qniri.ng new credit by inere&SLDlt the amount of hit demand.
"berer the ulterior demands tl1fia 1ll1'el'! provinces bne to
me. will be made with infinitely more efl'od through you and
la. Hunter rcepectivel], as they lII"iIl then COllie aoeompaniod
";th some detailoo. and mtt'lli!!ible exposition or the grounda and
objecLII oC each p&'tieulnr application.
Mr, Sill4rt', rkfpalcAu to Mt'. C'4ltlti1l9.
, Cor'!lilQ, JlI.l!l22, 1808.
•Accounh of advantages in the quarters, which from the
present state of things ean have little or no comlliunication with
this place, Ill)pear to be numcrous in proportion M the north of
Spaiu is barren of events a","l"ecable to the cxiatinj:{ gOI'erlllnent;
and I am disposed to consider unauthenticated reports of success
in Cata.louia,""Valencin., Mureia, Md AndlLlllJ!ia. to bll lL lllodc of
concealilllJ or palliating wsastcr8 in Loon, Cutille, lIod the
Montana.
'Jlll.r 24, 1803.
'One thousand men, under De Ponte, is tlte ul.mOlt force the
Ajturias have yet organi.l!:ed or .'lent into the field, and the COD-
tingenb ofJ...eon are very triflin"':
'"Thirty tbOIl.'lAnd men, ofwhf'eb twenty thOUl!and are ~u1&l'
troops under Hlalce, were united to ten thousand Cutillitm
~its under Cuellta.. They went tollic Scco to mareh aga.insl
BnrgOB, and eut olf Be!liercfl' ret:rea.t to Fra.noo, bnt they lost
ICven IhouwW. mcn at Rio Scoo:
'The Estrcmadura a.nny under GaUC:gOlI a a.t Almanu:. con,
listing of twenty.four thousand infantry and four thousand
C8valiy, but tho battle of llio Sceo has cut tho communieation
which had boen before kept up to Andalusia:
.d.hdrod ofinffW'1RQtw. «mt to Mr. O(lflfliJtg bJ Mr. St_ri.
'Jaly 26, 1808.
'The 29th of lIIay the inhabitants of Corufia. appointed a
prorisionalJ·unta of (orty member:! taken from the uotable~oflhe
place, and lill junta despatched circularfl to the 1lO"en provinces
of St. J~o, Uet.nnOOB, ComiiB., Mondonr:l.o, Orcnse, 1.11.1:'0. Md
Tuy, desinn~ thnt deputics from each sbould come to CO'I'UiUl to
form a junta for Gallicill cntire. Sevcn poracns (lame aud imme-
diately soil.od the Wlvcrnmcnt lInd dissolved the loonl juntll.; the
troops muchcd to the frontier, deputies went to EnglAnd, Md all
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Mr, St'll.Ul't to Mr, Ga1l1~i71g,
soomed to proceed wall until contributions woro demaMeo, Then
tho pro\"incc8 demurred, saying, thoir deputies were empowered
only to signify their approbation of 1'!"hllt hlld pllSSed, but nGt to
scize tlle government, and St. Jag-o insisted upon sending more
deputies, and having additiollal votes as bcinjr of more conse-
quence, It was then arrauged that two deputies from ~h
province should be scut to Carum with more power. The
archbishop and a Mr. li'reire eamo from SI;. Jago, and oihen
were arriving- when the first deputation resolved not to submit,
aud declared the second to be an ordinary jUrlta, chosen for the
nlCfO purpose of raising money, and subordinate to themselvel,
The archbishop aud the bishop of On'nse refused to act in such a
calm.cily; but a letwl' from the la~ter painting the true sWJe or
thllll;S bein~ i~tercepted, he WlllI arrested and confined in the
CitadeL A l>OUy of troops Wll8 scut to St.. Jago. it Wall uneer·
taiu whether to seize the archbishop or to awe the people; bal
Mr, Sluart Wall llUCrctly allsured it \\'3.8 for lhe former purpale.
The archbishop thought. eo also Bnd came immediatelr to
ConJi'ia. rhls trunSB~-tion was studiously con~'(!Bled from the
:English envoy, but ho pcnet1'lltcd the BlXlrct. The people were
dIscontented u.t tllis usurpation of tbll junta of sefell, but the
Iavieh succours sent to them by Ur. Cl\nnin~and the I?resenoo or
Mr. St.nart indn~'Cd them to submit, llB thinking tIle Junta were
supported by Eng-Iand.
'rhis junta of seven adopted no mell8Ul'eS in oommon with
• anr neighbouring- province, but willingly enUJred into c1Ol:1o alli·
ance witll tbe insurg'ents of Po~al as one independent atate
'with another; and t110y witWlcld allY share of.he English aup·
1>lie8 for tbe Ilrmies of Asturlall Illld Loon,
'Tho tu"ChbisllOp \I'lll! nu intriguing dangerons man, and
l!ecTetl}· wrote to :Blake to march with the snny against thtl jUIltll,
llis letter being intercepted six I'oted to IIrrest him, but the
sOI'euth, with tlle assistance of Mr. Stuart, persuaded thelll to
M'oid so vielent n meaall1"e, as tending (owarda a ci"il commotion,
1'umultll, however, did l-ako place, and the Ellglish naval officers
were requCllted und \)ouscnted to quoll a riot., lilld it prol'ed that
they.had wow influence over the pooplu thau thl) juntu.
'In AUriust the arebbidlOp WIl.8 commanded W lelll'o Corun&,
he obo}'ea, IInd the bisltop of OreD.tle \\'l\8 after 80me re;;i~taIlClt
madu a llwmber of U.W junta.'
'~u!!ud 7.
'There is no common plll.ll and consequently DO ooocert in
tlwir proceeding~, No prol,jJ.]oo shares t,he sucooun granted by
Great Brit/lin with it.:! neighbour, although that lld1'lllltage may
J.]ot be lIselill to themseh'es. No gUll.boats have been sontirom
Forrol to protect St. Andcro on tile COll,~t of DiSCtl}', fllld tho
Asturillns l11ml in vain llSkcd for artillery from the d6pt1la ot
Gtlllicia.
• The lltOrcS Innded ut GihOll I\Ild not UliCd by the Asturiaua.
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. bye remained in that port and in Oviedo, lLlthollll'h they would
have aflOrded a SClUlOnlLble relief to the lLrmy of make.
'The money brouj{ht by the Pluto for that province of Loon,.
1i"h~h has not railed a man &Dd was till thls moment in the
hand! of the French, remain8 unemployed in the pori where it
ns landed. Estremadura il laid to ba.,.e nine thoullll.Dd cavalry,
.....hich are of little service .inee the French quilted that province.
Iet they hAve not tent I man to Blue, who eannot prudentl!
11i!' from hill prelllnt poti'ion without ea"a1ry. GeneraJ. Questa
alao lw deprived him of.a hundred horae and hia n,ingartillerr.
wilh which'he hu actually quilted Sa1Am.auca on hiiI way to jow.
the ulrewdun. army:
• A.~91"~ 12.
'The duke of Inf'antado reached Dlalre'a quartr.ora after t'lI-
nping: from France. Dlake p:"e him his confidence, and Illnt
him \0 Madrid to form. a cnuncil of war, and to pe:nuade Cuest.
\0 !end two thoUlllDd cavalry to the armf of Galhcia. The junta
did DOt· applOl"ll of lbw; theY8U1pected lnfantado aa .. double
dtaler and 1D the French inure.t,
'After Ba)'len, the juntu of Seville an<l Murcia wi&hed to
m&bl~b • de&potism differing in nothing. from 'ha' of Cbarlea
III and CbarlCII IV.: g.,.e that Florida Blanea was to be the
head of .. regency. But in the north they were all for lilKTty
and pnt fof"flf'd the Britiah eonstitutwn as a model The anny
l;doe of Infantado .. reltCnt., but the ci,.ilian. dilllikcd him. .A.ll
tbe Rnglil1h gun! lent out for Gallicia went hy utah to the
Aaturias, the kDOCOUl'I were ab&urdly diatributed and e,.erything
'lrU in confUlion.'
Dilto to Ditto.
, CMviia, A..pd 9.
'I am plaoed at the very ntremity or the kingdom where I
t3JlDot possibly obtain any IOl't of information relpeeling other
prvrinees, and my presence hu very materially contributed to
cherUh the project of lteparalion from the re&t of the peninlula
Ur the mind. of the Gallieiana.
•Deaidc. the conata.nt communication of the navy with the
jnnla. a military mission i8 placed here, oon8iUiDI!: of 5CVCI'll1 per_
sons who communicate reJt'ular1v with the 1rO\'('rnment and tbe
admiralty, and whOle oorresponaence wi~h Enj:\'land being a mere
duplicate of my own renden the one or the oilier perfectly
u~ele8S.
'The piCKet, inlwad of eominjil' weeldy. only llrriVed every
fortnight, being sent to Gihon tocarry borne Mr. Hunter', letterS,
who Tunder!tand hu no order to report to DIe!
'The admirlll having DO offieinl notioo of my llitllfltion here
on the part of goverlllDent, cannot be expeoted. to detach Ve6fl(llt
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for the purpose of sending- my despatches, at a time when he is
occupied ill sending his own accounts of the eveuts taking pl8.Cft
in Spain lo tlie Admiralty:
SECTION n.-LoRD WllLLESLEY'S b;STBUCTIO~S TO
MR. STU4BT.
[Extraetill.]
•Ja1luary G. 1810.
'In return for these liberal supplies, his majrsty is entitled to
claim from tho Portuguese government every Illlsislsncc which
can 00 :dlordcd to the British commaudllr lIud troops, a faithful
and judicious applicution of the funds granted Jor the support of
80 large a portion of the Portuguese force, whiull must otlLerwise
be supplied from the exclusil'c resources of Portugal.'
'I am commanded to aib'llify to you tho expectation that !lIO
extraordinury efforts of his majesty's government for the aid or
Portugal, and the consequent pressure upon Dl'itisu resources,
will be met by correspondin~ exertions on the part of the regency,
and that alllOClll and temporltJ'y prejudices Will be submilled to
the urgent necessity of placinJ,;' the financos of tho kingdom in
that state which may render them available for it6 defence in the
approachin,g danger, You will direct your immediate and vigi_
lant attentIOn to this most important object, nor will you refrain
from offering, or even from urginl! your advice Oll any OCCllsion
which llIayopen ilie prospect of effectinq- any useful reduction in
the civil eharg-es, or augmentation in tile revenuos or military
resources oftlie country.'
'In addition to these arrangements, his majesty will expeet
to receive reJ!,"ular monthlr. accounts of i-he expenditure of the
sums applicable to the military ehar!\"cs of Portugal, under the
orders tllSued to lord W e.llin~ton, as well as aceuro.w renlTDS of
the state and condition of the seve-raJ. corps reeeil,jug' British
pay.' ---' It is also desirable Ibat his majesty should be
acqul\inted with tIle state and condition of thllt part of the Por_
tuguese force which is to be maintained from the r('veDues of
Port,ugaL' --- 'The eri.•is delll~n<b the most lmreacrvcd
confidence and eommunicnt,ion betfl'een his mnjcsly's ministers
Rnd the local government of the prince regent, No jealousy or
suspicion should be hlU'boured under such a pressure of common
dsnger; the weat sacrifices which we have made for the intert'stll
of our all;v must not be frust,rated by any consideration inferior
to the main purpose of our mutual security, nor must we now
hesitate to toke the lead in llny measurea neecsRllry to enablo
Portugal to contribute a just share of their own elI'orts n.nd re·
IlOnreCS for the occomplishmcnt of their own IlOfety.'
'Tho governing power in Spain doos not· deril'o its authority
from the appointment of the IlOvercig:n, the dis))O'lition of somo
of its leading membcrs is at least equIvocal, and his conduct has
not satisfied any expcctalions eith()r of the Spanish nation or of
.the aJ.lies.'---'lu Spain UIO S8Ilcmbly of the Cortes is the
only remedy to which t.hat couutr,)' Cll.ll resort for lh~ purp05e of
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infesting tho gOl'ernment with n. regular foree, or a national
spirit. nor can any hopo he entertained of 1\ 8um~1ent exertion
of the military resource8 of Spain, until a go,-erning power shall
be ~o fr!lJlled as 00 unite a due representatIon of the crown with 0.
just security for the interests and welfare of alt the estates of the
realm.'--
S.IICTlON m.-CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVEBNllENT.
Lmt 'W,dll7lgl01l to Mr. St'ilurt.
, Pueu-, Marc4 30, 1810.
'1 don't understand tLearraugemellts whieh gOVernlllont have
made oftho command of the troops there. I havo hitherto COll-
sidered thorn as part of this urmy, and, flOOlII the arruugomcnts
wllich I made with the Spanish government they cost us nothing
but their pay, aUlL :Ill the wOlloy procurml at Cadiz Jor bills was
applicable lo the sorl'ice in this t'Quntry. Their instruetiollll to
lcneral Graham Idler this entirely, and they hu,'o even gon~ 80!lI' as 00 desire him to take measures to oupply the Spaniards
with provisions front the ?fcditerrullean, whel'Cll.Il I had insisted
that ther should fced our troops. 'l'ha .first COl1£aquenoo of this
alTlln~emont will !:la, that wo shall have no more mOMy from
Cadiz. I hlld considered tho troops at eadir. so much purt (lf m,
army that I had written to my brother to desire to havo 11IR
opinion whothel', if the :Frcneh withdrew from Cndir. whell the.v
should attack Portu~lll, he thonght I might brill1t into PortU,!!;al
at least the trooPR which I IllLd 8ent thero. But ~ consider this
now 00 be out of the qllC3ti(ln.'
General G,-akam to M1'. Stuart.
'I8la, Mu!! 22, 1810.
'fadd tltis noto merely Il!l 11 postscript to my last, to tell you
tbat lord Li,'crpool hlUl J~'{;idl'd the douht, by declaring thi~ a part
of Lord Wellin.gton's arm)", but saying it is the wi;;.h of govern-
ment'that though I am orwoud in eommundw him I;;hould LJollJf't
here for the present. This is odd cnon/.:1J. I Illean that it;;hould
not have OOcnlel1 to his judg-ment to decide where I Wll.ll to be
employed; one would think llO ~oou!dl'ndjl"o fully iNtt.er ac~'QrdiuG"
to cireUIllStu!J.eOS thUD peoplo in. Eug aua,'
No. IT,
SECTION I,
MARMONT A..:.'ID DOILSE..}fNE'S OPERATro?l'"S,
I~tl:rcepUJd letter fMm Foy to Gim,-d, tMMlatedfMm tM
cipher.
'TruriUQ, 20 AOtU, lSlL
'MOXSI.Ell"1l LE GiNill.AL.-Wellin~on bloquo llodrig-o avec
quaraLlle milIo homwes; SOil aVll.ut garde occupc la. Sierra de
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FranClll. On !\SaDre que l'arlillerill dn train arrive de Porto pour
faire le siege de ceUe place. C'ost approvisionn€e pour troi~ mois.
Marmout va se porler vers le nord pour ss Numr aveo l'lltDJOO
cOlfilUlUldee par le g-cnllrol DOl'l!enne et at,taquer l'eunemi. Ma
division parilrale vingt-sill; poUT passer le 'f1l1{6 etsuivru 101ll0ul'e_
nJClIt de ].fH.rmont. Huit mille hOlllmos de 1'IITmec dn ceut.re
nOlls remplnccront 1i. Pla.ccntia et an Pout d'Almaraz.
'MOI.lSlCur le IDarechal due le ~agu8ll me charge de rous
eerire que c'est 1J. VOllS ii. contcnir quatl'll miUe Espagnols qui
Bout 011 00 moment Tennis devaut 'l'ruxillo,' &C. &6.
'FoY:
Intercepted leller from gtmC1'al WaUier ro {fill general COl»>
mundi1l9 at Ciudad RodrigfJ.
(ElltTlld.]
• Salamanca, Scpkmbrc 1, l8h.
•L'lLI'Il1Ce Espllgnol de Galice, bOUUUBcmcut cLassoo de eel!
po8itione de la DanC7,a et de Puonte do Orvil,'"O ot pOlU"Suivie par
l'avant l:'nrde all dela de Villa. Franea, a'eat rctir6e on gra.nd hllte
snr la Corniie. Le general.en.chef apres avoir nett.oye cell
paragos, viont iei sons sil: jonrs al"oc vlngt-einq mille hommes
do la garde. et nons irons tous ensemble voil: s'il plnit a ce8
illustres Anglaia de nous aUendrc, et de noU8 pern\ettre do rompro
quelques lances avec cux. Le due de Raguso il. qui j'envoie de
VOlI nouvcUes es~ llutour de VOU8 8. DaiiOll, Val de Fuelltes, PIa.
celltia, &c., et noU8 ogiroll.!l de concert avec lui.'
11Itercepud letter from Mannont lo Girard.
• p/.atJeru;ia, 7embre, 1811.
'Gil'll'lUL,-JC vons ni eerit pour VOIlS prier de fnire PlWlCf
uno lcttro quo j'ndressni nu ml\rCchnl due do Dalmatio, liCS
Anglais ont reum toutes lcurs fol'CCS auprcs de Rodrigo, les oorps
Espagno1s m6mo qui etoicnt sur la five gnuche du Tagc pf\8Sont
cn ce moment cctto ri\'ierc; VOIlS O'fl,VC1. presque pcnonno devaut
VOIlS. 11 AOraitextramcmcnt imJlortautqnc pendautque h. 'pl'Csq,nc
totaliM do I'll.nTIOO va BC portor Bur Rodrlgo vons puisSIC7. f!llre
nn mouvemcnt pour operer uno divorsion utilo ct l'll.pCUef un
portioo do la. force onncmie de votre 0616, J'ignore queUes sont
V08 instrllctiOn9, mais je ne doute pllS que ce olouvemcnt o'entre
dans les intentions du duo de Dalmatic.'
Du markllal Mal"11W1lt au general de divi:rion Fog.
• Talaoora, Oe(obre 21,1$11.
• GfldR.I.L,-Je ~ois seulement datl.!! 00 moment votre letlre
du IS"'" Mec la copie de cclle du l!,'eneral d'Anltanne. Pour
inatrud:ion gen6rsJc VOIlS ne del"cz obeir a aueno ordre qui VOUll
sernit donne /In nom dn 10i lorsqu'cll6!l sont contraires a. mes
intentions rarticu1ieres. Ne VOIlS departez jamajg de cos dispo-
sitioos. L armee du Portugal ne doit point Bervir aux e5eort~,
ni ala. communication de l'ann6e du midi,-nos troupes auroni
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bien llSSCZ de courses a. faire pour assurer la rentr~ de nOll appro-
visionncmcns. Le roi a paro desire: quo je n'oecupe poiot
lllescas, 11 cause do son voisinage dc MlUlrid; par cc motif et
plus euoore 110 rni~ull de l'eloigullmcot lJl du scrl'ice pellibLo doe
~rouPe;l, jo 00 veW( point I'o~cuper. MUll iutelltiolL etait de ne
r.intoceupcr Arllnjuo~; maia puisquo les milliatres du rai ont pruII m6suro iuoonsideree d'ordooucr III vcnw dcs m11i;azins, ne
perdez pas Ull soul insUllIt pour cUI'0,Ycr un dt5lacuemen& ooouper
Amnjucz, Oll [0 prefot de Tolodo fcm fairo 10 pillS do billCllit
pOllsiblo. l'rcnoz la memo mClluro pour tow! lo~ points Oll il y lI.
dOll mawu:we.-Em'parez.voua ClI,-<lt ,uo perSOlluu u'y touehe.
-L'cmporeur a illdlque la province do 'l<:.Jicdo cL Iloum pr6focturc;
llinsi eo sout lell r6sllourcea do touto In province qUI noue sont
lIJ1'ecws.-Emparcz,vOUll on,-<lt que Ic prMct administrfJ tow! 10
p,lyS. Dilll!l bien an prorot qu'Q quelquo titre quo eo soit aucun
des r6~sourees en bM, argent de qUlllquo soul'Ce qu'ollll~ pl'lh-ien-
nent ne doit etre distraits pour Mu.d.rid, llt.qu'elle~ doivent toutcs
elrc conscr\'6s pour 1'1I,rm6e de Portug-al. A In fin t1u mois In divi-
sion de dmgona Ilrrinlflt dlmslcs environs de'roledll.-..T'espho
qU'cllo eloignerll les gnerillllll. Dans lea ena oil ils rcsteroient
dlmS le voiamll~o on lour donoera Io.cbasse. Voyez 0. obtllnir du
pr6fct do Toledo qu'il fasso un effort extmordiul1.1re ponr cnvoyer
lI. Talavcra le b16 et I'or~e qui lui ont 6t6 dcmand6s, tlttendu quo
oomme ici on est ohlig-(! de fairc des expeditious cn avsnt;. nons
sommcs dAns un bcsoin tr~s pressnnt. .re d611rerois rentrer dans
la poslICssion de tout le hie qui a ctC vendn. On renverroit lea
ncheteurs par devnnt lo KouvcrneOlt>nt Espagnol pour Hrc in_
dcmnisces,---I!'il y II possibilitc cngng-c7. 10 pr6fet 0. prendre des
mesurc3 oonser\'atoins en nttendant que le prllnue un arrete a
cet el;n.rd sur le I'8pport que VOllS mo lorez. Jo me rends a
MadrId ou je l?assertli dcllX jours dalls I'll8pCrnuoo d'6c1airor 10
rei sur In condllltc quo SllS vcrimbles inwrels lui commandcnt de
tellir CCVllrB \'lI,rm60 li'1'8n9Iliso. De l1J. je me rends aToledc, Je
c'li I'aa hcsoin do vous rceommandel', general, d'cllvoyor a
AranJucz un officior sago et fcrmll, qui oxecule ponctuelLcmcntlcs
ordrll!l qui lui 8oroiont douc&!, qui so fa~se ohtll et qu.i mlltte 10
plus gralld sow u. fairo respecter I'habitation du rei.'
I'Ilterupted utter in cip"erfrom gew.eral MontbM//!. to d,
governor of Giudad Rodrigo.
• Vat de Fu.ente8, &p~mbre. 1811•
•Je re911 le - du cour/lnt, mon ~her g6n6ral, votro rcpollllo du-
ll. la letLre que je VOlUl ecrivis 10 -, dje m'olllprellsai d'oll commu-
niquer le continue Il S. E. le mar~ch:tl due do RagUIlO, qui me
charll'e de me metlre en communication uvec \'ous. Ju m'en
lI1XI.ultterai avee plulsir puisque e'cn est toujours un uoul'eau pour
lnol de recevoir ae vas uouvelle8. Je VOUll anconce qu'un IIppro-
visionnement tres cOluidCrable se prepare 3. Salamanqac par lea
sow du gtin6raL.en-chef DorsenllC, le mankhal, sur leque\"1'OIlll
pouvez comptcr aussi fait des preparatifs pour VOUB envoJu des
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vh'1'ClI. ToUll Ice eonvois partiront sous oonue m;cortc, et ne
D;1ettront en marllhe J'aprcB co que je pr<.>8umll un courant an
plus tard. Daus tous Ills cae ne VOIU< impnticnwz pas. Noua
somrncs pret.~ n vewT i\. votre seOOllrs do toutes Jes mallihes.
Vons ne sauri:lz trop de votre cbttS nous mettrll nu courant de la
foroo dc In position et cnfin VOWl ne ponrricz nOU8 dOlillcr tlOP de
d(\tn.ils sur I'nrmce Allg]o-PortuRft.isc. '
'J"c rc~ois 11, !'instantlt: billet qUCl YOUS aye! ccrit hier nu general
Eoycr, par lcqucl VOIlS lIOnS fnites oonnoitrc que d'llprcs t(l11.6 les
rcnseignomcns que \'OUS ave? ohtcuus, vous croye?' quo lcs sept
divisions .An~laisc~ sont du.ll5 vos pnmgcs. II im~rto de s'cn
Msurcr positlvcmcnt de oonnoltro leur position, et, s'il est possible,
leur composition. Il p!U'll.it quo VOllS n'aver. pas bClIUCOUp co
mooco cans votro pbce sur qUi Vo\lS puissiez comptor. PropOllCz
0. rhomme que jo \'oua enl'oi d'allor rceonnoltrc les AngIllis a.
Gallcgos et Fucnto Guinaico, et de rl5venir par El Bodon, et
vous me 10 renverriez eU8uito. Ditcs lui que je 10 paiorai bien
s'il veut fairc C<"tto tourni!e, mnis s'il 8'y refuse je VOllS pric de ne
pM l'y centraindro, &C. &e.'
General Wlllker to hrrd WeUillgtoo.
, Ct»'uiia, September 4, ISH.
'I l\IlW the whole of the troops with 11im (~cneral Abndia) in
and about 11 league in front of Astor,!!;a, having their advanced
posts on !Lo Eeln, the whole Dot amounting to above seven
thousand men, inJe~ndent of lL reserve of about fifteen hnndred
near Foneebadon and Bembibre or on the road from 1\11';0. The
force of tha enemy in llis front 'n'han collected bcin~ esti·
mnt;()d at about thirteen thousand men. Tha wretohod situation
of the Gallicinn troops, in want almost of ovcrvthing, ono third
pm-t at least without shoes, and dependent on tflO precarious sub-
sistence that can day by day be collected, corminly does credit to
thair pationce und good inclination.'
--' In consequence of this movement, (Abndia's retreat,} the
greut. road by Mauzanal tUld 13embibro being left open or nearly 80,
the }~rench :pushed forward ou it so rnpiillv that shortly after my
arrival here (Coruua), inwlligeuce was ret'C["edof their having got
posscBI;ion of the important. P:lSS of Villa 1<1-,m01l, 1I11d l·hat the Gal-
Iician troops thus cut. offfrom it, Imd bt'en obliged to mnk", thcirrc·
treat by tllO Val des Orres. \Vilhoutany oorreel iJlfonnation orlbe
force of the enemy, and the enlrlLuce of GallicilL thus M't entirely
in biB hlLnds, a verJ oousiderable alarmwas for some tilllo occasioned
here, of which 1 l.ook enlry advautage t.o urge upon the juuta the
necessity ofa full compliance with t.he rccOllllllcnda(ionllnd wishes
of the general 10 enable him t.o put the troops in such a stale of
cquipment as might render them, either for defence or attack,
in e\-ery way disposable in his hands; and at. tbe ~me tmIC lo put
Corm1a into temporary security, }\v withdrawing to it all the guns
(amountinj!," to no less thaIl filteen hundred) of the indefensible
G18cnal of Ferrol, "'weh would otherwi.!e become a SW'e dep6t for
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tho onemy in any attAck 11(' might oontemplate on this place, and
who might not otherwise yenturo to brin/{ with him heavy artil.
lery on 80 distant un cJ.:euraion:
SECTION n.
OJfici<d letters/rom the princ(JofNeftfckaicl to marslal Marnwnt,
extradedfroltl. tile duke 0/ &";9o's Mem"il·s.
'Paru, k 21 Novembrc, 1811.
'L'empcrellr me charge de you! faire connaitre, monsieur le
mar&hal, Jue l'objet le plus important en ce moment eat la.
prise de V cuce, L'empercurordonne que yOU! fa.saiez partir un
''{Irps de troupes qui, r6uni aux forces que le roi Mtachera de
l'armee du ceutre, se dirige sur Valence pour appuyc.r l'arrnee du
rnarechal Suchetjusqu'a, cc qU'on soit maitre de eeUe place.
'Faites 'executer sans dClai clltte disposition de concert avec
S, M. 10 roi d'Espa¥lIc, et instruiscz-moi de ce que VOU8 aurcz
fait a cet eglU'd. :N ous 80mnle8 illillnlits que le! A.nglais ont
Yingt mille rnalades, et qu'ils n'out pas vingt mille homines sous
les armes, en BortC qll'ilB lie pcuvent rien entrtlprcndrc; l'inteu-
tion de l'empereur csl done que douze mille hommes, infunterie,
c:lvalerie et sapeUI"8, marcl.wllt de suite sur Valence, que vous do-
tlehiez m~me trota a (luatre mille hommes Bur les dcrrib'~s, et
que \'OUB, mOllsioUl' le mllrechal, soyez cn meSUNl de soutenir lll.
priw de Valell~'e, Cette place prise, le Portugll.l sera pros de sa
chute, pn.rcctju'alora, dans la. bonne Sa.i50U, l'nnnee de Portugal
sera alll,"lllelllee de vingt-cinq mille homm03 del'annee dumidi rt
dtl quinze millo du corps du general Ullillc, de mllnilJre 0. dunir
plus dtl quatro-ving-t mUle hommrs, Dans ecHe situation, vous
rccevriez l'ordro de VOU8 porter sur Eh'us, et de VOIlS emparer de
tout l'AJemtcjo dans le miJmo temps quo 1'lU'meo dll nord se por-
temit Bur la Coo av("e une armee de qllal'llllto mille hommos.
L'6qllipag-tl do pont qui oxiste 0. Badajoz sCf\'irait 0. jetcr des ponts
sur 10 'l'llge; l'ennemi sernit horn d'ctat do rien opposer 1I1I.nc
pareilltl force, qui oll're toutos les c1mllecs dll 8uce~8 sans pre-
senter o.ueun danger, C'est done Valcneo qu'il faut prendre, Le
6 Novembro nous ctions maltrcs d'UD fnubourg; iI y a liou
d'espercr que la. plnee priso on Dcecmbro, eo qui VOUll mettrait,
mOlliliour le duo, nportce de vous trouver devllnt ElvlIs dans le
oolltlml de Jauvier. Euvo.\,cz moi vo~re IlYis sur co plall d'ovara-
nOIlS, allu qU'llpr~8 ",voir fI-'9u l'uvis de la prille de Valent-c, l'em-
pcreur puisso vOila dOlluer dtle ordres posili/il.
'Le prince de \VngTUm et de N ellehtJ.tel, major-general.'
(Siglle) •ALEXA.'WIlE.'
'Paris, III 15 Flvrier, 1812.
'Sa majestC n'est pnstSRtisfllite de Indirection que von.~ donnoz
0. la guerrll, Vous IWOZ la supcriorito lIur I'onnoml, et au lieu
de prendre l'initiative, vous ne cclI~ez de la rC'(Cl'oir. Q.nrmd le
gtlncrnl Hill mnrche sur l'nnnoc du midi nvcc qUlDze millo hommes
a'est C{) qui pcut vous arriver de plus hcurcll.l; ecHo annoo eai
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Ilssel'. forte et 8SSet hieD or~anill6e pour ne nen eraindre d'lQ'Illoo
Ang-laisc. auraiL-tllle quatre Oll cinq divisions rcunics.
'Aujourd'.hui !:enncmi suppose que vous aliez faire le 8i~ge
do ltodrigo; il approche le pcn6ral Hill do S8 droite afin de
lIOUNU- le faire nmir a lui a grandes marches, et VOIlS livrer
bataille rllullis, si VOllS voulez repreudre Rodrigo. C'est done au
due de Dalmatie " wuir \·jllgt mille hommes pOUf le cOliteuir et
l'emp~c1JtJr do faire ce Illouvement, et si /-!;entiral Hill passe 10
Tag-c, de se porwr a68 suite, Oil dans I'Alcmtcjo. VOIlS aver, la
double de la IIlUre que l'emperenf m'a OI"donne d'oorire IIll due
de Dalmatie le IQ de ce moi.8, en r6ponse 1l. la demando qu'it vous
avait faite dll porter des troupes dallsle midi; C'el!t vous, monsieur
le ulareohal, qui dcviez lui ccrire IIQUl lui dcuumder de porter un
~raud COI'PS de troupes ven la Guadiana, pour l1lllllltenir le gencraJ.
Hill dans le midi et l'empecher de se rtlunir alord Vi'eUingwn..•
LesAnglais CO)lI1aisscn~assc:z:I'honneur:Fran<;ais pour comprendl'6
que ce sucees (la. prU;e de Rodrigo) peut devenir un affront pour
eux, et qu'au lieu d'llmeliorer Ieur position, I'occupation de
Ciudad Rodrigo leg met dans l'obligation de dCfClldre cette 1'1&ee.
Ils llOU8 rendent maitres dll ehoix dn ehamp de bataille, plllsque
VOWl les forcez avenir au serours de cette place et acombahre
dans uut" position si loin de la mer . . . Je ne puis que VOUll
rcpeter Ics ordMS de l'cmpereur. Prene:z: votre quartier-general
aSalamanque, travll.il!ez avee aetivit6 a fortifier cette ville, re-
unissez-y uu nouvcl cquipa~e du sieKe paul' servir asnnel' la
vme, formez.y des lI.j)provislonnemens, falte fairc tous lea jours
1(' coup de fusilll.vec cs .d.nA'lais, placc:oo: dcux fortes avant gardes
qui menlllJCllt, l'une Eodrigo, c~ I'autre AJmeida; meuacez les
sutres directions sur la frontiere de Portul,,"lI.l, euvoyez des pll.rtisqui rll"agent quelques villll.$es, enfin emp oye:oo: tout ce qui peut
tenir I'ennemie Sill' le qm_vive. Faitc.~ tiplll'er les routes de
Porta et d'Alm ....ida. Tene? votro Rrrn6e ver3 Toro, Benll.vent.c.
La provint"e d'Avilll. n. mO-me de bonnos plIrties Oll l'on tJ'()Ul'orait
dea. ressourcea. Duns cette situation qui est lIussi simplo que
formidllblc, vous roposo? vos trQuI)CS, vons forme? dos mngasins.
etavee do aimplcs d6monstrations bien oombin6clI, qui mett.cntvos
aVMt.postf'1I i\ m6mo de tirer journellemcnt des coups de fnail
avce l'enncmi, VOUII aurc? barrc Sl1r lea Anglllis, qui no IXHlrront
YOUR obscn'cr .... Co n'f'st done pM 1i. VOIlS, monsieur 10' duc, ...
vousdisa6miner en favour de I'armee du midi. Lorsq,ue vous ave.!:
ete prcndre le comulllndcment dcvotl'o armee cllevcumt d'eprouver
un 60hee pUI'SlI rctraito do Portu/!,"lIl; cc Jlays emit rnva.ge, lc~
h6piw.ux et lcs mugasins de I'cnncUli etment a Lisbonnc; vos
troupes etaicnt futignOOil,. d6gouMes pUl'les marches foreecs, RlInR
Jrtillcric, suns tl'llin cl'equipages. :BlIdl.Joz etait nttaque dcpuis
long temp~; une un/aille dlllis le midi n'avnit pu fairo lever 10
sicg-e de eettc place. Quo deviez vous fairo IllorsP Vom porlcz
sur Almeidn pour mcnllccr LisbonneP Non, parccque votre
armee n'lIvnit pllS d'urtillel'ie, pns de train d'equipagcs, et qU'clle
6tait fllti/:,'1Iee. L'cnnemi a ectto position, n'lIurait pas cru a
ooUe WIlIlu.ee; ilu.urait 1ais~6 Ilpprochor jusqu'il. COlrubre, lIurait
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Iris Badaio~, et ensuite wrait venu sur vous, V0U8 ave:/.: donesit a. cette epoque co qu'il fallll.it fairo; VOllS Bye:!: marcM rapide.
mellt all seoollrs de Dadlljoz; l'eulIcmi a"ait mu-l'C aur vous, et
rut de la f;Ucrre et.ait de vous y I'ommettre. La siege aetolo\'c,
e~ l'enneml C8t rentr6 en Portug:al; c'est ce qu'il y avait a f&ire,
. , , Dans ce moment, monsieur le <luc, volre position est simple
et clairc, et ne deuw,ude pas do oombiuuisons d'esprit., Placez
1"OS troupes do mlluiho qu'en quatro marc1ws ellc~ puisscnt go
r6111ir et so grouper sur Sulamnnq,ucj, o.)'ez-y \"otrc quarticr-
g6ncral; que VOB ordrca, 1"011 dispositions annoccnt a l'ennomi
qll6 le gro88e nrtillcrioarrivo a SII.lamamlue, !Luo VOUS y former
des mll.KlL8ios ' , , • Si Wellin,lttOn so dirigo sur lludajoz, laissez 10
aller; l'l5unissez ausait&t "otrc arm6o. ct murcher droit sur AI·
mcida; pousscz des pn.rt.is sur Coi'mbre, et soycz perauad6 quo
Wcllio8ton reviendro. hien \'ito sur vous,
'Ecnvez au duo de Dalmatio et so11icitez le roi do Ini 6criro
~galemcnt, pour qu'il e;\"Ccute lell ordres imperlltifs que jc lui
doune, do porter tin corps de vingt mille hommes pour forcer le
~6n6rlll Hill R restor Sill' la. rive gauche clu Tage, Ne peruez
done plus, monsieur le mal'cchal, li lI11er clans le midi et marchez
droit Sill' le Portugal, si lord W cUington fait la faute de so porter
sW' la rive gauche du Tage ' . , ... Prontez du moment oil vos
troupes 56 reUllissent pour bien o~nisor et mettre de I'ordro
dansle nord. QU'OD trayaille jour et nuit 11 fortifier Salamanque,
qu'an y fnsse yenir de grosses pieces, qu'on fMw 1'6quipage de
siege; en£.n qu'oll forme des magasillil de subsistnnces, Vous
sentirez, monsieur le marechal, qu'en suinl.nt cca directions et eu
mettant pour les executer route I'activite couvenable, YOM tien-
droz l'enncmi cn &hec Eu recevant riuitiatil'O au lieu de
la donner, en ne songcantqu'a !'armoo du midi qui n'a pas besoin
de 1"OUS, puisqu'elle cst forte de quatre.vingt mille hommes des
meilleures troupes de l'.Burope, en arant dC$ aollieitudcs pour loa
para qui no sout pM sous votre oomnmndemeo.t et ablUldoDll811t
les Astllries et lOll prol'inces qui vous rcgardcnt, un combat que
vous eprouvcriez scrnit une cnhullite qui se ferait sentir daus
tollre l'Espll~ne, Un echee de I'armee du midi la oonduirait sur
Madrid 011 sur Valence et ne serait pas de mBmc nature.
'Je \'ous le replJte, vous (jteslc maitre de COllilerl"er barre sur
lord Wellington, en placaut votre quartier-~n6ral a. Salamanque,
en occupant en force cctte position, et pollssant de forte~ recon·
naissances sur les deoouches, Je ne pourrnis .quo vous r6dire ce
que je vous ni Mjn elt:plique oi·delllllls. Si Bndnjoz eMit ocrl1O
sculcment plLr deux 011 troIS divisions Angll1iscs, 10 due do Dal·
matie]o d6bloqucrait; mais 1I10rs lord 'Vcl1in~ton, I\ffilibli. VOUII
metlroit i\ memo de VOllS porter dans l"inUiricur dll Portugal, (:(l
q,ui swourl1lit plus cillcacolllcnt lludajoz que touto autre opera.
tlOU, , . , , , Je doUDo l'ordro quo tout 00 qu'il sera possiblo do
fournir vous soit fourlli pour comploter \'otrc artillerie et pour
lruIer Salllmanque, Vingt-qllatre houres apres b. r&:eption de
~t!e lettre l'cm(IOreur pellse qUll \"ous partirer. pour Salamanque.
&Il\(lWS d'cvonemoll8 matlcllllus; qUll "OWl chaogercz uno llVll.ll1,.o
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~rdo d'occupier les debouehes Bur Rodrigo, et una autre BUI'
Almcida; quo vous auroll: daus la maiu au moins la valeur d'une
division; que ,oous ferez revcnir la Cllloalerio et artillerie qui
Ilont 11 la divisioll du 'l'nge .... ,. Reuuiasez surtlJut votre
cal'alcrie, dout I'OUS n'avell: pas de trop et dOlle ,'ous avez taut
de bosom .•.•• :
.J.u PriNCe de Nellj'.-ltdlel.
VallaJolirl, le 23 Fivner, 1812.
• MO:;SEIGlOEUR,~'ignoro si Ba majeste aura daiA"lIc accueillir
d'une manihc favomble fa demande que j 'ai eu l'honneur d 'ndressc~
8. "otre altesBc pour supplie~ l'empe~eurde me pcrmettre de faire
sous BCB yeux la eampaguc qui VD. ,'o01'rir; mals qu'oUo que Boil'
sa dt!cision, je regarife comme mon devoir de lui fllire couDaltre,
au moment OIl iJ llCmble 11l'Ct as'e]oigner, la situation dos choses
dans eette partie de I'Espagne.
'D'npreB les dernier arrtUlgemens Ilrretb par Ba majesM,
I'nrtnce de PorhlA'nl n'a 'Plus le moven de remplir la tiJcbe qui
Jui est impos6e, et je serlllS conpahlo, si, ('1\ ee moment, jo ctl.Chais
11~ yeritC. La. frontihc sc trou,c trcs afliJibliepnr \c depurt des
troupes qui ont cM rnppc16ea par la priso do Rodrigo, qui met
l'enncmi li. m6me j'entl"Or dans le lXCllr do In ClIstillc cn corn-
mcnlfllllt un mou,cmcnt offensif; cnRuitc par rimmcnAC clenduo
do pllY~ quo I'nl'fl1l!c c~t danR 10 devoir d'oC<lnpcr, 00 qui rend
tOUJcursRon TlLSsemblcment lent ot difllcile, tandia qu'il y a peu do
temps die etnit toutc rCunie et disponible.
'Les sopt divisions qui la CQmpoecnt s'~leveront·, Jorsqu'cllee
ll.uront re~lU les regimons do marcho IlnnoucCo, il. quarantc·quatre
milles hommes d'infantcrie onviron; il fnut nu moins eioq milia
hommcs pour oecupcr les points fOrtifies et les communicatiOlls
qui ne peuvent l\t1'tJ abllndonncs; il faut apeu pres pareille force
~ur ob:erver l'Esl1l. et la. eouvrir cOntre J'armee de Galiee, q,ui
c,idemlllent, dnns 10 cas d'wl mouvcmenl oll'cnsif dee Anglals,
se porlerait u. Denavente et ii. Ailtorgll. Ainei, u. eupposer que
toutc l'armee Boit n';unie entre le Dllero et la Tormca, sa force
ne peut s'l!lc\'er qu'a treule·lrois ou lrCllte-quatre millo hOmlUCS,
tandis quo l'ennemi peut presenter tlujourd'hui une IlltlSllC de plus
do soixtlllte mitle hommes, dont plus cllJ moilie Al.lglnis, bieu
outillcs et bieD pounous de toutes ehosos: e~ cependant que do
ehancCll pour que les di,'iaious du Tag-e se trouvcut en &rrillre!
Qu'clles n'lIient pu ctrc rnlliecs promptemenl, et soient scparees
de l'armee pendant les momens lee pillS imponalls de la eamP~lle;
alors la lllaBSe do I\OS forces rCuuies ne s'clen'mit pM 11 plus de
vingt.cinq milia hommes. l')a mnjcstc suppose, il est vrai, que,
daus ec cMl'annee du nord souticndrait eello de Portugal par deux:
divisions: mais l'empereurpcut-il ctrc persuade que, dans l'ordre
de chose aetud, ccs troupes arriveront promptemellt et a. tcmps P
'L'ennemi parait ('n OfiCllSivo: aelni qui doit le eombattf'l
pr6parf.' sos moyens; eclui qni doit Ilgir bypothCtiquelllcut lIttend
~ans inq,u.ietudc, et laisso Cconler en pure pcrtc nn temps prellieux;
l'ennenu :marchll iJ. moi, je rCllllia mes troupes d'une maniere
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tu~thodiqne et precise, je Baill a. un jolU' pres le moment Ott le
piU! grand nombre au moins sera en lil{lle, a. quelle epoque lea
llutres seront en liaison avec moi, et, d'apr~ cot etat de choses,
je me determillO a agir ou lJ. temporiser, mais ces csleulll, je ne
puis le faire qne pour des troupes qui sont purement et simple-
mellt ames ordres. Pour celles qui n'y sont pas, que do lenteurs!
qne d'incertitudes et de temps pordu. J'annonce la march6 de
I'ennemi et je demande des seoours, on me rcpopd par des ob-
servations; ma lettre u'est parvenue que lentcment parceque lea
communications sont difficilcs dans ee pays, la rCj>Onse et ma
replique vient de m~me, et J'enucmi scra sur moL MaLs comment
pourrai.je ml)mc d'avance faire dea calculs raisonnables sur le
mouvemens de troupes dout je ne counais ni la force ni I'emplaee.
mentP Lorsque je ne sais rien do la situation du pays Ili des
hewins de troupes qU'Oll y eprouvc. Je ne pliis nusonner quo
Bur ce qui est It mes ordres, et puisque le8 troupes qui n'y sont
PM me sont cepeudantllCcessaircs pourcombaUre, et sont compMea
commc partie do la foree que jo dois opposer a. I'ennemi, je suis
en fausse pooition, etjc u'a.i leB moyens deriellfaire mt;thodique-
meot et avec connaissauce dc cause,
'Si 1'011 considllre combieu il faut depr~voyaneepolU' cx~cutcr le
plus petit mouvcmcnt en E~pagne, on dOlt se oonvainere do la
neeessit6 qu'il y a de donner d'a.vD.llce mille ordres preparat.oires
sans "leaquels les mom'emons rapidcs sout illlpos~ibles. Aiosi les
troupes dll nord m'elllut etra.uJtCres Imbituellcmont, etm'ctant
cependaut indispcllsablcs pour eombattre, le succCs de toutes mes
operations est dependant dll plus 0\1. du moins de prevoyauce et
d activit6 d'nu autro chef: je ne puis done pas Hre rospollsable
des cVenemeDS.
'llfais il ne faut pas sculement considercr l'Hat des choses pour
la defensive du nord, il faut la considCrer polU' celle du midi.
Si lord Wellingt<ln porte six diviaiolls sur la. ril'e gauche de Ta,,"6
le duc do Dalmatie a besoin d'un puissant secours; si daus eo CllS,
j'armee dll uord ne fouruit pas de troupes pour r6lever une pllrtio
d'armec de Portugal daDS quclques,uM des postci qu'elle doit
6vaeucr alors momcntanelllcnt, mais qu'il est important do tenir,
et pour la surele du pap et l,on)' mll.intellir la Gslice ct observer
les deu).: divisions ennemics qni seraient sur I'AJrledn, et qui
fCl"Iliellt sans doute quelques demonstration~ olfellsives; si dis.je
l'armee du nord ne vient pas a son aidc, I'armoo de Portugal,
trop raiblo, ne lJourra pas fuire un d6taehement d'une force con·
"l'"onable, et Badojoll tombora. Ccrtcs, il {nut des ordrcs polU'
obtenir do l'al'lIlCo Ju nord un mouvcmcnt darn cctl:o hy~tMsc,
et le romps utilo pour ~ir;'8i on s'en umait 11 dCSpropoaltiollS Ilt
iI. des negooill,tions, eo temps, qu'on ne POlll'rnit rempluccr, IIcroit
perdu en vainCll discussiolls. Jo BWS autorise n eroire co
resultat.
'L'armoo de Portugal cst cn ce moment la prlnci~lle arm60
d'Espaguc; c'est 1l. elle ~ oouvrir l'Espaglle contro les enterpriBC3
dCllAur;lais; pour pou\'oir lllanccuvrer, il raut qu'cllo ait dell poiutll-
d'appul, Je~ pIUCll~, Je~ Jorts, des Ultes-de-poll1, cte.
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'n faut poor ccln. du mnt6rid d'artillc~, et je n'll.i ni CllnDU9 m
munition8 fl y appliquer, tnndis quo leg 6tnblisscmens de l'a.rm6e
dn uord en sont tout rcmplis; j'en demandcmi, on m'en promettra,
mail! en resultntje n'obtiendrai rirm.
'Apres avail' discute la question milihl.ire, je dirai un mot de
j'admlnistrntion. Le pays donne a1'n.TIllce de Portugal adcs pro-
dnch prcwmcs le tiers de ceux des cinq gOllvcrnemcns.
'L'arm6e de Portugnlcst beauooup plus nombreusc que 1'/Inn6e
dll nord; le pays qu'clle oc<:upe cst insoumis; on u'lI.lTlWhe rien
qn'ltvec In force, et lea trotlPCS de 1'IIITllCe dn nord ont lICmbM
prendre at!lche, en l'el'RCuant, d'en enMver tonks lesrcsSOllrccs.
T..es autres gouvcrnemcns, mlllwi les j:l"uerillas, BOnt encore dam
la 8oumissiOll, et e.cquittent lea oonkibutione Bans qu'ilsoit bcsom
de contminte. D'apr~8 cela il y a une immense difference dans
le 80rt do rune et do I'autre et comme tout lIoit tendre au m~mll
but, que pnrtout co sont los 80ldats de I'empercur que t.ons les
efforts dOlvent avoir pour objct 10 sueers des op6rntions, ne
sorait-il pM juste que les rc~sourccs de tous cos pays fussent
llnrtag6es proportionnellcment nux besoins do ehacnn; et com·
ment y parvonir sans uno nutoritO unique P
'J0 crois a\'oir demontr6 que, pour une bonno d6fensivo dll
nonl, le general do l'armec de Portugnl doit ll"Oir toujoun 1; ses
ordreB les troupes et 10 territoirc de l'nrmeo du noni, puisquo
cos troupc8 sont appelOO8 n t'Ombattrc avoo lee Bionnes, et qne
lee rc~Boureee do 00 terriloiro doil'cnt {ltrc on partie consaerocs ~
los entrctenir,
'Je pssse maintonant a ce sui regarde le midi de rEspagne.
Une des tll.ches de l'nrrnC'O de Iortugal est de BOlltenir l'omuoo dn
midi, d'a~oir l'ooil Bur BaulIjo.,; ot de couuir ].fad.rid; et pouTtoela,
il fuut qu'un corps asset llombreux OCCllp6 la valMe dn 'fage;
lllllis re corps Illl pourrll. subsisler et ne pourra preparer des
ressourees pour d'aulres lroupes qui 8'y rendraient pour le sou·
tenir, s'il n'll pall un territoire produetif, et cc terdtoire, que!
nutre pent-il elre que l'arrondissemcllt de l'armee du C(llltre?
Q.uelle ville peut offrir des rCllsources et des moyens daus la vallCe
du Tag-a si cc ll'est Madrid? Cependant aujourd'bui rarmee
de Portuglll ne possMe sur le nord du Tage, qu'uu desert qui
ne lui offre aucune espeee de moyens, ni pour les hommCll lli
pour Ics ehe'l"aux, et dIe ne rencontre de la part do. autorit6~
de Madrid, que haine, qu'auimoMite, L'armee du centre, 1';
n'est rien, possMe n elle scule un tcrriwiro plus fertile, pus
etendu que celui qui est aeeorde pour toute l'armee de Portugal;
cette valllie ne peut s'cxp]oiwr faute de troupes, et tout le monde
s'oppose acc que nous en tirions des reS80urces. Cependaut si
les bcrds du Ta~e etaicnt b·aeu6s par suite de la disoUe, per-
lonnc aMadrid ne '·oudrait ..r. allprecicr la vcritable raisoD, et
tout le monde accuserait l'armoo de Portugal do decounir cetlo
'Ville.
'D e:riste, iI faut le dire, une haine, uno animOJit6 cnvers les
FrnnQais, qn'iI est impossible d'~rimer, dans le lI'ou'l"ernement
Espagnol. D eIiste un dellOrdre 8 Madrid qui present.6 le spec.
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tacio 10 plus roroltnnt. Si ICB BllbsistRnccs enrployt'is en de
(ausses e(Jll80mmo.tions dans eett:tl ville eUMent 6t6 consllcrCcs 11.
former un m~llsin de f'CIlSOUrccS pOUl' l'ann6o do POl"tugnl, les
troupes qui sont sur 10 Tage scraicnt dans l'llhondnncc et pour-
vocs pour lon~-temps; on consomme 22 mille rntions par jour
8. Madrid, etil n'r ll. pas 3000 hommes: e'cst qu'on donne et
IlIiue lrcndre 8. Wilt le monde, e;tccpt.J 8. cen;t qui ser,'ent. ],fais
bicn pus, je le rephe, c'est un erime que d'aller prendre cc que
J'armee du centre ne peut dle-meme ramll8ser. I1 est ITai qll'il
'varait lIS!let consequent que teu;t qui, depuis deux ans, trompent
le roi, habillent et SJ:"mout c1ll1que jour des soldats qui, au bout
de deu;t jours, 1'ontse joindre li. nos enncmis, et 8emblent en \'6riM
Ill'0ir ainsi eonsacro uu mode regulier de re<:rutement des bandes
que nous avolls sur les brllS, s'occupentdoleurresorvordes moyelll!
de subsistances li. nos depens.
'La seule Communication carrossab}Cl entrClle ganclle et lereste
de I'armee de Portugal est par la province de Se~vie, et 10
mouvement des troupes et des oonvoi!l ne peut nvoir lieu avec
faciliM, parceque, quoique ce pays soit excellent et pichI de
res80urce',les autoru..es de l'armce du centre refusent de prendre
nucune di~position pour assurer leur subsistances.
'Si I'armce de Portugal peut etre afi'ranchie du del"oir de
Becourir le midi, de couvrir Madrid, cUe peut se eoneentrer dan~
la. Vieille.Castillc, et ellc s'en trouvcra bien: alors tout lni devient
facile; mais si elle doit nil oontra.ire ],Clmplir cette double tache,
cUe ne le peut qu'en occupant la vallee dll T:lJ\'e, et dam cette
vall~e eUe ne peut avoir le-s rcssources necessnircs pour y Yivre,
pour y man(CUl'rer, pour y preparer des moyens suflhans pour
toules les troupes qu'il flludra y envoyer, qu'en possedant tout
l'arrondissement de l'armce du centre et Madrid. Ce territoire
doit oonserver les troupes qui I'oecupent A pr68ent, afin qu'en
marehant a. l'ennemi, I'nrmee ne soit oblifl'cO de laisser personne
en llrricre, mais qu'au contrairc cUe en tire quclque accolll'8 pour
Ba communication. Elle a besoin Sltrtout d'Hl'C d61ime des
obstacles que fait naitres sans cesse un ~u\'ernementyeritable·
ment ennemi des 3rmcs Franl(aisea; quelles que soicnt lea bonnCll
intentions dn roi, it p!\fait qu'il ne peut rien contre l'intlrilt et
lCls pas~ions do eeu;t qui l'enl-ironncnt; iI semble cglllement qUll
j1l9qU'A present il n'lI rien pu t'Ontre IC8 de8ordre8 qui ont lieu 11
.'lfadrid, oontrc I'nnll.1'ehie qui regne i\. I'nrm6e du centre. 11
pout y al'oir de grandes raisons en politique pour que 10 roi
reside a. Madrid, mais i1 y 0. milJe raisons pOIlitivCll et de 8(\1'ot6
pour les llrmllS }~rnll"mislls. qui semblcraient dovoir lui fairo
cuoi5ir IlIl autre s6jonr. Et on oflct, ou le roi !lst general OC
oommandant dos arml'Cs, ct da.ns 00 elU! i1 doit dtre au milieu des
trouplls, voir lcltrs be~oi\ls, pourvoir i'l. lont, et litre responsable;
ou il eet 6tranger a toutes les operatiolls, et alors, !l.ulant pour
ea tranqui1lit6 rersollllelle que pour In.isser },lus do libllrt.6 dllll8
lea operations, il doiL s'610igller du pllys qui en est le tueatre et
Ut'8 liew.: qui Sllrveut de points d'appui aux mouvem\illS de
l'armee.
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'La. guerre d'Espa~e est difficile dlllls lIOn essence, maia cetto
diffieulw est nugmentee de bel\u~'Oup par b division de.'! com·
mnndemens et pllr le p;ra.nde diminution des troupes que roUe
division rend encore plus flJneste. Si ceUe division 0. dlijll fait
t&nt de mal, lorsque l'empercuf, e!:llnt 11 Pans, s'occupant !lIIlla
cesse de ses armcCll do la Pcnilumle, pouvait en partic rem&l.ier 11.
tout, on doit fremir dn rcsultflt infallible de 00 systemc, 8uivi
avee diminution de moyous, lorsque l'cmpercur 8'cloigllO de trois
oonta licuca.
• Monscianonr, ic VOIlS ai c~e routes lea rnisona qui me
somblent d'cmontrcr jusqu'a. l'cvidcuco. la n6ccssit6 de rounir
sous la rn~mc nutorit6 lootes 109 troupes ct tout le pays, depuis
Ba:yonne jU6<lucs et y oompriB Madrid et la Manchc; 011 eels, je
n'IlI eM guide que par mon amour ll'tdent pour la I{loiro de nos
nrmcs et pllr ma conscience. Si rcmpcreur ne trouvait pas oon·
venable d'lIdoptcr ce s)'s~me j'ose 10 sUp'plier de me donner UIl
SUCC('!lseur dflJlll le comma.ndement qu'il m'lI.vait conlie. J'ai la
COllliance et le sentiment de POUVOlr faire ll.utauL qu'uu autre,
mais tout restant dans la situation u.cLuello la charl:"o cd au-
deseus de mes forces. De quclqucs difficultcs qU6 soit 16 OOID·
mandemClIt g-ClIcral, qudqu'imposante qU6 soit la responsibilile
qui I'accolllpagnc, ellee me paraissellt beaucoup moindrcs que
relies que ma position entraine en 00 moment.
'Quelque fuitk'ur que 80it un I{l'lllide commandement, il n'a de
prix nmes yeux que lorsqu'il est lIcoompaKntS des moyens de
bien faire: lorsque ceux·ci me sont enleves, 8lorll tout me parait
preferable, et man ambition BC r&luit it. seITir en soldat. Je
dODllerai ma vie sans regret, maia je ne puis re8ter dans lacruelle
position de n'lIvoir pour resultat de mes efl'orl8 et de mes BOins
de tous le~ momens, que la tristA:'! llerspective d'attMher mon
nom ades evencmcna f'acheux et pCII dignes de lo. g:loire de nos
armcs.
• (Signe) Lll M..u!.fenu. Due DE R.\.Gus£..'
J"oscpA to Napoleon.
Madrid, lIlai 18, 1812.
•SIRB,-ll y a aujourd'hui un mois cL demi que j'ai rt'~U la
lettre du prince de Ncufchtttel en date du 16 Mars dernier, qui
m'nnnonce que votre majeste imperiaJe et royale me eonfiait le
commandcmcnt de ses armca, en Espagne, et me prevenait q,ue
leB generaux-en-chcf des amUlet du nord, de Portugal, du wdi
et de l'Arragon reccI·aient les ordres convenables.
• Depuis cette epoque it m'a eM impos3ible de rcmplir les inten·
tions de V. M. impcriaJo et royale. Le gener8l-en-ehef de
rarmee du nord s'est ref'use a m'cDvoycr aucune rapport disant
et eerivant qu'it n'lwait aucuD ordre a.cet e~ard. l.L le ma.r6ehal
commandant en cJlCf l'a1'lllco dn midi n'a cncore r6pondu a
Rllcuue des lettrcs qnaje lui ai ccrites DU fait 6criro dcpuis ectre
epoque. M. le mar6chal commandant cn ehefl'nnneo d'Arragon
ne m'envoye aucuno rapport, ct rcsto cntillrcmcnt iso16 do moi.
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M,le marechal commandant en chef I'armee do Portugal m'a
fait bcaucoup de demand..! am:quelles ilsll.\':lit parfnitcmcllt quc je
ne pouvais satisfairc, eommc eelles de troupf;'s de I'arm&! dn llOrd,
des vivrea, &c, Sa conduil;e est tcllementilldeccnte qu'olle n'est
pu OOllcevable. V, :M. 1. et R. pourrll. en jugor par mes dcpcche!
au prince de NcufchIitcl.---Sire, en aeceptant le commande-
Dleut dCil armks From,aiscs al'cpoquc 011 Je l'ai re.;u,_j'ai ern
remplir uu devoir que tous lea liens qui m's,ttachent a. V, M. 1.
et It ala France tu'iml»OllaicllL parccque j'a.i .fICDSe pouvoir 8tre
mile, maia j'ctais persuade que V. M, I. et R. me confiant Ull
depot ai pr6cLeux lea gellcrauJ:·cD-chcf s'emprcsserllieDt d'obCir a
la volonul de V. M. 1.1 u'eu est pas aiu!L; je m'adre88e donc s
elle pour qu'elle venille bien 6crirc on fairo ccrire am: gencrauJ:-
ell·chef '1u'c1le est sa. voloute pour qu'e1lc leuT (assc d&larer que
leur desobcisS:lIlCC arnI'll ordrcs lea mettrait dans le cas d'Hre
rcnvoycs ell Frauee ou i1s trol(\'craiellt uu juge juste mais scvere
duns V. M. I. et u.. Si Y. majcstc ne trouve pas le moyen de
persuader 3. Cl'S measieu1'8 que sa volonte est que je sois oMi, je
la supplie de ooDsidcrcr que le r61e auquel je Sllis expose eflt
indigne de mon caractl!re et <lu nom de V. M, Si la. guerre du
uord a lieu, je ne puis etre utile ici qu'autant que je suis oMi,
et je DC puis titre OMi qu'autant que ccs mCllsieurs sauront que
j"lli le droit de les rcmplacer; je ne puis infli"'er, moi, d'autre
punition que celle la. a un gcn€ral.en-chef. Si je ne sui8 pas
obei, et que V. U. aille au Hard, l'Espagne sera cl'acue hontcuse-
meut par ICll troupes impcrialcs. et le nom que je porte aura
presidc inutilcment at-elte epoque desastrcuse.
'Le mal est ~ra.ndJmaLs il n'estan-desau8 ni de man devouemcnt
ni de mon oourage. O'est 11. volrc majest6A les rcndrc effieaces par
la force dODt il est indispensable quelle m'entourcj le aalut del
armces impcriales et de l'Espagne independcnt.'
No. IlL
T,I.RIFA.
[The MlonymO'llS extract! are from tbe memoi... and letters of o.ljfferent
office... engaged in the ijiege. 'l'he Rowan cha.f1\Ctenlmack diffi,nmt
IIOUll:d o£ information.J
SECTION I •.
NlutWC'l" and condu.ct qftlw F1't:IlCh.
A-
'As to the numbers of the French; tho prisoners, tho inter-
tepU:d letters, the secrct informction from Chiclana, a1I!1CCOunt8,
in fact, ooneurred in stating t.ha.t tho troops employed =cedea
1:/iae tlwu..trmd 'I1I.mf
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Eztraet4 from ooWnel.~keN'ett', despatcn.
'The enemy's foroo employed in the siege ill stated at tell
tlrolUana, probably tAu it m ",ome degree C!Ul99crated.'
n.
'Tho fact of the enomy, with eleven tlwlUand ~tI!Ced
IOklicrs, not having made another effort aftc:r his Bssault of the
3ht, &0.' .
Lord Wellington', acspatc4.
'January ID, 1812.
'Dy accounts which I have from CaJiz to the 27th December.
I learn thllJ the enemy iuvested Tarifa with n force of uboutfi1!6
tlwusand men on the 20th DCloomber, covering their operatiou
agll.i.ullt that place by another corps at Vejcr:
Condud ofthe FreliC!.
A.
•Thelel W8B not on the part of tho lending French offioor (an
old lieutenant of the 94th) or of his followcl'8, nny nppcarnnoo of
panic or perturbation. l'hcir advance was serene, steady, and
silent, worthy of the 5th corpa. of their Austrian murcl.e., of their
't.>iciUe, 1JU)1J,3taeRc,.'·
SECTION IT,
Conduct of IRe Spanirk $oUrer,.
D.
, At the asSo.wt general Copons himself was the onTy JlCT801l
whe showed Jlia head above tIle pllrapet. The pNeO.ution of out..
flanking Ilim by three companies of the 47th regiment remedied
the chance of cvil, whi(:h 110 llUllenlllblo lL wnnt of chivalry might
have occasioned, but the knights of older timcs well) probably
betwr fcd than were our poor distressoo friends.'
SECI'IOY ill.
Conduct ofcolonel Skerrett.
A.
'It is necessary te advert t() the lS.poundOl' IIlOUIItcd on the
Gusmans'tower, lIS o8ou111cy'0 History contains some strange
misrepresentation on the subjeet.'-'Tho Freneh made the
IS-pounder an early object of attack, but they did not succeed
ill cruah.iug i~ Unfortunat.cly one of tue spherical case &hol,
not precisely fitting ita old lLOd worn ctIlibre, burst iD passing
over the town, and killed or wounded a person in the s11'eet.
This produced some alarm and oolliylnintamongst the inhabitants
for a moment, and in the first feehng of that moment, SkerreU,
with characteristio impetuosity, directed the l{UIl to be placed
'Mrl ch 8ervice.' There was no ambiguity ID his command,
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, Let it be rpi1ced.' '-' IInd he referred the case to the COl0-
mtuldiull' offieer of artillery, lhe order would not have been
exeeuted, meanll would have bccD fouud to remo,'e tiJe first
impression Imd tranquillize tlJO pooplc, wit,hout the 8:lcriliee or
the b'llD, which. might have addud lllalel'ially to Uw offellsive
powcrs of tlu! garrison, particularly if the siege had been pro-
IOIlj.,red,'
B.
•On thc 20tJI of December, colonel Skcmtt, with a rAte
~dil'"ity, digmountcd a 32'-round Ctl.l'I'onllde that looked into the
enemy'g batteries at the distance of nOout four Imudred yurdll,
and he 8ucooeded in spiking Rnd knocking olf the trunnion of an
IS-poundcr, borrowed from the Stately, This gun WII8 mounted
en the tower of the GusmUlJ9.'
General Campbelllo lord Lir;eryool.
'January 3, 1812.
•Annexed is a letter received lallt night from oolone\ Skerrett;
nnd, notwithstanding the despondency therein e:qlressed, which
haa boon equally so in other letters that I have received from
him, my opinion remain9 the same aa formerly:
A.
•At the crisis prodneed by Skerrctt's desire to rctiro from tbe
town, and desiro to le!wo the island 11.180, generul Campbell sont
express instruetionll tbat the town should not be abandoned with-
out the concurrence of the conunandiog officers of nrtillery and
engineers; alld accompanied these instructions with U \»ositive
command that every officer and soldier bclou;,.jllg to Gibraltar
snould, in future, be staliolled in the island, to in.sure ut all 6ventB
the preservation of that port.'
SBcnoN IV.
Sir O. Smith'll conduct,
'Smith never tolerated the idea of anrrendcr--ne'l'er ndmitwd
the possibility of defCtLt:
•Compreh~ndiug frolll the fust the resource9 aud capabilities
of his post, and with !l 80ft of intuition nnticiputing his as-
sailant, he covered the weak points while he coucealed his
drength; and so eondncted the skirmish which preceded the
investment, that he, as it were, dictated the whole pllUl of attack,
and in reality pointed out with his finger the position of the
breaehing_battery:
'Had the dictates of his viJ:orous mind and entorprising spirit
been duly ,listened to within, the defell('e w6uld have been mero
Ill)ti.e llnd more brillilUlt.'
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SRCTION V.
[E.dra.c1.il.1
Lo1'd WellingtOfl to lord Li'IJerpcol.
• January 9, 1812.
'l'rom the flC'.counte which I have received of Lhe place
(Tarifa) it appClITlI. to me qlli~ imrs~ible to defend it, when the
enemy will be equipped lo aUae it. TIll! utmost that can be
done is to hold the Island eontiguon.B to Tllrifa; for which ObjCl:t
colonel Skcrrett'a detachment does not appear to he necessary.
I don't believe t1lnt the enemy will be able to obtain possession
of the ialand, without which the town will be entirel)' useless 10
them, and, inneed, if they llad tILe islnnd as well as the town, T
doubt their being lIb\e to retain these possellSioll8, advening to
tile mcnna of llttllckin~ them win\ which gen,-rnl Bullcstt.ros
migllt ho snpplied by the e;nrrison of Gihrnltnr, unless thoy
should keep 11 force in tho field in their DcighbourllOod to proted
them:
LmJ, Wellington to fflajQ1'-general Coofce.
• February 1, 1812.
• SrR.-I ha'l"o omitted. to llJlRWer your lclt-er~ of the 21th
December lWd of tho 7th JlIlIulIory, relatillK to the correspoll.
dence which you had had with the ~overnor of Gibraltar, upon
the oonditional orders, which )'011 lmd given colonel Skcrrelt to
withdraw from Tarifll, because I conclude iliat you rderred that
correspondence to the secreLary of state, with whom alone it
restll to decide whether it wa! your duty to recall oolonel Sker.
rett. and wlu:lther you performed that duty at a proper period,
and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you
1Il10uld gi'l"e colonel Skerrett the orders in questiou. From the
rt>port of colonel Sh'rre!t and lord Proh'[, IlDd other information
which I had received respecting Tarifa, concurred in the orden
that you )rave to colonel Skerret.t, and my opinion on that subject
is not at all changed by wllat has occurred since. ,Vc ha"e a
right to eJqlcet that his majesty'a officers and troops will perform
their duty upon every occasion; but· we have no right to u:pect
that complLl'lItively a IImall number would be able to IlOld the
town of 'Iarifa, commnnded ns it is nt short dilltances, und enfi-
laded in every direction, llnd unprovided wilh nrtillery nnd the
walls scarcely cannon-proof. 'l'hc enemy, howevcr, retired with
disgracc, infinitely to the honour of tIle brave troops who defended
Tllrifa, and it is useless to rl!ncw the discussion. It. is ncceSBarv,
howC\'er, that you Ilhould now come to Dll understanding wiih
general Camp!Jcll regardinl;' the troop~ "'hich huve been dewched
from Cadiz /IJld this army under colonel Skerrett.:
Ditto to ditto.
, Fcbrua'T'J 25, 1812.
• I have nlrcndy. in my letkr of the ht instant, stated to yOU
my opinion rcgardiug Tarifa, I do not think. that captain Smith's
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letter throll'8 new li~bt upon the 8ubjc('t. 1'hlJ island appct\rs
slill to be the priuclpal point 10 defend, and the easiest to be
defended at a ~Illnll expcnse !lnd risk of loss. Vi'llC:tlwr tho town
and the hill of Sant,n Cll.tnliun, enn be made subservient to 1he
defcnce of the islnnd depcnds uJY.'n eireulllstnnccs upon wllicll it
"Would be pos.qibla to decIde, only by having a local knoll'ledgo of
the place. It is very clenr to me, 1IO"I'I'C\'C1, that tllO enemy will
not atlflek Tarifa in this spring', and tlUlt you will not be enllcd
upon to furnish troops to gnrrisOll that plnca so soon ns you
e~pect. If you should be called upon either by the SPlIDi9ll
government or by the A"0\,crnor of GibmltnrlOIl must dccide tlJ(l
question according' to the s\1~gestionswhich made to you in my
despatch of·the 15th instnnt. If rou should send a. detachment
from Cadiz at the d('siro of the Srllnish A'O'l'"crnment for purposes
connected with the operations 0 gencral TIlI1lestero8, I coneeivo
that the governor of Gibraltar hag nothin~ to say to sueh detach_
menlll, if you sllOu!d wnd one to TariJa at the desire of tho
governor of Gibrnltar, or of the Spnnish l{overnment; it is better
nl>t to discuss the question whether tlw detachment shall or shall
not obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occu·
pied Tarifa permnnently, and he is about to impro'l'"e the defences
of the place whieh. he eoneeiV"es to be under his ordeu; but,
w:ording to all the rules of his majesty's service, the senior
officer 8hould command tile whole. 11Ia"e nothing to say to tho
division of the command of the island and town of Tarifa, which
I conclude has been settled by the go.ernor of Gibralta.r.'
B:dractfrom the ffoles of al/, offu:er engaged in tM siege.
, Thoug-h tho duke of W ellin~t.on yicldud to the opinions and
wishes of gcneral Cooke, colonel Skcrrott, and lord Yroby, yct
hiB characteristic und nllveT failing sagacity scellls to have sug-
gested to him a I'lJllr or a faucy, that part of the etl.8O was kept
concealed. A local knowledg(' 11'1\8 ncoossary, not onl.)' to judge
of the relaliou lUld reciprocal defcuccs and capabilitieS of tilo
town am.! isbud, but to estimate the vast importance of the poilt.
the necessity, iu fact, of ill> possession. It was llIy impression
theu, and it amounts to con'l'"ietiou nOI" tllat the island, particu.
larly during the winter, llalf fortified a.s it was, and totally desti.
rule of shelter from bombardment or from weather, could not
haV"c been maintained against an enemy ill possell.'lion of the
town, the suburb, and the neighbouring heights. Dut even it' it
had, br means of British bravery, resolution, and nl90Uree, be"n
prO\'iSlOned and defended, still the original and principal objects
of its occupation would iJave been altogether frustrated, namely,
the command alld embarkation of 8uPl'Iies for Cadiz and t.he fos.
tering of tho patriotic /lame. It IS dcmonstrnhle that, lmd the
duke of DahUlltia once l)('como possessor of tho old walls of
Tnrifa, cvery city, villuge, fort, llnd watch-tower on the Andalu-
sian coaat would soon hllvc displayed the banller of king Josepu.
and tiJo struggle in the south of Spain WlI8 over.'
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Genm-al Camp~lll" lm-J LiverjJool.
, Gibraltar, A.pl"i12, 18t2.
• Af'f' J.JOnn,-I have the honour to neknowlcd1cre the reooipt of
I-our lord,~lJip'8 letter of the 8th of February liSt, amI I bel;eave ro refer yonr lordship to the documents herewith, Jmrtieu.
Io.rly to the rl'lport of Cltplnin Smit.h, royal l'lnp'noors, which I
trust will p"we that the dcfenee of the town 0 Tarifa IfM not
Inken up on slicrht g'rounds. and tllat t]1C detachment from Cadi?,
under the ord~rs of colonel Skerrctt, together witb. tb.o troops
f~m benee whieh formed the ~ll1'risOll of tbe town, \fOro nover
in any danger of being eut off, M their retreat would have been
cO\'crf.'d by the eMtle of the Guzmans, the redonbt of Santa.
Catalina, llnd tho island; tb.o two first of these points being
eonnect.cd by a field-work, llnd the whole mountinK twenty-nine
pieces of ca.nnon and mertllrs exdUlliroly of what remained in
the town, the enemy's butteries uein~ completely kept i.u check
during' suoh an opcrulion by the island Ilutl lht! l,Ia.stle bf the
GuzlHallS. 31y lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion
respecting this post, aud in direct Oppo!liWOll to my OWlL and that
of captain Smith, royal ellgineers, who is cousidercd b~ his corps
as an officer of firslrrate professional abilities, Major-general
Cooke must therefore }Iave acted Oil tbe reports of the colonel
when he autborized him to abandon his post, for tbe major-
Il"eneral was nnaequainted with its resourcC8: besides, m,r lord, I
llad a right to expect that troops sent to that point kI llSSJst in il:3
defence should not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the
place been lost my lord by sneh misrepresentation, it wonld
have been attributed kI any other than the real cause, and the
odium would have been fixed upon me, as having taken up the
position: I am happy however, that ih oapability hlUl been
proved whilst it remained under my orders, and that by inter-
posing my anthority the valuable possession of Tarifs. has been
I!Iwed from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply con-
cerned m the rate of the place; a [rent qnantity of mHitll.ry
Jltores and proviJlion haVing becn embarked on th....t Jlorviee by
my authority, from a oonVletion tbat the,}" were fully protected
by this additional force.
• After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I
concluded I WM cutitled to some consideration, it is no small
lIlortifitation for roo to find that my conduct should be decmed
llucstionable; but 1 flatter myself that if the I;Qvemment of llis
royal highlles9 the prince rogent will do me l.he justioo to read the
aunoxed papers, lilOy will pcrooive that if I had done less his
JlIajesty's arms IDW!t have boon dishonourcd, In rc~ard to the
tlSsumption of l'Ommand on that oCCllllion. I have only to obsorve
that oollsitlering the post of 1'II.rifa. as a dependency of Gibraltar,
having occupied it exclllBively for these two ytJ!l.1'8 past, and that
a commandant and Btaffwerc appointed froUlmJ rcl'OiUmendation,
with nlaries annexed, and Uill with the ll.pprobation of belli
governments, these citcUlllstauoe~ added to wlw.t I hlll'e seen en
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similar occasions put it past llo doubt in my mind, and colonel
Skcrrett having applied w me for' precise ordelfl: shows that
he was aware that such WlL!I the case_ If, my lord, I evcr had
a right to exercise an authority over tho post of 'farifa from
what I hM-e stated, the entry of troops from another 9,uarter.
unless actually commanded by aD, officer senior to myselt, could
Dot, according to tho custom of our service. deprivc me of it;
and I have heard that wc CllSC has l::een referred to lord "rei·
Jiul:"tOl> who was of illC same opiniou. 'I'his however, I only
take tbe libcrt}, 10 udnJ.nce ill justification of my oouduct, and
not in opposition to the opinion l~rmoo by the gO\'ernmcnt of his
royal hlgllllcss the prince regent. I trUllt therefore I shall
be excused in 1116 eyes of g:O\-erlllllcnt in declaring withont
rescnc, that if I hlld not rcl·allleol tho oomwand the place would
Dot now be in our pOllllcssion, and the wants ofourellemies would
have been completely supplied. by its affording a fre6 communica-
tiOll with the states of llaJ.'bal·y. I havo tile hOllour to report
thatlhavo.made the UOeeSSll.fY (.'Qmmuuicntion with major-gencral
Coo1:o, in cOllsequonce of its bcwg' the wish of government that
TlU'ifasllu.lllro occupied by troopsl'rom Cadill. l'he major-general
informs mn in answer thereto, that he has oommunlcuted with
lord Wellington, as lie h!>8 !lot received orders to that effcet nor
has ho the mCIlIlB at prosent to makc the detllChmont required, and
}'OUf lordllhip ill nWllI'e thatlluLVO it not in my power to reinforce
that post in case of need,' &e. &e.--P.S. '~hould your lord.
ship wish any further information with l'CSpe<:t to tlw.t post, it
will be found on rcferring to my report made after I had visited
TlIrifa, whero commodore Pcnrose and colonel sir Charles Rollo-
way, royal engineers, lLOOompa.nied me.'
Extradf1'Om captain O. F. Smit},.', TCprn-t.
, Tan!a, IJecemlJer 14, 1811.
'I do not hesitate to dedllnl tha.t IJlla6e thQ utmost roliance
on the rellOllt(.'C8 of the P}:K'e. and consi er them such lIlI ought t<J
nlake a good and ultimately sueeeaBfu.l dcfence.'
IJitto, ditto.
_ ' IJccembvr 24, 181L
•My opinion l'Cspecting the defences of this postiB unalterable,
and must evCl' rema.in BO,-that till the isllLndi,s moreindepcndent
in itself, there is a necessity of fairly dcfendiug tho town ll8 lUl
outwork.'
Extract of« letter f/"QI1l cokmel King, t!18 ~lmior officer of tluJ
troops detached/rum Gibraltar for too JifeM:8 of larifa .
• August {l, 1834.
'I probably bad better mention a CiJoCtlnlstancc which oocurred
t~o days befol'C the assault of the breach at TanI'lL; colol1el
Skcrrett illIscrnbled the commanding ofliccrB of corps on the
evening of the 29th Dee. 18il, and llllkcd their opinion illI to the
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po~8ibility of dcfcndin~ Tarifa. I Hunk thcy were all of hli
ppinion, inclined lo abandon it, cxcepl myself and hia cll~iIleer
captain Smitll, now eoloncl sir C. F. Smith. Wll bolll urged in
'llrollg-lallguage our capabiliLy of defclH.ling iL; when he ordered
U!l to retire to our quarlCI"!I, and the commanding olliceril to give
him their opinion in writinj{ n.s Hoon 116 IJOilsiblc. I imwediately
wrole, lUId glll'e in the following opinion:--.
, Ta"';fa, Decem~er 29, 1811.
'I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tllrifll will
afford the Britisll glLTri60n 1111 opportunity of gaining eternnl
hOIlOur, and it ought to he defended to the last extremity.
'll. JUNG, major, 82no rObot..
'Commandant of TlIrifn.'
'On the morning of the 30th, colonel SkelTctt enJlcd upon me
to 811y he had determined to embll.l·k with llill form of l:lOO men
/lnd \i'ished to kIlOw what I meant to do. I exprc3scd mr regret,
nnd told him I WlUl rC80kcd to defend tlle place, und if hc did
embark I hoped he would do it at night when he could not be
HOOl! h:y the enemy. Captain Smith eoon after called on me to
oiler bl8 services, \\'hich I gb.dly ncceptcd it Skerrett would allow
him to remain 119 bo belon~(-d to his oommand. I immediately
~ent nn express to general Cam:rbell at Gibrultar, informing him
of Skenett's determination lill my wish thllt he should send me
two or throo coulpanies liS soon liS po,~sible, lind that ho mill:ht
depend upon my defending Tlll'ifa to the very J!lBt exf.rcuuly.
Lllte ill the evening, !l. naval ollJccr from Gibl'lllt:lr lIl'rived witb
an order for the traltSport3 to proceed to the Uoek Il.lld not take
a soldier on board: .
Note,_MlI.jor King jg mistaken in thinking tllat all the OOlllln.~lIding
officers of regimonts \I'ore in favour of Il.barldofling the plllCe. Colonel
Gou::h WM M<Jecided1y lI.ven;e to it "" majl>r Kiull' hiluselfwll.ll.]
No,.IV.
STOR.MINO OF CWDAD ltODlUOO MW IlADAJOS.
(The sllollymous ~xtn.ets are tak~n from Ihe memoirs and jOllmab (If
offioen engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the lICtion d~8Cribed. 1'00
Roman char.wUll'll m.:lrk different sources of infonnation.)
SECTION I.-ClUDA.D U()DRIGO.
A-
'The duke of Wellingt..on, stnndjng on the top of Homo ruins
of ilie (,'Ollvent of l:ranculCo, pointed out to co.lonel Colborne W1d
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to major Napier,. commanding the Itormin~·pll.rtrot tIle light
dirision, the apot where the ~mllll breacb ....as. Having dOne
this, be said, , N(J1fJ do ymt wndu,iallrl tzactly tit. flKJJ 10" art' iD
tahM1 at to a.,.,.ju at tAt brt'ac4 tltitAollt fWiu (J7' CfJ/tfIUiD.r
Ht 'II'U a.M1II"ered, • YtS, pVftelly.' Some one of the staff then
83id to major t'apier, . Wby don·t you lo&d P' lie aM1II"ered,
':So. ifwe can't do Ife bmiuess without looding we ah.aI1 not do
it at all' The duke oCWellington inunediatcly &aid, , .Leave bin.
alone.'
-'The ~ores under colonel RIdei' '!fete to ClaITf bay-
ba,.."" to thro.... into the ditch. but the aigmu of attack hanng been
ginn IDd the fire commeucing at the !.<reat breach, loo ltorrners
Would not wlit for the hay·ba~", ",,'hieh from IOme conflllM>ll in
the orders delivered h:ld 110t set amved; buL from 119 fault of
eolCloe1 Elder or his W'llant rt.1,rimcnl; tbuS were alll·aYI ready
Cor IlId equal to lI.lIJiliiDI;' tbey were ordered to do,
'1"O.e troopil jumped lUta ~he dilch; tba 'fauu bNlye' 'l!"~
C!ICed with stone, 10 1UI to form a pcrpondiculllr wlLil o.bout the
centre of the diteh, it WILi scaled aud the foot of the broach WM
attained. Lieutenllnt Gurwood had /tOne too fllr to hil Ion wit!l
the forlorn h0110 lInd missed tha entranoo eethe breach; he was
Btruek down with 0. wound on the llead but llprnn,; up lI~ill
end joinod major Nllpier eaptain Jonell 52nd rcgt. Miwhell
95th, Ferguson 4:lrd IIlId solUe other offioors, who lit the head of
the etonne1'!l wore (\11 going' IIp the breach together.'
-' Colonel Colborne, although vory bn.dlf wounded in the
ahalllder, fOl'll1cd the fit'tY·llceoud on tho top 0 tho rampart and
led them againBt the enemy.'
'Tho great breach Wa!I IlO lltrongly hnrriClllded. 10 fiercely
ddended, that the third dil"ision had not c:1rried it, and were still
bravely exerting every efful't to force their WlIy through the
obsladClwhen eoloncl !['Leod of tho forty.third poured 11. heary
tl&nk fire upon the enemy defending it.'
B.
, 'The third division havinlr commenced firinA' '<I"e were obliged
to hUlTJ to the attack. The forlorn hope fed, we advanCed.
Dpidl, acrou the glacis and dCl>Cended into the ditch n~r the
DvChn u.nder • hello"" lire. We found the forlorn hope placin~
ladders lIfli!llt the Cace of the '<I"ork: and our party turnea
towvdJi them. ll"bcn the engineer oflieer ealled out, • Y". an
~9, tAis is tlu _! to the brtad. or tIN fu.1UU bNfJe die!
leads te tA, b1Tac!~ urt' W ~J:""
--'We ascended the breach of the /aus" braye. and then
the breach of the body of the pla..'C ....ithout the aid of ladden.'
--' 'Ve were for a Bhort time on the breach. before we forced
the entrance. A gun was stretched aCl'08I the entrance but did
not impede our march. Keat" it some oC the enamy were
• Brother to tho author oftbiJI work.
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bayoneted, amongst the number some deserters who Wllftl found
in arms defending- tJIC breach.'
--'Major Napier WIIS wounded at t,be moment wll(~n tllc
men were checked by the Iteavy fire and detennined reslstanre
of the enemy about two·thirds up the lISccnt. It was then that
the soldiers, forgetting tlley were not loaded lIS the major had
not permitted them, snap?cd all their firelotfcs.'
--' No individual oould cmim being the first that entered
tlle breach; it was a ~imultllueou.s rUJ!h of about twenty or thirty.
The forlorn bope was thrown in some degree heJund. hein"
engaged ill fixing ladders 8ll'ainst thtl face of the work, which
they mistook for the point of attack.
'Upon carrying the breach the parties moved as before,
directed by major Kapier; that is, the fifty.second to the left
the forty-third to tile tight. The forty-third cleared the nunparts
to the right, and drove the enemy from the places they attempted
to defend until it arrived near the great breach at a spot where
the enemy's defences were o,·erlool'cd. At this time the great
breach had not been carried and was powerfully dcfended by
the enemy. The houses benring on it were loop-holed, nnda deep
trench lined with mnsketry bearing directly upon it; the Hanb
of the breach were cut (lff', and the descent into the tQwn from
the rarnpar1:8 at the top of it appeared considerable, 80 as to
render it exeeedinl!;ly difficult, if not impossible to force it with·
out some other aid than a front attack.'
--' The moment the Jijtht division atorming'.partr arrived at
tIle spot described, they opened a heavy enl1.lading fire of mus·
ketry upon the trench, winch Wall the main defence of the great
breach, and drove the enemy from it ....ith the aid of the storm-
ing-part:r of tlle third r1ivlilion that now entered. I Wl\lI wounded
at this time, and retired a short way back on the rnmpart, when
I saw the first explosion on the rampart nellr the great breach.
It was, in m)' opinion, next to impo!!sihlc, all I have Mid before,
to force the weat brcacll by 0. front nttnck, Ill! long- o..~ the encmy
held their defences; but the moment the li~ht division turned
their dcfences the breach WM instantly carried.'
Abstract qf eluJ J/)//,Nlal f(fseneral Ha7'IJOY, Po-rtugue86 8ervi~.
, I stood on ti8iDg ground and watched the pro)2reiiS of the
13.1 tack. The great Iireach was attl\.Cked first At the top of it
lho third division opened their fire heRl'ily and it was returned
heady; but there \I'as a. distressing- pause. The small breach
\\ RS carried first, nJl(i there was one considerable explo~ion Md
two 0" three smaller ones on the ra.mparla.'
SECTION II.-BJ.DAJos.-AsUI7LT OF PICUBIlU.
C.
•An engineer officer ",'ho led the attack told me two dap
after, 'that tho place never would have been taken bad it not
been fol' the intelligence of these men (a detachment from tho
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light divi9ion) in ab90lutcly walkin~ round tho fort, and findin...
out the Kllte, wllich WI\.ll literally b<>!l.ten down by them, and thcy
entered at the point of t.he bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the
fifty.slX:ond was shot tluough the body by a Frenclunah a. yard
or two inside the gate.'
A.s9J.ur,T OF BA.DUOS•
•(:iota.-The account of m:Ljor.genernl Sb:LW Kennedy'~ intrepiilityand
coolness on the third brea.ch was deri,·ed from hiB heroic companion,
captll.in Nicholllil, who relatod it with admiration when dying hizilsell
of hi~ wounds.]
'For the dCBccnt of the ligbt and fourth divisions into the
diteh, only fite ladder, ,.,ere placed, and those five laddcn were
c1o~ to eal·h ot,her. The adt'ance (or storming party) of the
eighth division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believu
tha.t no part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from
the first great eXl?loslon, and the storming.party only bad entered
when that exploslon took place; but observe, that althollj:(u tll"
1d~ance of the ligllt division preceded the ad~ance of the fow-m
di,·ision, I only mean by that, that the hend of thl'li,zllt divisioll
entered the diteh SOOller than the }read of the fOllrth divisioll, for
tile main bodies of the two divisions joined at the laddel'8 and
were deseendin~ int-o the ditch at the same time.
'I consider that the eelltro breach at Badajos was ne'l"er seTi-
oll8lyattacked. I was not at the centre breach on the nigbt of
the llSsault, therefore 1 canllot positively assert what took placll
there, But there were not bodies of dead and wounded at thll
centre or CU11:lin breach in the morning t:o indicate such an
attack baving been made upon it, and being' in the curtain it Wall
fill' retired from the troops, aud tlu) approach to it WII8 mado
extremely difficult by !hep cuts, and I think it passed uuob9Crved
except br a strnggliuJ; few.'
--'1 consider that' chevaux de [r;lIe' were placed upon the
summit of tne centre breach during tho lli;!lllult;,. I wl\..~ there ut
daybrenlr. The npproao::ll to it was extremely diffil.'ult, both from
the difficulty of findin~ it, and from the dcep holes that were
before it, whiell to my rcoollection rcsembled tho holos you sce
ill a cJay-fidd, whero thoy make hrich. Another great ohstru6-
lion \I'!li:I the fire from Ule fllCilSll.lld tlank~ of the two bll.8tions,
whicb cro.ll81ld before the curtai:n.'
Extractfrom a memoir bg captai'! BaMle,r,t, O}uUI,ellrf
BritanilJ1U!8, oothtg engincer at tM siege,
• The explosion of the 'BarilJuu joudroganta' TCsembled
'!OUY(U!$t!8,' Iltld I expected the bastion would !w.ve crumbled to
pieces. At this IDoment 1 perooi\'ed one pcr:>on in the midst of
Ilro, who had g-ainud tllC top of the breach in the face of the bas·
tiOIl, ho seemed irnpellillg lii.w.self forwnrd «)wards the enCU1Y in.
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tm offensive position when he SlInk down, appo.rently demroyed
by the fire. On exo.mining this breach at daylig-ht, I found R
Portugucse grenadier, \\'hom I suppose to be the person, l\tI he
lay dend the 'foremoat on this bren.eh:
--' Twice the bug-loa sounded to retire from t,he breaches.
Tile fire diminished, and passin/{ nloug the glueis of the rnvelin
I h.aatened to the attack of general Pieton, and found but tl&O
ladders, onc only just leng- enough to reach. tho ombrll8ure, and
the other with so\'eral of the upper rounds destroyed. 'rhe
ensUe WII.S full ofmcn. and had tho cnemy thrown shells amonA'
thcm I do not think it oould have becn kept possession of.
:!1Pjor Burgll Ctlrne to ascertain the result ef the attack, lUld th/l
reserves were ordered up. On coming down from the enstlo I
met jreneral Pieton and told him tho castle wna full of men, but
they Jlnd net ndvaJlt'ed into the to\\'n. He immediately ordered
llOrties to be made to clear the breadl, lUld a good Jock-out to be
kept towards Christo\·al. '--' Passillg in frollt of tho battery
where lord Wellington WIlS, I wont on the right bank ef Hie
ilHllldllt.ioll till I could cross, and going towards the breach, I WllS
overtaken by tile prince of Orlillge, earryillg an order for colimel
BlIrJllI.rd to oceupy the blocn.elJ. Tho ellemy's fire had ceased,
yet nOlle of the $lOTming-pnrty knew whuther we were $uecessfuI
or not. I told the prince I was .iu~t c<llllO from the castle, which
was occupied ill force. A.~ we approached the breach the slench
of burnt hair aod scorched flesh was horrible, and on the crest
of tilC ,g:laeia the dead and wounded lay in ~uch numbers it wu
impos~iblo to pass without trcadiog on them.'
• noro I also found but three ladders, oue broken so Il3 to
render it useloss. On arriving: at the curtain·mac!, some mea
of tlIC light division Il3sisted mo ill removiog from the top Me
cAe~·au.x dcfrise oflu:ora-b[adel ana pikes.'
LUerfr(»ll, maJor Squire, of the E1I9inecrl.
[Extrad.]
'.J.pril8,1812.
Tho enemy made a most obstinato rC8istnnoo, and had pre-
pared the breachos in Bucll a. manner with chcvau.'l! de [rise,
planks with lcnwr-hooh, shells and blUTcl.S of gunpowder, that
to cntcr them becamo impoflBihlc.'
ExtTactfrom a fI1/Wfoir on tRe escalak qf St. Vincent, by copic;;"
Elterl P. HopJ.:inl,fourth regiment.
• The column halted a. fell' yards from a. breflSl;.worlc BW'-
mOllnwd with a stockade find a chevaux de .frile oonrcaJing a
gllllrrl-lloDse on the covered way, and at this moment a. most
awful explosion took {'lace, followed hy the mosttromendoua peals
of musketry. • Thnt la at the brenohes,' was the whisper omoDJiSt
our soldicrs, and their Ilnxiety to be led forward was intensc, but
their firmness and obedience wore equally oonapieuous. 'i'he
moon now appeared. \Vc could hellr tho French. soldieI'll talking
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in the guard-houso, and their officers wero visiting the sentries.
The engineer oilker who preceded the column, said, 'MW is tfw
time;' the oolumn instantly moved to tJlO fnec of tho gnteway.
It WI\8 onl}' I1t this moment that tho sentry observed us, and
fired his ahU'm-shot, lI·hleh 'I'M followed by musketry. '1'he two
companies ofl'ortuguese earryin~ the sCl1hng-laddel'll throw them
dGwu, and donf to tliO vOle(,s of their oilieo1'8, made ofF. ~'hili
occurronoo did not in the least shake tho zeal and steadiness of
our men, who occupied immediately the space lell, aDd shoulder-
ID2; tho ladders moved on. 'Vc could not force the gate open,
but the breast-work Wall instantly crowded, and tho impewmon18
eut away sufficiently to 1111011' of two men entering abreast.'-
• The engineor oJliccr wus by tllis time killed. We llad no other
llSllistance from that corps, Ilnd the 10811 W!lll most Il(jverely felt lit
this early period of the at.tack.'
--' The troops were now filat filling tho ditch; they had
S61"eral laddors, and I shall ncver forget the momentary dislIp_
poIDtment amongst. the Inon when they found that the ladders
were too ~hort.'--' '1'he enemy took advantage of this to annoy
us in every way, rolling down beams of wood, Jlro·balls, &c.,
toget.her With all enfiladi'll9 fire.
• Wc obaoM'cd near UK an embrasure unfurnished of nrtillery,
ibl place being occupied by a K'J.bion filled witll earth. A ladder
WIU! inetHnl,l:r placed under its mouth, and also one at each Bido.
ThiB allowe three personil to as~'Cnd at once, but only 011(1 at a
time could ontor in at Ihe embrasure. The first several atteml)ts
were met with inslaut death. The ladders were even now too
~hort, and it was necessary for onc perilOn to alisist the other by
hoieting him up the embrllsuro.'-' Some shots wore fired from a
building in the town, and colonel Piper lI"as sent with a party to
disloil.llc the enemy, wllilo general Walker, at the head of his
brigade, attempted to cloll.f the rampart to the right, &e. &e.
'The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and
oolonel Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the
bodv of the town. Could "'0 havo divested our minds of tile
reafsituation of tJIC town it might have been Unll.gined that the
inbabitll.nts werc preparing for some j(rau<l fete, R8 ill tbe houses
in the streets and squllree were brilliantly illuminated, from the
top to the first !loor, with numerous lamps. This illumination
scene was truly remarkable, not a living creature to bo seen, but
n oontinual low buzz and wbiaper 'nround us, and we now and
then perceived a smn1l1attico gently open llnd re-shut, as ifmoro
cloody to observe tho 8in~llJ' scone of 11 small English porty
pcrambnlating" the town in j.,'VOd order, the buglelllllu at the head
blowing his instrument. SOwe of our men and officers now feU
wouuded; ll.L first we <lid noL know where the shots came from,
but soon obseM'ed they were from the sills of the doors. WII
800n nrrivetl at a. large church facing ilOmo {p'and houses, in a.
IOrt of square. The J?llrty here drew up, and It was at first pro-
posed to take possession of this church, bnt that idea was lI.blln_
doned. We made severAl prisoners leading some mwesladep
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I<ith ]ooso bnl1'Cf.lrtrid~cs in large wicKer haskets, which they
atntcd tllOy w~rc conveying from the 111ngf\1.ine.1l to tlw breaches.
After sccut".ng the pnsoncn, nmml1nition, &0., wc moved from
the square with tJlll mtention of forcing our way upon the ram·
ram. 'Vc went up fI small Btrcct towards them, but met with
~11c11 opposition lIS oblil!:cd 1UJ to retire with loss. Wo np;ain
(ound 011TlleJVe8 in t11e SqlllU·(·. '.lUore nn Enl!:lish soldier came 1111
to 118 who had been oonfincd in the jail, prol.lJtbly l\ dc,crter.
Hc said om troops had attacked the castle ond 1U\(1 failed, but
that the French troops llad af'terwlU:ds evacuated it. At this
period rapid chnDg'cs took place. Sever,,] French OffiCf'TS CllffiC
mto the square; the town bl'longed to the Eng-lish; tile j:(Tcat
'Vcllington was yictorious. A scene of sad eonfuslon nOli' took
place; several Freneh officers of rank, llICiT wi"es IInd children,
ran into thc squnre in a. s!:llte of fronzy, 1101diTl)! liltle ca~ketll
eontninin,g- their jewels and valuables, and their cllildron in their
arms. '[lIe situntion of thesc females WII~ dreadful j they im.
plored our protection, and I helicyc this party escape<l the plun.
del' and pillage whidl WIlS! now unfortunately in progress, 'The
Sl'.ene Ihat now commcnced surpllllsed 1111 that elln 00 imagined,
drunkennc!lS, cruelty,. IInd debauchery, the losg of mllny li..-esj
and great destruction of property, was one boon for our victory.
The officers had lost all comm/lnd of tl.ei1' men in the town;
tl1Os0 who lllld )!ot drunk nnll had sntisfkd themselves withlllun-
del' oonj!1'e)!!ltcd in smnll Jlltrtics Ilnd fired down tho streets. I
SIlW an Englisll soldier pMS tllrougll the middlo of tho street
witll a :1o'1'eneh knapsack on his back; lIe recoil'ed It shot through
bis hand from somo of the drunkards at the top of the street;
he merely turned round and 8llid, Damn them, I supposc tilcy
took me for n. Frenchman. An officer of tho Brun.swiekers, who
W!iII oonlending with lL soldier for the pOllsCllsion of 11 canary-bird,
WllIl shot doad by onc of these insallO drunkards. Groups of
soldillT8 were soon in nl1 places, and eould we hlll'O forgotten tho
di~lrc6SilllZ' purt of 1111l ~uellO !lover wus thero a. mere eoml!leltl
masquerade. Some dn'sB~oJ a.i wonks, some 1I~ friars, I!OlUO in
eouJi.dressesilllllny earrJ'iug furnit.ure, cloth, provisions, monuy.
plate from the churches; the military chest W!lS evell got at uy
the soldiers.'
No. V.
SRCTION J.
E:NGLISll PAPERS ltELA'l'ING '1'0 SQULTS AND MAltltfON'1"S
OPERA1'IOriS.
Collmel Le M/1,fflrU7, commandant of Almcida, to ~";fladiCl"
gel/eral Trant.
'..J.lmeida, j[arch 28, 1812.
''When I took possession of Ihe fortress, ten days since, I
round not a single gun in a. state for working; either o'lliDg to
APPENDIX. 451
GG2
tJle want of side anns or tile ill assortmout of allot llnd ammuni.
tion, not a single platform WM lald dowll, and scw'ccly a sin!;!;lu
embrasure opened III any part of the newly-repaired fronls. My
powder WlIS pnl'tly in nIl (lutwork, partly ill two buildingg I>CRrcely
~'eathcr-]>roof, onl)- oall front of lIlJ CO\'cL'eol way pallilHI.ded, and
the face of one of Illy ml'cliLli! \\'ithou~ allY r.w{)!.emcut. whalc1'er;
the l"CVMlllllent lIlL'()U"!Lout l!lll \\")'ole of the nejlrl,r-repaired
front.'! llot ueiu!:" mol''' iiUln <-lIe·third or oLlc·fourt.h bf It$ former
hdght, 1'Il:wy of tILC8U d"fucts have UeOll remedied; \\"e have
platforms WLt! elllbr:lIlUI'CS Lhroughout tho nell' frouts, the gUll~
poswd with theiL' proper sid(l·arms ami shot l,ilcs, alld wuh a
proper a~~ortmCllt of ammunition III the eais801lS; the bulk of
our powdllr nnd orunam.:c-cal1;ridgo being- distriuuled ill oomu-
p!'OO(s; we havc fOI'med a respectable entrcnchmont 011 tho top
of the Lrcnch of the milled f(l,veliu, which it is propl>scd to nrm
with llalisades, but tho uhno~t total wllnt of trumpert hus pre-
vented our being ablc to complete mere than two front.! and
a half of our covert wny with those essential defences. }'rom
this sketllh you will collect that, though tlLll fortress is uot to be
willed into, it is yot far from being secure from the consequenccs
of l\ resolute ussault, plU'tiuul.n.rly if tho garrison be composed 01
raw and unsteady troops.'
EXlrmtfrom a memoir Qfgeneral Pram.
'Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had
Dlarched from Sabu:;:al in order to attaek me iu Guarda; he hd
at the lcast five thousand infantry, some reports made his fotce
sel'en thousand, and he had live or six hundred clwalry. My
distrui!t of the militin witl) regard to the execution of precautioils
sll.ch as I had nOl'o' adopted, had induced me at aU times to have
a drummer at my bed·room door in readiness to beat to arms;
and thia WII8 moat fortullJltdy the case on the night of the 13th
April, 1812, for the very first intimation I reeeive(l of the ellemy
being nenr at hand was ~van me by my own lICrvant, on brill"-
iug ma my cofl'1l0 at daybreak of the 14th, He said such 11"~
tlH.' report in thc street, llnd that the ~oldiers were as:;embling- nt
the (l,lnrm J'('ndezvoos in the town. I inatnntly hent to arms, nnli
tho beat being ag instantly tukon np by cvery drummer who
heard it, Mnrmont, who at thnt very momont, WI\.S witl1 his
ea.\"alrv at the vory clltrunce of' tba tOWD (quite open on the
Sabug"alaido more than elsewhere), rct.ired. Ho hnd cut off the
outposts without tlwir firing a ~hot, :md lUll.! he only daahctl
headlou'~ into the town, must havo cafturcd Wilson's amI ILl)'
militia ilivisions without losing probab y a siogle mau. I ,,'as
myself the first out of the town, alld he "'as no~ thou four
hundred yards from it, retiring at 11 slow plWC. I lost 110 time
in forming my troops in position, and scut my few dragoons
in obsarvation. When at a couple of miles distant, Mllnnont
drew up frooting Guarda., and it turned out, as I inferred, that
he expected infantry.'
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Lord Wellingtoll to nr' N. :&«1It.
'Ca8lelw B1'(J.71co. April 17, 1812.
•DUR SJR,-I arrived here about two hOllra 8g-0. ~fa~hal
Dercsford received yOUI" letter of the 13tb upon the road, aud I
received that of lhe 12th from general Bncellar this mornin~.
We shall move on as soon fIB the troops come up: it would
appear that the French afC collecting more force upon the
Agued~ llci Coa. You should take care of yourselves On
Gunrda if the)" should collect n.·o divisions aot or in the neigh.
bourliood of Sabu~al: Guaroa is the most treacherous position
in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should
prefer to /lee an advanced g'uard upon It, and the main body
on the Mondego behind. Have you saved my rnag8.2:ines at
Cderioo P I cnolosc a letter for the commissary there, and one
for Don Carl08 d'Espagna. Pray forward both; the former is
to order forward fresh supplics to Ce1crico. Show this letter to
/leneral Bacellar: I don't write to him as I have no Portuguese
with me,' &e. &e. '''WlSLLINGro:s.'
])i(to to ditto.
, Pedroguo, .A.pri/21, 1812.
'DEAR SIR,-I have recci\'oo your letter of the 15th, and yOIl
will see by mine of tlle 17th, written 118 soon /l.8 I knC\\' that
your diviMon and that of j:enerlll Wilson were on Guarda, that
I expecfl·d wbat happened, and tJw.t I wislloo you to withdraw
from thl>t position. In fact, troops oU,l!;ht not to he !lut in a
strong pOIIition in wllich they can he tun1/~d if they han not an
easy rctrCtlt from it; and if yolt aih'on to that principle in war,
find look at the position of G\mrda, you will ngrco with me that
it i8 the most trefLCherous pOIIition in PortllWlI. I cnn onlv !lily
that,1\9 ManllOnt nttllcked you, I aID dcli~Mcd that you 'hnl'o
goat off so well; whielj circumstnncc I attribute to your carly
decision not to hold tlle position, and to the good dispositions
which you made for the retrCllt from it.
, As to your "lan to sUl'llrisc Marmont at Snbugnl. you did not
lltlempt t.o put Lt in execution llnd it is \llje!C8S to say allYthing
about it. 1 would observe howe"or upon ono of )'our prinuipl~8,
viz., that tiw nmgllitlldo of the ohject would jUstify Ute attempt,
that in war, J,larLiuularly in our situatiollll.lId with 8uch lroop~ all
wc, and you III particular coullllaud, nothillf:" i~ 80 bad a8 fuilure
and defeat. You could not have 8ucc~'eded in that attempt, and
JOU would have lost }'our di\'i~ioll alld that of genera-\ Wilsou,
I give you my opiuion very freely upc>n your plau8 aud oppra·
tiOllll, 1\9 yOIl have written me upon them, bef:"g"mg you at the
same time to believe tllat I feel for the difficulty of your situn·
non, and that I am t>"rfectly ~atisficd that both yOIl and geocrnl
Wilson did el'"erything that officers lIhould do with 8uch cireum·
stanCtll, and that I attribute to you the lIafety of the two dil'"i.
sions. I ~hall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the n~t day; and J
hOtle to ~ee you before we shall again be more distant from each
other,' &e, &C. '~'ET.LI:OOTO:;.'
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fll.E..JWU PAPEUS UELAl'ING TO SOULT'S AND MARMON'l'S
OPERATIONS.
,'['ra1l8latf!rl. Ezt1'lU:l8from Simlf8 intercepted M8jJatclie8.
, Seville, April 14, 1812.
'I enclose coJlies of 8. letter from the duke of nagu~n, di\l;('d
22nd February, and another from g-enerlll Foy, dll.ted Velvis de
.Tarll., 2StJl Fehntary, whie11 announced posltivl!ly that threo
diviaions of infantry and one division of e8.valry of tile army of
Portugul would jom me if Dadujoa wus attllCked; but those
rli\"isione, fifteen dlLys t1ftorwlLrda, marched into Old Castille at
the moment wllen they knew that !loll tho Eng-lieil urmy WlIS
moving upon lludlljoa, and at the instunt when I, in virtue of
your highness'a (Bcrthier'e) orders, had Bent fh·o regiments of
rnfuntr'i and two of clwalry. an(l my skeloton regimonte to Tala-
,·era. t is certain thut if those three divisions hud remained in
the valley of the l'agus. tho enemy would not huvo uttacked
Dadajos, where they t-oulU have been fought to adnwt.uge.
'The contrary hus arri\·ed. I hal'o bel'll lefl; 10 my 011'1]
forces, whieh have been reduced by fifteen thousand men as I
have stated above, and not eV{<ll a military demonstration has
been made much less sureour. because the attack on Deira could
not influence the siege and did not.'-' DadajOll fell by a 'rollp
def(}1'/1I.1le.' because It was not in human foresii{ht to think that
fi\"c thollsand men defending the breach llllCl.'eS8fully, would
sulfer II surprise on a point where no attack WM directed, and
when I waa within II rew marches with twenty-four thonSlllld
men stronl;ly or~anized.
'If I had reeei,'ed your llit:-hness's Jetter wben I was before
the English, I mij\ht, although unaided by M. Mormont and
nllmericnlly inferior,lmve /-,';\'{'n battle to Rave ThullljOg; but I
should probably hnvc bt-en wronj\, and I should hoNe 108t the
force 1 lert in Andalusia, where llOt only Seville 1'I'l\::l illl'eswd
lOud my t'QJJ1111unicatiotlll cut, but II g'eneral insurrection wu>! com-
mencing. HappilJ 1 heard in time of the fall of llllJujos; but I
lla\'e not even yet opelled my communieatiom with New Castille,
Grenada, or Malftl.(a. I have however ]Jre:r.lll'\Jd in time to
deliver It great battle on my own ~ound-An alnsill.
, The emperor of course cannot foresee all things, and in hiS
ordeT8 nllhlTl)lly meant that his ,g-enerals ~houJd act with dis-
cretion on .lUch OCCllllion8; 11enee if Mllnnont llad only made
demonstrations on Deira. wiu\ u. part of hi~ llrmy, and hlld
orossed tho TlLWlS to unite with my troops, tlle sicA"o would
hl\\'o been raiscd before thl) breach wus prHcticable. Manl10nt
had notJLing before him, llnd he knew Wellington hud pussed
the Gundiann and comment'O<! tho siege: I slIr thllt 1111 the
EII!!lish IIrIDY had pa::ised ilie Guu.d.iaull., and tills was its dis_
positi.on.
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'GeneraJ. Gmham commanding' the lirst corps of ohser>atioll
had the sixth and seventl! divi8iollS of infantry and Cotton's
cavalry two thousand fivo hundred strong. witll thirty gUM.
'rhis corps pushed my right will'" to Cranja und Augua, at the
'dl;boIlChe' of l:u.cntc Ovojuua, while Hill, with the second and
tJlird divisions, t ....oll·o hundred cll"alry under Erskine nod
~lI"d\'o guns, mOI"cd on mr extreme right in the direction of
:La LcrcmI from lklcndcnl'.cr.
. ,Vcllil\~n carried on the siege in p<'rson, llllving tho fourt!l
divi~ion, part of the third division, a Portu~I1CSC corps, and I am
lI$sured he lillll also two or three thousand Spaniards, which made
round the place eighteen tllt)USllnd men .
• The fifth division remained at l1r8t on tho riJ!ht bank of the
TaltU'> with R brigade of CIl,Valry; but they were aiM called up
and came t{) Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best !!.CCOunts
gn\'e \Vcllington t.hirty tholBll.ud men, nnd !IOl1le make him as
lii,lt'b as forty tJlOusnmf, at tbe moment when I WHS before him at
Villalba; and it' thl' army of Portllga Iliad joined me with twenty_
five thousand men, Badnjos would haWl been sa,-ed or retaken,
and a ,::-reat victory would throw the English hack into their
lines. I was not ~tr{mg enoll~h alono; 81111 hCllides the loss I
should have 8ufn~·e I I could not have got baek in time to Ila\'e
101' troops in Andn!usill,
-. The ElI~lish did not hide tlHJir knowledgo that !fnrmont Wl\3
Ralherin~ in Lean; but tllCy knew lie hnd no battering-train.
nnd thut the wnsled 8tnte of the country would not permit llim
to penetrate fur into Portugal. So measured indeed wero thoir
operation8, that it is to be 8UppOSed tbey h....d intercepted some
despatch which explained the system of operation and the irre-
solution of Marmont.'
'Your hig-hllcS8 tells mo I '~hould not have 10f& Hill after his
last movcmont in December on Lstrcnmdur.l. nor have per·
mitted wm 10 lake DIy lllagaziue8:' r 811)' llllll:ul lakeu nolhiu/.(
frolu me, The advanced guard at Meritla Jivlld from day 10 day
vn what was sent to them Ji·OUl La Lerella. I know uot if some
(lf tlus has falleu into his hands; but it· can bll but liltle. Dnt
a~ this period 1Vcllin:::tou wished to lJt,siege Dada,/'Oll. and only
Kllspended it because of the rain which 1I'0ldd not et him mOl'e
his artillery, and ~auso IhlX'e dil"isions of the army 01 Portugal
were in the vallcy of the Ta:;tus. If they had remallled [he siell:o
would not lw.ve been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for
on the 22nd February he "'rote to 1110 to say tuat, independent
of those three divisions under l"oy wllich lie destined to send to
the aid of Badajo~, he llimself would act so as to surmount the
diffieultre~ which I-he state of his munitions opposed to his reso-
lution to defeat the enemy's projects:
'If your highness looks at the states of Ille 14th April, you
will sec that I IlHd not. as yon suppose by your letter of 19rh
]:'ebruary, forty thousand men; I hud only thirty,flvc t1lOu!!llnd,
including the gllrrison of Badajos, ont of which I had brought
"'ith me twenty.four thousand, the reat being employed before
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Cadiz nt Seville, in Grenada. and Murcia, and again~t Bnllcswros.
You must consider that fifteen day,; before the Englillll passed
the Guadiaoa I had sent five re~imcnta of infantry, two or
cavalry, and many skeletoIU! upon l'alavera, in nU fifteen thou-
sand men; and SlfiC6 two years I have sent mauy other skeleton
re~iments to France, being morc than fifteen thousand meD
ellltn:ring their destination or worn out·, without having yet
received the troopll from the interior destined for my army.
1I1tho\l~h these are borne Oll the states; besides which, I have
four thousand men unlit for the field who ought to p;o to
France, but 1 am forced to employ them in the posts. Ilal1cs-
teros has, besides the arID of Mllrcia., ten thou8llnd meD; and
in Uurcia tho Spanilt.rds are strong, bcC<1\lSC the fugitives from
Valeoein had jOllled two dh-isioos wllieh lul.d not beeo l)n.!!;lI~ed
there. and thus. incllldin~ tbe garrisons of AliCll.nt and Cartna-
gena, they bad fifteen thousand men, Suchet's operations have
certllinly produlXld weat resull:8, but for ORC moment llllvQ hurt
mc, hceauac nIl who fly from him come back upon my left flank
at a moment when I Imve only three bll.ttalioullllud four hundred
CII.\'alry to OppOAC them lit Grenada only. I hnve aent my brother
there In bllllte to aup.ron them. The English, Portuguese, rmd
Spanish at Cadi1., Glbrnltnr, nnd on tlle ocean could nho at any
time descend with ten or twelve thousand men on uny part of my
lino, und I wnut nt lellSt ns mnnv to oPJ;KIso them nnd gUlU'd my
posta, Tmny therefore be accllscld ofhnvmgellrricd too mnny mea
to the relief of JhdlljOO; and that IIrmy was not strong enough,
thoug:h exeClllent in qunlity.
'I .:munot hold twenty thousand men, as your highuess desires,
on the GUlldinutl. unloss I anl rClinforced, Clspceinlly lIiuoo the fall
of llndajos; but as soon as I ,know UiC English llilVfl repasscd
tlw.t ril'or, all my right undor D'Erlon, i. e. mne regimelll.ll of
iufantry and four of e(wnlry, aud twelve ~UIl.l:l, ~hs.U msrch into
the interior of Esh"l'lllaUura and occupy Medellill, Villllfranca,
and even Merida, and, if poesible, hoM in check the Wlrrison of
Dadajos and the English corps left in Alemtejo. and so fire-
vent any grand movement up the valley of the Tagus: agaInst
Marlrid.
'Since my return here the demon~trations of the English
appear directed to in\'ade Andalusia so far 8Jl to have obliged me
to unfurnish many poinUl, and even in a manner raise the siege
of Gadiz; Graham hRS come to 1,lerona, and Cotton to Derlangl'l,
where we had nn nffair, and lost sixty mon.'-' I have ordel\ld
D'Edon to rellllSs tbe Gundalqllivir, aod come to me to fl"ht the
Engliab iftbey ndl·anee; if not, he shall go on IIgll.in,ll.nd ~ tbink
the Ell~li9b. genem! will not commit the {awt of entering the
1llOunto.ins, though he aa.yshe will!'
--_._.-
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SECTION 1.
SUMMARY OF TIlE FORCE Ol' TIlE ANGW·ronl'UOUESB
ARMY AT DlPt'EIU;KT l't:RIQD8, EXCLUBIVE OF DRUM.
MJ::.RS AND Alt1'ILJ..J<.:RYMJ<:N.
October I, 181l._C.1Vll,lry.
Pl"Cocnl. 8lck. C<>mmand. Prl9Onors. T."
British ............ 3571 llB
'" '"
~930
l'ortu.guellll ...... 1318 256 1140 2169
ToW Cavalry ..• 49H 1370 2081
'"
3699
Infantry.
Britim ••..•.•••.•• 21J,530 17,nu 2663 1684 51,851
Portuguese ...... 23,689 6,009 1701
"
Sl,48Q
Total Infantry ... 53,219 23,983 4310 1759 88,331
Gooneml Tot.al, including serjea.nttl, 58,263 iI:1obl'€s and hayontlA in the
field.
January 8, 1812.-Cavalry.
Rritish 4949 841 741
l'Qrtugu_ ...•.. 613 43 275
6,';31
981
1016ss.'l'otnl Cavalry... 5562
-----------'-
Infantry.
Dritillh 30,222 11,414 2827 44,463
Por~ugu_ ...... 20,455 4,849 2360 51 27,715
1'otnl Infantry ... 50,677 16,263 5187 51 72,178
General 'l'otnl, including Ilerjeantl, 56,239 8lIIbm B.lld baYOlIetil in the
field.
NotG.-ThG abl1Jlell 30nd dosortioo8 in thG Portuguese lmv&1ry hllod beell
ao great that OnO division Wl'$ IUppreo;;sed.
'1'o!al Ca.'aIry ••• 4646'---__"5~78'---_~I'OI"7____.:S_
Aprilli,1812.-Cl\valry.
Dril;sh ..• 4299 564 755
Portugueile .••••• 347 {I 492
3 60~8
S18
6$96
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Infantry.
J"r'olcnt. ~lclr.. Command. -~. T~.TIritish ..•....•.•.. 211,897 11,452 2779 2 40,10..
Portugu1l66 ...... 20,22J 6,532 1501 18 27,21'11
--_.~~~
1'oW Infantry ... 47,121 16,984 4286 20 67,984
Sabre8ll.nd bll.yonebl .
l"illld artillerymen .
GUIlDers in tUij batterie. .
61,161
1,980
900
General ToW ... 54,647
Note.-The hea~GenTIan ca.VlLiry were in the reM e.t EstremOll, and
two Portugueoo rognnenUl were in Abrnnooe.
TROOPS EMPLOYED A'£ TUE SIEGE Oli' D.WAJOs,
APRIL, 1812.
Dritillb.
2679
2882
2579
2896
-~ll,036
4685
'58
976'
2384
18015
_~1O,748
Total......... 21,784
Portugueoo.
namilton's division .
~!fht d~v!-s~on ...........•...•.•....••.....•...•••..•.••.••
1LUN dIVlliJOn .
Fourth division ..
Fifth division .
~~~ ~~:~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::
}'onrth dll1sion ..
.l!'il1.b diviiioll .
.ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812.
Cavalry under general Hill.-Left Wing.
DritiKh...................................................... 783
Portugue.'\e 347
Infantry ditt.:l.
Eritish.............................. 6156
l'ortll~'1Ie&e 2385
1130
85(1
Total under genel"llJ Hill 9671
3.517
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Ca..wy under general Gnha.m.-Right Wing.
Driwh 3517
Pol1ugUCIIII .
lurantl)' ditto.
Dritillh 10.154
l'ortllguete .5.896
--16,0.50
'fobJ under geaeral Graha.m ... 19,567
~ral ThtaJ or the ocn'ering arm.,. exclaiM or the artillerymen IIlld
t.h~ bea...,. German cavalry....ho ...,..alDed in Lbo reu at~29,~sRn and hDyoacl&
SECTIO:s" D.
SUlllURT OF THE ANGT.o·PORTUGUESE LOSSES AI'
DADAJOS. 1812.
•\l!tl.\lJLT.
BI'ililh Lou.
Kllle<l WQU"ded,
Generab 6
S,,," 1 11
0Ill"",,.. Sol U~...
Artillery ,
"EnSinoora , ,
-, 7
"
Light dirision.-Lillf.
-~ '.B.... T~'
".. ............... " ." 341 t&70
"""
............... IS
." 323ll!ith. Ill. ""l- ......
"
179
'"93th, anl bat. ...... • "
M
ToW ... 53 '69
""
Thinl dJvilioo.
6" ............... ,
"
"1".. ............... " 337Hh ............... 7
" "17lh ............... • 'Q "j'SO83..d ............... • 62 7088th ............... 10 135
'"94" ............... , 'M "6
" '"
'SO
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Fourth division.
o..~
""'.....
"""1lh ............... 11 1" 180!8!'d ............... 17 101 1'1~~ ............... 10
"'
185
"'"
............... I' 121 ,,,
..'" ............... 19 101 liS
81 U,5
'"
Fifih di-.ilioD.
I< ............... , ,
.'" ............... 11 2t3
'"Ob ...............80" ............... ,
""
13"l
""
...............
, 37 "2U" ............... ,
"
,0<
"
m 61'
60th- ............... •
"
..
llrunll\\ick Od~· ,
" "
'rotal JJritish low at the M1i:lull.
omce.... S!ll'J8LntJ, Sold!~""
51 40 560 killed
213 153 1983 wounded
1 21 mit:ling
Total Portugu_l(l,U at the .-ult.
8 " 141 killed
45 32 4/$8 wounded
SO milSing
Total.
f3022
Grand Tobl 317
'"
"., 3752
Briti!lh m. durint the ,..bole ai"'D"'B.
60 45 715 kilkd I
251 178 2578 WOIUIded sSGO
1 3:! miuWg
~ I.o6s during Cbe ,..hole Ilit!£e.
III (I 137 killed !_<
65 38 657 wounded """
30mimDg
General Tobl... ... 378 268 4179 .se;;
• Th_ rflIlmOt'" "'t$lltoched b$ """'l"Inl•• to \.he third, r... rth, ~d nOli IIhl·
.-
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SECTION Ill.
SUMlt[ARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT Dln'Jo:RENT
P};IUOn3, EXTRACTED FROM THE UfPERIAL MUSTER.
lWLLS. v_ ...... ~~. ,_. _..
)I.a. 11...... N ... 11........ !loo". 'rn. •• H......Au~.~ 1811 2&$.216 37/,(,9 iIlMO'l IO,8G!l 41.4~2 ~,418 M.318
ReillfQr«mcnta 13.I90traln
In M.o.:<:Il •••• 17,361 •.m
" '"
18.4'la 3.929
Tat&1.. •• 219,63'1 41.r.!18 5o,r>8~ IO,8G9 42,4113 3'/2,841 ~2.~(l'l
Jan....ry, 1812•• m,l~ 41,919 22,8(13 5,434 42.0lo6 :ni,9M 42,m
April, 1812 2-10,&54
"'"
12,2'l~ 3,814 U," 20/;,4.10 40,<W1
~......an
BayQnne ." •• ...,.
'" • • ••
4,93') 'W
Total •.• , 24~,6!l1 8'"",lH 12,260 a,849 81,3G9 2!l1,3ro 40,6'i3
ObM!nmt«m.-Jn September, 1811, l\n lIrrny of TClIerve, con5iatin~ of
two divilic>ns of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, ill all W, 37
umlor anll$, wa.a Conned for tl.te armt"!:! du miili.
'1st August, 1811.
Uo4tr.,... li<1_. I/_;u,~ 1(1«"'"
M•.
"-
:M••• Il"...,., :M••. n......
Al'IlI6o:l<ln MIdi
"""
10.008 32,(1(3 5,359 11,836 ~... l~}
'."Ut3
du Centre ,. 16,M0 .,~ ., ~ 1.;81 IB,;12 .m} 3..93
"'.~}de l'ortugal ~,'" ,,~ ;.901 3.100 10,424 56,13<1 8,9252.23lM6'}d'A.-.gtm .. 4~,lll'J 6,;18 ,,,,, ", 6.t:l8 61.%1 6,105
'-439
3,~31 }
du f'oro ... ...~ 1I,0'l0 ;,GI; 1,80<> G,G;>! IM,418 - 12,8'->
'.'"
1'2&}de Cataklgne
"'" '.'"
l,m8
'"
'.m ~."" I,:mZi3
~'34S}Total. •••• 2(;2,276 37,669 ~,.'>OIl 10,8(;' 41,-IMI ~,4IB __ 48,53'l
13.190
Rcinf<m>CmcnU 17.361 'W.
" '"
18,423 2,9'29
3'J,:m}
Goneral Toto.! 219,~
"'"
bG,M3 10.800 42,443 372,8·11 -- 52,487
1:l,190
f:f_·)I.... n,_.
17,613 8179
STA1'E OF TUE IMPERIAL GUARDS.
15th August, 181!.
D«...w. Hot)'l••l
M... tI ......
3944 H 1189
1;.""' .....
~... 11",'''.
12,797 3193
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STATE OF 'I'llE OARmSON OF BADAJOS.
1_.....
lI... 110,.....
2SS7 239
1st. March, 1812.
'"
16th May, 1811.-Five battalions.
Dn...."" II"",~)1:... u"'.... 1lI«I....1I,~. 110"".
3125 239
..5034
380SOl
..4.393
STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CHiOA» RODRIGO.
15th 1),;c,JJllber, 1811.
19
"
180 1056 19
1,1l8~
11,186
10.012
'00'
."
'"
6,201
1,233
"~
''''''
28,966
19,12~
~,le7 lI,GGido F.rtugnl
de Caul"ll"e 26.9.W
d'Angon ..
dn NON ..
U~turn of numbers, 1.»' annies, 1st October, 1811.
Ihol......... f)o,._. ~l.Mo'. qmlff.
M... u...... Ill... " ...... H"pi..~ I'n.. bho. Ho,....
''''}Ann~d.Midi ee.912 11,757 7,I;311 ~3~ 13,3,3 88-,033 _ 12,el~train 33113
,"OO}21,311 - ~,H9
"'
61,162 6~} 11,6'~
"00
39,%3 33'l2} 5,~n
""til69}1000l1!1 _ JOm·~
(l86
11"O)39,2~1 _ 1,439
U,
TllIal ..•• 280,047 H,r,O 23,110 4117 ~J19 ~3,~38 .n,69~
R~nto"",m.nlll ,,", •• 1,~2G lo,~58 ."
GUleral "01&1 289,249 41,\lMI 23,110 4111 61,345
.,,'" 38.200
15t.h April, 1812.
,,_ • ..e. M~. lI..pl/.l q ..,.....
lol.n. u ....... ll.n. ._. loln. H.",..
Ann~d. Midi .. ~5,797 ll,Ol4 2,l98 '00 a,l}(;.; ."., 11,114
do ( ..,........ 19.148 3.!93
'"
••
""
IO~118 l.OH
de l'ortugal fJe.W1 ~,J~ 4.:JlH
""
7.106 ro,037 LO.3»t.i
d·,\r&l;OD•••••• 14.7Se 3,~ro 2,ro~
'"
1,167 18,948 un
d. 1"\,••1>....... _ Ill,S;IO 1,~73
" •
8.,'1~ 20,176 1,819
de Calal"sne. 28.9'14 1,2.;9 I, IUS
"
fJ,540 3-",,621 I,~ft,
du NON 4II,z:l2 1.0N 1,:Yl9
"
8,G77 b~,r.6 j,~13
ToW 24o,~~ 3G,WO 12,2"24 ~" 33,:.34 281l,4l0 4O.~61
R~Ilt".At
Dn'OtIne ',~ I~i ~
"
.~ 4,9.19 ,n
Grand Total 244,C!l'l: 3G.a7 IUIiO M~9 34,3G9 291,379 ~,6Sa
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No. VII.
1IR. TUPPER'S REPORT 'fa SIR H. WELLJ:;SLEY,
[Extract.]
'January 27, 1812.
'The scandnlous helUlNlour of lhe members of the juntu. will
llllve morc influence upon IllC public mind, will dis!lOarlen tho
peoplo e"en more than the fall of Valencia and the dispersion of
the army. :E'or sccing thoir representatives return to their
rcsllcctivil district.s, it \\;]] givc nn example to follow, tl1lLt all is
losl; ltnd bM'ing no nuUlOritv to protect them or to look to, the
1100ple hn"c 110 o~hcr rcsourOO left tlUIlI to submit t.o the Joko of
thc enemy.'
Exlract,jrmn llFr. Tupper's report to sir Henry wtlksle!l,
fi."m 22 to 27 January, 1812.
'Blake with his immen~e resources remnincd aJto~ether inac-
til'e, and contcnt<Jd himsclf with ohserl'iuj{ thll movements of the
ellcmvand his progTeSB in fortifying himself under the walls of
the city:
'With Blllke's ltJlprobation I had raised a corps of ahout one
huudrcd and eight.y men to net us guerlllas, and by bcl{iulling n
plan of oUcnsiveopcrutions I expected to seo the CXlUIll,l13 JollowCd.
I IIbo demunded the direction of the chief buttery, thut of Suntll
Cuwlina, from whence tho :F'r4:nch camp mig-ht bo mueh UDnoyed.
and for tho spllCe of thirty successivo days cllu~ed tho French
considerable damage in killed and wounded. Excepting this
baltcry, that of St. Joseph contiguous 10 it. and that of ilie
Puentll del Mar, everyt.hing else rt'maillcd in a slale of complete
illlletivHy. Dlllke, lulled into a state of cOllfldl'nee that the enl'lDJ
'll"ouM not attack without reinforccments, hud Luken 110 measure~
whatever.'
'Tlu;, junta of Valencia was cOIllpo~cd of members. as per list
enclosed. of which onl.y the first .remaincd, the others hsving
bcfore retired and shllmefull)' !{Onc to their rCllpeetive homes;
but upon the fall of the capltn!. where lhey hud lheir property,
those remaining sent in tIleir resigllation to Mnhi, nnd Without
bein!!: competent to do so, gnve up the only representative autho-
rity of the province whieh had been COllUded to thero, lInd have
thus thrown the whole oolUltry into n state of anarchy, nbnn-
donin!:!, it altoj:!ethcr to the ",ill of the enemy; yet 1 am persuaded
the spirit of the people is the Slime, .'I'rellt resources are left in
the province, immense riches still rcmain in the churches, con-
"cnts, diezmos, &c., &0.'---' I am however sorry to uy that
since the fall of the capital, na.y, sincc the blltt1e of Ule 26th
ultimo, not a single step has been taken, /lnd at this moment
ol1t~ide the \\"n118 of AHeant the province docs not exist.-Mllhi
has objected to Padre ]lico, the only man in my opinion, and in
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thnt of e,llrybody, cap!!.?le of giving actiVIty and soul to the
rceOIlrC<lS of the country"
" ..... '1 am sorry to inform your cl\"C<llleuey that after
repeated interl"icwe with Mahi and the intendant Ri.aa, on the
subject of tllC commission 1lul<l proposed, 1 mn now clearly of
tbe opinion from the repeated delays and studied objections dlllt
no authority will be eatablished:---' In short nothing has
been done. and nothing will be aone.'---
'1 am firmly of opinion that th<l people 110W in autllority liTe
disposed, by leavUl~ public affair" III their present abandoned
state, to submit to rue French )"ol(e.'---' On t-he 16th ultimo,
when Montbrun made Ilia appearance, the A:yuntamiento desircll
the SYlldico Pcnoneso to gi'"c 11. petition In t·he name of tho
people to enter into II eapilll1ation; he refused; but I am inform~d
there was some arrang:ement betwcen the governor and the
Ayuntamiento, the members whereof remain in officc notwith-
stimding" th~ir traitorous conduct on the 16th.'
No. VIII.
[The following c~trnet9 of Jetters are published to :lvoid :lny future c;;vijs
upon the point. th<.'J" refer to, and also to show how difficult it ia for
the hiiltorill.n to obtain ccltllin and aoournw detclila, when eye·wit·
IlCllSC8, Jlavillg DO wiol, Wmislead, differ 80 much.]
nATILE OF &\U?>fANOA.
Extract of a memoir by &i1' Ohal"lCI Dalb-iac, who ffJas onc of
Le J11archallt's b1'iyude of heav!! cavalry.
'Througllout tlICse charges upon the enemy the heat'!! b1'igruk
'ltas ullsupported by any other portion of the cavalry WnaICl'Cl";
but ",as followed, all rapidly as it Wit! possible for infantry to
follow, by the third division which had so gloriousJy led tho
nttack in t ho first instance and had so effectually turned tJIO
encmy's cxtreme left:
E:clractj1"Om a memair by colmlel Afoney, who "'as onc qf
general AlIstl1l'/t brigade qf light cavalry.
, The third division moved to the right, and the cavalry, M
Marchand's and All8tm's, were ordered to chal):"flll.'l 800n as the
tirailleurs of the third division l,eglln to ascend the rigllt .!lank or
the llill.'-' Tbe 1'llpid movement of the cavalry which no\\" bc~all
to ~allop, lUld thc third divjsion pTe8!lin,gthcm (the French), tnt'y
fllll into tbc wood which scpnrtltcd IJ1Cm from t]10 army; 1('"
(Anson's light camlry) rl/arged litem Ul1acl' a heav!! jil'e Of'l1llt8-
ketry and artillc"!I fr()'lll, allother heigltt; near two thouslllId
threw dOIl"ll their arms in di£l'crcnt pal"tl! of th(lwood, and wo
t:outinl1ed ow' l,llw.rge through the wood until ow' brigade tllWe
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into an open plain of ploughed fields, where the dustwas so great
we could sce nothing and halted; when it cleared away we
found ouraeh-es within three hundred )'arda of a lar~e bodvof
French infantry and artillery, formed ou the declivity of a Liu:
A tremendous battle was heard on the other side. which pre·
vented the enemy from perceivin~ us. At last they 0ECued a
fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good order
and without allY 10000s:
ll;rtract of a klteT' from lit' Henry; Watson, crmwUlnding thejird
regiment of Porl:u!Jlcese cavalry under gcMt'al D' Ut'ban..
• When Marmont, at tllO battle of Salamanca, advanced hia
lcft, lord 'WeJlington ordered down tho roservc, of which the
first and tenth Portugueso C/l,.nlry and two BfJuadronB of the
British cavalr}' under enpMin 'l'oWllsend, now lieutenant-colonel
Townecnd, formed u part under sir B. FUrban. The cll.l'alrv
was pushed forward in contifZUoUll columns, and wcre protected
from the cncmy by a small rising /{t'ound. which, IlJl soon ll.9 I
bad paBsoo, I was ordered to whecl up and ehnr~e the front in
line. The enCf11Y lwd frn-mcd a 8quare and gavo us 0. yolloy ll.8
wo adxancod, the eleventh and fourteenth romained en potence.
In tkil chargc wo Cf)mpletelg Ifuccecdcd and tho enemy avpearcd
Plmio.~truek, and made no attempt to prc\'ent our cuttmg aud
thrusting at them in all directions until tho moment I Will! about
to withdraw; then lL soldier, at uot 1lI0re than six or eight paces.
levelled his muskot at me Md shot mo through the shoulder,
which knocked mo oft'my horse, where I continued to lie till the
whole of our infantry lui.d passed over.'
Extt'aetfrom a lctterqf colonel1bwnsC1ld, 14th Dragooru.
•At 1}10 battle of Salamanca I r.erfectly rcoollect seeing
D'Uroon'a CIlvalry advll.neo up tllO hIll and ehnrge tbo }'rcnoh
infantry. ThC!! were rcpulMd, nnd left W ll.tllOn (now air Henrv),
who led his rCl,timcnt, the first Portngue:c, hadly wounded 'on
the field:-' I am «lmoat pOlfitit'e tlie lrcnd. were 1I0t iT/. squaTo
llid in line, waiting to ~V6 the aUad: rif thc leading bri·
gadc of thc third division, which gnllanUy Clll'ried everything
before it:
No. IX.
Copielf de act/x atfpkllelJ de l'cmperC'lCr au minmr6 rk la guer1'C
"dulil/cs au due de lluglllf(J.
Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812.
MO~SIEUR LE DUe DE FELTBE,-Je vons renvois In corre·
!!pondance d'Espngne. Ecrivez au due de Rnguse que c'est le
roi qui doit lui donner dea directions, Que je suppose qu'il s'est
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r,eti~ det'&~t lord Wellington BClon les rl!,:rlea de la guerre, en
IoblJg~anh 1I. se mnaser, et non cn BC 1'Cploy.ntdcvant!l Cll:ntlerie
l~gCre: qu'il.ura conservc dcs tlJtcs do pont sur l'Agncda, ee
qui JlCut lICul lui pcnnctb'e d'avoir dce nouvellrs de ('ennemi
toU! lesjoun, et de 10 tenir en rttpcet, Quo si an eontrai1'C il a
mis trento licuea d'inicrvallc entre Ini et J'cnoemi, comme ill'a
dij~ fait deux roi! contM toU! IC8 principcs do la guerrc, illaisse
le gCn~ra1 ~lail maltrc de se porter ou iJ vent, iI perd eonst3m-
mcnt l'initiat"c, et n'eat plua d'aueun poida daD! lcs dairea
d'~e; que la Biscaye et le noM eont clanl dill dispoIitions
flleheUICI pat lea luites do J'evaeuation dill A.stnnca par la
diMon BonQCt; quo la rOOocupation de ocUli. provinoc n'a pas
l'Ilcore eu lieu. quo le nord Nt expoe6 h do ~da malheurs.
que Santona et St. Sebastian IIOU(, oompromia, quo Ice libm com,
munieationa dill guerillM avcc la GiJioo et lea Asturics par la.
mcr ICB lendronf formid.bJelI, q,ue s'il ne f.it ~ rOOccnpel
promptement loa ..bturies, lllI. posltion no peut llUDcliorcr,
RcOOmmandez IU geuGral Calfarelli de r6unir davantago EClI
troupes, el d'llvoir toUjOUN una oolouno dllllB la main.
Ecri\,cz au glin6ral L'Buillitll' d'avoir l'<lli! aur 81,. Subastian, et
d'a\'oir toujOUN 3000 hommes dans la main pour 108 dirigcr sur
cett.e pluee si oUe Ilovoit bc<;oin d'Otre aecourue,
Ell gtin6rnl, pour paror Ala mll.uvaiBe mUUOlUvre et nla. mau·
vaUs6 direclion quo It! due dt! llaguso donuo a nOlI affllires, il est
ueeessaire d'avOlr beaucoup de monde a Dayonue. Aetivez la.
marcho du S" el du 106- et de la 0" demi bri~ade provUsoire aur
cetle place. Tenez y deux g~nernux de brisa:ao aOO que le g~n/!,
nl L'Huillier punae tonjoUtll disposer des force. pour Mre en
mesure d'agir aelou 108 eircouatauce5.
lleuniuczunmillier d'bommes det! dewt. de eavalerie de l'armfe
d'Egpagne, et dirigez lea en r~gimCD' de marche .ur Bayonne.
P1'Ct<:mez all gl!nl!raJ. L'HUillier de tenir sea tronpe! daDS la
vall~ de Dutan, a Bayonne. St. Jean de Luz, et Iron, en les
JlIumnant biCD, lea barraqlll.Dt, le. el:ertaut, et let fonnant. Cc
tera au moyell de eeUe rell8Oure8 que ai le due de~ con-
tinue &. faiM des bevuce on pollln empkher le mal de devenir
.-..
Sur eo, je prie Dieu. &C.(Sign/!) NJ.POLE(llf.
[For aeoond deq.kh, _ Appeodi.l. No. XIV.]
No. X.
Ldt~ rk M, u dIU] M Dalmat~ all M.
Bmlk. 12 .J~, 1812.
Je n'.vai! ~ aUCllDe nouvoUe de V. M. depni. lea lettret
~u'ella m'a fait l'bonncur m'krire dc! 6 et 7 Juillet dernicr.
Enfin je viena de r&:evoir celle daMe de Segorie 16 29 dll m6me
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mois. Les rappol'ts publiw pRf les eunewis m'avaicnt dcj?. in.
struit des ~vtmcl/lclls 811fl'cllUS en Castille lesquels 6taienl nalu.
rellcwcuL exagcr4s; V. M. a bien voulu en qUIJJ~ue wrte fixer
a ee 8ujet 1ll1;l8 idees: JIJ deplore Ills ,pcrtes que I armee d':l Por-
tugal Hcv.rouvees. D-ans l'c{:'tt ou etauwt les afflLires d'Espagne
uue bnt:ulle !le dCl'lut se dOllner QU':" la dernicre C)[LrClIlite. mais
toulll'esll)!Ii perdu. V. M. apr~8 llI'avoir couunuui<juelcs dil$-
positions qu'elle Il faitcs depuis Io 6 (date de la derwere leUrel
an 19 Juillct lIl'ordOUllC comllla UHt' l'C880un'{l d'cv3Cucr rAutla-
lousie et de me dirigcr sur 'foJ.:de. Je M pu.ill dissimult-r que
cetw disposition me pafuit fort extraordillairo. J'6tllis loin de
penser qUIl V. M. s'y seraiL delermince. Le sort de l'Eslla!ill~
est il douc d~cidu P V. U, veut die aaeriGer le royaume 11 la
capitale P et a-l-elle la certitude de la conserver en prenant cc
partiP Enfin l'evacuation de l'Andalousitl et roa lllarche aur
TolMe aout ones l'unique ressouree qui nOllS resteP Je vais me
preparer a cette disposition que je regarde OOllllue des plus
funcstes pour l'honneur des armes lmp&rhdes, le bil'n du service
del!'empelrelur et I'inte~t de Y. M. dans l'espoir qU'lIvant qu'eUc
s'execuu V. M.I'aura ch~6e ou modifiee ~Ui\'allt les propos.i.
tions que j'ai eu I'honneur de lui fain le 10 JuilIet, le S ae cc
rnois, et par M. le colonel Dcsprel;,
- J'ai l'honneur d'adresscr avotre majesM triplicfltade IDalettre
du 8 de ce u'ois. En me r6feraut aUK observations et propo.l:i.
tious qu'elle renfermc, si V. M, ne prond pas dcs dispositions en
oon~quence, je oonaid6re que revacuation de toute I'Espaple est
dccidee, car il faut que V.:M. !le persuade que dn moment que
mou mouvcment aera commence je acrai /luil'i par aoixankl mllle
ennemis (eaquela ne me donncront pas le terns ni la liberto de
prendre Ill. direction que V. ],-f. m'indiquo ot qui se rcuniront 11
cenx qui ont penare en Castille et ill'em,~eheront del erijoutncr
Bur le TllgO enccro moins d'arrirer il. J\fadrid. Il n'ya Iju'un
moyen pour rctablir lee affaircs: quo V. M, vienne en Andulousie
et qu'elle y IIm~no toutes les troupes de l'armco du centre, de
l'armoo do Portugal, do l'armce d'Arrn~on flllxqUCl1C8 ses ordrcs
pourront pllrvenir, qUllJld bien m~mo t<)ut le royallmr. de Valence
dovrait Ure 6VllCUe. Qu'importo i\ V, M. de conserver Madrid
si elle pord li.~ royllurno? Philippe V. en BOrtit trois fois et y
rentra. en eouveruin. Du moment quo nous aurons 70 ou 80
millo Frau~is r6unis tWos le midi de l'Espagntl, le th6i\tre do la
guOrT6 est change; l'arml'O do Portugal so trouvo d6!!:1I/!.'6e et eUe
pout se reporter succcSsivomclIt jus9u'au 'l'age. D'lIi1leurs ce
serait sans incom'6nient qu'el!e gardllt Burgos et la rin' glluuhe
de I'Ebro et que klllt l'csplIce compris entre IJUO et le Siem
Morenll fut ala disposition dos eunemill jusqu'1J. ea que des ren-
forts \'inseut dt! France et que l'empereur eut pu prendre dee
dispositions. I.e BlIcvifiee uue fois fait il n'y a piU!! dt! moyen d'y
remMier. Lee armco& impCl'ialee en Espal::ue repaesent l'Ebre
.d'oil peut-Hrc la fllmine lee chaS/lera, los lI.fI'aires de l'empereur
dllllil le !lOrd de l'Europe peuvont s'en resscutir, l'Amerique l\ui
"iCllt de declarer la guerro a.l'Anglctcrre fera peut.~tro la palL
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V, M. a sang doule relMchi 11 wutes lcs couscquonccs d'un parcH
clmngoment: Ill. perte momontanco do Madrid et dos CllBtiUos'
est llUUO pour la politiqu6 do l'eUlpcreur, clle p'?ut se rOllarcr on
plus ou moills do tellls. La pcrtc d'une batallle pur l'annce de
Portugsl n'cst qu'un gr(l,nd duel qui so r6paro 6~alement, mais la
Jlerte de l'Andafeuaie e~ la lov6e (Lu sicg-e de Cadiz sont des th'une-
Illcns dont loa offete sorellt rcssontis dans route l'Europe et dans
I~ noul'cau monde, Eullo 011 !idCle S\ljc~ do l'om~rour jo dois
d~cLlLl'Cr i'I. V. M, que jo no croiB JlWl les lI.ffiliros d'.EsplIgue asscz
dososp<\rees pour prendre un parti &uasi violent. J'entrel'oia
encore clll remMo si V. M, vcut prendre lea dj~positions quo j'ai
proposoos; lout en nw prepar:mt n l'c~6cution dll S08 ordres jll
me pennets de lui dCllllluder denou\'ello8 ins{ruetio\U. J'ai sur·
tout l'honnour de prin V. M, d'ordonoer que IllS communica-
tions de l'Andalousie avee TolMo soient nHabliea et quelque
evcooment qui sU1viouneo de vouloir bien faire prendre al'arm6e
du eeutre, hi. direetiotl de Despoiill. Perros ou d'Almadou (KIur
se joindre a l'armce du midI. AlOI'S jeo reponds de wu~, et
j'executerai lea dispositions que j'ai euollcces dWlS lUa lettre 8 de
re mois,
Je, &e. &e. &C.
No. XI.
Lettn u M: k marlcAal due d~ DabMtill a. M, le Minidn
dll la guerf'e a Paris.
MOl'l'SlllUn Ll1 Duc,-Teute communicntion de l'AndalOllsie
avcc la Froncc ~to.nt interrompuo ct n'nynnt ncn rc.yu dcpuis les
premicrs jOllrs de Mni; dcpuia un moig 10 roi lI.}'ant m~mc retire
lea troupcs qui etoiont dans la Mancho et ne poUVllUt commu,
niquor \l.vec "Madrid, j'eotrc'prena dc laire parvcnil' mcs nlJ?porte
la votre excellence p&r la VOle de mer. Si le Mtiment ~uc JQ ftUS
a llCt cnet partir de Mal~'a ~ut arriver 11 Mal'Seillc, 1empereur
86ra plutbt instruit de C~ qUI se plISse daus le midi tleol'E~pllgll(l
et de la position de son armce.
A ee sujet j'ai l'honneur d'adrcsscr avotre excellence copie des
dernierl rllpPOrts que )'ai flliu au roi, lesqucJs contiennent lea
representations que fal eru devoir l:IOumettro 11 sa majeste pour
le bien du service de I'empereur, la ool1$ervation des conqucres
et 1'110000111' dcs flrm6cs impcriflles.
Je ne suis instruit des malheurB que I'armee de Portugal a
6prou\'cs que polr lea bruita populaires et Ics rll'p(KIrl:il do l'ennemi;
car le roi Cll m'ccril'nnt le 211 Juillet do S6gono ne m'cn a donlle
aucnn d6tail. Jo dois dono m'imagincr que lcs pcrtes quo nous
avons faiws en Castile !lOut b~lLUCOUP t'iXll.ger6cs et j'ell tire la COll-
llequetlOO quo les affaires dll 1'Ilmpereul' Oll Espaq-ue no sont pwl
lIussi desC8p~reee que le roi parnit en ~tro pel'Sua<lc. Cependant
aa roajeste apres etre restC 23 JOU" sans llI'eerire, lorsquo les en·
ou2
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lIerni~ Hoient en plein mou'Voment et que sn mnjeaM so port<lit
avee 14,000 hommes de l'arm~o du centre 1\. Ill. rcncontre au due
de Rnguse qui 8llIl3 I'attcndro s'et<lit engage preeipitnmmcnt et
cprouvnit une dcfaitc; le roi dis.je on mo faisant part 10 29
.Tuillct de 8es mou'Vemens me donus. l'ordre former d'cvlleucr l'An·
dalousie et me diriger sur Tolede, et it mo dit oxpross6ment que
c'cst I'uniquc ressource qui nous reste,
Je suis loin de pnrtnficr ravis do snmajcsttl, je orois fermement
qu'il est possible do mICux fnire, et que tout pout s'nrnmgor en
atkndnnt que d'apres Ics ordrcs do l'empereur Y. E, ait pl\
mettre les annlles qui !lOnt dans le nord de l'.Espagllc ll. mlJmo de
rcprendre le~ opCrillions, ainsi que j'en fais la proposition a. Sll
mnjestC dans les Jettrcs dont je meld ~i·joinl copies, Mais mon
devoir est d'obCir, et je mo ehargcrais d'uno trop wando respoll'
sibilit6 si j'6ludais l'exooution de l'ordro formal d 6vacuer que le
roi m'a dOlln6.
Je vais donll mc preparer u. exccuter eette disposition quo je
regarde comme fUlltlSlo, puisqu'tJ1le me force a livrer aux ennemia
des place« fle guerro sl18ccptibles d'uue bonne dHeuse, tout apro·
visionnoos, les etablissemens et UIl materiel d'arlillerie immense,
et de laisser dans les hbpilaux beaucoup de malades que lenr
situation et le manque de transport ne permettent point d'em·
mener, Je ne ferai oopendant mOll mOu\'ement que proA"ressil-e.
mcnt, et jo ne ncgligerai aueun soin pour qu'il ne reste en arriere
lien do 00 qui pent l!tl'e utile a,1'armee,
Je De pUIS encore alllIDrer que je no ferai cc motl'Vement par
Toledo, car du moment qu'il sera. eutl'c:l!ris je sCl'lli suivi p&l'
60,000 eDnemis qui BC joindront aM diviSIOns que lord 'Velling.
ton aura deja po~es sur le Tag-e. Aiuai i1 cst possible que je
me dirige par Morcie SUI' Valencesuivll.nt cc que j'npprendrai, DU
lea nouveaux ordrea que je rCllevrai dll rei.
Dans oot Ctat do choses, je ne puis diasimuler aV, E, que je
regarde 1'6~uationde I'Espagne au moins jusqu'it. I'Ebre oomme
decidee du moment que le rei w'ordonna. d'c\"ll(:uer l'Andalousie
et me diriger sur Tollde, car il est bien certain qu'il ne sera pas
possible de rester en position sur le Tal\'c ni clnns les Castilles, et
que dh-Iors les oonquiltes des armes Unpcria1es en Espagne dout
I'empereur avait ordonne h conservation, sont sacrifi~es,
A ce sujet je ne puis me dMendre de r6fleohir sur d'autres
6vcnemens qni so pssscnt. .J'ai In dlUls lea )ournau:t de Cadiz
que J'nmbllSSsdem du rei en Russio Rvait jomt l'annoo Russe,
que le roi ILvait fait des insimlations an gouvenlement insurgent
de C(l(}iz, que In SliMe avait fait un traiw S.VCll l'Angleterre, et
Que le prince hOrCditairo ll.vait demand6 a la regence de Cadiz
:!so Espllgnols pour sa g-ardc pol'S{lncl1c, (Avant hier un parle-
mentaire quo 10 gCll6ral Scmcle nvuit envoy6 n. l'caeadro AnglaislI
pour r&:lamer des prillolllliel'll, resta pendant quclques instans a
bord de l'amira1, lequel lui montra une fregllte, qui, dit i1. est
destill6e a porter en Angleterre et eusuite en Suedo les 2.50
Espagnols.!.lue le ,Prince Jkrlladotte deUUUlde pour Sll. A'arde per.
sODelle.) Eufin j n.i. vu d.aus les mlimea 'ourualU: que Moreau, et
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Dlucher ~taient ruriv~s 8. Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-
camp de Moreau, etait a. Londres. Je ne tire aucune conSt!-
qucnce de tous ces faits, mais fen semi plus attentif. Oeycndant
j'ai crn devoir deposer mes craintes entre les mains de SIX i!:en~.
raUI: do l'armee, aprea avoir exilt<l d'eux le sel'ment qu'ils ne
rCv61eront ce que je 1eur ai dit qu'a I'empereur 1ui-mtlme ou aux
penonnell que S.M. aura speeilLlement d6leguees pour en rC<fCvoir
la deelaratJon, si auparavllnt je ne puis ll\oi-m&me en rendre
comte. 11 est pourtant de mon devoir d.ema.nifcstcr a. V. E. quo
je crains que le hut de tOUtell les fau8J!es dispositions que 1'00 a
prises et celui des intrigues qui ont lieu, ne soient de forcer les
Il.rmees imllCrialcs qui sont en Espagne i\. repllllser 1IU moins
I'Ebre, et ensuite de presenter oot evenement commc l'unique
l'eS~llrce (expression du roi, lettre du 20 Juillet) d&ns l'espe-
ranee d'en profiter par quelque arranj!;ement.
Mes craintcs sont pcut.(ltre mat fondees, mais en pareille situa_
tion il vaut mieux lee pou9ser 8. l'extremiM que d'ctre n6gli<rcnt,
d'au(ant plus ~ue ces I'raintes et ms sollicitude toument aubien
du service de I cmpereur, et nla suret6 de l'arm6e dout le com·
llllLndemcnt m'est oonfi6.
J'ai I'holl.Ocur de prier V. E. de vouloir hien si roa lot-tro lui
parvient-, la mettre le plutot possible sous les you de l'empercur
cL d'll8~urer S. M. que mOL et son llrmell du midi serolUl toujours
dlg-nes de S& suprome conlillnce, Je de~irc bien \'il'tlment que
Y . .E. puisse me faire Sll.\'oir que mes dc~eheslui sOnt pancnUCS
ct llurt.<mL· rccevoir pur die les ordres du Sll. mlljcllW.
J'ail'honucur, &1J.
(Sigue)
No. XII.
SIRE,-Je suis arrive aParis hior 21 du courant. Je me Buis
Bur le ohamp presoll.t~ che.;: le ministre de la !':uerre et jo Ini at
romis la. lettre de V. M. ainsi que cellos de l\f. le mar6e!Jal
JOllrdan. S. E, m'a qucstioll.ne Bur ICB IIffiliroB d'Espa~nc, mais
sans me demander mes flcp6ches pour l'emperenr. ]~l1e m'a,
8uintntlos intentions de V. M., ponM'll des ordres dont fai be80in
pour POUl'SUlVre roa route llVCC oC16rit6.
Cc roatin le ministre m'a fait appilcr ct .j"ni ell llVeo lui une
IODgue oonf6rcncc. II m'o. prcsse do lll'cxphquer aveo frnMh.ise
11111' 00 que j'ayais pu remarquer pendant mon wjour en A.nda.-
Joullie, m'a 16moign6 quelquc inquulludll Bur l'influcll.ct;I que pou-
voit exereer le lIIarkhal t.aut Bur l'armee que Bur les aULol'itell
civiles. D II rnppeJe les iutri~ueB de Portugal et a oonclu en me
disall.t qu'il d6pouillait devull.t moi le caracte-re de ministre pour
causer avec un homme de volTe ooufiance, et que Jes services
que vous Ini IIviez rendlli! a l'epoque de sa. di8J:("rAcc devaient Atre
pour V. M. une garantie dn desir qu'i!llvait d'sgir suivant se.
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intcntlons. Quelque franches Gue m'aieut parua CCll oUVerlUI"C8
je n'ni pas crn dc\'oir parler do la pudio la plus d6hcaw de m&
mission. J'ai Bculcmont rESpondu quo l'anm~c dn midi setai
toujours 00110 do l'empercur, que I01'8qull S. M. cnvcrrait S08
ororoa determincs, die SCTuit oMio, et quo tout. ce que j':lvais
cntcudu en AndaloUllic no me laissllit 11. co sujct llucmn doute.
All redo ma convcrlllltion aveo le due de }'dtrc m'n prounl
qu'aucune lcttro do la nature de cello dont jll suil! portcur no Jui
ctait encore parvenue, et cola est pour mll mission uno circon·
8tnnce fa'l'"orll.blc.
J'ai causo avco S. E. de la resisbnce que loa chefs do 1's.nn6e
Fran~8c en Lspagno amicnt wujollrs opJ;'osce aUI ordres de
Y. M. IJ a decJar-6 que tOll8 H."niont ell! nUll SOUll "08 ordres el
SUDS aucuna restriction, qu'al'ant son depart l'empereur aVait
tellloi,\ue sou etollllomellt tiur les douws qUlllllallil1:.alaicnt acet
egllrd ea lettres de Y. M. et qu'il uvaiL ordollllo que I'oll lit 0011-
naitre ses illtenLions d'uno) lllunicre encore pllli! positive, J'ai
cilola lettro oll le lllllr&:hal Suchtlt B'autori~e d'uuo phrase dn
prince de Noufchiltel, c('lIes dll /{ellcral Donellne et du ~6nerlll
Calfarelli, il parait que to1l81c~ ouslaclt.'S qui poUl'ailHlt elllrllvor
l'execuliOll de vos ordres ont el.e lcves par des instructiODs
adressees postt'irienrelllent nux gcnenlUx en cItef, QUfl.llt a. la
desobeiSSlllwe formelle du marechal Soult S, E, a dit u'"horu que
V. M. avait le droit de lui Oter le commundmllent, mai!! elle est
eonvenue cllsuile qu'une demllrehe sClublubJo ne pouI'ait lltre
{aite que par l'ordre exprcs de I'emperour.
Le miDislro est aussi cntre clans queJgucs details sur les alfaires
militaires, les ordres donnes par V, .M, ct par 10 marcchal
Jouroan aux diverses epoques de la camragne, ont eu, m'a-t-il
dit, l'aVprobatiou gcncrule et cc qU'1I cent 'ompereur, depuis qu'iI
a IIpprlS la bataille de Salamanqlle, prouve qu'il donne entiero.
ment droit a. V. M. L'opinioll llllblique a cot egllrd est encore
plus prononcee quo eelle de" hommes en place, et je ne puis
oxpnmer it. V. M. 111'00 queUe rigueur !ont juges on Franco le3
mar&haux Soult et MaMnont.
Le due de Feltro m'll. parM du mouvement aur DllI8co Sfmcho.
Ponl;.Ctro, a.t.il dit, }'cmpcrcllr reprochera un pcn d'hcsitation;
execute dell:'\: jOllrs piutQt illlurait IlrOduit les plus hCllrellx elfct9;.
V. M. ao rappeUc que j'avaia pr4SvlI cctto objection etje ne 8Crai
point cmbllrrass4S pour"j ropondrc.
S. E, a ern quo j'allals uuprl!8 do rompeNur'~ur 8011icirer do
nouveaux renforts; ello m'a dit quo la gucrrc de Itu88ie avait
jusqu·o. prescnt absorM tous los mOJona, qu'il6tait loin do POIl-
'-Olr cnvoycr les troupes sur Jcsqucllc.s pllraissllit comptcr M. le
murechlll Jourdan, que I'on pourrait BcuIllllll.mt pouyoir 0. (a perre
mntCricIlo f!lite par l'arm6e do Portugal. II pll.rait que les nou-
volles troupes envoy60s on Espagno ne s'e16vont pas uu·delo. de
"ingt mille hOllulles, au rest<! la grande vieloire n>mpor\.lle I'II.I'
l'emperour f01'1I probablclUent prendre dell dispositiolls I,lus fave-
rabies IIUX; IIlfairCll de la Peniusule.
Le due de Fdtre a. r09u des Ilouvolles dll general ClaU201.
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Ce general anMnC8 que l'a.rmoo Anglaise marche vers le nord,
que lord \Vellinll:ton s'est de sa personno port6 vers le Duero,
que l'arm~e del Portugal s'est ralhee, que 8e8 perte~ sont beau-
coup moindres qu'on ne l'a\'ait eru, que le ~6nernl Foy a..-ait fait
\Ill mouvement pour dClivrer Aator/.{a et fordeail\a.<i, mais que
deja ces deu;'!: places s'Hllient rcndues, que l'on pourrait accuser
de flliblesl!e les deux gouverncurs et que peut-ttre la oonduito
de eelui de Tordesillall de\'l~it Ctre jugee plus scverement encore.
J·o.i Illlr16 Rll ministre de Ill. position ('mbnrrnsSlIllte dalls laquclle
me mettllit le d6crct du 26 Aout, illl. r6pondu qne je pOllvais sans
incoU\'6nient me presenter arcmporcur 11\'00 les dEcorations du
grado que m'adonnc V. M., que cc n'6tllit pointcontre les officiers
/l, votre sllrvieo que le dCeret II.vait ct~ dirig6, et qu'il seTlLit modilM
en leuT f,wenT.
J'ai l'honnour de prevenir V. M. quo jo pnrtirai co soir de
Paris, /'0 poursuivrlli llllUS m'lIr~ter ma route jusqu·lI.l1 qUllrtier
g6n6ra de rcmpcreur.
J'ui 1'llOnneur de mottro om:: picds do V. M. I'hommo.go de
mon profond respect cL de mon entier del"ouoment.
(Sign6) LlI COLO:illL DES1'lIllS.
Pam, 22 &ptqmbro, 1812.
No. XIII. A.
Lettro wlIfulentielle tcnk au roi par mo1Uieur le due de
Feltre.
Paris, 10 NovembrtJ, 1812.
SIRE,-La.let1J'e chiff'ree q\le V. M. m'a ecrite de lkqucila le
18 Octobre, m'est psrfenue il r lI. qucljues JOUN, et je I'al sur le
champ transmiso al'cmperouT qui 00 ll. roce..-m t.cute fois que
19 jours aprcs 10 dl!patt do ootte m~me 1ctt1'6 de PilriS. A III
diatance ou l'ompercur se trouvc de so. cllpitnle, il est dcs C1\08e8
Bur IcsqucllC8 Ill. politiqUCl fureo iI fermer Jell youx: dll moins
momcutauemont. Si la conduito do monsieur 10 maroehal duo
do Dalmatie esl Loquivoquo ot clLuteJouse, si sca d6mlU'ehcs pre-
senteot la mt\me Ilspeet quo colles qu'il parott lLVOir faites et qui
ont precede l'llbandon du Portugal apr1Js JIl pnse d'Oporto, il
vioudra uu monltmt ou l'empcreur pourra. I'en punir s'illo }.uge
cool'enable, et peutCtre cst-it moills dan~erl'Ux ou il est qu il uo
10 serait iei, ouq,uelques factieux: ontpu du seiu m~me des pnsoIUI
qui les renfermalent, mt:diter en I'abscnce de l'emperourunert!..-o-
lution contre l'omllCreur et sa dynastic, ct presque l'ex&mt.er,
le 2 et 3 Ocwbro de'rnier. Je penSe donll, sire, qu'jJ est prudent
de ne pM pousser il. bout le mardchal due de DlIlmlltlc, tout en
oonll'll.riont sous mnin lea d~mnrchos ombiticuses qu'il pourroit
tentcr, et en S'llS8urnnt do III fideliul des prineipau:< offieiers de
l'armoe du midi CllvcrB l'emperllur et m~m6de celle deB Esp8gnols
qu'il tmine 11 58 suile. L'aTllle du ridicule qu'il est facilade manicr
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en cetoo oeCRBion 81lffira, ee me semble, pour d6jonersell COUPllbJU
projeta s'm existent, et le ramener a. son devoir, sauf a. faire pren_
dre par la suite des precautions pOur <su'iluc s'eu ~arte jllmais.
Quoiqu'il en wit je suis inoontestablcment dans la necessit<!
d'attcndre les ordrcs de l'empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de
V. M. datee de nequefia le 18 Oct. Rile yoit par la presente
que je partaRe ses sentimeus sur J'objet clout elletrllite; je viens
cl'titre a8sezlieureux pour donner a l'empereur et il. s& famille de
Muvellts prcuvcs de mll fidelit6 et de mOD attllehement, et je SIDS
wure que si V. M. connait Je~ details de mll, oonduite le 2 et:)
Octobre, cIle la trouvera confonne IIUX sentimeus qne je me sui!
fait un plaisix de lui exprimer en Cavenr de l'cmpc.reur et de sa
famille all moment on j'ai prill CODge de V. M. 8. Luneville i1 y a
quelques IlnneeS, &e. &e.
Nou.-It is only nceess/l7 to /ldd to this letter t111..t notwith.
st8ndin~ the duke of Feltro B profl',/lsions of attachment he was
BOOn al'k!rwards onc of the most zealous courticrs of the Bourbons
and ili" mO<!t bitter enemy of thc emperor.
'The constancy with wInch the duke of Dalmutia served that
great man ill well known.
No. XIII. B.
Cokmtl IJuprez to the king.
Paris, 3 JamJiet', HU3.
Sn:B,-J'ai en l'honneur d'annoneer It. V. M. mon arrin'ie a.
Paris. Mais fai dll en me SCITant de la voie de l'estafctte user
d'une extreme discretion. Ls. reine m'ayant conscill6 de vous
eenre avee quelque detail, et arantd:l.iQ;ne m'oifrir de fnirepartir
ma lettre par le premier conner qu'elle exp&lierait, fen profhe
pour :rcndre compte 8. V. M. de ma mill!lion et lui faire connaitre
une partie dea evenemena dont fai eM Mmoin.
Je suislUTive a. MOBeou 10 180etobro au soir. L'empereur
venait d'apprendrc que ravant ~lIrde commandee pill' le roi do
Naples avaltet6 attaquee et foreee ala Termite avee une panic de
Mn artiIJerie. Deja le depart elait rCsolu et les troupes se met·
taient en mouvemcnt. On m'annon9a a. S. M. qui repondit
d'llbord d'une maniere peu favorablc. Cependant 311 milieu de la
nuiton me fit appeler. Je remis al'empercur les depechcs dont
V. :M. m'avllit eharg,c, et Bflll~ lea O\lvrir, il me quesnonnfl. sur
lellr contenu. PIlis I1 tit sur Jes op~mtiolls de Ill. campagno uno
pal'tie des objectioulI qu'a\'ait prcvuca V. M.
n dit que le monvement en favour dl' I'annce de Portugal avait
l'iM commenoo trop taN!, qll'il aurnit llU Ctre fhit un mois plutOt~
que lui·m~mo fl,valtdatC Ill. conduite i\ tenir dnn~ ootte tiroonsflJ.noo
lonqu'clD 1808 il al'"uit en.ns hesitcr quitl6 :Madrid pour marcher
aux Ang-lnis qui s'etniont nvnnccsjusqu'n. Vnlllldolid. Je ropondis
que Y. M. a'etait millo en marcho pen d'Leures npfes la division
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Palombini, qu'elle avait dft attendl'e eette division pour eonduire
verB l'arm6e de Portugal un rcnfort tcl quo le suceh nCllUt litre
domeux; qu'ello aVllJ.t d'fLutllnt moina cm dovoil' pr6cipltel' son
mouvement, quo M, le IDa.r6chal Murmout avait 6erit pLusieurs
fois qu'il so croyllit trop faible pour lutter seul OOntrel'lIrnl~e
Anglaise, que 00 mo.rCehalllyuit etC rnllltro du terns, qu'il n'llvuit
point lite bllttu dans sa position sur III Duero, lUllLs bien sur un
champ de bataille dans lequel rien ne l'avait {oroo de s'cngager.
L'emperellr pretctldit ellsuiw quo V. M, aprl!s avoir appris la
perle de la ba(.aiJIe de Sulamauque aurait dft sc porter snr le
Duero et rallier I'armce de Portugal. Je mppelai alorsle mouvc-
llicut fait du Guadarama \'C1"8 SCgovie et la position critique dallS
laquelle 1'0118 avcz laisse la due de Rag-use 'lui avait lui-mllme
propose cc mouvemcnt. L'empcrenr dit qu il CQnna.i!lsait tres
bien tOIU les rcproehes qu'a.cet egard on pouvait faire au marechal
Marmont. 11 ajouta que l'arml5e du centre ayant fait sa retraitc
sur Madrid elle aurait du garder plUll lon!,riems les defiles du
Guadarama, qlt'On avait trop tOt passe le Tage, 9uc du moms ce
mouvemcnt a.xant eM resolu, il falJait ne JX!int lalsser de gll.rnigon
all Retiro, bnser tous lcs a£l'uts, emporter Its aigles et bru1e1' les
eff'ets d'habilJement; qu'il n'avait jamttis considerc C6 poste que
commc propre aconteuir la population de MMl'id, que l'ennemi
cront mnitre de la ea.mpngnc, on dovait l'abandonucr et quc do
routes les fa.utcs de la. campagne o'etait celle qn'il avait le moius
eonljM, Je repondis? cctte objection ainsi que j'en 6taia con-
venu avco V. M. L'ompcrcur en venant onsuite 0. la lettre du
due de Dalmatie me dit qU'clle lui etait dejA parvenue par uuo
autre voie, muis 1u'il n'y llvuit attache aucuue importanoo; que 10
marochnl SouLt 8 etait trompe, qu'il ne pouvait 8'occupcr de wm-
blaMes pauvreUs dans uu mOUlllnt oit il ~tait a la Ute de ci'llq
cent miUe /wmmu et faisait des c/w8(;$ im1MlU~iI. Co !!Ont se~
expressions, qu'au reste les soup<;ons du due de Dalmatie ne
I'Honnaicut que faiblement; gue beallcoup de g<'5ncl'aux de
l'armee d'Espaj;'ne les partagClUcnt et peusalent que V, M. pre.
femit l'Espagno a. la FrhnCIl; q~'il slll'ait parfaitcment qu'elle
avait le cceUl' Fralll;oLs maLs que CIlUX qui la jugeaietlt par 869
diseoun devaient a.'oir uno autre opinion. n ajoutll que le
marccbal SouIt tltait la seuIe Mte militaire qu'it cut eu E9pall'nC,
qu'il De pouvllit l'en retirer sans oompromettre I'armee, que d'ail-
leunl il devait, Hre parfaitcment tranquille S1l1' scs intention~
fnisqu'il vcm~it d'apprendre pal' Icsjollnmux Anglais qu'ilc\'IlOlInit'.'\ndalollsie et 8C rCllnisaait au" nrlllces du centre et d'ArllgOl1,
qUll cetto reunion opcreo on dcvait Hre asseT. en force pour
rq>rendro l'offonsivo; 9ue d'nillcurs il n'o.vn.it point d'ordrcs i\
envo~'er, qu'il ne SlIV(l.lt point en donner de si Join, qu'il nc 8ll
dissilllulait Eoint 1'6ttmdue du mnl et qu'il te~roltlloit ~IUll que
jamais que V. AI. n'ait point swvi le oolueil quillui aVlut dOllUC
de ne pM retourner en ESpllglle; 1u'ilct.ait inutile queje tepaI'·
ti.s~o, que je resterai a. l'arml5e ou 'on m'emploieroit. J'insutn~
alors pour Hre renvoye RV. M. d'nDe manihe qui parut fair..
sur I'empereur quelque impression, et il £nit par ~e dire que je
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scrai crp&lie raais que je ne pouvais 1'I!tre dans ca moment,
qu'ayant b~soin de r~p~8 je r~sterai8 a. Mos~u, et que puisque
J'HIl.i8 Offi(Mt du g-emc, JC serata charge de dU'lger 80US 1cs ordres
du due de Trevise les travau:l et III dMcnse dll Kremlin, Je
r~us en oonsequence un ordre writ du prince de Neufchtel
Lorsqu'apr~sl'elltiereel"llcuation de Moscou le C01'P'l de M.lo M,
Mortler eut rejoint I'armec,je dcmandaict j'obtins d'y rester
attache jUgqu'a. cc que je fusse cxpedie. Jc craignais q,uc si je
restais au quarticr general on nc m'y designlit des fonctlOns qui
seraient un uouvd obstacle umon retour, Je pensai que peut..
I!tro on eviterait d'cnvoycr uV. M, UIl temoin dcs evenemens
qui se passaicnt, etje prMcrai att.endre qu'uueoccasion favorable
sc presentat. Etant arri\'c a. Wilna peu de telllil apl'h le depart
de l'empereur, je demaudai au duc de Bassano, et il me donna
l'autorisation de venir IIttendre des ordres8. Paris. J'llJ eu !'hou-
neur d'lIulloncer " V. M. dam un aut,re Icttre que l'altoSration de
ma. sante me foryait it suspelldre mon retour en E~pagne.
L'armee all moment 011 je la quittai Mait. dallS la plus aJJ'reuse
dHresse. Depuis longtems deja la. clesorganisatiou ct Ics pertes
etaient effraYl.Intes,l'artillerie et la cavalerie u'existaieut plus,
'foIlS les oorps etaient oonfoudus. Les soldats marchaien~ plHe.
m&le et ne 8Onj"aient I.\u':" prolonger IDaChinalemellt leur exis-tellce; quoique 'enneml fut sur nos fianes, chaque jour des
milliers d'hommes isoMs se repaudaient daDs les villages voisins
de la route et tombaieut danales mains des Cosaquea. Cependant
qllclq:uc grand que soit le nombre des prisoulliers, eelui des morts
fest lDcomparablcment davantago. n est impossible de peindre
jUSlJu'a quel point la disetle a'est fait scntir pendant plus d'nu
m018; il n'y cut point do distributions; les chevaux morts ctaieut
l!lo sewe ressource, et biell aouI'ent les marechauJ: mllmea man-
qU!lient de pain. La rigueur du climat rendait la disetUl plus
meurtrihc, chaque nuit nous laissions au bivouac plU!ieur/I
eentainCll de mortS. Je crais ponvoir sans en.g6rer porter 1i.eent
milia le nombre qu'on a rerdn aiusi, et peindre avee MSC:/; de
v6rlM la situation des choses ell disant que l'armec est morte: la
!.eune gardo qui faisait partie dn corps lIuqucl j'etais attacM eiaitorto de 8000 hommes lorsqlla DOUS avons quitte Mosoou, a. Virilna
cUe en comptait 1i. peine quat,re cents, Tona les autres corps
d'armce scnt r&luits duna1a rncrne proportion, et la retmite ayant
dli se prolonger III1·dela du :Kiemcn, jo suis convaincu que vingt
milla hommes n'auront pM attcint/l la Vislule. On croyait 3
l'armee que beaucolIl;' de 80ldats anient pris 1esdevants et qu'ila
se ralliernient lor~qu on pouITait 811spcndre le mou.ernent retro-
grade. Je me /luis aMllre dll contrairo; a. cinq lieuell dn quartier
general, je ne renOOlltrai plus d'hommcs iso,tSa et je CQnnus bion
/lION la profondenr de la plaie. Uno phrtll!C pourrnit donner 3
V, hr. uno id6c do 1'6tllt dcs chos08, depuisle ,PlI8SlIge dn Niemen
un ool'ps do 800 NIIJlolitollius, 10 scul corps qlll O1U oonllCrvc jucl-
que oonsistlUlcc, faisait I'arri~ro gllrdo d'UIlo =60 FranrrWse, orto
n'a ~Credo trois ccnte mille hOmIIIC8. n est impossible d'oxprimer
jUBqu'lL quel point 10 d680rdro t5tai~ eontagioux; lcs oorps reuni.ll
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dell dues de Dcllune et de Jlcg~io comptaicnt 30,000 hemmcs
all. pas5a~re de la BeresiulI, deux joun aprea ils et:~iont dissous
eomme le reste de farmce, Em'oyer de8 renforts e'etait au~.
meutor 105 pertes, et I'on reoonuut enfin qu'il fallmt em~chcr les
troupes neuves d{l so mettre en contact avec wtto multit.ude en
desordre it laquelle on ne peut plus donner 10 nom d'llorm&!. L6
rei de Naples diaait hlloutomcnt qu'eu lui Iais5llont le commande_
mout l'eml)(lreur avait exig-c le plus grand sacrifice qu'il put
attendre do son dOI·ouement. Les forcea phflli9ue3 et morales
dn prince de Neufchiltel 6t,aient entihcment epul~e8. Si main-
tenlLllt V. :M, me demlUldait quel doit Mre 10 tonno dll mouve-
meut retrograde, je Ini repondrnis que l'e.nncmi est maitre de le
fixer. Je ne creill pas que lea Pruuicns fauent de g-randa efl'om
pour dt.1fendre leur tcrritcire. M. do Nllrbonne que j"ai vu a.
Berlin et qui 6bit charg6 de lettres do l'ompereur pour c rei do
PrU5Se, m'o dit (11lC les dispositions de cc prince et do son premier
ministrc Ctaient fnvorables, mnis il no se diuimulait p89 que celles
do la llntion no sont pus les m~mes. Dcj1l. plusienTS rixcs8'~tnicnt
engagcos entro les habitulls do Berlin otdes soldata de Ill.gllornison
PronQaise; et Oil travcrsnnt.la Pru;:se j'ni en lien de m'/l.88nrer
que I'on no poul'uit g-ucrc comptcr sur cetto nllico de nouvcllo
dnto,
D portlit llussi que dnnsl'armee Autriehicnnc lea officiors doom.
muieut publjquemeu~ oonll'1l Ill. g-uorro.
Qllcl trisw quo soit cc tableau, jc erois l'nvoir point sans
llxag~ration et l'avoir ob~llrvo de sail.!:' froid. 1lfon opinion sur
l'6tcndUll dn mal est la m(lme que loreqne j'etaia plus voisin du
theatre.
No. XIV.
Ghiurt, k 2 Septemlm:, 1812.
AfoNsuroa LE Due DE F'ELTIl.E,-J'ai reQu le rapport du due de
Rugnse sur la bata.ille du 22. n est impossible de rien lire de
plus iusignifinnt: il y n. plus de fnt.ra.s et plus de rou/lKes que dans
une horlor'e, et pas un mot qui f(me oonuaHre 1'61n.t riel des
chosea. V'eici mn maniere de "oir sur eotte affaire, et la eonduite
que voua dCI'm: tenir, Vous attcndrcz que le due de Raftuse Boit
arriv6, qU'il80it remis de sa blessurc, et i\-pcu-pres entlhcment
retabli. VOllS lui dcmnndilrllz :1.Iors de r6pondre e,'J,t6goriquement
n oos questions. Pourquoi ll.·t·i1livr,j batnille sans fes ordrcs dc
son g6n~ral.ell-chofP 1'0utquoi n'a,.l-il pas pris des ordrcs sur
le parti qu'il dcvoit suivre, suuorUonnti all s)'sUlme gCll6ral StU"
mea armoos d'EspagneP n y ll.mun r:rime d'jll8JfQordinatioll- qllL
cat la cause de tous lcs mallIeurs de ceUe afl'aire, et quaod m8lue
il n'eut pas 6te dans l'obliA'ation de ae mettre en communication
ll.vee 1I0D. general.en_ehefpour exkuter les ordres qu'il en recevrait,
comment a·t-il pu sortir de aa dMensive sur le Duero, loraque,
SallS un grand efl'ort d'imagination, il etoit facile de ooucevoir
qu'il pouvoit litre S6COUru par l'arriv6e de la diviaion de dragons,
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d'uno trcntnino de T'i~e8 do Oll.llan, et do plll.'l de 16 millo
bommcs do troupes Fmn(,lniscs qllo 10 roi llvoit dUll!! Ja. main? Et
comment J!Ollvoit il Bortir do In defensive '(}Om prendre I'offensive
gans attendre la reunion et 10 aocou1'll d'un corps do 15 a17 millo
hommes?
Le roi ll.voit 01'donn6 il.l'armce dll noTd d'cnvoycr Aa. cllvalerio
r.. son 80COUl'8i clle l!toit en mardHl. Le due do Rnguso J10
pouvoit l'iplOrer, pllisque cette cavalerie est arri"ce le soir de la
bataillo. De Salamanquo It, Bu'1.'Os il y IL bieD des marches.
Pourquoi n'n-t-il pas rctBrd6 de deux jOUTS pour avoir le !leCOlll'll
de eotto clwalcl'ic, qui lui Hoit si import.f\nto? Il fnudroit avair
uno explication SUT les raisons qui ont porW le duo do Rngustl 11.
no pas llttendre lea ordrcs de son gCJlcrll!·on·chef pour livrer
blLtaille Mug Ilttendre lea renforts que-le roi, comme commandant
llupcrieur do mes arm6e8 en ESpllgnC, pouvoit retire\" de l'nrm&l
du centre, de I'llrm6c de Valence et de I'Andlllousie. Le seul
ronda de l'nrmoe du centre fourniasoit 15 millo hommes de pied,
et 2500 ehev!l.ux, lesquels pouvoient ~tre rendus dans le meme
temps que 10 due de Rag-use faisoit battro son corps, et en
prcnant clans ses deux arm6cs, 10 roi pouvoit lui nmoncr 40 millo
Lommcs. El)lin 10 due de Hag-use anchant que 1500 chcv!l.uX
6toicnt pnrtis do Burgos pour le rcjoindro, comment no les a_toil
P!\.B attendua?
En faisant eoinllider CCB de\lX circoDstnnoos d'nvoir pris l'olTen.
sive sllllsl'ordrc de son g6ncral-en-chef et de ne pM avoil' rcto.rd6
la bntnillo do deux joura pour no pus rcoovoir 15.000 hommes
d·inftulwrio quo lui amelloit 10 roi, ot 1500 ehovauxde I'armcb du
nord, on est fonde 3 pellser que cc lnllr6chlll a cra.int que 10 rai
ne participe au SUCC~B de lu blltaille, et qu'il a. sacrill6 il, la vllnit6
la gloire de la plltrio Ilt J'nvlinlago de mOll service.
DOllnez ordre lIUX g6n6raux divisionnlllres d'cllvoJor les etats
do leurB pcrws. I1 eat inloMralJlc qU'OIl rondll des oomples faux
ot qU'Oll me dissilllule la vorM.
PrellCrivez au gcnoral CIll.uael, qui oommande l'armC>t1, d'cll'
Yo)'er la ~itUltiiOll avanl et aflres la bataille, Demandez ~galelllcnt
aux ('hef~ de l.,'{)rpij des siluallons CXIIC(.cS. FinalemclIt, YOU. ferez
oonnoitre au duc de Rll{;usll IlU temps opportun oombiClI je sws
indigno de la <:(luduito mexplicllblo qu'iJ a tOllue, en u'attendaut
pus deux jours que loa seoours de J'arm6e du centre et de l'lIrm6e
du uord le rejoig-Ilissent. J'lIttellds lI.\'ec impatiellce l'lI.rrivfe du
general aidc-de-ealllp du roi poUl' avoir des renaeig-Ilcmclls precis.
Cc qU'i111 6crit ne s4:'uilie pas grlllldc chose.
(Sig-uo) N.uOLBO:S-.
No. XV, A.
E:dractfrom 91!1leral &uham'lJ deljlutch to the minilJtw ofTJ:ur.
Brivie¥cu, 1n4 October, 1812.
FlIT votre lettre du 6 Oetobre vous m·annoncez que 10 due de
Dulmatie venait do rcWlir Bon armcc So Grenade ot aJaen, et que
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10 rei nlloit eo mottre incoeeamlllont on communication avec cc
rna.r6chal pour mlll'chor de concert sur :Madrid, En COnSCq\lCnCe
de cee mou\'emenaje resolus de marcher;, la. rencontre de I'ennemi,
et de le forcer a lever le siege de Bur~o8. Le 18 toute mall
arm~e se mit en rnouvement sur trois colonne~, et le 19 elle
oecupait les positions ainsi qu'il suit. La. droite a. Termino, 10
centre sur les heurours de Monastorio, et la gauche a. Villa
Eecuso la SoLana et Villa E~U80 la Sombria. I,ll. journce du :<0
devait litre celle du combat, 10Tsque je w,us 11. rinstant, adoux
beuree du matin, par un aide-de.camp, uuo lettre de 8. M. C.
qui m'ordonuc do ne point cnga,g-or d'aJJaire g6nerale. et d'attendro
quo pILr sos mancenvres lord 'Ve1lingtoll sait foroo d'c\'ll(:uer Sll
position do Burg08; ainsi il mo fuut renoncer 1. rous mes projet~,
et non sans un violent chl\lirin, cllr je pnis assuror V. E. que man
armeo ctait pllrfnitcment disposee, et que j'llurais pu eombattro
l'onnomi avoo nvantago. Cependant l'arm6e n'a des vivres 'J,uo
pour quatro )OUTB, et Acetto ef:1que, si lord Wellington n'cst pomt
en rotraite, JO scrai roro6 dol nttnqucr. ,T'entrc\'oi~moins dc peril
do marchcr en avant quo de ra~rader. Dans un instnnt 011 10
moral du soldnt commcnce ~ BO rafformir rout mouvemcnt en
arrillro prodnit 10 plUll mauvais cffct.
(Sign6) COIlTE SOUll.ur,
No. XV. B.
Extrarfsf1'l)1'1/, koo letfer, tMitten b!J fhedrtke ofFeUre to king
Joseph, dated Pari" Stll Oct. atul19th Nov. IS12.
On one of the lotters is the following note, in pencil, by tho
duke of , VeIlington. •Advantage ofEllfJli,h nerc'paperl.'
'SiRR,-J'fli 1'honnour d'adrcsllCr ei-joint a votre mlljC'ltf
quell\uos extraita dca journnux Anglais les plus reeents dont j'ai
choisl ee qui pourrnit Hro de qncIqne inMr~tdans le8 eireonstances
actuels.' .
'Slu:.-J'ai l'honnenr d'lldresser ci.joint i\. Y. 1f. plusieurs
extraits des journanx Anglais eontenlUlt queIquee faits utiles 011
int&ceeans i\. eoullaitre:
TheBo extraets taken from the Courior, Mornin~ Post, 'rimes,
Alfred, Statesman, and Morning Chronicle, contain minute details
upon the numbers, situation, and destinatiou of the Sicilian,
Spanish, and Anglo-Portugnesc armies, and the mNlt cud account
of the reinforcements Bent from Enj1;land. In fine, 11. complete
system of intelligence for tho enemy.
478 APPENDIX
No. XVI.
Ea:lNCt ofa lettet' from mllr&kal JOIlrdan to ooloncl Nopicr.
StMy IflUl Etick, 14. Janvicr, 182"J.
•Le 10 N O\'cmbrc, 1812. Lea armecs du midi, clu Portuga
et cln centro se trouvlI.icnt renuics sur IlL Torull,Js. YOllS cou-
lllIisst"z la position qu'oc-cupait l'arllJEJo des alMs. eouo position
l!.yaut et6 biclI rocounue. dans la jourucll dn 11, par le rQi,
ncoompa~llc dn duo de Dalmatie, de plusionrs gllueralU, et de
moi, je proposai de pas~cr la 'formes, gueablll prl!squ&parlout
entre VllJlI.-GonzlI.La ct Ruerla, et do nous porter Fdpidement sur
Cah'llrissa do Ariloa, qui ~o trouvait lIU ~1llltre de la li~ne des
cum.'mis. J'esperais que lord 'Vellinp;toll ne pourrnit cvitcr la
bll.taillo; et j'Clals d'avis quo IlOUS devious Cairo tous nos l.'(fort.s
poUf le forC<lr u.l'llCccplcr; mo f1aUallt qU'llveo ulIe lI.rmee de 80
milles hommcs, dont 10 milles de eavnlerie et 120 pieces de
canon,· nous ctions en ~tllt de rem porter un brilliant succh, sur
le m~me champ de bntaille oil quclqucs moiB avant nous nvions
cssuyc un revers.
'Le due de Dalmatie, n'etant pas de mon avis. proposa d'aner
passer le Torme8, iI. des gucs qu'j] avait reeOllllU8 ;1 dcux lieues
llU.desSIlS cl'Alba; ce partl Hait sans doutc plus prudent; mais il
avoit, suivllnt moi, l'inconn'nient que je \"ou!ll.lS Eh·iter. e'est.a,.
dire, qu'il laissait it. nos ad\'crsaires la facilit6 de se retirer sanl
combattro. Ccpcndant comme je n'ctais re\'Ctu d'aueua corn·
mandement, modis que le due de Dahnatie lwait sous ses ordres
lea deux tiers de l'al'mee, le roi Jugea. collvl.'nable d'adopter son
plan, et lui en ooo£a l'l.'xCeutioll; VOUB en eOnIlail!sez le resultat:
il fut!cl que je l'avaig pre\·u.
• Permettez moi, Monsieur, d'ajouter une reflexion. J1 me
semble que lord Wellington dcciM a bauro en retraire, aumit
da commencer al'opcrer le 14cme jour, ou noU8 franehimeg la
1'ormes. En ne se mett,ant en mouvcmeutque le 15, il se trouva
dans la. necessit6 de dMiler devant n011S pendant TIne partie de
lajourn&; et saM les rnauvais lems, et surtout MUll beaueoup
trop de eirconopwtion de notre c6le il eut peut-~tre couru quel.
quo dllllgcr.
'On n public que pendnnt leur retraiw lell allios ne pcrdireut
que 50 ou GO t.uos, 150 blcss6s, 170 prisonniers. D est, cepeudnnt,
ecrtD.i.n quo le nombrc de prisonuiers Anglaia, Portugaill, et
* These numbers are somewhat below thOile I have aasigned to tile
FTeneh army; my ea.leulatioll ,,'ll!I made from the ;mp"ri~ mullter-rolls,
but the difi'eren(l8 may be easilyacoounted lor by the length 01 tilDe
which elapsed when mllrWal Jourdan "'TQW this I~tter. llia uumbers
(lore evid{:ntl)' from memory, and probably he did not moon to include
the king'lI ~IU :wd Sjla.lliardll.
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E~~gnola, conduit. au quamer genlira! 0. Salamanque, {;toit. le
20 NO'fembre, de 3520:
The ju!tiee of the manIlal'1 opinion Il8 to lord Wellington
htlving lta-yed too long on the Tormea ill confirmed by the following
note of l\ eOllVClr8l1.tiou held with the duko of Wcilinjtton on the
lubject.
'Lord Wellin~nwould lla'fe foultllt the French on the oid
polition of the Al"lpiles in 1812 notwithAtlndffi; their SUDen,}r
llwnben, '.>ut he 8tared too 10Dg at Salamanca.' '
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